Madras High Court
N.K.T. National Girls Higher Secondary ... vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu And Ors. on 28 August, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)1MLJ11
ORDER S.S. Subramani, J.
1. Petitioner seeks issuance of writ of mandamus, directing respondents 1 to 5 to forbear the respondents 6 to 12 or their agents, servants or men from inviting applications for admission to the petitioner-School, and respondents 13 and 14 from admitting students to the petitioner-School and also forbear the respondents 6 to 12 from appointing or dismissing teaching or non-teaching staff in the petitioner-School, 13th respondent-College and 14th respondent-Boys High School.
2. 15th respondent is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The same was founded by Shri N.K. Thirumalachariar, a leading Member of this Bar. Shri C.R. Pattabiraman, a doyen of the Bar was also one of the Founders of the Society. The Society was formed with the object of establishing educational, cultural, artistic and welfare institutions, and managing N.K. Thirumalachariar National Boys' High School Triplicane and N.K. Thirumalachariar National Girls' Higher Secondary School, Triplicane. In course of time, the Society established the National College of Education for Women and the Society has been administering all these three educational institutions well. These institutions have been catering to the lower and middle class residents in and around Triplicane. The Society admits patrons, life members, honorary members and ordinary members. It has framed its own bye-laws and regulations which were revised and amended in 1992 in order to bring it in consonance with the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and the rules framed thereunder.
3. It is said that all the three educational institutions established by 15th respondent were functioning smoothly and efficiently. One N.S. Viswanathan, father of respondents 6 to 8 and grandfather of 9th respondent, was the Headmaster of N.K. Thirumalachariar National Boys' High School and he retired in 1971. As Headmaster, he had very close association with the members of the Society and the members reposed absolute confidence in him.. In view of this, he was admitted as a Member of the Society after his retirement. In 1976, he became the Secretary of the Society. He was able to influence the affairs of the Society as he had the academic qualification of being the Headmaster of the School.
4. In 1992, it came to the notice of the Society that N.S. Viswanathan was conducting the affairs of the Society in a manner which was detrimental to the interests of the Society. Even the school premises and other amenities were grossly abused, and these aspects were aired in the general body meetings. The members of the Governing Body expressed their feelings openly because they genuinely felt that an educational institution, being Temple of Learning, should not be converted into a den for acts of indiscipline and corruption. It is further said that the 6th respondent, who is the son of N.S. Viswanathan was allowed to use the school for advertising sorts of medical treatments of dubious nature.
5. On 16.8.1992, the Governing Body met and granted an opportunity to N.S. Viswanathan to mend his ways. But, instead of mending his ways, he fabricated false minutes of the meeting held on 16.8.1992. But the same was immediately detected and corrected by the President. The annual general body was to be convened on 6.2.1993, but the same could not be proceeded with as Viswanathan failed to turn up for the meeting and also did not deliver the account books and other records. The meeting was, therefore, adjourned to 6.3.1993, and on the same day, an extraordinary general meeting was scheduled to be convened to elect the office bearers as the term of previous office-bearers had expired long before-Viswanathan attended the meeting on 6.3.1993 and he was not elected as office-bearer. It is thereafter litigations after litigations began. The present 10th respondent was the counsel for Mr. Viswanathan. Through 10th respondent, Viswanathan filed O.S. No. 2038 of 1993, on the file of City Civil Court, Madras and obtained an ex parte order of injunction restraining the duly elected Secretary of the Society from interfering with the functions of the said Viswanathan. The Society filed a counter-statement and tried to vacate the injunction. It is said that under the guide of acting as counsel for Viswanathan, 10th respondent himself was taking decisions, and when injunction application was also to be heard, the 10th respondent filed an application alleging that the defendants in that suit had committed contempt. The same was heard by the VIII Assistant City Civil Judge and it was dismissed. It was held that N.S. Viswanathan was not be Secretary; and that he has not stated anything about the general body meeting held on 6.3.1993.
6. Immediately, an application for transfer of the suit was filed as C.M.P. No. 310 of 1993. Defendants in that suit did not raise any objection for transfer of the suit and they made an endorsement to that effect. The intention of transfer was to prolong the litigation. But the intention failed when the suit itself was transferred to V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras with a direction to complete the hearing in the injunction application within a specified time. When the suit as well as the injunction application were about to be heard, the 10th respondent again filed a petition before this Court to transfer the said suit to this Court to be tried along with C.S. No. 1684 of 1993. O.S. No. 2038 of 1993 was transferred to this Court and renumbered as C.S. No. 1277 of 1995. C.S. No. 1684 of 1993 was a suit filed by the Society and its governing body to restrain Viswanathan from interfering with the affairs of the Society and also from convening any meeting either on 24.11.1993 or on any other date. An injunction was also granted in that case.
