Delhi District Court
State vs Virender Singh on 14 May, 2024
IN THE COURT OF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE-07,
WEST, TIS HAZARI COURTS,
NEW DELHI
Presided over by- Devanshu Sajlan, DJS
Cr. Case No. -: 65956/2016
Unique Case ID -: DLWT020027762014
No.
FIR No. -: 90/2014
Police Station -: Paschim Vihar East
Section(s) -: 341/506/509 IPC
In the matter of -
STATE
VS.
VIRENDER SINGH
.... Accused
1. Name of Complainant : Chitra Manchanda
2. Name of Accused : Virender Singh
Offence complained of or
3. : 341/506/509 IPC
proved
4. Plea of Accused : Not Guilty
5. Date of registration of FIR : 06.02.2014
Date of filing of
6. : 17.09.2014
chargesheet
7. Date of Reserving Order : 04.04.2024
8. Date of Pronouncement : 14.05.2024
9. Final Order : Acquitted
Argued by: Sh. Dhirendra Kumar Yadav, Ld. APP for the State.
Sh. Varun Kumar Singh, Ld. Counsel for both
accused. Digitally signed
by DEVANSHU
DEVANSHU SAJLAN
SAJLAN Date:
2024.05.14
17:12:05 +0530
Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 1 of 17
-:BRIEF STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION:-
-:FACTUAL MATRIX:-
1. Briefly put, the case of the prosecution is that on
06.02.2014 at about 02:45 PM, on the stairs in front of Flat No.71B,
Ekta Apartment, Paschim Vihar, within the jurisdiction of PS
Paschim Vihar, the accused Virender Singh wrongfully restrained
the children of the complainant namely Ayan @ Nupul Manchanda
(13 years) and Lavanya Manchanda (8 years) by restraining them
from going up stairs on the 2nd floor from the 1st floor (the accused
and his family are stated to have been residing on the 1 st floor
whereas the complainant with her family is stated to have been
residing on the 2n floor of the same building). Further, it is alleged
that when the complainant confronted the accused for misbehaving
with her children, the accused criminally intimidated the
complainant Smt. Chitra Manchanda by threatening her and he also
insulted the modesty of the complainant by uttering words in
obscene language. Accordingly, the accused is alleged to have
committed the offence punishable u/s 341/506/509 IPC.
INVESTIGATION AND APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED
2. After registration of the FIR, the Investigating Officer
(hereinafter, "IO") undertook investigation and on culmination of
the same, charge-sheet against the accused was filed. After taking
cognizance of the offence, accused was summoned to face trial.
3. On his appearance, a copy of charge-sheet was supplied
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DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU
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Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 2 of 17
to the accused in terms of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, "CrPC"). On finding a prima facie
case against the accused, charge under Sections 341/506/509 IPC
was framed against accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial.
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE -
4. During the trial, prosecution led the following oral and
documentary evidence against the accused to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt-:
ORAL EVIDENCE
PW-1 : Chitra Manchanda
PW-2 : Naveen Manchanda
PW-3 : Ayan @ Nupul Manchanda
PW-4 : Gulshan Malhotra
PW-5 : ASI Madan Lal
PW-6 : HC Rajender
PW-7 : HC Satbir
PW-8 : Retd. SI Rajender Singh
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Ex. PW-1/A : Statement of complainant
Ex. PW-1/B : Arrest memo
Ex. PW-1/C : Personal search memo
Ex. PW-1/DA : Site plan
Ex. PW-5/A
: FIR
(OSR)
Ex. PW-5/B : Endorsement on Rukka
Ex. PW-5/C : Certificate u/s 65B I.E. Act
Ex. PW6/A : DD No.29A dated 06.02.2014
Ex. PW-8/A : Rukka
Ex. PW-8/B : Bail bond
Digitally signed by
DEVANSHU DEVANSHU SAJLAN
SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14
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STATEMENT OF ACCUSED AND DEFENCE EVIDENCE -
5. Thereafter, before the start of defence evidence, in
order to allow the accused to personally explain the incriminating
circumstances appearing in evidence against him, the statement of
the accused was recorded without oath under Section 281 read with
Section 313 CrPC. accused stated that he is innocent and has been
falsely implicated in the present case. He further stated that on the
date of incident, his mother was seriously ill and the kids of the
complainant were shouting loudly coming from the school and he
had asked the kids to not do the same.
