Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Safdarjung Hospital Clerical Staff ... vs Health on 9 April, 2026
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Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023
Court No. IV
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No. 1525/2023
Reserved on :- 17.03.2026
Pronounced on:- 09.04.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Anand S Khati, Member (A)
1. Safdarjung Hospital Clerical Staff Welfare Association
through its President, Sh. Charan Singh, aged 58 years,
S/o Sh. Dharam Singh, R/o D/9, Type-III, SJH Staff
Quarter, Kidwai Nagar West, Delhi - 110023.
2. Sh. Amit Tyagi, aged 35 years, S/o Sh. Surender
Tyagi, R/o F/9, Type-II, East Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi -
110023.
3. Sh. Rohit Dahiya, aged 30 years, S/o Sh. Rakesh
Kumar, R/o House No. 2354, Shivaji Market, Narela,
Delhi - 110040.
4. Sh. Deepak Kumar, aged about 33 years, S/o Sh.
Ashok Kumar, R/o B-11, Type-I, SJH Staff Quarter, East
Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi - 110023.
5. Vikas, S/o Sh. Darshan Singh, aged about 28 years,
R/o Mehlana, Sonepat - 131001.
...Applicants
(By Advocate: Mr. Amit Anand)
Versus
1. Union Of India Through The Secretary,
Ministry Of Health & Family Welfare,
Govt. Of India, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi - 110011.
2. The Secretary,
Department Of Expenditure,
Ministry Of Finance, North Block, New Delhi - 110001.
3. The Medical Superintendent,
VMMC & Safdarjung Hospital,
Ansari Nagar, New Delhi - 110029.
...Respondents
(By Advocates: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar with Mr. Harish Saini)
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Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023
Court No. IV
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) :
By way of the present Original Application, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:
"(i) quash and set aside the office order 15.05.2023, Office Memorandum dated 21.04.2023, order dated 29.03.2023 (Annexure-A-1) to the extent that the same may not be applicable to ministerial staff working in Hospital;
(ii) to continue and restore the payment of PCA/HPCA;
(iii) to grant consequential arrears from the date the same has been stopped qua the applicants herein;
(iv) direct the respondents to pay costs to the applicants herein;
(iv). Pass such other further order(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the present OA has been preferred by the applicants challenging the arbitrary and illegal action of the respondents in abruptly stopping the payment of HPCA/PCA to the ministerial staff, despite the fact that such allowance had been duly granted and recognized under the applicable Government policy and gazette notification.
2.1. Learned counsel argued that the applicants, being ministerial staff working in hospital settings, are continuously exposed to the same risk of infection as doctors, nurses, and paramedical staff, as they function ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 3 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV in close proximity with patients and handle registration, coordination, and administrative processes integral to patient care.
2.2. The learned counsel emphasized that the nature of duties and the working environment, and not the classification of posts or pay scales, is the determining factor for grant of HPCA/PCA, as consistently upheld in a catena of judgments including those affirmed up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
2.3. Learned counsel contended that mere upgradation of pay scales pursuant to the 6th or 7th CPC does not eliminate the inherent risk of infection faced by the applicants. Learned counsel added that the impugned action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as it creates an unreasonable classification among similarly situated employees exposed to identical risks. 2.4. Learned counsel highlighted that no show cause notice or opportunity of hearing was granted before stopping the allowance, thereby violating principles of natural justice. Additionally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the applicants were treated as frontline workers, with their leave cancelled and many of them contracting the infection due to their duties, which further establishes their entitlement. ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 4 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV 2.5. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that even the recommendations of the 7th Pay Commission restricting HPCA were not accepted by the Government (CCEA), and ministerial staff continued to be eligible. Therefore, in absence of any amendment or withdrawal of the governing notification, the respondents could not have discontinued the allowance. Hence, the present OA has been filed seeking restoration of HPCA/PCA, quashing of the impugned action, and appropriate reliefs in accordance with law.
2.6. Learned counsel for the applicant fairly pointed out that a decision has been rendered by the Single Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 4105/2023, wherein, in paragraphs 21 to 25, it has been observed as under:
"21. The factual matrix as was in case of Joint Forum of Medical Technologist of India (supra), Surender Pal Singh (supra) was related to grant of HPCA/PCA to non-ministerial staff being in primary duties of continuous contact with patients/materials involving infection with communicable diseases. Applicants in present case are ministerial staff and also failed to show nature of primary duties being of such that they are in continuous contact with infected patients/material with communicable diseases whereas as per eligibility criteria in OMs, contact of occasional nature does not make employees entitled to receive HPCA/PCA. There is no parity of applicants at par with primary duties of employees in case of Joint Forum of Medical Technologist of India (supra), Surender Pal Singh (supra) and the ratio laid down in the said cases not at all applicable in present case and there is noorder/OM/instructions to grant HPCA/PCA staff/applicants and relief sought cannot be granted. to ministerial CONCLUSION ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 5 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV
22. This Tribunal has already analyzed in detail the issue and in light of aforesaid analysis, the issue is decided against the applicants and in favour of the respondents and the applicants are not held entitled for HPCA/PCA and the impugned OM dated 21.04.2023 (Annexure A-1) is upheld and the applicants are not held entitled for grant of HPCA/PCA.
23. The Original Application is bereft of merit and accordingly standa dismissed.
24. There shall be no order as to costs.
25. As a sequel thereof, pending Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of."
2.7. On the other hand, in a later decision rendered in O.A. No. 181/2018, the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal observed as under:
"27. On a cumulative consideration of the pleadings, documents and judicial precedents, the following conclusions emerge: (1) The entitlement to HPCA/PCA under R1H3 flows from the Cabinet Resolution dated 06.07.2017, effective from 01.07.2017. (ii) The respondents had no authority to withhold HPCA/PCA from ministerial staff while implementing all other 7th CPC allowances. (iii) The OM dated 21.04.2023 is an executive instruction and cannot override the Cabinet- approved Notification; hence, it is illegal and inoperative qua the applicants. (iv) The provisional grant of HPCA from December 2022 by the Institute amounts to an admission of eligibility, and denial of arrears from 01.07.2017 is arbitrary. (v) Parity with similarly placed Central institutions further strengthens the applicants' claim.