7. C.S. No. 1277 of 1995 came before me while I was sitting on the Original Side and I dismissed the suit as per my order dated 13.10.1995.Iheld that Viswanathan is no more the Secretary, and even if the plaint allegations are correct and could be accepted in their face value, even that period has expired on 13.10.1995. Within a week after the dismissal of the suit by me, one Balan, 12th respondent herein, filed another suit as O.S. No. 7466 of 1995 before the XII Assistant City Civil Judge against the Members of the Society. According to him, he was elected on 24.11.1993 in a meeting convened by Viswanathan. On 6.2.1996, the XII Assistant City Civil Judge dismissed the injunction application. Learned Judge held that even if the meeting was held on 24.11.1993, the same was void in view of the injunction granted by this Court in C.S. No. 1684 of 1993. On 10.2.1996 the Governing Body decided to hold a meeting on 6.3.1996 and to elect new office bearers. It was also resolved that Viswanathan should be removed as he failed to attend the meetings of the Governing Body. A resolution was also passed to that effect on 23.2.1996 declaring that Viswanathan has ceased to be a member of the governing body. On 6.3.1996, a suit filed by Viswanathan for declaration that the meeting of the Society to be held on 6.3.1996 was illegal and the interim application filed therein came up for hearing. The matter was heard by III Assistant City Civil Judge. But he did not pass any order. The General Body meeting was held on 6.3.1996 as scheduled, and Mrs. Sarojini Varadappan was elected as President of 15th respondent. Later, Viswanathan filed O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 and sought a declaration that duly elected members were not allowed to function as elected members. He also moved for an injunction. The Society was also represented by counsel. No interim order was passed. A counter was also filed later stating that there is material suppression of facts since he did not make mention of the previous litigations.
8. It so happened that when the injunction on application in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 was posted on 10.8.1996, there was no representation by the Society. The court, for the only reason that there was no representation, allowed the petition without giving any reason. This caused a serious problem to the Society. Even though the counsel filed a personal affidavit stating the reasons for his absence, the injunction was not vacated. It is said that the suit was filed by Viswanathan in his individual capacity and not as Secretary of the Society. At any rate, it became infructuous since Viswanathan himself died on 10.6.1998. Litigations and litigations were pursued by Viswanathan at the instance of 10th respondent. The Society thought it better to file a suit to prevent Viswanathan and others from harassing the elected office bearers. C.S. No. 139 of 1997 was filed before this Court for various reliefs. An injunction petition was also moved on 24.3.1997 for restraining Viswanathan and 12th respondent and also others from interfering with the affairs of the Governing Body. An injunction was also granted. It so happened that on 17.3.1998, the case which was listed as Item 80 was taken up at the instance of 10th respondent, and since there was no representation on the side of the plaintiffs, a learned Judge of this Court dismissed the same for default. Immediately a restoration application was filed, and the same is pending even now.
9. Once the suit was dismissed for default, respondents 6 to 12 attempted to create scenes and thereby the administration of the various educational institutions was seriously affected. The Principal of the College who was duly appointed by the Society was also removed by 10th respondent. Therefore, she filed W.P. No. 7410 of 1998 and the order of removal was stayed. In spite of the order of stay, the 10th respondent, who is a legal practitioner personally went to the College and prevented the Principal from discharging the duties. Questioning his attitude and behaviour, representations were filed before police officers including respondents 1 to 5. But they remained silent only on the ground that any action by an advocate will be taken as a public cause by members of the legal profession, and thus they will be put to difficulties. The inaction on the part of the police officers enabled the respondents 6 to 12, who were staying within the School premises along with anti-social elements, to prevent the Principal from discharging her functions. Moreover, the Order passed in W.M.P. No. 11310 of 1998 in W.P. No. 7410 of 1998 was treated with contempt by these persons. It is under these circumstances, petitioner has come to this Court for the aforesaid relief.
10. When the matter came for admission, I ordered notice of motion, and also ordered interim injunction as prayed for till 17.9.1998. The said order is still in force.
11. 10th respondent has filed a counter affidavit, though in the cover page of the counter affidavit, it is mentioned as Mr. D. Ramakrishnan, Advocate for respondents 10, 11 and 13 to 15. In the counter-affidavit, tenth respondent has mainly challenged the locus standi of the petitioner to file the writ petition, especially in view of the interim order in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 and also in view of the dismissal of C.S. No. 139 of 1997, on the file of this Court. According to him, in view of these Orders, petitioner cannot claim to be the Secretary of the School Committee, nor can he claim to be an office-bearer of the Society. He also pleaded ignorance about the order in O.S. No. 1684 of 1993 filed by the Society in which the convening of the general body meeting to be held on 24.11.1993 or on any other date. It is also contended that the injunction order passed in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 is not non est, and till it is not set aside by an order of court, petitioner herein is also bound by the same. It is said that the appointment of Principal made by the society without taking into consideration the interim order which N.S. Viswanathan had obtained, is invalid in law. Many allegations have been made against the Principal of the Training College. The allegation that the 10th respondent has forged the signature is also denied. It is said that they have appointed another Principal, and this was resisted by the erstwhile Principal and also by one Sushilla Kumari Vyas, and thus there was confusion in the administration of the Institution. It is said that the respondents 6 to 12 are entitled to admit students to the school and also the college, whereas the petitioner is not entitled to admit students in view of the orders mentioned above.
12. Along with the writ petition, petitioner has also filed W.M.P. No. 16977 of 1998 to direct respondents 2 and 3 to give adequate protection and security to the petitioner and respondents 13 and 14. Institutions for proper management and also to take necessary action against persons who are violating the orders of this Court.
13. Advocate Mr. R. Sankaranarayanan appeared for the 10th respondent college and also placed before me the Minutes of the Society, and also filed a list containing the events chronologically. Though he did not file counter, he advanced arguments.