ARGUMENTS -
6. I have heard Sh. Dhirendra Kumar Yadav, Ld. APP for
the State and Sh. Varun Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the
accused at length. I have also given my thoughtful consideration to
the material appearing on record.
7. It is argued by the learned APP for the State that all the
ingredients of the offence are fulfilled in the present case. He has
argued that the testimony of the eye-witnesses has proved the
offence beyond reasonable doubt. As such, it is prayed that the
accused be punished for the said offences.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused has argued
that the State has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable
doubt. Learned counsel has argued that the accused has been falsely
implicated in the present case and no injury was caused to anybody
in the present case. Digitally signed by
DEVANSHU DEVANSHU SAJLAN
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Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 4 of 17
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE -
9. For commission of the offense under section 341 IPC,
the essential ingredients are: (i) accused obstructed a person with the
intention of preventing that person from proceeding in a direction in
which that person has a right to proceed; (ii) the accused committed
the said act voluntarily; and (iii) by doing such act, the accused
prevented such person from proceeding in certain direction in which
he had the right to proceed. The term 'voluntarily' has been defined
under section 39 of the IPC as follows:
A person is said to cause an effect "voluntarily" when he causes
it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which,
at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to
believe to be likely to cause it.
Illustration: A sets fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large
town, for the purpose of facilitating a robbery and thus causes
the death of a person. Here, A may not have intended to cause
death; and may even be sorry that death has been caused by his
act; yet, if he knew that he was likely to cause death, he has
caused death voluntarily.
10. Further, the accused has been charged for the offence
under Section 509 of the IPC, which is reproduced hereunder for
reference:
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters
any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object,
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such
gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon
the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and
also with fine.
11. The offence under the section 509 of IPC will be
attracted if a person intending to insult the modesty of a woman,
utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object,
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such
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gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or intrudes upon the
privacy of such woman. (see M.M. Haries v. State of Kerala
(16.02.2005 - Crl. M.C. No. 9717 of 2002).
12. Therefore, the prosecution was required to satisfy the
aforesaid ingredients to bring home the charge against the accused.
Needless to mention, in criminal law, the burden of proof on the
prosecution is that of beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of
innocence of the accused has to be rebutted by the prosecution by
adducing cogent evidence that points towards the guilt of the
accused. The evidence in the present case is to be weighed keeping
in view the above legal standards.
APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS-
A. Wrongful restraint
13. The testimony of PW-1/Smt. Chitra and Sh. Naveen
Manchanda is hearsay in nature with respect to the offence of
wrongful restraint. PW-1/Smt. Chitra specifically deposed in her
examination in chief that her elder son came to her crying and told
her about the incident. Further, PW-2/Sh. Naveen Manchanda
specifically admitted in his cross-examination that it is correct that
the incident did not happen in his presence. Therefore, the testimony
of PW-1 and PW-2 is not relevant to decide the allegations of
wrongful restraint.
14. PW-3 Ayan deposed that on the date of incident, the
accused came out of his house and blocked the way of PW Ayan
and his sister Lavanya while they were climbing the stairs of the
apartment. He further deposed that the accused caught hold of his
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arm and shook him and threatened him that they must go quietly
from the front of his flat. He further deposed that he and his sister
started crying after which they went to their home and narrated the
incident to their mother. Lastly, he deposed that they came back to
the spot with their mother where the accused started abusing their
mother in filthy language.
