Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dr. V.V. Devsthale vs Income-Tax Officer And Ors. on 14 February, 1995
Equivalent citations: [1995]214ITR315(MP)
JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner is a partner of the firm bearing the name and style of Opal Fine Chemicals Industries, which carries on business at Indore. The firm was constituted on April 28, 1953, and carries on the business of manufacture and sale of cosmetic chemicals. It was assessed to income-tax for the first assessment year, i.e., 1974-75. The firm obtained registration under the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act. Various assessment orders were passed. The petitioner filed returns showing losses at Rs. 1,74,610 and Rs. 2,29,947 for the assessment years 1978-79 and 1980-81, respectively. For non-compliance with notices under Section 143(2), the Income-tax Officer completed the assessments ex parte determining the total income at Rs. 3 lakhs and Rs. 5 lakhs, respectively. It appears that the petitioner did not file any application under Section 146 against the assessment orders passed by the Income-tax Officer. The petitioner preferred appeals against these assessment orders on January 10, 1984, before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals-I), Indore. These two appeals were dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in limine on March 3, 1984, as time-barred. An application of the petitioner for condonation of delay in submitting the appeals for these two years was also rejected by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The present petitions under Section 264 have been filed on July 27, 1984, and are thus late by nearly four months. The petitioner filed an application dated February 21, 1985, and a written submission dated March 5, 1985. Aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No. 3 (Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal) under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (annexure 'P-20'), the petitioner has filed this writ petition.
3. The respondents have filed the return in opposition. I have heard both the sides.
4. As urged by counsel for the petitioner, it is not necessary for me to examine the validity of the orders or the merits of the matter. He limited this petition to the grievance of improper rejection of the application seeking condonation of delay in the submission of the case under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
5. The application under Section 264 of the Act was filed on July 27, 1984, and was barred by nearly four months, as the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was passed on March 3, 1984.
6. Counsel for the respondents submitted that if the order disposing of the application seeking condonation of delay is demolished, then the matter may be left to the discretion of the authority for reconsideration of the application afresh and that the respondents may be left free to object to the prayer of condonation of delay.
7. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC), it is held that the court should adopt a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay.
8. In view of the submissions of both the sides, I find it fit not to express any opinion on the question of condonation, but demolish the order so far as it rejected the application dated February 21, 1985, seeking condonation of delay with the direction to the authorities to revive this application and to decide it afresh after hearing both the sides in this behalf. For this purpose, the points posed or opposed shall also be treated as open and litigable. The authority shall also take into account the conduct of the petitioner, the time spent in other proceedings and the desirability or otherwise of examination of the matter on the merits for doing justice between the parties and decide the question afresh in conformity with law. If the authority elects to condone the delay, then the application submitted under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act shall be heard and decided on the merits.
9. This petition is, thus, disposed of in the terms indicated above, but without any order as to costs. The security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner after due verification.