14. From the Minutes Book for the period from 24.4.1993 till date placed before this Court, it could be seen that an 14.5.1993, an Extraordinary Meeting was held and Thiru N.S. Viswanathan was directed to make available the minutes and other books of the Society for inspection. An Emergency Meeting was also held on 265.1993 for which also N.S. Viswanathan was absent. The Members of the Governing Body expressed their concern over the fact that N.S. Viswanathan was continuing to occupy the premises illegally without sanction from the Governing Body and the successor who was inducted must be allowed to occupy the premises. The Governing Body, therefore, requested Thiru N.S. Viswanathan to vacate the premises. The Governing Body also decided to issue lawyer's notice. The Governing Body also took note of the fact that N.S. Viswanathan neither produced the books nor made his appearance for the meeting. The Governing Body also took note of Clause 10 of the By-laws of the Society wherein it is said that if any member of the Governing Body absents himself for more than four consecutive meetings without prior intimation leave of absence, he loses his seat ipso facto. The Governing Body decided that this fact should be brought to the notice of Thiru N.S. Viswanathan so that necessary action could be taken. A further meeting was also held on 22.6.1994 wherein the litigation already filed by N.S. Viswanathan was also discussed. Similar is the case with respect to the Governing Body's Meeting held on 11.2.1995. A Governing Body meeting was also held on 25.3.1995 and in the Governing Body meeting held on 4.11.1995 it was resolved that necessary action should be taken for getting the records which were retained by N.S. Viswanathan, and action should also be taken to take possession of the premises occupied by him. A similar decision also seems to have been taken in the general body meeting. In that meeting, it was further decided that since N.S. Viswanathan has lost his status in the Governing Body because his continuous absence and nobody recommended the retention of his name, his name should be removed from the Governing Body. On 6.3.1996, Annual General Meeting was held under the Chairmanship of Shri C.R. Pattabiraman. It has got relevance for the purpose of this case. Shri C.R. Pattabiraman, Chairman, indicated that accounts of the Society for the years 1992-93,1993-94 and 1994-95 could not be finalised and put up before the general body as they were not handed over by N.S. Viswanathan, the Former Secretary, to his successor. In that meeting, Mrs. Sarojini Varadappan was elected as President of Shriman N.K. Thirumalachariar National Education Society for a period of three years effective from 6.3.1996, and Mrs. Mano Bakthavatsalam was elected as Honorary Treasurer of the Society for a period of three years. As Ex-officio Members, Dr. Miss. Suseela Kumari Vyas, Mrs. C. Chellammal and Mrs. K.N. Vijayalakshmi were taken as members of the Governing Body. The Minutes of the Governing Body meeting held on 6.3.1996 are also available in the file. It may be further seen that appointments were also made to the Committees of the various Schools and the deponent to this writ petition was appointed as Secretary in respect of N.K.T. National Girls Higher Secondary School for a period of three years. The book further contains details of other meetings of the Educational Society upto 1.8.1998.
15. Mr. Sankaranarayanan, learned Counsel, has also brought to my notice the correspondence between the Registrar of Societies and the Secretary of the Society. The entire correspondence till date has been placed before this Court. The last of the letters is dated 20.7.1998.
16. Before proceeding further to deal with the details of the meetings, certain admitted facts may be summarised thus:
N.K. Thirumalachariar National Education Society was founded in 1944. One N.S. Viswanathan was the Headmaster of the N.K.T. National Boys High School. He retired in 1971, and he was admitted as Member of the Governing Body in 1991, and later he became the Secretary of the Society. In 1992, there was some misunderstanding between the Members of the Society and N.S. Viswanathan. The allegation was that he was not managing the affairs of the Society and the Institutions properly. It was also alleged that he was not maintaining the accounts properly. On 6.2.1993, it was decided to hold a general body meeting, but the same could not be held since N.S. Viswanathan was not present, and he also did not bring the records before the Governing Body. The meeting was adjourned to 6.3.1993. In that meeting N.S. Viswanathan was present. Even though he wanted to be re-elected as Secretary, the same was not successful, and a different body was elected.
17. Within two days thereafter, N.S. Viswanathan filed O.S. No. 2038 of 1993 before the 8th Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras, to restrain the duly elected body and the office bearers from interfering in the discharge of his duties as Secretary of the Society for a period of three years from 18.8.1992. He also filed I.A. No. 3857 of 1993 seeking interim injunction. On 9.3.1993, ad-interim injunction was granted. While the Interim Injunction application was about to be heard, the present 10th respondent who was the counsel for N.S. Viswanathan filed an application as I.A. No. 8105 of 1993 alleging contempt. On 17.9.1993, the City Civil Court held that there was no contempt, and it was also found that the suit was filed suppressing material facts., viz., that there was no statement regarding convening of the general body meeting on 6.3.1993. It was further found in that Order that N.S. Viswanathan was not the Secretary. Immediately thereafter, N.S. Viswanathan filed O.P. No. 310 of 1993, seeking transfer of his suit to some other court. The defendants in that suit did not raise any objection and agreed for a transfer. The suit was transferred to the Fifth Assistant City Civil Judge.
18. In the meanwhile, the society filed O.S. No. 1684 of 1993 against N.S. Viswanathan and others from convening a meeting either on 24.11.1993 or on any other date. N.S. Viswanathan and his associates wanted to hold a parallel meeting, once he was elected as a Secretary. The same was prevented by an order of injunction obtained by the Society. Even though the suit filed by N.S. Viswanathan was transferred to 13th Judge, City Civil Court, he was not satisfied with the transfer, and he thereafter filed another transfer petition that his suit must be transferred to the High Court. The same was also not opposed, and accordingly the suit was transferred to the High Court and re-numbered as C.S. No. 1277 of 1995. On 17.10.1995, while I was sitting on the Original Side, I dismissed the suit holding that nothing survives for consideration in that suit. I held that even if the plaint allegations were taken as prima facie at their face value, the period had already expired, and the suit itself had become infructuous.