15. PW-4/Sh. Gulshan Malhotra deposed that on the date
of incident, he heard the noise of children crying and when he came
out of his flat, he saw that the accused had caught hold of two
children and he was shouting at them. He further deposed that the
said children went to their home while crying. He further deposed
that after some time, the children came down the stairs with their
mother and when the mother confronted the accused, the accused
started abusing her in filthy language.
16. The aforesaid testimonies have been perused. It has
been argued on behalf of the accused that he had not restrained the
children of the complainant in any manner. It has been further
submitted that even if the case of the prosecution is held to be
accepted to be true, the act of the accused did not cause any injury
to the complainant or her children in any manner. It has been further
submitted that the accused had merely told the children to not shout
since his mother was unwell and was taking rest. It has been
submitted that a criminal case has been filed against the accused due
to the political clout of the witness PW-4 Gulshan Malhotra, who
has orchestrated the present false case against the accused.
17. The aforesaid submissions reveal that the accused
wishes to invoke section 95 IPC in his defense. Section 95 IPC is
Digitally signed
by DEVANSHU
DEVANSHU SAJLAN
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intended to prevent penalization of negligible wrongs or offences of
trivial character. Whether an act, which amounts to an offence, is
trivial would undoubtedly depend upon nature of the injury, the
position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the
offending act is done, and other related circumstances (see Amish
Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1).
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Veeda
Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1773 (2)
considered the scope of section 95 IPC and observed that:
"The next question is whether, having regard to the
circumstances, the harm caused to the appellant and to her
servant Robert was so slight that no person of ordinary sense and
temper would complain of such harm. Section 95 is intended to
prevent penalization of negligible wrongs or of offences of
trivial character. Whether an act which amounts to an offence is
trivial would undoubtedly depend upon the nature of the injury,
the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with
which the offending act is done, and other related circumstances.
There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm which may
be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and
temper would not complain of the harm. It cannot be judged
solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes.
A soldier assaulting his colonel, a policeman assaulting his
Superintendent, or a pupil beating his teacher, commit offences,
the heniousness of which cannot be determined merely be the
actual injury suffered by the officer or the teacher, for the assault
would be wholly subversive of discipline. An assault by one
child or another, or even by a grown-up person on another,
which causes injury may still be regarded as so slight, having
regard to the way and station of life of the parties, relation
between them, situation in which the parties are placed, and
other circumstances in which harm is caused, that the victim
ordinarily may not complain of the harm."
19. Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has also dealt
with the applicability of section 95 IPC in Neelam Mahajan Singh v.
Commissioner of Police, 1993 SCC OnLine Del 505:
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21. For the offence of criminal trespass the necessary
ingredients are entry into or upon property in the possession of
another with intent to commit on offence or to intimidate, insult
or annoy any person in possession of such property. It would
also be an offence if the entry into or upon such property is
lawful, then unlawfully remaining there with intent to intimidate,
insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an
offence. The law, however does not take into account the trifles.
Section 95 of the Penal Code, 1860 which deals with trifles
reads as under:--
Section 95:"Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or
that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to
cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of
ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm."
22. Mr. Aggarwal contended that defence of triviality can be
set up by the petitioner only before the Magistrate and in law
cannot be a ground for quashing the First Information Report
and also that 'triviality' has not been pleaded in the petition as a
ground seeking quashing of First Information Report. Section
95IPC is part of Chapter IV of the IPC dealing with general
exceptions. Mr. Aggarwal is right in his submission that the
burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the
case within any of the general exceptions in the Penal Code,
1860 is upon the person who pleads such an exception and that it
is a weapon of defence and also that there is presumption of the
absence of such circumstances (Section 105 of the Evidence
Act) However, every definition of an offence in the Penal Code,
1860 is to be understood subject to the exceptions contained in
Chapter IV (Section 6. IPC). The fact that there is presumption
about the absence of existence of circumstances bringing the
case within the purview of Section 95, IPC, does not mean that
if, on admitted facts, it is shown that the offence is trivial and
thereby covered under Section 95IPC, the accused has still to be
left to the face the or deal of the full fledged trial and this court
has no jurisdiction to quash the First Information Report even
after reaching a conclusion, on admitted facts, that harm is so
slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would
complain of such harm. It is also not possible to accept the
contention of Mr. Aggarwal that the petitioner has not pleaded
triviality as a ground for quashing the First Information Report.
