Madras High Court
P. Jeyapandi And N. Rameswari vs The Revenue Divisional Officer, N.S. ... on 9 June, 2008
Author: V. Dhanapalan
Bench: V. Dhanapalan
ORDER V. Dhanapalan, J.
1. The issue involved in these writ petitions being common, they are decided by this common order.
2. The challenge in these petitions is to the notices in Ref. Na.Ka. No. 457-08 dated 24.01.2008 of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Usilampatti Taluk, the first respondent herein.
3. The petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1041 and 1042 of 2008 participated in the election conducted under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 ("the Act" for short) for the post of Councillors of the Chellampatty Panchayat Union in which they were elected as Councillors in Ward Nos. 2 and 16 respectively. Subsequent to their election as Councillors, they participated in the election process for the post of Vice Chairman and Chairman respectively and they got elected as such and took charge of the respective post on 25.10.2006. According to the petitioners, the Panchayat Union is functioning as per the instructions of the Government of Tamil Nadu in accordance with the provisions of the Act and there is no adverse remarks either from the public or from the Inspector of Panchayats as regards the functioning of the Panchayat Union. The above being the position, the respondents 2 and 3 had abducted some of the Councillors of the said Panchayat Union. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents 2 and 3, the relatives of those abducted Councillors lodged criminal complaints in three police stations and Habeas Corpus Petitions were filed in respect of two Councillors who were abducted. While those Habeas Corpus Petitions were heard by this Court, the said Councillors/detenus were forced to give a statement that they were not abducted and that they were in Kerala.
4. While the above being the position, the petitioners received notices dated 24.01.2008 from the first respondent. In the said notices, the first respondent, stating that 13 out of 16 Members of the Chellampatty Panchayat Union have sent him a complaint proposing to bring "No Confidence Motion" against the petitioners, directed the petitioners to submit their reply for such a proposal of the Panchayat Union Members. Along with the said notice, the reasons for the proposal of "No Confidence Motion" and the draft resolution were also sent. As against this notice of the first respondent, the present writ petitions have come to filed.
5. According to the petitioners, after receipt of the written notice of intention of bringing "No Confidence Motion", the first respondent should issue an order framing the charges against the Chairman and Vice Chairman, along with a copy of the draft motion and this procedure has been given a go-by and as such, the impugned orders of the first respondent are vitiated by non-compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 212(2) of the Act.
6. The further case of the petitioners is that as per Section 212(2) of the Act, it is mandatory on the part of any two of the Councillors to deliver in person, to the first respondent, the written notice of intention to make the motion, together with a copy of the motion and the written statement of charges and this provision has not been complied with inasmuch as the complaint has been received by the first respondent only through "Registered Post" who has endorsed so in the said complaint itself and for these reasons, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside.
7. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the first respondent contending that:
a. the notice of "No Confidence Motion" was presented to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Usilampatti on 22.01.2008 in accordance with Section 212(2) of the Act and it was recorded by him in the notice itself as such, but, he had inadvertently mentioned in his notice that the complaint had been sent to him.
b. as per Section 212(2) of the Act, it is not mandatory that he should frame charges and it is sufficient if a written statement of charges is enclosed with the complaint and since the complaint itself contains draft notice of motion and draft charges for which the petitioners also have given their explanation, they cannot contend that he had not framed charges which is not required under the statute.
c. the complainants have chosen to present one copy of the complaint in person and another copy through "Registered Post" and the receipt of complaint by "Registered Post" does not mean that the complainants have not at all sent it in person; and d. the petitioners cannot avoid the enquiry simply by saying that the draft motion is not signed by any two Members of the Panchayat Union since the complaint which contains everything including the draft charges and draft motion has been signed by 13 out of 16 members of the Council.
8. Heard Mr. R. Viduthalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. R. Janakiramulu, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent and Mr.A.Thiagarajan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3.
9. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that when the provisions of the Act are mandatory in nature and as such, when each and every procedure contemplated in the Act has to be strictly followed, the impugned orders of the first respondent have to be quashed inasmuch as they were not presented in person to him by any two of the Members of the Council and were only sent through "Registered Post". According to him, as per the provisions of the Act, the persons who are intending to move the "No Confidence Motion" should give a signed motion having 3/5 of the total elected Councillors and two persons should hand over the said request in person and while making the notice of intention in a written form to set the motion in order, this statutory requirement has been given a go-by thereby making the impugned notice vitiated by law. It is also his strong contention that a copy of the motion, along with the written statement of charges, is to be delivered by two elected Councillors in person to the Revenue Divisional Officer, who in turn should call for a report or explanation from the elected office bearer and convene a meeting and as per Section 212(9) of the Act, the first respondent should read the motion of the Councillors in the meeting and the statement of charges and also the reply to the charges and there will not be any debate and the minutes of the meeting will be communicated to the Government which will take a final decision on the "No Confidence Motion" and this mandatory requirement has not been complied with in the case on hand. It has been vehemently contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that there is no draft motion along with the charges and there is also no documentary evidence to show that two Councillors presented the draft motion in person to the first respondent. Assailing the stand taken by the first respondent in the counter that there is no prescribed format for making the complaint this regard, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has further contended that the version of the first respondent that two persons along with four other Councillors approached him at about 8.35 a.m. at his residential bungalow and handed over papers to him together with charges and notice of motion, without disclosing the manner in which the complaint was received by him and without specifying as to who are the persons approached him, throws suspicion over the physical presence of those Councillors before the first respondent. In short, it is the strenuous contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the records have been created by the first respondent after filing of the writ petition to show as if the first respondent has received the complaint in early morning.
10. It has been vehemently argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the entire charges levelled against the petitioners can be considered only for initiating proceedings under Section 206 of the Act and not under Section 212 of the Act as done by the first respondent and in fact, the first respondent ought not to have accepted as if the complaint was a "No Confidence Motion" though there was no fulfilment of statutory requirement and hence, on this score too, the impugned orders are liable to be interfered with.
11. In support of his contention that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside since the copy of the draft motion was not made available to the petitioners which is a violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments of the Supreme Court:
i P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir A statute as is well known must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be dependent on the user of the words "shall" or "may". Such a question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve.
What is mandatory is the requirement of Sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the 1950 Act and not the ministerial action of actual publication of Form 16.
The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object for which the same had been used. In the instant case the 1960 Rules do not fix any time for publication of the electoral rolls. On the other hand Section 23(3) of the 1950 Act categorically mandates that direction can be issued for revision in the electoral roll by way of amendment in inclusion and deletion from the electoral roll till the date specified for filing nomination. The electoral roll as revised by reason of such directions can therefore be amended only thereafter. On the basis of direction issued by the competent authority in relation to an application filed for inclusion of a voter's name, a nomination can be filed. The person concerned, therefore, would not be inconvenienced or in any way be prejudiced only because the revised electoral roll in Form 16 is published a few hours later. The result of filing of such nomination would become known to the parties concerned also after 3.00 p.m. ii Dove Investments (P) Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Investment Corpn.
Whether a statute would be directory or mandatory will depend upon the scheme thereof. Ordinarily a procedural provision would not be mandatory even if the word "shall" is employed therein unless a prejudice is caused. (See P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir3.) In Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar v. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar, this Court observed: (SCC p. 212, paras 74-75)
74. In this case it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether Section 83 is imperative in character or not inasmuch it is settled law that even where the expression 'shall' is used, the same may not be held to be mandatory. Even a mandatory provision having regard to the text and context of the statute may not call for strict construction.
75. In U.P. SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh, this Court stated the law in the following terms: (SCC p.440, paras 96-97)
96. Ordinarily, although the word 'shall' is considered to be imperative in nature but it has to be interpreted as directory if the context or the intention otherwise demands. (See Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan AIR para 12.)
97. It is important to note that in Crawford on Statutory Construction at p.539, it is stated:
271. Miscellaneous implied exceptions from the requirements of mandatory statutes, in general.-Even where a statute is clearly mandatory or prohibitory, yet, in many instances, the courts will regard certain conduct beyond the prohibition of the statute through the use of various devices or principles. Most, if not all of these devices find their jurisdiction in considerations of justice. It is a well-known fact that often to enforce the law to its letter produces manifest injustice, for frequently equitable and humane considerations, and other considerations of a closely related nature, would seem to be of a sufficient calibre to excuse or justify a technical violation of the law.
In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India, this Court observed: (SCC p. 144, para 17) The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the language depends upon the language couched in the statute under consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' depends on conferment of power. In the present context, 'may' does not always mean may. May is a must for enabling compliance with provision but there are cases in which, for various reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty. In Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn.), it is stated that the court will, as a general rule, presume that the appropriate remedy by common law or mandamus for action was intended to apply. General rule of law is that where a general obligation is created by statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and language of the statute and consideration of policy at times may, however, create exception showing that the legislature did not intend a remedy (generality) to be exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The language is the medium of expressing the intention and the object that particular provision or the Act seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the intention. The word 'shall' is not always decisive. Regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty of the court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or section or a phrase under consideration.
iii Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P. Section 6(2), on a plain reading, deals with the various modes of publication and they are: (a) publication in the Official Gazette, (b) publication in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and (c) causing public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality. There is no option left with anyone to give up or waive any mode and all such modes have to be strictly resorted to. The principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefor in the Act.
12. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent contended that the complaint was both presented in person by two Councillors and also sent by "Registered Post" to the first respondent and the first respondent, inadvertently, had stated in the impugned order that the complaint had been sent to him. He has further contended the first respondent is not at all required to frame charges against the Chairman or Vice Chairman as argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and suffice it is if a written statement of charges and draft motion are enclosed with the complaint.
13. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second and third respondents, at the outset, has contended that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties and also on the ground that the petitioners have already filed their objections to the show cause notice and as such, cannot initiate parallel proceedings by way of these writ petitions. Secondly, it is his contention that the term "copy of the motion" referred to in Section 212(2) of the Act has not been construed in its proper perspective and the notice issued under Section 212(3) of the Act is perfectly valid and has been issued in strict compliance of law. In this context, he has further contended that the term "motion" is nothing but a proposal to bring "No Confidence Motion" by a majority of the members who are the Councillors in this case and when the same has been signed by 13 out of 16 Councillors listing the charges under a separate heading, the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that the copy of the motion and charges were not served on the petitioners has to fall to ground. As regards despatch of notice by "Registered Post", it is the vehement contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the said exercise would not vitiate the entire proceedings as it was only an additional mode of communication besides handing over the notice in person to the first respondent. Lastly, it has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second and third respondents that there are as many as 28 formats dealing with various matters and as such, no specific format for motion has been prescribed in the statute and when this being the case, moving of motion in the Parliament or the Legislature cannot be compared with the proceedings initiated under the Act.
14. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second and third respondents on the following judgments:
i. - Union of India and Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana - (para 16) No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge sheet or show cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.
ii Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Anr. - (para 5) This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition....
iii Union of India and Ors. v. Hiranmoy Sen and Ors. - (para 5) Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the auditors and assistants have been historically treated on a part in the matter of pay scales. Although this fact has been denied by the appellant, we are of the opinion that even if it is correct, that will not be of any help to the respondents. To give an illustration, if post A and post B have been carrying the same pay scales, merely because the pay scale of post A has been increased that by itself cannot result in increase in the pay scale of post B to the same level. It is entirely on the Government and the authorities to fix the pay scales and to decide whether the pay scale of post B should be increased or not. The judiciary must exercise self-restraint and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain.
iv (2001) 10 SCC 639 Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore - (para 2) During the course of hearing, we enquired from learned Counsel for the parties as to whether any final notification, including certain area within the limits of Tarikere Town Panchayat consequent upon the notification dated 22-8- 1997 has been issued or not. Learned Counsel for the parties stated that so far no such notification has been issued. Under such facts and circumstances, we feel that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was premature and ought not to have been entertained by the High Court. Merely by issue of a notification dated 22-8-1997, none of the rights of the petitioner were affected. Therefore, a decision on the basis of the notification dated 22-8-1997 was totally unnecessary. In this view of the matter, the judgment and order of the High Court shall stand modified. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms....
v 1976 MLJ 303 - V.C. Kadirvelu v. Sub-Collector, Karur, Tiruchy District - (para 4) According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is not enough to merely serve a copy of the statement of charges along with the notice of intention to make the motion. But, it is necessary, under the said section to serve on the petitioner the actual no-confidence motion to be moved. I do not understand the section in the manner suggested by the learned Counsel. It is the copy of the notice of intention to make the motion which is referred to in Section 153(2) of the Act and which is required to be served on the petitioner.... I do not think that apart from the copy of the notice of intention moved by the requisite number of members under Section 153 (2) of the Act, the actual no- confidence motion to be moved at the meeting is required to be served on the petitioner. Both the contentions, therefore, fail. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.
vi 1999 WLR 694 Karu Mookkammal v. Pudukkottai District Panchayat Inspector-cum-District Collector, Pudukkottai District, Pudukkottai and two Ors. - (para 5) ...The notice contains that whether the petitioner is to be continued as President or to be removed and as such it is vague and not contemplated under Sub-section (3) of Section 205 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, 1994. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In Section 205(3), it only refers to the proposal for the removal of the President which does not mean that the question for consideration is only for the removal of the President and not otherwise. The notice issued to the members of the Panchayat clearly satisfies that the question for consideration is whether the President is to continue or to be removed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the removal of the President is not before the Panchayat Board meeting.