19. On the same day of the dismissal of that suit by me, the 12th respondent herein filed another suit as O.S. No. 7466 of 1995 before the 12th Assistant Judge, to restrain the Governing Body from functioning. He described himself as President of the Society as per election held on 24.11.1993 at the instance of N.S. Viswanathan. Though ad interim injunction was granted in I.A. No. 14871 of 1995, in that suit final orders were passed on 6.2.1996 vacating the same. It was held by the 12th Assistant Judge that the 12th respondent has no right in the Society and the so-called election on 24.11.1993 is void since there was no injunction from holding any meeting on that date. That order has become final.
20. On 10.2.1996, the Governing Body again met and it was resolved to hold an annual general meeting on 6.3.1996. In that meeting it was further resolved that N.S. Viswanathan may be removed from the Governing Body as he had abstained from the meetings consecutively for more than four occasions. A letter was also communicated to the Registrar of Societies on 23.2.1996 to that effect. On 6.3.1996, a suit was filed as O.S. No. 3033 of 1996 before the III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, for a declaration that the meeting to be held on 6.3.1996 was illegal, and an interim injunction restraining the Society from holding the meeting on 6.3.1996 was also prayed for. No interim injunction was granted. The suit was filed by N.S. Viswanathan. As scheduled, the annual general meeting was held on 6.3.1996. Mrs. Sarojini Varadappan was elected as President and other Office-bearers were also duly elected and the intimation was duly communicated to the Members. After the election, N.S. Viswanathan did not remain silent. He filed a suit as O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 for declaring that the so-called office bearers elected on 6.3.1996 are not entitled to function as Governing Members and for permanent injunction restraining them from functioning in any manner relating to the affairs of the Society. No interim order was granted. The case was posted on 30.6.1996, on which date learned Counsel for the Society submitted that the injunction application is frivolous and it is a result of suppression of material facts. The court decided not to grant any interim order, and the suit was adjourned. But there is some dispute as to the date to which the suit was adjourned. According to learned Counsel for the Society, Thiru Sankaranarayanan, the adjourned date was 25.9.1996, but the same was subsequently corrected without notice, and the case was posted to 10.9.1996, on which date an order was passed allowing the application filed by N.S. Viswanathan. It is said that even though the correction was also brought to the notice of the learned Judge, the trial Judge promised to dispose of the suit at the earliest. In fact, an affidavit was also filed making mention of the above correction.
21. On 24.3.1997, the 15th respondent filed C.S. No. 139 of 1997 for declaration that the 12th respondent and others are not members of the Governing Body and for an injunction. The suit was listed for trial on 17.3.1998. On that date, the suit was called and was dismissed for de-fault. An application for restoration was filed, and it is pending. On 10.6.1998 N.S. Viswanathan died.
22. As I said earlier, the main contention raised by Shri S.K. Sundaram, Advocate, 10th respondent herein, who appeared in person the present writ petition is barred in view of the interim order granted in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 and also the dismissal of the suit C.S. No. 139 of 1997. Whether this contention has any merit will be considered in a later portion of this order, and at that juncture I will consider about the validity of the orders mentioned above.
23. Before further proceeding to the merits of the case, I have to consider the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
24. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 946 : (1963)1 S.C.R. 1, their Lordships held thus:
...It is, therefore, clear from the nature of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subjects that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction, though original in character, as contrasted with its appellate and revision jurisdictions, is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may, for convenience, be described as Extraordinary original jurisdiction.
25. In Dwarka Nath v. I.T. Officer , their Lordships considered this power and held thus:
We shall first take the preliminary objection, for if we maintain it, no other question will arise for consideration. Article 226 of the Constitution reads:
...every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose.
This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power of the High Courts to reach injustice where it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression "nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T.C. Basappav. Nagappa and Irani v. State of Madras .
26. In Union of India and Ors. v. R. Reddappa and Anr. (in para 5), their Lordships have said thus:
...the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 or the tribunal is not as wide as it is in appeal or revision but once the court is satisfied of injustice or arbitrariness, then the restriction^ self-imposed or statutory, stands removed, and no rule or technicality on exercise of power, can stand in the way of rendering justice....
27. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , in a concurring judgment by Justice Hansaria, in para 23, their Lordships considered the power of the High Court thus:
It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142, relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice, and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh case that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that to do complete justice also inheres in every court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. Of course, this power is not as wide as which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter.
[Italics supplied]
28. In the book 'writ remedies' by Justice-Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee - 2nd Edition (1998), at page 15, the learned Author has said thus, regarding the scope of Article 226:
To do complete justice: High Court, being a Court of Plenary jurisdiction, has inherent power to do 'complete justice' between the parties similar to Supreme Court's power under Article 142. The mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Court, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material. High Courts too can exercise power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. The power to do complete justice also inheres in every court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like the High Court. Of course, this power is not as wide as which the Supreme Court has under Article 142....