28. Accordingly, this Tribunal holds that the decision of the respondents in stopping HPCA/PCA to ministerial staff is illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law. The impugned order dated 07.02.2018 (Annexure A-14) and the OM dated 21.04.2023 (Annexure A-18), insofar as they deny HPCA/PCA to the applicants, are set aside. The respondents are directed to grant HPCA/PCA to the applicants at R1H3 rates as per the 7th CPC with effect from 01.07.2017 and to pay all consequential arrears after adjusting the amount already paid (if any) within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Original Application is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs."
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 6 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the present OA is wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed, as the applicants have no legal entitlement to claim HPCA/PCA. 3.1. Learned counsel argued that, as per the consistent policy framework and guidelines issued vide letter dated 04.02.2004, HPCA/PCA has always been admissible only to Group C & D non-ministerial employees whose duties involve continuous and routine contact with patients or infected materials, and expressly excludes those whose exposure is merely occasional.
3.2. Learned counsel emphasized that no order was ever issued by the competent authority granting HPCA/PCA to ministerial staff, and therefore the applicants cannot claim continuation of a benefit which was never lawfully sanctioned.
3.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the 7th CPC recommendations, as accepted through resolution dated 06.07.2017, clearly intended to restrict the allowance only to such categories of employees who are in continuous patient contact, and any reference to ministerial staff therein was an apparent error which has been subsequently clarified and corrected through official memoranda dated 17.05.2018, 18.09.2019, and ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 7 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV finally 21.04.2023, directing discontinuation of HPCA/PCA to ministerial staff.
3.4. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the applicants, being engaged in clerical duties, do not satisfy the essential eligibility condition of continuous exposure, and at best have only incidental or occasional interaction with patients.
3.5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the action of discontinuation HPCA/PCA is in strict compliance with Government policy and does not violate any constitutional or legal right of the applicants. Therefore, in absence of any enforceable right and in view of the clear policy position, the present OA deserves to be dismissed.
3.6. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the respondents that office ID Note No. A- 27023/1/2018/E.II B/7th CPC/Pt. dated 06.04.2023 has not been challenged and, therefore, this Original Application should not be entertained. 3.7. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the respondents that, as is evident from the record, vide office communications dated 25.01.1988, 30.10.1988, 05.03.1990 and 04.04.2004, there existed a clear-cut policy for payment of HPCA to Group 'C' and 'D' non- ministerial employees working in hospitals/dispensaries ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 8 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV and organizations engaged therein. It was further submitted that the said policy position continued even pursuant to the implementation of the recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission vide Resolution dated 06.07.2017, albeit with certain modifications, including that ministerial staff would be considered for grant of HPCA/PCA only in accordance with the Risk and Hardship Matrix and subject to fulfillment of the prescribed eligibility criteria.
4. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the applicants, it is submitted that the applicants, being members of the ministerial cadre working in a hospital, are entitled to Hospital Patient Care Allowance (HPCA) as they are exposed to a disease-prone environment and remain in direct as well as indirect contact with patients while performing duties such as OPD/X-ray registration, mortuary work, and COVID-related assignments. Reliance is placed on the judgment of PV Gopinath, wherein it has been held that the entire hospital constitutes a disease environment. It is further submitted that these duties are duly supported by official letters, duty rosters, and ACR entries reflecting continuous interaction with the public, which have not been specifically rebutted by the respondents. The applicants also rely upon the judgment in UOI vs. Balbir ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 9 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV Singh Tur, as well as the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal, to contend that executive instructions cannot override a Cabinet-approved resolution or Pay Commission recommendations. It is argued that HPCA, which was earlier being granted, has been arbitrarily discontinued without issuance of any show cause notice, despite the Government having accepted the 7th CPC recommendations vide Resolution dated 06.07.2017 (Appendix 1 & 2) for continuation of HPCA to ministerial staff. The applicants further submit that the Office Memorandum dated 21.04.2023 and related instructions are legally unsustainable, especially when similar issues have already been adjudicated and the impugned action has been set aside by the Chandigarh Bench, and that the judgment in OA No. 4105/2023 of the Principal Bench is distinguishable on facts as, in the present case, the applicants have clearly established the nature of their duties involving patient interaction.
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record.
6. ANALYSIS :
"Now is the winter of our discontent Made glorious summer by this sun of York; And all the clouds that lour'd upon our house In the deep bosom of the ocean buried. Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths;
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 10 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV Our bruised arms hung up for monuments; Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings, Our dreadful marches to delightful measures. "
-Spoken by Duke of Gloucester -Richard III (by William Shakespeare (1564-1616) 6.1. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. G. C. Mandawar, 1955 (1) SCR 599, the Apex Court considered a challenge to different rates of dearness allowance fixed by the State Government as compared to the Central Government. The Hon'ble Court held that under Rule 44 of the Fundamental Rules, the grant of dearness allowance is purely a matter of discretion of the Government, and no Government servant has a vested or enforceable right to claim the same. Consequently, no writ can be issued to compel the State to grant such allowance. The Hon'ble Court further held that Article 14 does not permit comparison between policies or laws framed by different authorities, and merely because the Central Government grants a higher or different allowance, the same cannot be a ground to challenge the State's policy as discriminatory. It was thus held that the State Government is competent to fix different rates of allowance, and such action cannot be said to be violative of Article 14.