In these matters the pleadings cannot be construed in the strict
and hyper technical manner. The question whether the harm is so
slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would
complain of such harm is requited to be judged and inferred
from the facts pleaded. The petitioner has pleaded all necessary
facts and has also stated in the petition that she was assured by
respondents 3 and 4 that it was a 'petty' matter and they are not
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DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14 17:12:55 +0530 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 9 of 17 taking any action on the basis of the complaint filed by Gupta and she could go home. She also says that it is further stated that it was at best a minor trifle on the part of the petitioner for a valid cause as compared to the serious wrong on the part of respondent No. 5 ........ We, thus, do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Aggarwal.
28. ... According to Ms. Singh the incident took place in the verandah but we would assume, as Gupta says, that the incident took place inside his flat. The genesis of the incident was the servants of Ms. Singh and Gupta. It is not the case of any of the parties that any damage to the person of Gupta was caused or any physical assault or injury resulted to him, his wife or his servant. What filthy abuses in fact were hurled by Ms. Singh has not been stated in the complaint. From the complaint of Gupta extracted above, it is seen that Gupta has desired that necessary action be taken to restrain Ms. Singh and to compel her to behave in a civilized and decent manner and he sought that in the interest of peace and tranquility of the area the Ministry of Urban Development should be requested to get the apartment vacated from her. Gupta did not say that First Information Report be registered against Ms. Singh for her having committed any offence much less criminal trespass. Gupta, it seems, was compelled to adopt this course of sending the complaint so as to place on record his version, as it seems, that the petitioner was not treating the matter closed and was pursuing her complaint. While considering whether an act which amounts to an offence is trivial or not, the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done and other related circumstances are required to be seen.
30. Applying to the facts of the present case the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in aforesaid decisions we have no doubt that, this case would be covered by Section 95IPC. The entire episode emanated because of misunderstanding about the servants. No physical assault or injury resulted to anyone. The alleged filthy abuses hurled by Ms. Singh have not been mentioned in the complaint. The incident seems to have taken place because of tempers running high at the spur of the moment. As noticed above, it seems that initially Gupta was not interested in registration of the case against Ms. Singh Considering the social status of the parties, the Knowledge or intention with which the offending act was done and other related circumstances noticed hereinbefore, it is clear to us that the harm causes to Gupta was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of such a harm.
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20. Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala, in the case of Narayanan v. State of Kerala, 1986 SCC OnLine Ker 278, held that even if obstruction is caused, if the harm caused is so slight, Section 95 IPC will apply:
6. When considering the question whether the acts alleged against the petitioners would amount to an offence of wrongful restraint, the maxim "de minimis non curat lex" (the law does not take account of trifles) should be borne in mind if the harm caused or intended to be caused is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. The above principle is embodied in S. 95 of the Code. The definitions of various offences in the Code are so framed as to bring a number of activities within the letter of the penal law. If we are to go by the definitions alone, "it is theft to dip a pen in another man's ink, it is mischief to crumble one of his wafers, it is assault to cover him with a cloud of dust by riding past him, it is hurt to incommode by pressing against him in getting into a carriage". At the same time, those are but few of the innumerable acts without the performance of which men cannot live together in society, and acts which it is desirable that they should do. It depends upon the degree of the acts and that is why the authors of the Cods took particular care in striking a note of caution by incorporating S. 95 in she Code.
21. Therefore, it is a settled position of law that even if obstruction is caused, if the harm caused is so slight, section 95 IPC will apply.