29. Why I am stressing on power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is that once the petitioner has come to this Court with a grievance, and if the same is found to be genuine one, and if it is further found that an injustice has been caused by intervention of a third party who has no right over the institution, this Court cannot close its eyes and say that in view of the technical arguments put forward by the 10th respondent, petitioner is not entitled to any remedy. Technicalities will have to yield when it is ultimately found that interest of justice has suffered, especially when a manifest injustice is apparent. We must also understand that this Court is concerned about an educational institution where the atmosphere should be peaceful. If a third party interferes in the management of the educational institution without any right and consequently the teaching staff are transferred or removed from service, persons who are really affected are the students for no fault of theirs. It is the institution that fails, and consequently the entire society is affected. This Court is well aware that even though it has got extraordinary or unlimited powers, it should be exercised with great limitations. But that is a self-imposed restriction. But once the injustice is patent and it is likely to affect the society at large, that will be a circumstance to exercise the extraordinary powers and see that justice is restored.
30. Now I will consider the merits of the case. I have already said that I have perused the Minutes of the 15th respondent. It is clear therefrom that N.S. Viswanathan has been removed and various allegations have also been made against him while he was Secretary. It could be further seen from my judgment in C.S. No. 1277 of 1995 that even the claim of N.S. Viswanathan in that suit was that he is entitled to continue as Secretary for a period of three years from 18.8.1992. Even he did not have a claim beyond that period. I have also found in that case that even if the plaint averments are taken in their face value, nothing survived in that suit, and the suit itself was dismissed as infructuous. I declared in that suit that on the date of that suit, he was no longer the Secretary of the Society.
31. On 6.3.1993, another General Body meeting was held. N.S. Viswanathan was not elected and he only put forward a claim that he is entitled to continue as Secretary. On what basis, he put- forward such a claim is not in evidence. No evidence has also been filed before this Court to substantiate the same. In this connection, it may also be noted that even though he has obtained an order of injunction, he also moved a contempt application in the very same court on the allegation that the elected office bearers have violated the interim order. Court found that there was suppression of facts even in the suit filed by him, and he-was no longer the Secretary on that date. The contempt application was dismissed on the ground that the plaint did not disclose the fact of annual general body meeting held on 6.3.1993, and some other person was elected as Secretary. This finding in the contempt application was never disturbed in any other proceeding, and I dismissed the suit ultimately.
32. The next Annual General Body Meeting was to be held on 6.3.1996. Again a suit was filed as O.S. No. 3033 of 1996 to restrain the Society from holding an annual general body meeting. No interim order was granted. Other office bearers were elected and they assumed office. A few months after that, in July, 1996 N.S. Viswanathan again filed a suit as O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 to declare that the elected office-bearers are not entitled to function as such and wanted an injunction. An interim application was also filed. But no order was passed. On 30.7.1996, it was represented before court that there was suppression of material facts in the plaint in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996. A copy of the plaint in that suit is also available among the typed set of papers. It could be seen therefrom that Shri N.S. Viswanathan has not stated anything about the prior litigations, except the suit filed by Balan (12th respondent herein). Even in regard to that suit, he only said that the said suit was pending. The earlier suit filed by him as C.S. No. 1277 of 1995, its dismissal, and the filing of another suit as O.S. No. 3033 of 1996 are not referred to therein. It may also be noted that the last suit, namely, O.S. No. 10880 of 1996 was filed on 19.7.1996. In O.S. No. 7466 of 1996 filed by 12th respondent on 6.2.1996, it was declared by the learned Judge in that case that the so-called meeting dated 24.11.1993 is not valid and he cannot claim to be the President of the Society. None of these facts is averred in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996. It is said that on 10.9.1996, an interim order was passed in O.S. No. 10880 of 1996. What is the interim relief that was sought for, and what is the order that was passed, may be considered, so that the technical argument advanced by Mr. S.K. Sundaram, 10th respondent herein, could also be considered. The injunction application and the order passed thereon are as follows:
For the reason stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is therefore prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to grant an order of temporary injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from functioning in any manner pertaining to the affairs of the Sriman N.K.T. National Educational Society and its educational institutions, Triplicane, Madras-600 005, till the disposal of the above suit and pass such other and further suitable orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and thus render justice.
Dated at Madras this the 19th day of July, 1996.
Sd. S.K. Sundaram, Counsel for Petitioner/Plaintiff Order dated: 10.9.1996:
After lunch. Counter not filed. No representation for respondent. Respondent called absent set exparte. Petition allowed.
Sd. V.C. Rajamanicakm, IV Asst. Judge.
What is the scope of that order?
33. I have already said that in the plaint filed by N.S. Viswanathan, who was represented by the 10th respondent herein, nothing has been stated about the prior suits and the orders passed thereon. The fact that already a suit was dismissed by me in which there was already a finding by me that N.S. Viswanathan is not the Secretary, and the further fact that there had been an annual general body meeting on 6.3.1993 are not stated. The fact of his filing another suit as O.S. No. 3033 of 1996 is also suppressed. His own associate, who is the 12th respondent herein, filed another suit on the basis of a parallel meeting. It also did not find merit with the City Civil Court, i.e., in that suit, the injunction application was dismissed. Even though he states that the suit filed by 10th respondent is pending, consciously he did not make mention of the dismissal of the injunction application, and the reason for such dismissal. It is clear therefrom that was suppression of material facts, and particulars which ought to have been mentioned were not stated in the plaint. One thing more, N.S. Viswanathan has not stated anything in the plaint, regarding his right in the Society, except stating that he is a life member. Once there is suppression of material facts and only on a perusal of the plaint alone, the court passes an order, what does it mean? It means that the court took the statement contained therein as true, and it has passed the order in the light of the averments made therein. That means, a fraud is played on court by suppressing material facts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994)1 S.C.C. 1. Their Lordships held in paragraphs 5 and 6 thus:
The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex.B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex.B-15 and nonsuited the plaintiff.A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.