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 11 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV 6.2. In State Of H.P & Ors vs Rajesh Chander Sood Etc on 28.09.2016 (2016 (10) SCC 77), the Apex Court observed as under:
"58. We are of the considered view, that the principle of estoppel/promissory estoppel cannot be invoked at the hands of the respondent-employees, in the facts and circumstances of this case. It is not as if the rights which had accrued to the respondent-employees under the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1995 (under which the respondent- employees were governed, prior to their being governed by 'the 1999 Scheme') have in any manner been altered to their disadvantage. All that was taken away, and given up by the respondent- employees by way of foregoing the employer's contribution upto 31.3.1999 (including, the accrued interest thereon), by way of transfer to the corpus fund, was restored to the respondent-employees. All the respondent-employees, who have been deprived of their pensionary claims by the repeal notification dated 2.12.2004, would be entitled to all the rights which had accrued to them, under the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1995. It is therefore, not possible for us to accept, that the respondent-employees can be stated to have been made to irretrievably alter their position, to their detriment. Furthermore, all the corporate bodies (with which the respondent-employees, are engaged) are independent juristic entities, as held in State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha (supra). The mere fact, that the corporate bodies under reference, are fully controlled by the State Government, and the State Government is the ultimate authority to determine their conditions of service, under their Articles of Association, is inconsequential. Undoubtedly, the respondent- employees are not Government employees. The State Government, as a welfare measure, had ventured to honestly extend some post-retiral benefits to employees of such independent legal entities, on the mistaken belief, arising out of a miscalculation, that the same can be catered to, out of available resources. This measure was adopted by the State Government, not in its capacity as the employer of the respondent-employees, but as a welfare measure. When it became apparent, that the welfare measure extended by the State Government, could not be sustained as originally understood, the same was sought to be withdrawn. We are of the view that the principle invoked on behalf of the respondent-employees, cannot be applied in the facts of the present case, specially, in view of the decision in M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Meerut, AIR 2015 SC 901, wherein this Court held as under:-
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 12 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV "The first contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant was based on the decision rendered by this Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 41, wherefrom learned counsel invited our attention to the following observations:-
"20. Estoppel by conduct in modern times stands elucidated with the decisions of the English Courts in Pickard v. Sears, 1837 6 Ad. & El. 469, and its gradual elaboration until placement of its true principles by the Privy Council in the case of Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha, (1891-92) 19 IA 203, whereas earlier Lord Esher in the case of Seton Laing Co. v. Lafone, 1887 19 Q.B.D. 68, evolved three basic elements of the doctrine of Estoppel to it:
"Firstly, where a man makes a fraudulent misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to its true detriment: Secondly, another may be where a man makes a false statement negligently though without fraud and another person acts upon it: And thirdly, there may be circumstances under which, where a misrepresentation is made without fraud and without negligence, there may be an Estoppel."
Lord Shand, however, was pleased to add one further element to the effect that there may be statements made, which have induced other party to do that from which otherwise he would have abstained and which cannot properly be characterized as misrepresentation. In this context, reference may be made to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in the case of Craine v. Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1920 28 C.L.R. 305. Dixon, J. in his judgment in Grundt v. The Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines Pty. Ltd., 1938 59 C.L.R. 641, stated that:
"In measuring the detriment, or demonstrating its existence, one does not compare the position of the representee, before and after acting upon the representation, upon the assumption that the representation is to be regarded as true, the question of estoppel does not arise. It is only when the representor wished to disavow the assumption contained in his representation that an estoppel arises, and the question of detriment is considered, accordingly, in the light of the position which the representee would be in if the representor were allowed to disavow the truth of the representation."
(In this context see Spencer Bower and Turner:
Estoppel by Representation, 3rd Ed.). Lord ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 13 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV Denning also in the case of Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance Ltd., 1956 (3) All ER 905, appears to have subscribed to the view of Lord Dixon, J. pertaining to the test of 'detriment' to the effect as to whether it appears unjust or unequitable that the representator should now be allowed to resile from his representation, having regard to what the representee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the representation, in short, the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party who altered the situation upon the faith of it cannot complain. His complaint is that when afterwards the other party makes a different state of affairs, the basis of an assertion of right against him then, if it is allowed, his own original change of position will operate as a detriment, (vide Grundts: High Court of Australia (supra)).
21. Phipson on Evidence (Fourteenth Edn.) has the following to state as regards estoppels by conduct.
"Estoppels by conduct, or, as they are still sometimes called, estoppels by matter in pais, were anciently acts of notoriety not less solemn and formal than the execution of a deed, such as livery of seisin, entry, acceptance of an estate and the like, and whether a party had or had not concurred in an act of this sort was deemed a matter which there could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then the legal consequences followed (Lyon v. Reed, (1844) 13 M & W 285 (at p.
309). The doctrine has, however, in modern times, been extended so as to embrace practically any act or statement by a party which it would be unconscionable to permit him to deny. The rule has been authoritatively stated as follows: 'Where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief so as to alter this own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.' (Pickard v. Sears (supra)). And whatever a man's real intention may be, he is deemed to act willfully 'if he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true and believe that it was meant that he should act upon it.' (Freeman v. Cooke, 1848 (2) Exch. 654: at p. 663).
Where the conduct is negligent or consists wholly of omission, there must be a duty to the person misled (Mercantile Bank v. Central Bank, 1938 AC 287 at p. 304, and National Westminster Bank v. Barclays Bank International, 1975 Q.B. 654). This principle sits oddly with the rest of the law of estoppel, but it appears to ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 14 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV have been reaffirmed, at least by implication, by the House of Lords comparatively recently (Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings, (1977) AC 890). The explanation is no doubt that this aspect of estoppel is properly to be considered a part of the law relating to negligent representations, rather than estoppel properly so-called. If two people with the same source of information assert the same truth or agree to assert the same falsehood at the same time, neither can be estopped as against the other from asserting differently at another time (Square v. Square, 1935 P. 120)."