22. I am of the considered view that the present case is covered within the scope of section 95 IPC. PW-3 and PW-4, who are alleged eye-witnesses, have nowhere deposed that the accused caused any injury to the children in any manner. Further, the restraint, if at all, was of a momentary nature, after which the children had gone to their house without any obstruction caused by the accused. It has nowhere been deposed that the restraint continued till any third person came to the spot to free the children.
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Even if all the testimonies are accepted to be true, it is evident that the accused himself let the children go after telling to not shout and go quietly from the 1st floor. Therefore, no injury or harm was caused to anybody and the restraint, if at all, was also temporary pursuant to which the children went to their home. Considering the said circumstances, the act of the accused cannot be categorized as one done with criminal intent. Quarrel between neighbours regarding each others' conduct is usual in nature. I am of the considered opinion that an act by which children are scolded to maintain silence, is not an act of criminal nature, and the same is an act which can be categorized as an act for which no person of ordinary sense and temper would make a criminal complaint. Accordingly, since the present incident is covered within the scope of section 95 IPC, the accused is entitled to be acquitted for the offence u/s 341 IPC, since every definition of an offence in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is to be understood subject to the exceptions contained in Chapter IV (Section 6 IPC). Therefore, if an act falls within the scope of section 95 IPC, it will not amount to an offence even if the ingredients of any offence are satisfied (for instance, section 341 IPC in the present matter). B. Word, gesture or act outraging the modesty of a woman (509 IPC)
23. Perusal of the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses namely PW-1/Smt. Chitra, PW-2 Ayan and PW-4/Sh. Gulshan Malhotra reveals that none of the said witnesses have specified the nature of abuses allegedly hurled as Smt. Chitra. PW Chitra has deposed that the accused started abusing her and threatened her with Digitally signed DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14 17:13:14 +0530 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 12 of 17 dire consequences. PW-3 Ayan has deposed that the accused started abusing his mother in filthy language. PW-4/Sh. Gulshan Malhotra has deposed that the accused started abusing the mother of children in filthy language. Therefore, it has to be analyzed whether the said vague testimonies can be relied upon to convict the accused for offence u/s 509 IPC.
24. The legislative object behind section 509 of IPC is that a woman must be protected not only from physical aggressions made in the course of outraging her modesty, but she should also be shielded from various other acts which do not involve even a touch. In M.M. Haries v. State of Kerala (16.02.2005 - Crl. M.C. No. 9717 of 2002), it was held that:
Legislature was quite aware that a woman's modesty can be insulted or outraged in various ways. A mere word, a wink, a touch or even a look would suffice to insult the modesty of a woman. Physical advances may not be necessary in all cases. Everything depends on the intention of the mischief-maker and the manner in which he conveys his intentions. It is evident that legislature intended that any aggression into a woman's modesty whether by any word, deed, touch or look need be curbed and deterred.
25. Therefore, the gravamen of section 509 IPC is the intent to 'insult the modesty' of a woman. It is a settled position of law that there is distinction between an act of merely insulting a woman and an act of insulting the modesty of a woman. In order to attract section 509 IPC, merely insulting a woman is not sufficient and insult to the modesty of a woman is required to have been done. (see Abhijeet J.K. v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 703).
26. However, the term 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that the essence Digitally signed by DEVANSHU DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14 17:13:19 +0530 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 13 of 17 of a woman's modesty is her sex, i.e., modesty is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex (see Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra: (2004) 4 SCC 371). To elaborate further, the following extract from Raju Pandurang has been reproduced hereinafter:
12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word "modesty" is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (3rd Edn.) defines the word "modesty" in relation to a woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; Shamefast; Scrupulously chaste."...
15. ... From the above dictionary meaning of "modesty" and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1] the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is whether the action of the offender is such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. The above position was noted in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059].