[Italics supplied]
34. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996)5 S.C.C. 550, their Lordships have held that the party who has played fraud on Court for obtaining an Order should not rely on his own fraud, and the same unravels everything. It is better to extract that portion of the order which reads thus:
Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court, the courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court. Similarly, where the court is misled by a party or the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the court has the inherent power to recall its order....
[Italics supplied] I make it clear that I am not justifying the absence of the petitioner herein when the suit was called on for hearing. The court may be justified in passing the order of dismissal. But the validity of the order and how far reliance could be placed on the same are different. If only N.S. Viswanathan and the present 10th respondent had placed all the materials before court, even if the petitioner was absent, the court might not have passed such an order. While passing an order in the absence of a party, the court looks into the materials that are placed before it. The 10th respondent should have been little more honest while drafting the plaint and before procuring an order. As a counsel who was all along appearing for N.S. Viswanathan in all the litigations, he knows the details of prior litigations and their results. N.S. Viswanathan who was also acting on the dictates of 10th respondent, a legal practitioner, was also aware of the same. Why he suppressed these facts is not even stated in the counter filed by him. An order which was obtained on the basis of a fraud played by him cannot be the basis of a claim by 10th respondent or by any person who are the beneficiaries of the order.
35. The said order is also invalid in law for another reason. Admittedly no interim order was passed at the time when the plaint was presented. The court directed only notice. That means, the court did not find a prima facie case for granting an interim order when the plaint was presented. The suit was adjourned to 30.7.1996, and it was represented before court that in the plaint there is suppression of material facts. The suit was thereafter adjourned. Even then no interim order was granted. It was only in the absence of the defendants' counsel, in the suit an interim order was granted. It is here we have to consider how far reliance could be placed on such an order. I have extracted the order passed by court. An 'order' has been defined in the Civil Procedure Code under Section 2(14). It means 'the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree'.
36. In a recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Dinesh Mathur v. O.P. Arora and Ors. (1997) 10 S.C.C. 520, their Lordships have considered the conditions on the basis of which an interim injunction could be granted. Their Lordships have stated in para 3 thus:
."..Granting injunction is a matter of discretion. Balance of convenience and irremediable injury are triable issues and are required to be examined and found positively, [words in italics] ..."In the order on which reliance is placed, there is no finding at all on any of these points. It only says: "defendant absent. Hence interim order is granted."
37. In Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. , in paragraphs 5 and 6, their Lordships have held thus:
Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bonafide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is & prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the court has to exercise it sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad-interim injunction pending the suit.
...
...But the court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused.... The phrases "prima facie ", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by men's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well-nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success.
If we take into consideration this decision, even the jurisdiction of court to pass interim order is only on the basis of these findings. Merely because the defendant is not present or has not filed counter, court is not getting jurisdiction to pass an interim order in the absence of compliance of these requirements. It is settled law that granting injunction is a discretion. The discretion must be on the basis of materials placed before court. If a discretion is to be exercised on the basis of materials placed before court, again, absence of defendant will not be a ground. From the order on which reliance is placed, it cannot be said that discretion has been exercised in such a way in which the court should have done.
36. I have already extracted the definition of 'order' as given in the Civil Procedure Code. It is an adjudication. It pre-supposes a determination of rights and a reasoned order. In the decision reported in Rameshwar Dayal v. Banda (1993)1 S.C.C. 531 an ex parte decree was passed under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887. Even though defendant had filed written statement, on the date of hearing, he was not present. The court only said:
The defendant did not turn up to contest the suit. Hence the case was proceeded ex parte. The suit is decreed ex parte with costs for ejectment of the defendant from the suit property.
The defendant in that suit, even though took steps for getting the ex parte decree set aside, could not succeed. He ultimately filed another suit for declaring the ex parte decree as invalid. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that unless issues are settled or there is some reasoning, it cannot be said to be a judgment or decree and, therefore, it is non est in law. In para 20 of the judgment, their Lordships said thus:
...Hence the present decision of the Small Cause Court is not a judgment and a decree in the eye of law and is, therefore, non est as far as the respondent is concerned.
37. Even though in this case we are not concerned with a decree, I am taking guidance from the said decision that when law requires that granting of an injunction should be on satisfaction of certain requirements, even if the defendant is ex parte, the court cannot abdicate its duties and grant order in favour of plaintiff merely because of the absence of defendant. The court will have to see whether the plaintiff who has come to Court is entitled to the relief. That entitlement is not on the basis of absence of defendant, but on the basis of the claim put forward by plaintiff. There must be an adjudication of that claim. In a decision of the Kerala High Court reported in Haridass v. Madhavi Amma (1987)2 K.L.T. 701, the question that came for consideration was, in a case where written statement could not be filed within the time granted by court, and an ex parte decree was passed, whether an application under O.9, Rule 13, C.P.C. was maintainable. In that case, the further question that came for consideration was, what are the matters to be considered for passing a decree even in the absence of defendant. In the instant case, the order dated 10.9.1996 which does not satisfy any of the legal requirements is not an order in law, and it is only to be ignored, in the light of the decision of the Kerala High Court, referred to supra, wherein it was held thus:
The opening words of Order 9, Rule 13 (C.P.C.) are in any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant." Therefore, the real question for the applicability of the rule is, whether the decree is ex parte or one on the merits whatever be the provision under which it was resorted to. If it is ex parte the remedy under Order 9, Rule 13 is there irrespective of the simultaneous or alternate remedy by way of appeal. Whether the decree is ex parte or one oh the merits is a question of fact depending upon the facts of each case. A decree which is for all external appearance one on the merits may in fact only be an ex parte one. As held in Chari Vijayan v. Achuthan Vasti 1973 K.L.T. 849, the courts owe a duty to weigh the merits of the case and consider whether there is a case for granting a decree even when there is no contest by non-appearance of the defendants. Attention to pleadings and evidence even in cases where the defendants do not appear is not only a healthy trend but also a duty cast on the court to decide whether the plaintiff has a good case to be decreed.Even in cases where the defendant remains ex parte, decreeing the suit merely on that ground without looking into the pleadings and evidence may not be conducive to justice. Whether the claim is contested or not is not the real question. The question is whether the plaintiff presented a case entitling him to get a decree. For that purpose, even in cases where the defendants remain ex parte the court should insist atleast on formal proof from the plaintiff as held in Kochvelu v. Markey 1968 K.L.T. 462 and the Judge is bound to look into pleadings and evidence.