22. A bare perusal of the same would go to show that the issue of an estoppel by conduct can only be said to be available in the event of there being a precise and unambiguous representation and on that score a further question arises as to whether there was any unequivocal assurance prompting the assured to alter his position or status. The contextual facts however, depict otherwise. Annexure 2 to the application form for benefit of price protection contains an undertaking to the following effect:-
"We hereby undertake to refund to EEPC Rs... the amount paid to us in full or part thereof against our application for price protection. In terms of our application dated against exports made during... In case any particular declaration/certificate furnished by us against our above referred to claims are found to be incorrect or any excess payment is determine to have been made due to oversight/wrong calculation etc. at any time. We also undertake to refund the amount within 10 days of receipt of the notice asking for the refund, failing which the amount erroneously paid or paid in excess shall be recovered from or adjusted against any other claim for export benefits by EEPC or by the licensing authorities of CCI & C." and it is on this score it may be noted that in the event of there being a specific undertaking to refund for any amount erroneously paid or paid in excess (emphasis supplied), question of there being any estoppel in our view would not arise. In this context correspondence exchanged between the parties are rather significant. In particular letter dated 30.11.1990 from the Assistant Development Commissioner for Iron & Steel and the reply thereto dated 8.3.1991 which unmistakably record the factum of non-payment of JPC price." It is apparent from the factual position narrated above, that the original action of the State Government was bonafide, and for the ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 15 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV welfare of the respondent-employees. The State Government cannot be accused of having misrepresented to the respondent- employees in any manner. The provisions of 'the 1999 Scheme', clearly bring out, that the pension scheme would be self- financing, and would be administered from the corpus fund created out of the employer's contribution to their CPF account (alongwith the accrued interest thereon). When the above foundational basis for introducing the pension scheme, was found to be an incorrect determination/calculation, the same was withdrawn. In the above view of the matter, it would not be possible to infer, that the State Government, induced the respondent- employees, to move to 'the 1999 Scheme'. Accordingly, it would not be possible to apply the principle of estoppel/promissory estoppel, to the facts of the present case."
67. Another reason for us to conclude, that the action of the State Government was not discriminatory is, that despite having revoked 'the 1999 Scheme' through the notification dated 2.12.2004, the State Government had permitted such of the Government owned corporations in the State of Himachal Pradesh, which were not suffering any losses, to promote their own pension schemes, and to extend pensionary benefits to their employees, on an individual basis, in the same/similar fashion as had been attempted by the State Government, through 'the 1999 Scheme'. In the instant view of the matter also, we are of the opinion, that the action of the State Government cannot be assailed, on the ground of discrimination.
68. We shall now consider, whether the State Government which had introduced 'the 1999 Scheme', had the right to repeal the same. In answering the above issue, it needs to be consciously kept in mind, that the employees of corporate bodies, who were extended the benefits of 'the 1999 Scheme', as already noticed above, were not employees of the State Government. 'The 1999 Scheme' was, therefore, just a welfare scheme introduced by the State Government, with the object of ameliorating the financial condition of employees, who had rendered valuable service in State owned corporations. In order to logically appreciate the query posed, we may illustratively take into consideration a situation, wherein an organization similar to the one in which the respondent-employees were engaged, suffered such financial losses, as would make the sustenance of the organization itself, unviable. Can the employees of such an organization, raise a claim in law, that the corporate body be not ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 16 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV wound up, despite its financial unworkability? Just because, the resultant effect would be, that they would lose their jobs. The answer to the above query, has to be in the negative. The sustenance of the organization itself, is of paramount importance. The claim of employees, who have been engaged by the organization, to run the activities of the organization, is of secondary importance. If an organization does not remain financially viable, the same cannot be required to remain functional, only for the reason that its employees, are not adversely impacted. When and how a decision to wind up an organization is to be taken, is a policy decision. The decision to wind up a corporation may be based on several factors, including the nature of activities rendered by it. In a given organization, sometimes small losses may be sufficient to order its closure, as its activities may have no vital bearing on the residents of the State. Where, an organization is raised to support activities on which a large number of people in the State are dependent, the same may have to be sustained, despite the fact that there are substantial losses. The situations are unlimited. Each situation has to be regulated administratively, in terms of the policy of the State Government. Whether a corporate body can no longer be sustained, because its activities are no longer workable, practicable, useable, or effective, either for the State itself, or for the welfare of the residents of the State, is for the State Government to decide. Similarly, when and how much, is to be paid as wages (or allowances) to employees of an organization, is also a policy decision. So also, post- retiral benefits. All these issues fall in the realm of executive determination. No Court has any role therein. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, in our considered view, the conditions of service including wages, allowances and post-retiral benefits of employees of corporate bodies, will necessarily have to be determined administratively, on the basis of relevant factors. Financial viability is an important factor, in such consideration. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not possible for us to accept, the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent- employees, that the State Government should provide financial support for sustaining 'the 1999 Scheme', at least for such of the employees, who were engaged on or before the date of issuance of the repeal notification (- 4.12.2004). We would like to conclude the instant submission by recording, that the respondent- employees have not been able to make out a case, that the notification dated 2.12.2004, repealing 'the 1999 Scheme', was in any manner, capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed, and as such, we would further conclude, that the respondent-employees cannot be considered as being entitled, to any relief, through judicial process."
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 17 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV 6.3 In Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2023 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.8083 of 2022) titled The Union of India & Ors. Versus Rajib Khan & Ors.decided on 16.01.2023, the Apex Court held as under:
"4.1 The High Court has taken the view that the educational qualifications cannot be a ground for denial of Nursing Allowance at par with the Staff Nurse who can also be said to be an integral part of the nursing service in general. The view taken by the High Court is just contrary to the decisions of this Court in the case of Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited (supra), Pramod Kumar Sahoo (supra) and T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao (supra).
4.2 In the case of T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao (supra) it is observed by this Court that the classification of posts and determination of pay structure comes within the exclusive domain of the Executive and the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the wisdom of the Executive in prescribing certain pay structure and grade in a particular service. In the case before this Court, this Court upheld the different pay scales/pay structure based on different educational qualifications. It is observed and held that considering the educational qualifications prescribed for appointment to the post of Data Entry Operators, Grade B and the order assigning duties, the classification of Data Entry Operators in different grades, does not violate any right of equality guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution nor does it violate the constitutional protection against hostile or arbitrary discrimination.
4.3 In the case of Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that different educational qualification and experience prescribed for appointment can be a ground to have different pay scales/pay structures.
