Gujarat High Court
Neerajkumar Manojkumar Nayak vs State Of Gujarat & on 7 October, 2015
Author: J.B.Pardiwala
Bench: J.B.Pardiwala
R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 1197 of 2015
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NEERAJKUMAR MANOJKUMAR NAYAK....Applicant(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR KUNAL S SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MRS HANSA PUNANI, APP for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 1
MR. ALKESH N SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 07/10/2015
ORAL ORDER
RULE returnable forthwith. Mrs.Punani, the learned APP waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent no.1 - State of Gujarat. Mr.Alkesh N.Shah, the learned advocate waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent no.2.
By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, original accused, prays for quashing of the proceedings of the Special Atrocity Case No.15 of 2014 pending in the Court of the learned Special Judge, Navsari, arising from a First Information Report being C.R.-I No.24 of 2014 registered with the Navsari Town Police Station, for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 507 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Page 1 of 13 HC-NIC Page 1 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989.
The case of the first informant may be summarised as under :
The son of the first informant, viz. Rohit, holds the Degrees of B.A., B.Ed. He was offered a job in a school running in the name of New Modern Science Day School as a Managing Director. The applicant herein is one of the trustees of the school. When the son of the first informant was offered a job in the school, there was an oral contract, as averred in the FIR, that the son of the first informant would be paid Rs.8,000=00 per month towards the salary. There was one more understanding that if the son of the first informant would get students, then on admission of each of the students he would be given a commission of Rs.5,000=00 in addition to his salary. The case of the first informant is plain and simple. According to her, although such promise was given by the applicant in his capacity as one of the trustees, yet such amount was not paid to him. The second part of the allegation, as usual, is that about two weeks from the date of the registration of the FIR, there was an altercation between the applicant herein and the son of the first informant, and in the said altercation, it is alleged that the applicant herein uttered abusive words. On such allegation, the FIR was registered and charge-sheet was filed.
Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the proceedings should be quashed.
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R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER
Let me first deal with the aspect of the offence under the Atrocity Act. Section 3(1)(x) speaks about intentionally insulting or intimidating a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with an intent to humiliate within the public view. There is not a single word in the entire FIR that the applicant herein abused the son of the first informant with the name of his caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-applicant herein is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and her son was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the applicant herein with an intent to humiliate him in a place within the public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such proceedings to continue so far as the offence under the Atrocity Act is concerned, would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law [see Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008)12 SCC 531].
Even if, I accept the entire case of the first informant, I am of the view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code or of cheating punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code are spelt out.
The offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients. In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC).
1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the property, and Page 3 of 13 HC-NIC Page 3 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER
2) The person entrusted :
a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or willfully suffers any other person so to do in violation
i) any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged and
ii) of legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see: S.W.P. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002)1 SCC 241) : (AIR 2001 SC 2960).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under section 420 IPC, the essential ingredients are :
1) deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission;
2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or
3) the consent that any persons shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see: Harmanpeet Singh Ahluwalia v.
State of Punjab, (2009)7 SCC 712 : (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC) ) Further, in both sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present from the very beginning or inception without which either of these sections cannot be invoked.
In my view, the plain reading of the First Information Report fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted Page 4 of 13 HC-NIC Page 4 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER above. I may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 of IPC, punishable under Section 406 of IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it could not be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 of the IPC, punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
Every act of breach of trust may not be resulted in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but any breach of trust with a mens rea gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It has been held in Hart Prasad Chamaria v. B.K. Surekha and others, reported in 1973(2) SCC 823 as under :
We have heard Mr. Maheshwarit on behalf of the appellant and are of the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents under Section 420 Indian Penal Code. For the purpose of the present appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact which have been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does riot disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section 420 Indian Penal Code. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs. 35.000/- There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs. 35.000/- by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made, the Page 5 of 13 HC-NIC Page 5 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating.
To put it in other words, the case of cheating the dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, the person who comes into possession of the movable property receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against the terms of the contract. Then the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention is with dishonest intention or not. Whether the retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of each case.