[Italics supplied] Therefore, the contention of the 10th respondent that there is an injunction is favour of one of the respondents and the same is still in force is only to be ignored.
38. The next contention is that the Society itself has filed a suit as C.S. No. 139 of 1997 and the same was dismissed for default. I do not find any merit in the said contention also. Dismissal for default is not an adjudication. At the most, plaintiff therein may not be in a position to file fresh suit on the same cause of action. Plaintiff in C.S. No. 139 of 1997 is the 15th respondent herein. Present petitioner was not the plaintiff. As against the petitioner, there is no bar under any law. Even though the plaintiff also might be claiming as an Institution formed by 15th respondent, petitioner itself is a legal entity. What is the consequence of a suit for dismissal for default? As I said already, there is no adjudication of rights when a suit is dismissed for default. Rules 8 and 9 of Order 9, Civil Procedure Code are two sides of the same coin. A dismissal of a suit under Rule 8 does not mean that the dismissal was intended to operate in favour of defendant as resjudicata. It does not give any benefit to the 10th respondent or respondents 6 to 12. It only precludes the 15th respondent herein from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action in view of the statutory bar. Even if the 15th respondent is a defendant in a subsequent suit, it is not precluded from agitating the same matter in a subsequent suit. In this case, the 15th respondent is entitled to put forward all the claims, and that is what the 15th respondent has done by placing the entire records. It is also not on the same cause of action. To prove that it is under the same cause of action, 10th respondent must place some records before court to show that in the present writ petition as well as in the earlier plaint, the case is the same. The plaint in the earlier suit is not before court, except the decretal order. If the 15th respondent who was the plaintiff in that case is not prohibited from agitating the claim, in view of its position as respondent in the writ petition, the court is bound to look into the same and cannot close its eyes merely because the earlier suit was dismissed for default. Again, on a reading of Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C., there is a bar only from entertaining a suit. Writ petition is not a suit in law. It is a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, the technical argument put forward by learned Counsel for 10th respondent deserves only to be rejected.
39. If reliance is placed on technical arguments, the technicality also must be proved in full. There is absolutely no evidence before court to substantiate his argument, except a counter-affidavit wherein it is merely said that the suit was dismissed for default.
40. If the two arguments of 10th respondent are taken away, and when there are no materials before court to show that respondents 6 to 12 have any right in the Society, and at the same, when the petitioner has also proved its case, I feel that this is a fit case where the court must grant relief sought for. It is here, the power of Article 226 of the Constitution will have to be invoked, which I have extracted from various decisions.
41. One thing that is clear from the conduct of the 10th respondent is that he will not allow the Society or the petitioner or any of the educational institutions to function smoothly. Even though he appeared in the scene as an advocate for the erstwhile Secretary, his actions have exceeded beyond the role as a Counsel. It is now admitted that he saw that his wife was appointed as Secretary of the Society, and he is now intermeddling with the affairs of the school and other institutions. It is unfortunate that a counsel who is presumed to know the fundamentals of law, has stooped to such a level, and made the atmosphere of the educational institutions miserable. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that in spite of the order passed by me, the 10th respondent refused to obey the same, and he has created scenes in the Institution. It has also come out in evidence that persons appointed by him or his associates are not allowing these educational institutions to function properly, and the 10th respondent is also issuing notice to staff members as if he is the disciplinary authority. When respondent 6 to 12 have no fight in any of these Institutions run by the 15th respondent, they have to be prevented from even entering into the premises of these various institutions. Respondents 6 to 9 are only the legal heirs of late N.S. Viswanathan. A life membership which he had in the Society had come to an end on his death. There is no question of devolution of membership in Society. It is not a hereditable estate.