vii 2005-3-L.W. 524 S. Jothi v. The District Collector-cum-Inspector of Village Panchayats, Namakkal District and 8 Ors. - (para 12) In the light of the overwhelming decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench judgment of this Court referred to above, we do not find any scope to rely on the two Division Bench judgments of the Orissa High Court as well as that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The other decisions cited on behalf of the appellant are not germane to the legal issue involved in this case and therefore, the same are not helpful to the appellant. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge in holding that it was highly premature at this stage for this Court to interfere with the impugned proceedings of the respondents 1 to 3. We find no merit in this Writ Appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.
viii 2005 WLR 20 Tmt. R. Kasiammal v. The District Collector-cum- Inspector of Panchayats, Virudhunagar District, Virudhunagar and two Ors. - (Para 3) We are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution in this case since as yet no adverse order has been passed against the appellant at all and hence the writ petition was premature. For removing the President of a village panchayat, the Act provides for certain modalities. Under Section 205(10) of the Act a meeting of the village panchayat has to be held and its views have to be recorded in the minutes and a copy of the minutes has to be forwarded by the Tahsildar to the Inspector. Thereafter, under Section 205(11), the Inspector, after considering the views of the village panchayat, in his discretion, may either remove the President from his office or drop further action. As yet even the meeting of the village panchayat has not been held. In such meeting, the members of the village panchayat may express views in favour of the appellant, if he has done good deeds to the villagers, but if he has not done anything in the capacity as President of the village panchayat for the betterment of the villagers, it is very likely that the panchayat may express adverse opinion against him. At present, the matter is premature and calls for no interference....
15. I have given careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the materials available on record.
16. Before venturing into the matter, a glance of the relevant provisions of Sections 206(1) and 212 (1) & (2) of the Act would be useful and they are extracted as under:
Section 206(1) If in the opinion of the Inspector, the Vice-President wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or disobeys any provisions of this Act, or any rule, by- law, regulation, or lawful order made or issued under this Act or abuses any power vested in him, the Inspector shall be notice in writing, require the Vice President to offer within a specified date, his explanation with respect to his cases of omission or commission mentioned in the notice.
Section 212 (2) Written notice of intention to make the motion, signed by members of the panchayat union council not less in number than 3/5th of the sanctioned strength of the panchayat union council, together with a copy of the motion which is proposed to be made and a written statement of the charges against the Chairman or Vice Chairman shall be delivered in person to the Revenue Divisional Officer of the division by any two of the members of the panchayat union council signing the notice.
(3) A copy of the statement of charges along with the motion shall be caused to be delivered to the concerned Chairman or Vice Chairman by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Chairman or Vice Chairman shall be required to give a statement in reply to the charges within a week of the receipt of the motion by the Chairman or Vice-Chairman.
17. From a perusal of the relevant records, it is seen that the petitioners who are Councillors in the Chellampatty Panchayat Union participated in the election conducted under the provisions of the Act and got elected as such and are functioning in their respective posts from 25.10.2006. It is further seen that on one occasion, the respondents 2 and 3 have abducted some of the Councillors of the Chellampatty Panchayat Union and the husband and son of the two Councillors who were so abducted had filed Habeas Corpus Petitions before this Court and those two Councillors who had appeared before this Court had informed that they were in Kerala from 09.01.2008. While that being the position, the petitioners have received the impugned notices dated 24.01.2008 from the first respondent as regards moving of "No Confidence Motion" against them initiated by 13 out of 16 Councillors of the Chellampatty Panchayat Union.... It is further seen that on receipt of the said impugned notices, the petitioners had filed W.P. Nos. 933 and 934 of 2008 respectively before this Court. However, the same had been withdrawn by them with liberty to file fresh writ petitions. Hence, the impugned notices dated 24.01.2008 issued by the first respondent under Section 212(3) of the Act have been challenged in the present petitions on the ground of non-compliance of mandatory requirement under Section 212(2) of the Act.
18. In the impugned notices, the first respondent has stated that he has received a notice signed by 13 out of 16 members of the Chellampatty Panchayat Union stating that they have proposed to move a "No Confidence Motion" against the petitioners and that the copy of the statement of reasons and the draft resolution for moving the "No Confidence Motion" are enclosed as per Section 212(3) of the Act. He has further stated therein that the petitioners are required to submit to him their written reply to the "No Confidence Motion" within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the said notice.
19. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent that pursuant to the receipt of a copy of the "No Confidence Motion" along with a written statement of charges against the petitioners, they have given their explanation to the charges levelled against them to the first respondent and the submission of their explanation to the first respondent has not been denied by the petitioners.