4.4 In the case of Pramod Kumar Sahoo (supra) it is observed and held that nature of work may be more or less the same but the scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. It is further held and observed that inequality of men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' to them. In the case before this Court, this Court upheld the classification based upon the higher educational qualification for grant of higher pay scale to ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 18 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV a trained person or a person possessing higher qualification.
5. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand the view taken by the High Court that the educational qualification cannot be a ground for denial of Nursing Allowance to the Nursing Assistants is unsustainable. In the present case the respective Nursing Assistants are being paid 'Hospital Patient Care Allowance'. The Nursing Assistants in the BSF neither have relevant experience for appointment as Staff Nurse nor they possess any educational qualification for appointment as Staff Nurse. Therefore, the case of Nursing Assistants cannot be compared with that of the Staff Nurses as both carry different educational qualification. Under the circumstances, the High Court has committed a serious error in holding and directing that the Nursing Assistants serving in the Assam Rifles/BSF are entitled to Nursing Allowance at par with the Staff Nurses."
6.4 In Dr.Solamon A. v. State of Kerala and Ors (SLP No. 3946/2023), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the AYUSH or Ayurvedic doctors, having regard to the qualitative distinction in the academic qualifications and the standard of imparting respective degree courses, cannot seek parity with medical doctors. 6.5 In Director, Central Plantation Crops ResearchInstitute, Kesaragod, and others Vs. M. Purushothaman, and other -Civil Appeal No. 885 of 1993 decided on 26th July 1994, AIR 1994 SC 2541, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :
"7. We are also afraid that the Tribunal is not right in including the HRA in the definition of wages. The Fundamental Rule 9 (21) (a) which is applicable to the respondents-employees defines "pay" as follows :-
"9 (21) (a) Pay means the amount drawn monthly by a Government servant as-
(i) the pay, other than special pay granted in view of his personal qualifications, which has been sanctioned for ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 19 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV a post held by him substantively or in an officiating capacity, or to which he is entitled by reason of his position in a cadre; and
(ii) overseas pay, special pay and personal pay; and
(iii) any other emoluments which may be specially classed as payby the President."
8. It is obvious from this definition that HRA is not part of "pay". Further, Fundamental Rule 44 defines "Compensatory Allowance" as follows :-
"F.R. 44. Compensatory allowance. Subject to the general rule that the amount of compensatory allowance should be so regulated that the allowance is not on the whole a source of profit to the recipient. the Central Government may grant such allowances to any Government servant under its control and may make rules prescribing their amounts and the conditions under which they may be drawn."
9. The HRA would be covered by the definition of Compensatory Allowance. It is compensation in lieu of accommodations. This definition itself further makes it clear that compensatory allowance is not to be used as a source of profit. It is given only to compensate for the amenities which are no available or provided to the employee. The moment, therefore, the amenities are provided or offered, the employee should cease to be in receipt of the compensation which is given for want of it. We wish the Tribunal had perused the definition of "pay" and "compensatory allowance" given in the FundamentalRules before pronouncing that the HRA is a part of the wages or pay and, therefore, cannot be disturbed."
6.6 In D. Peri Reddy And Ors. vs Govt. Of A.P., Finance And Planning, (1997(1)ALT721), the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the petitioners cannot demand the allowances claimed by them as of right and that they cannot compel the respondents to pay the said allowances by way of a writ of mandamus. But this does not preclude the government from granting the said allowances as a matter of policy if it so decides. ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 20 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV 6.7 Similarly, the HPCA/PCA is covered by the definition of Compensatory Allowance. It compensates for primary duties based on the Risk and Hardship Matrix. Compensatory allowance is not a source of profit. It is provided solely to compensate for amenities that are not available or supplied to the employee. Once amenities are provided or offered, the employee should no longer receive compensation given for their absence. 6.8 HPCA/PCA is duty-based, rather than post-based. Consequently, the duties of ministerial staff who engage in continuous and routine contact with patients or handle infected materials as part of their primary responsibilities require identification, as defined by the Risk and Hardship Matrix (introduced by the 7th Central Pay Commission).
6.9 It is settled law that all the employees who fulfill the eligibility conditions, as per the rules, form a homogeneous class [Refer: Union of India vs S.R. Dhingra, (2008) 2 SCC 229]; and identically situated individuals cannot be discriminated against with reference to the admissibility of the quantum of pay and allowances or the date from which such pay and allowances are admissible [Refer: Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586].
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 21 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV 6.10 In Civil Appeal Nos. 5185-5192 OF 2016 Union Of India & Others Versus Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees' Union And Another (2026 INSC 74) decided on 20.01.2026, the Apex Court held as under:
13. It was opined in the aforesaid judgment that the 1948 Act was enacted to guarantee occupational health, safety and physical well-being of the workers.
Exemptions as provided under Sections 64 and 65 of the 1948 Act were also discussed. Concessions provided therein were not applicable to Section 59 which prescribes payment of overtime wages. An interpretation which restricts or curtails benefits available to workers under the 1948 Act must be avoided. Chapter VI of the aforesaid Act intends to protect the workmen against exploitation.
14. Further, there was no answer to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the same provision of law is being interpreted differently by the Ministry of Railways, Government of India, where all the allowances are being included within the term, 'ordinary rate of wages' for the purpose of calculation of overtime wages. Relevant extract from the letter dated 20.05.2011 issued by the Ministry of Railway, Government of India, is reproduced herein below:
"The issue of revising the date of effect of OTA w.e.f. 01.01.2006 instead of 01.09.2008 (as communicated vide para 3 of Board's letter of even number dated 17.02.2010), as demanded vide item no.24/2010 in DC/JCM has been considered by the Board, it has now been decided to revise the date of effect OTA as 01.01.2006. It is however clarified that the basic pay and DA element for the purpose of OTA shall be revised w.e.f 01.01.2006 and other elements consulting emolument for the purpose of OTA viz HRA and Transport Allowance etc. shall be taken into account at revised at revised rates w.e.f 01.09.2008 as per the sixth CPC recommendations."
14.1 Different Ministries of the Government of India cannot assign different meaning to a provision in the Act of Parliament, which otherwise is clearly evident from the plain reading of Section 59 (2) of the 1948 Act.