The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating are fine one. In case of cheating, it depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by a subsequent conduct but for this the subsequent conduct is not the sole test but mere breach of contract which cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is his intention, which is the gist of the offence. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in respect of which the offence after breach of trust has been committed must be either the Page 6 of 13 HC-NIC Page 6 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be of some other person. The accused must hold that property on trust of such other person. But the offence, i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention but they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of entrustment. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender practices fraudulent or dishonest to induce with another person to deliver the property. In such situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
I may quote with profit a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nageshwar Prasad Singh alias Sinha v. Narayan Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1480. In the said case, the allegation of the prosecution was that an agreement was signed between the complainant respondent and the appellant whereby some land was agreed to be sold by the appellant to the complainants on a consideration, and allegedly a part thereof was paid as earnest money, the balance being payable in the manner indicated in the deed. The most important term in the deed was that possession of the plot would stand transferred to the complainants and possession in fact was delivered to the complainants over which they made certain constructions. The complaint was laid on the basis that the appellant had cheated the complainants of the sum of money they had paid as earnest money as his subsequent conduct reflected that he Page 7 of 13 HC-NIC Page 7 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER was not willing to complete the bargain for which the complainants had to file a suit for specific performance which was pending in the civil court. Held, that latter part of illustration (g) to Section 415, I.P.C. illustrates that at the time when agreement for sell was executed, it could have, in no event, been termed dishonestly so as to hold that the complainants were cheated of the earnest money, which they passed to the appellant as part consideration and possession of the total amount involved in the bargain was passed over to the complainant/respondent and which remained in their possession. Now it is left to imagine who would be interested for dealing the matter for completing the bargain when admittedly the complainants have not performed their part in making full payment. The matter was, therefore, before the civil court in this respect. The liability, if any, arising out by breaching thereof was civil in nature and not criminal. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and complaint proceedings were quashed.
It was further held by the Supreme Court in the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2341 at Pp. 2345-46 of para 16) as below :
"15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between, mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention, which is the gist Page 8 of 13 HC-NIC Page 8 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed."
In All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. & others v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & another, JT 2007 (12) SC 345, the Apex Court quashed a criminal proceeding on the premise that the allegations contained in complaint were wholly inconsistent with the pleadings in a collateral civil proceeding. It held as follows :
"17. We are of the opinion that the allegations made in the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence. For the said purpose, This Court may not only take into consideration the admitted facts but it is also permissible to look into the pleadings of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 in the suit. No allegation whatsoever was made against the appellants herein in the notice. What was contended was negligence and/or breach of contract on the part of the carriers and their agent. Breach of contract simplicitor does not constitute an offence. For the said purpose, allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients therefor. Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Superior Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice."Page 9 of 13
HC-NIC Page 9 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER In K.L.E. Society & others v. Siddalingesh, (2008) 4 SCC 541, on a similar issue, the Supreme Court quashed a criminal proceeding labeling it to be an abuse of process of Court as the allegations contained in the complaint ran contrary to the averments made in the petition filed under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Apex Court held as follows :
"7. One thing is clear on reading of High Court's reasoning that the High Court came to the conclusion that deductions were made without any rhyme and reason and without any basis. That was not the case of the complainant. On the other hand, it tried to make out a case that the deduction was made with an object. That obviously, was the foundation to substantiate claim of entrustment. On a close reading of the complaint it is clear that the ingredients of Sections 403, 405 and 415 do not exist. The statement made in the complaint runs contrary to the averments made in the petition in terms of Section 33-(C) (2)."
In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) SCC (Cri.) 415, the Supreme Court held that the High Court could take into account materials of "unimpeachable character of sterling quality" while exercising its inherent powers to quash a criminal proceeding and observed as follows :-
"29. Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lals case.
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In Vijaya Rao v. State of Rajasthan & another (2005) SCC (Cri.) 1600, the Supreme Court held that merely using expressions like "fraudulent representation" and "malafide intention" does not give rise to an inference that the complaint discloses the ingredients of the offence of cheating.
In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & others v. State of Bihar & another (2000) SCC (Cri.) 786, the Supreme Court succinctly laid down the distinction between breach of contract in one hand and the offence of cheating in the other.
"15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time to inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed."
In Anil Kumar Bose v. State of Bihar, (1974) SCC (Cri.) 652, the Supreme Court held that mere failure to perform a duty or observe rules of procedure may be an administrative lapse or any error of judgement but cannot be equated with dishonest intention or cheating.
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Criticizing the institution of malicious and frivolous criminal proceeding against individuals, the Supreme Court in PEPSI Foods Ltd. & another v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) SCC (Cri.) 1400, held as follows :
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. it is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
In B.Suresh Yadav v. Sharifa Bee & another, JT (2007) 12 SC 341, the Supreme Court again highlighted the distinction between a mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating.
In Inder Mohan Goswami & another v. State of Uttaranchal & others, (2007)12 SCC 1, the Supreme Court analysed inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 as follows :
"23. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under section 482 Page 12 of 13 HC-NIC Page 12 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015 R/SCR.A/1197/2015 ORDER Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
24. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute."
In view of the above, this application is allowed. The further proceedings of the Special Atrocity Case No.15 of 2014 are quashed. Rule made absolute. Direct service is permitted.
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.) MOIN Page 13 of 13 HC-NIC Page 13 of 13 Created On Tue Oct 13 00:55:25 IST 2015