20. Though the learned Senior Counsel has strongly harped on the aspect of non-compliance of provisions of Section 212(2) of the Act and various other circumstances which led to issuance of the impugned notices, in nutshell , it is quite pertinent to state that the entire controversy centres around the manner in which notice of "No Confidence Motion" reached the first respondent. While analysing the aspect as to whether the petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned notices of the first respondent, which, according to them have been passed without following the provisions contained in Section 212(2) of the Act, it would be relevant to refer to the said Section which provides that written notice of intention to make the motion, signed by members of the panchayat union council not less in number than 3/5th of the sanctioned strength of the panchayat union council, together with a copy of the motion which is proposed to be made and a written statement of the charges against the Chairman or Vice Chairman shall be delivered in person to the Revenue Divisional Officer of the division by any two of the members of the panchayat union council signing the notice.
21. From a pragmatic approach to the issue on hand, it is seen that the crucial point raised by the petitioners is that the notice of "No Confidence Motion" has not been handed over to the first respondent in person and this lapse is in contravention of the provisions of the Act.
22. On a perusal of the entire records produced before this Court, it is seen that two Councillors by name M.Jeyamani and C.Tamilselvi and two other Councillors by name M.P. Raman and Devaraj have delivered the notice of "No Confidence Motion" in respect of the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1041 and 1042 of 2008 in person to the first respondent on 22.01.2008 at 8.45 a.m. At the same time, needless it is to say that the same notice of "No Confidence Motion" signed by the members has been sent by "Registered Post" and received by the competent authority. In response, the petitioners have filed their explanations before the first respondent. Such being the case, this Court is not in a positiin to accept the main case of the petitioners that the impugned notices are vitiated by non-compliance of Section 212 (2) of the Act.
23. There can be no second opinion about the aspect that when an Act stipulates or contemplates that a particular act has to be done in a particular manner, there should be strict adherence to the same. Trite it is that when there is a rule of law where a general obligation is created by statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. It is also equally trite that the question as to whether an act to be performed is mandatory or directory, must be construed in the given facts, circumstances and context of each case and there is no strait-jacket formula available in this context. As such, it is the duty of the Court to strike a balance between the intention of the Legislature and the facts, circumstances and context of the case. In the instant case, as already stated, since it has been clearly found from verification of records that the notice of "No Confidence Motion" reached the first respondent by two modes, one by handing over in person on 22.01.2008 at 8.45 a.m. and the other by "Registered Post", it is absolutely needless for this Court to go into the aspect as to why the notice of "No Confidence Motion" has been sent by "Registered Post" inasmuch the required provision of Act has been complied with and in such view of the matter, the reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners to substantiate his contention that the provisions of the Act are mandatory in nature and not directory, can hardly be of any avail to him. In this context, though it is argued on the side of the petitioners that the records are created for the purpose of the case, the said argument cannot have legs to stand for the reason that it is not supported by any material evidence whatsoever produced before this Court.
24. This Court, by its catena of decisions, viz., the ones reported in (i) 1976 MLJ 303, (ii) 1999 WLR 694, (iii) 2005-3-L.W. and (iv) 2005 WLR 20 and the Supreme Court, by its decision reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440, the relevant portion of which have been extracted above, have made it clear and categorical in their judgments that except for want of jurisdiction of the authority, writ petitions should not be entertained for mere asking and as a matter of routine and the petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. It is also a well- settled principle that proposal for "No Confidence Motion" does not mean that the question for consideration is only for the removal and not otherwise. As such, it is always open to the petitioner to put forth all his grievances before the competent authority during the enquiry. The judgment reported in 1999 WLR 694 the relevant portion of which has already been extracted above speaks in detail about this proposition.
25. From the foregoing discussion, since this Court is satisfied as regards the compliance of the provision under Section 212(2) of the Act inasmuch as the notice of "No Confidence Motion" has been submitted to the first respondent in person, this Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned notices and accordingly, they are upheld. Further, since the petitioners have submitted their explanation to the charges levelled against them, this Court is of the considered view that they have every right to get all their grievances redressed before the competent authority during the course of enquiry in the manner known to law. Accordingly, in view of the prevailing situation, as this matter relates to the issue of moving a "No Confidence Motion" concerning the Chairman and Vice Chairman of a Panchayat Union, the first respondent is directed to conclude the enquiry in accordance with law, after affording to the parties to the proceedings, a reasonable opportunity of being heard, at any rate, not later than six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Resultantly, the writ petitions which are devoid of any merit are dismissed with the above direction. No costs.