15. As observed by the High Court, the core of the controversy rested upon the interpretation of Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948, which defined the ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 22 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV "ordinary rate of wages" as basic wages plus "such allowances" as the worker for the time being is entitled to. The High Court has rightly opined that it is well- settled principle of statutory construction that the Legislature never wastes its words. Notably, when the statute provides for only two specific exclusions: bonus and wages for overtime work, in the absence of any formal rules governing the exclusion of other entitlements, the Executive cannot, through a mere Office Memorandum, read additional exclusions into the Act that the Legislature did not contemplate. The High Court further noted that the employees had been in receipt of overtime allowances calculated by including HRA, TA, SFA, etc., for a considerable duration. The sudden exclusion of these allowances via the Office Memorandum dated 26.06.2009, lacks legal authority and is contrary to the literal mandate of Section 59 of the 1948 Act.
16. We also came across a judgment of Kerala High Court in V.E. Jossie & Ors. Versus The Flag Officers Commanding in Chief Headquarters,2011 SCC OnLine Ker 4030 which has taken a view contrary to the view being expressed by us in the present judgment. The Kerala High Court was considering correctness of an order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench which upheld the orders passed by the respondents therein16 discontinuing overtime allowance on HRA, City Compensatory Allowance, TA, SFA, etc. The High Court has upheld the view expressed by the Tribunal therein while upholding the order passed by the authority. The same being contrary to the view expressed by this Court, we hold that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down the correct law.
17. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any case is made out for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed."
6.11 The HPCA/PCA allowance is now specifically for employees who frequently interact with patients or handle infected materials as a core part of their jobs. 6.12 The respondents express concern that the hospitals in question, acting autonomously and without soliciting concurrence from either the nodal ministry or the Department of Expenditure, and furthermore without seeking clarification regarding the implementation date ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 23 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV or the nature of duties, have universally applied the recommendations of the 7th Pay Commission to all ministerial personnel employed within these institutions, thereby failing to differentiate posts based on the nature of duties in relation to the Risk and Hardship Index. This created a financial burden for the public exchequer and resulted in excessive allowance payments to applicants. No evidence on record establishes that all ministerial employees in the hospital are similarly situated or face the same occupational safety standards to be entitled to risk compensation. It was strongly argued that the connection between HPCA/PCA must be understood in the context of the Risk and Hardship Index. A comprehensive analysis of the employer's evidence concerning this matter has not been provided. 6.13 The concern of the applicants is as under:
(i) Employees often share common spaces with patients while entering the premises, collecting medical certificates, countersigning claim bills, or attending grievance desks, making it impossible to avoid exposure. The union also cited the Gazette of India notification, which, it said, had accepted HPCA for all Group C and D employees.
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 24 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV
(ii) All hospital settings come under the threat of communicable diseases, and Group C and D are no exception.
(iii) The support staff is required to enter operating theaters, laboratories, wards, and outpatient departments to carry out their duties.
(iv) The employees from the engineering department, central workshop, stores, and other support services are often involved in installing and inspecting equipment, maintaining utilities, and coordinating with clinicians and nurses to ensure uninterrupted patient services. All these categories are equally exposed to infected materials, instruments, and environments. 6.14 The principles behind such allowances are rooted in broader International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Health Organization (WHO) standards regarding occupational safety and risk compensation. Nine key Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Instruments:
• Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No.
155) • Protocol of 2002 to the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 • Occupational Safety and Health Recommendation, 1981 (No. 164) ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 25 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV • Promotional Framework for the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 (No. 187) • Promotional Framework for the Occupational Safety and Health Recommendation, 2006 (No. 197) • Occupational Health Services Convention, 1985 (No.
161) • Occupational Health Services Recommendation, 1985 (No. 171) • Protection of Workers' Health Recommendation, 1953 (No. 97) • List of Occupational Diseases Recommendation, 2002 (No. 194) 6.15 Government of India, vide OM No.1 1 -1/201 6-IC dated 23.07.2016 constituted a Committee under the Chairmanship of Finance Secretary & Secretary (Expenditure) and Secretaries of Home Affairs, Defence, Health & Family Welfare, Personnel & Training, Posts and Chairman, Railway Board as Members to examine the recommendations of the 7 CPC on Allowances. The Committee, after due deliberations, submitted its report on 27.04.2017. Upon deliberations made by the Committee, the following recommendations are pertinent to be highlighted for our concern :
2.3.4 Based on the examination on these lines, the 7th CPC has recommended that 52 allowances be abolished altogether. Another 36 allowances are to be abolished as separate identities, but to be subsumed in an existing or a newly proposed allowance.
2.3.5 Allowances relating to Risk and Hardship (R & H) are to be governed by a Risk and Hardship Matrix proposed by the 7th CPC.
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 26 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV Risk and Hardship Matrix Table RH-Max HARDSHIP Level >=9:
₹31,500 High Medium Low pmLevel <=8:
₹21,000 pm RISK R1H1Level R1H2Level R1H3Level >=9: ₹25,000 >=9: ₹16,900 >=9: ₹5,300 High pmLevel <=8: pmLevel <=8: pmLevel <=8:
₹17,300 pm ₹9,700 pm ₹4,100 pm
R2H1Level R2H2Level R2H3Level
>=9: ₹16,900 >=9: ₹10,500 >=9: ₹3,400 Medium pmLevel <=8: pmLevel <=8: pmLevel <=8:
₹9,700 pm ₹6,000 pm ₹2,700 pm
R3H1Level R3H2Level R3H3Level
>=9: ₹5,300 >=9: ₹3,400 >=9: ₹1,200 Low pmLevel <=8: pmLevel <=8: pmLevel <=8:
₹4,100 pm ₹2,700 pm ₹1,000 pm 5.5.4 Hospital Patient Care Allowance/Patient Care Allowance (Para 8.10.29, 8.10.70) Existing Provisions: Patient Care Allowance (PCA) is admissible to Group ₹C‟ and „D‟ (non-Ministerial) employees excluding nursing personnel working in the health care delivery institutions/establishments (other than hospitals) with less than 30 beds, subject to the condition that no Night Weightage Allowance and Risk Allowance will be admissible to these employees. Similarly placed employees working in hospitals are eligible for Hospital Patient Care Allowance (HPCA).