27. Further, in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194, it was held that:
Since the word 'modesty' has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code we may profitably look into its dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition) modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means 'womanly propriety of behavior, scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct. The word 'modest' in relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as 'decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shame fast'. Webster's Third new International Dictionary of the English Language defines Digitally signed DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14 17:13:24 +0530 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 14 of 17 modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency' a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English Dictionary (1993 Ed) the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behavior, scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions".
28. Therefore, based on the aforesaid precedents, it is evident that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is whether the action of the offender is such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman, keeping in mind that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex.
29. Needless to mention, in criminal law, the burden of proof on the prosecution is that of beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence of the accused must be rebutted by the prosecution by adducing cogent evidence that points towards the guilt of the accused. The evidence in the present case is to be weighed keeping in view the above legal standards.
30. The sum and substance of the allegations made by the eye-witnesses is that the complainant Smt. Chitra was abused in filthy language. Now, it has already been noted above that a mere insult is different from an insult to the modesty of a woman. Even if the version of the complainant and the eye-witnesses is believed to be true, the offense under section 509 IPC is not made out. The prosecution has failed to prove or bring on record the nature of alleged abuses hurled at the complainant. The entire case rests on the mere phrase "abused (the complainant) in filthy language". I am of the opinion that in order to bring home the charge, the Digitally signed by DEVANSHU DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date:
2024.05.14 17:13:30 +0530 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 15 of 17 prosecution was required to prove the nature of abuses or filthy language which was allegedly used towards the complainant by the accused. In absence of the same, there is no means to ascertain whether the alleged abuses were mere insults or insults to the modesty of the complainant.
31. The term "verbal abuse" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (9th edn.) in the following manner:
Verbal abuse. Emotional abuse inflicted by one person on another by means of words, esp. spoken words, in a way that causes distress, fear, or similar emotions. Verbal abuse may include name-calling, insults, threatening gestures, excessive and unfounded criticism, humiliation, and denigration. - Also sometimes termed vulgar abuse.
32. Therefore, while the definition of abusive language/ verbal abuse does include 'insults' within its meaning, it cannot be equated with insult to modesty of a woman. The court cannot presume that the filthy/abusive language used amounted to insulting the modesty of the complainant and the prosecution was required to prove the same. However, the prosecution has failed to prove/show/bring on record the nature/wording of insults which were hurled towards the complainant. Apart from the allegation of usage of abusive/filthy language, there is nothing specific on record which points towards the guilt of the accused. As noted above, the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. Even if the version of the prosecution is believed to be true, it appears that there was a quarrel between the parties related to shouting by the children of the complainant outside the accused's house, which led to use of alleged abusive language by the accused. The alleged abusive language appears to have been made in the context of a quarrel/fight Digitally signed DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14 17:13:35 +0530 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 16 of 17 and there is no evidence on record that the said language was used with any sexual overtones. Accordingly, the offence u/s 509 IPC is not made out.
33. The same logic applies to the allegation regarding commission of offence u/s 506 IPC. The nature of threats given by the accused have not been specified and a vague allegation has been made to the effect that the accused threatened the complainant with dire consequences. The said allegation is vague in nature and the same cannot be used to convict the accused. Accordingly, the offence u/s 506 IPC is not made out.
CONCLUSION -
34. To recapitulate the above discussion, the prosecution has failed to prove the offence u/s 341/506/509 IPC. Accordingly, the accused Virender Singh S/o Bhupender Singh is hereby ACQUITTED for the offences under Section 341/506/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
35. Bail Bond accepted at the stage of trial is accepted for the purpose of section 437A CrPC.
Pronounced in open court on 14.05.2024 in presence of the accused. This judgment contains 17 pages, and each page has been signed by the undersigned Digitally signed DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU SAJLAN SAJLAN Date: 2024.05.14 17:13:42 +0530 (DEVANSHU SAJLAN) Metropolitan Magistrate - 07 West District, Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi/14.05.2024 Cr. Case 65956/2016 State v. Virender Singh Page 17 of 17