42. Immediately after the suit was dismissed for default, I find that the 10th respondent had been making representations to the Authorities as if everything is under his management or his wife along with Balan, who was also defeated in an earlier suit. In what way he assumed the management, and under what right they had secured the right to manage the Institutions? To establish these things, there is no material before court. As I said earlier, the order dated 10.9.1996 and the dismissal for default will not confer a right on respondents 6 to 12. They have been misconducting themselves in a temple of Learning, and staff of the Institution have also been harassed. Respondents 2 and 3 who are police officials should see that respondents 6 to 12 do not interfere with the administration and management of 15th respondent and its educational institutions, i.e., respondents 13 and 14. Merely because the 10th respondent happens to be an advocate, that cannot be a reason for the police officers not to take any action, if he is responsible for the mischief. An advocate is not immune from the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or law of the land. As a professional, he is accountable to the Society and he should be more responsible, and he must behave properly. If a legal practitioner himself acts against law, police officials should not be hesitant to initiate action, whatever may be the consequences. If they refuse to act so, it amounts to abdication of their duties. In such an event, the court will have to step in and issue necessary mandamus in such cases. Why I am stating this is, for the reason that an affidavit has been filed before this Court stating that the 10th respondent along with some anti-social elements on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court on 10.9.96 is creating nuisance in these educational institutions, and when representations/complaints were given to respondents 2 and 3, they refused to act on the same, The approach of the respondents 2 and 3 is only to be deprecated. They should provide adequate and necessary police protection for these Educational Institutions so long as they require.
43. From the above discussion, my conclusions are:
15th respondent society and the educational institutions under it, i.e., petitioner and respondents 13 and 14, are managed and controlled only by the office-bearers duly elected in the annual general body meeting dated 6.3.1996. Instead of enumerating them or giving their names, a copy of the entire proceedings of that meeting shall form as Annexure to this order? Only those officers who were duly elected in the said meeting are entitled to represent these Institutions in any proceeding or in a court of law. Only they are entitled to appoint teachers or admit students to these Institutions. Respondents 6 to 12 or any persons associated with them have no right in any of these Institutions, nor are they entitled to institute any proceeding in the names of these Institutions or to appoint any person or admit any student therein. All appointments made by them are declared null and void and the elected office bearers (elected on 6.3.1996) are not bound by the appointments so made. In regard to admissions of students, it is for the duly elected office bearers to decide whether they should be accommodated in the various institutions. Students being innocent and were not aware of the malicious and fraudulent acts of respondents 6 to 12, should be given a sympathetic consideration. I leave the matter of admission of those students to the discretion of the duly elected office bearers, and accommodating those students will be decided by them.
44. From the affidavit of 10th respondent, it is further seen that he has appointed a principal and other staff to the Institution. From the records in this case, i.e., affidavit and counter affidavit, it is seen that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against some of the staff who were appointed by the duly elected office-bearers. All the disciplinary proceedings, suspension or other enquiry initiated by respondents 6 to 12 and their associates are declared invalid and shall not be proceeded with further. The victims of those proceedings are entitled to join the Institution as if no proceedings were initiated against them.
45. It is seen that late N.S. Viswanathan was occupying a building in the premises belong to the 15th respondent i.e., in the respondent premises, in his capacity as secretary. Only in that capacity he occupied the building, and it is seen from the resolutions that he was asked to vacate the premises, and he was also directed to produce the accounts for the period from 1992-93 onwards. He did not comply with the same, and he resorted to various litigations. Since his secretary ship has already been terminated, he has no right to continue in the building, since the permission given to him is only in the nature of a licence. It is also not a hereditable right. Respondents 6 to 9 are occupying the same without authority. Therefore, respondents 6 to 9 and any persons claiming under them or through them, are bound to surrender the building to the 15th respondent within 48 hours time I also direct respondents 6 to 12 to return all the account books and records of the Institution which they have been retaining for the last few years. This direction should also be complied with, within 24 hours from now. All amounts received by respondents 6 to 12 in the name of the society and the Institutions, are to be returned to the secretary duly elected by the 15th respondent-Society, within 24 hours from now. Only those persons who were duly elected and appointed by 15th respondent-Society are entitled to enter the premises of these Institutions, apart from the students. Respondents 6 to 12 and their associates have no right to interfere with the administration of any of these Institutions and to enter the premises for any purpose.
46. In view of the above conclusions, naturally some direction also has to be given to the police officers, viz., respondents 2 and 3 herein to implement the same. I direct respondents 2 and 3 to see that respondents 6 to 12 or their associates do not enter the premises of the 15th respondent or any of its educational institutions. Merely because the 10th respondent happens to be an advocate, respondents 2 and 3 should not hesitate to take any action against him, if he acts against the directions given above. No lenience also should be shown to him in taking any such action. Proceedings will have to be taken against him in accordance with law. The duly elected secretary of the 15th respondent shall submit a ,., list of staff appointed by the society and on submission of the same, they alone will be permitted to enter the premises for the purpose of teaching the students, and also to do the work allotted to them. Respondents 2 and 3 are directed to see that persons appointed by respondents 6 to 12 and their associates do not enter the premises for any purpose.
47. If respondents 6 to 9 do not surrender the building which they are presently occupying within 48 hours from now, I direct respondents 2 and 3 to see that they are dispossessed and the building is taken possession of by them, and surrender the key of that building to the duly elected secretary. Under no circumstance, respondents 6 to 9 shall be allowed to continue in possession of the building beyond 48 hours from now.
48. In case respondents 6 to 12 do not hand over the records within 24 hours from now, and also the amounts collected by them in the name of various educational institutions run by 15th respondent, respondents 2 and 3 are directed to take immediate action for the search of those documents and take possession of the same, to be handover to the duly elected secretary of the 15th respondent. Any failure on the part of respondent 2 and 3 to comply with the above directions will be viewed seriously. They should comply with these directions in letter and spirit, and report compliance of the same at 10.30 a.m. on 31.8.1998 (Monday) before this Court.
49. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above with costs, which I quantify at Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand only). W.M.P. No. 16977 of 1998 for direction regarding police protection is also allowed as prayed for. The other connected W.M.Ps. are closed.