Hospital Patient Care Allowance@ ₹2,100 pm for Group ₹C‟ staff and ₹2,085 pm for Group "D‟ Staff. Recommendations of 7th CPC: The 7th CPC has recommended that this allowance shall be paid as per Cell R1H3 of the newly proposed Risk and Hardship Matrix @₹5,300/- pm for level 9 and above and @₹4,100/- pm upto level 8. It has also been recommended that HPCA / PCA should be admissible to only those employees who come in continuous and routine contact with the patients. The amount of allowance will increase by 25% each time DA rises by 50%. Demands:
I. National Council (Staff Side), JCM: The exclusion of the Ministerial Staff by the 7th CPC is without substantive reason as the job of the Ministerial staff working on the premises of the Hospitals involves risk. Therefore, this allowance should continue to be paid to Ministerial staff working in Hospitals. II. M/o Health & FW: Doctors may be granted Risk & Hardship Allowance as per cell R1H2 of Risk & Hardship ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 27 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV Matrix and Nursing Personnel may be granted as per rates of R1H3 of the matrix.
Analysis and Recommendations of the Committee:
The Committee notes that Doctors are granted NPA and the Nurses get Nursing Allowance.
The NPA will be paid @20% of the Basic Pay and the Nursing Allowance, which was not recommended to be increased by the 7th CPC, is being recommended to be increased by 1.5 by the Committee. As such, demands for a separate Risk & Hardship Allowance for Doctors and Nurses may not be accepted.
As regards grant of HPCA / PCA to ministerial staff working on hospital premises, the Committee is of the view that working on hospital premises does involve an element of risk. The recommendations of the 7th CPC on HPCA/ PCA may, therefore, be modified to the extent that these allowances, at present admissible to ministerial staff working in hospital premises, will not be discontinued and be paid to them as per R1H3 of the Risk & Hardship Matrix.
The additional financial implication on account of the changes proposed by the Committee is estimated to be ₹ 30 crore per annum and will benefit approximately 15000 employees.
Sr Name of Recommendati Recommenda
No. Allowance ons of 7th tions /
CPC Modifications
proposed by
the
Committee
83 Hospital Patient Retained. Accepted with
Care Rationalised. To the
Allowance/Patie be paid as per modification
nt Care Cell R1H3 of that
Allowance the newly ministerial
proposed Risk staffs working
and Hardship in Hospitals
Matrix. also be
allowed to
draw HPCA /
PCA as per
R1H3 of the
Risk &
Hardship
Matrix
6.16. We observe that the High-Powered Committee has already accepted and deliberated on the suggestions ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 28 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV regarding the 7th Pay Commission recommendations.
The financial implications of the changes proposed by the Committee were assessed. The remaining question concerns the allocation and release of funds to the respective hospitals. The HPCA /PCA has already been rationalized.
6.17. Because no global treaty exists for this specific allowance, the Union of India applies the Risk and Hardship Matrix (introduced by the 7th Central Pay Commission) to ensure fair compensation for hazardous work, aligning with international principles. In the context of the applicant's submission, the contention is restricted to the inherent nature of the duties performed, thereby supporting the assertion that ministerial personnel employed within healthcare facilities who exhibit direct or indirect involvement with the Risk and Hardship Index warrant appropriate computation of their admissible allowances. That question also ought to be re- examined.
6.18. The aforementioned decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the applicants indicate that both pertain to the issue of grant of HPCA/PCA. In OA No. 4105/2023, it was observed that the applicants therein were unable to demonstrate that the nature of their ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 29 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV primary duties involved continuous contact with infected patients, or that there existed parity between their duties and the primary duties of employees of the Joint Forum of Medical Technologists of India.Whereas, a perusal of the decision rendered by the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 181/2018 shows that the same was passed in the context of an administrative action taken by the respondents, which formed the subject matter of challenge. Furthermore, in light of the ratio laid down by the Chandigarh Bench in OA No. 181/2018, whereby the Office Memorandum dated 21.04.2023 was quashed, the said decision continues to hold the field as on date. The Division Bench of this Tribunal is neither sitting in revision nor exercising appellate jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the decisions rendered by two Single Benches in the factual matrices of their respective cases. Therefore, no further orders, insofar as the quashing of the Office Memorandum dated 21.04.2023 is concerned, are called for in the present matter. This is particularly so in view of the fact that the onus lies upon the respondents to challenge the same or seek appropriate remedial measures in accordance with law before the appropriate forum. Until such time, the order dated 19.01.2026 passed by the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 181/2018 shall continue to operate. ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 30 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV 6.19. We also take note of the fact that in similar situation, the Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 84/2024, observed as under:
"19. I have considered the submissions of both the learned counsels. The applicants waited for almost 11 years for which they have no explanation to occur. The only explanation they have assigned is that they waited for the respondents to pass appropriate orders, and since proposal was also made, they waited for the decision be taken on the proposal. I do not find any justification for grant of Hospital Patient Care Allowance (HPCA)/Patient Care Allowance (PCA) from the date of first representation made by the applicants. Waiting for the decision on representation for more than ten years is too long a period. The state exchequer cannot be burdened with such a huge expenditure. In these circumstances, I deem it appropriate to grant arrears for period of three years from the date of application.
20. In view of the above, the applicants are entitled to Hospital Patient Care Allowance (HPCA)/Patient Care Allowance (PCA). Hence the order:
(a) the respondents are directed to pay Hospital Patient Care Allowance (HPCA)/Patient Care Allowance (PCA) to the applicants for the period of three years preceding the date of their application.
(b) This exercise shall be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
(c) There shall be no order as to costs.
(d) Pending MA, if any, stand closed."
6.20. The contention of the respondents that Office ID Note No. A-27023/1/2018/E.II B/7th CPC/Pt. dated 06.04.2023 has not been challenged does not ipso facto render the present Original Application non- maintainable. Inter-departmental notings merely reflect tentative views recorded in government files and do not constitute a formal decision unless and until the same are finalized. Reference may be drawn to the judgment of ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 31 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5876/2022, titled Mahadeo & Ors. v. Smt. Sovan Devi & Ors., wherein it has been held that inter-departmental communications cannot be relied upon as binding decisions. It was further observed that the failure to challenge such internal notings, as contended by the respondents, does not furnish a valid or sustainable defense to contend that the subject Application or Petition is not maintainable.
6.21 Notably, in a most recent decision rendered by the Bangalore Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.455/2024 titled Mahesh Mysore and ors. Vs. UOI and ors., the Tribunal observed as under :-
"18. Having regard to quantitative assessment of the duties performed by the ministerial staff as highlighted by the Respondent No. 2 institution itself, the ministerial staff are posted to work in the risk areas like out-patient departments, MRD and Clinical Departments of the hospital side and even in the Departments situated in the administrative block i.e., Neuromicrobiology, Neuropathology, Neurovirology where there is continuous and routine contact with patients leading to chances of communicable diseases. The rotational transfer of staff periodically among ministerial staff from hospital zone to administration and vice versa also entails for grant of HPCA as identification of such ministerial staff by virtue of their work in the hospital zone and the administrative side would be difficult. Infection is in the environment of work. If the administrative block and the clinical block are situated in one campus, movement of the patients and their attendants is common in the campus. Even the infections can spread in the elevator or common utility areas etc., not merely by coming in direct contact with the patient. As observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the cases referred to above, it is not uncommon for patients and their attendants to leave waste materials, garbage etc., and the place where they sit and wait in lawns and gardens. The ministerial staff are also facing the same risk of infection in the same campus. It is not unusual that the patients/their attendants are visiting the ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 32 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV counters for payment of hospital charges/fees or for claiming any other medical facility to which they are entitled to.
19. Even the employees who are on constant contact with the patients are coming to the administrative blocks for their settlement of administrative issues which cannot be avoided or ruled out. Thus, the bacteria or virulent micro organisms can spread in the campus irrespective of ministerial staff/non-ministerial staff which ought to have been necessarily considered by the Respondent No. 1 while issuing any orders. No blanket/general orders could be issued for stoppage of HPCA/PCA without the assessment of quantitative data. No doubt, Respondent No. 2 has acted upon the instructions issued by the Respondent No. I Ministry but such action not being in conformity with the settled legal principles, the same cannot be countenanced.
20. Hence, for the reasons aforesaid, we pass the following:
ORDER:
1) The impugned OM dated 21.04.2023 (Annexure A12) issued by the Respondent No. 1 is quashed insofar as discontinuation of HPCA to ministerial staff as far as the applicants are concerned.
2) Consequently, the Respondent No. 2 is directed to resume the payment of HPCA to the applicants including arrears.
3) Compliance shall be made in an expedite manner, in any event not later than eight weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order.
4) OA stands disposed of in terms of above.
No order as to costs."
6.22 In M/s. Burn & Co. Ltd. & Others v. Their Employees, 1960 (3) SCR 423, the Apex Court rejected the contention of the company that clerical and subordinate staff, having no direct role in actual production, should not be granted any incentive bonus, particularly on the ground that their workload does not increase with higher production. The Court observed as under:
ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 33 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV "It is, however, difficult to accept that there will be no increase in the work of the clerical staff in particular and also of the subordinate staff because of higher production, though it may be accepted that the increase may not be in proportion to the increase of production. It is also true that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods like manual workers, and that may be a reason for treating them somewhat differently in the matter of incentive bonus. That is what the Tribunal appears to have done, as it directed the company to extend the scheme of incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff and to lay down the rates and conditions thereof, without mandating identical rates and conditions as those applicable to manual workers. However, there can be no doubt that, economically speaking, the clerical staff and the subordinate staff also contribute to production, and there is no justification for excluding them altogether from the incentive bonus scheme. Moreover, as noted by the Tribunal, in other comparable concerns, incentive bonuses are being paid to such staff. The fact that dearness allowance is paid to the clerical staff at a higher scale is also not, in our opinion, a valid ground for depriving them entirely of the benefits of an incentive bonus scheme."
6.23 In the present case as well, HPCA/PCA has been introduced by the Union of India for ministerial staff upon acceptance of the recommendations of the 7th Pay Commission. The relief sought herein does not seek introduction of a new benefit for the first time; rather, it concerns a benefit already granted. Such a benefit cannot be unilaterally withdrawn or revoked without any cogent justification.
7. CONCLUSION :
To sum up :
"The discontinuation engenders discontent, rather than offering a viable resolution. "
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7.1. In view of the aforesaid analysis and considering the subsequent alterations introduced by the impugned notifications, the present Original Application is hereby disposed of with the following directives:
(i) The respondents are precluded from recovering any amount disbursed to date for HPCA/PCA.
(ii) Considering the financial implications involved and also recognizing the need for a structured release of funds so as not to prejudicially impact the State's exchequer while at the same time balancing the rights of the employees to receive emoluments due to them, we find it appropriate to refer the issue relating to HPCA/PCA back to a Committee under the Chairmanship of the Finance Secretary & Secretary (Expenditure) and the Secretaries of Home Affairs, Defence, Health & Family Welfare, Personnel &Training, Posts, and the Chairman, Railway Board as Members to re-examine and take steps concerning the date of implementation and release of funds by way of notification, taking into account Risk and Hardship Matrix (accepted and introduced by the 7th Central Pay Commission) also to fulfill the international principles of fair compensation for hazardous work. Needless to ANKIT ANKITSAKLANI SAKL 2026.04.1 0 ANI 11:12:49 +05'30' 35 Item No. 42 O.A. No. 1525/2023 Court No. IV mention, the Committee shall take suggestions of stake holders before arriving at a just decision.
(iii) The above exercise shall be completed within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
7.2. Pending M.A.(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.
(Dr. Anand S Khati) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/as/
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