Karnataka High Court
Sri. Veerabhadrayya vs The State Of Karnataka on 4 February, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 15.12.2025
Pronounced on : 04.02.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.103388 OF 2025 (S-REG)
BETWEEN:
SRI VEERABHADRAYYA
SHIVAPUTARAYYA KULKARNI
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
OCC: JUNIOR ENGINEER
TOWN PANCHAYATH, MUNDGOD
(PRESENTLY ON DEPUTATION TO
CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, DANDELI)
R/O BASAVESHWAR NAGAR, DANDELI
DISTRICT: UTTAR KANNADA - 581 349.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SUNIL S.DESAI, ADVOCATE )
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU - 560 001.
2
2. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATION, 9TH FLOOR
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
SIR M.VISHWESHWARAIAH TOWER
BENGALURU - 560 001.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
UTTAR KANNADA - 581 349.
4. THE CHIEF OFFICER
TOWN PANCHAYAT, MUNDAGOD
DISTRICT: UTTAR KANNADA - 581 349.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. GIRIJA S.HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3;
R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT
OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO REGULARIZE
THE SERVICE OF THE PETITIONER IN THE OFFICE OF 4TH
RESPONDENT FROM THE DATE HE COMPLETES 10 YEARS OF
SERVICE AND EXTEND ALL MONETARY BENEFITS FLOWING THERE
FROM AS PER ANNEXURE A DATED 22.10.1999 IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC.,
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 15.12.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
3
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following
prayer:
1. "Issue a writ of mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to
regularize the service of the petitioner in the office of the
4th respondent from the date he completes 10 years of
service and extend all monetary benefits flowing
therefrom as per Annexure-A dated 22-10-1999 in the
interest of justice and equity;
2. Issue a direction to the 2nd and 3rd respondents to extend
all other benefits attached to the post held by the
petitioner including fixation of pay, extending the benefit
immediately after completion of 10 years of service and
to extend all other financial benefits attached to the post
with arrears and interest thereon.
3. Pass such other order/orders as this Hon'ble Court deems
fit, in the facts and circumstances of the case, including
an order as to costs, in the interest of justice and equity."
2. Heard Sri Sunil S. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and Smt. Girija S. Hiremath, learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 to 3.
4
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
3.1. The petitioner is said to have been appointed as a Junior
Engineer in the 4th respondent/Town Panchayat, Mundgod. His
claim is that he was appointed against a sanctioned vacant post but
on daily wages and he had requisite qualification to hold the post of
Junior Engineer as on the date he was appointed on daily wages.
The petitioner is now said to have completed 25 years of continuous
service and as on date he is in the verge of retirement. In the year
1999, the petitioner is said to have been extended the benefit of
equal pay for equal work like all other regular employees and claims
to have become entitled to consideration for regularization of his
service.
3.2. Pursuant to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case
of STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UMADEVI - [(2006) 4 SCC 1], the
State notified a circular directing steps to be taken for
regularization of services of the employees who had worked for
more than 10 years as on the said date. Since the petitioner had
not completed 10 years of service, his case was not considered for
5
regularization and continued to work in the Department of Rural
Development and Panchayat Raj on daily wages. Several
representations are said to have been submitted by the petitioner
which had gone unheeded and the latest of the representations so
submitted are appended to the petition. The claim of the petitioner
is for regularization of his service.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
vehemently contend that the petitioner, as on today, has completed
25 years of service against a sanctioned vacant post and completely
qualified to hold the post, but continues on daily wages. Insofar as
pay is concerned, the petitioner is getting the pay that every person
in the cadre would get and, therefore, submits that he is entitled for
regularization of his service.
5. Per contra, the learned High Court Government Pleader
would vehemently refute the submission in contending that the
claim of this petitioner cannot be considered, as the Apex Court in
the case of UMADEVI had clearly held that persons who had not
completed 10 years of service as on the date of rendering of the
6
judgment, which was on 10th April, 2006, regularization cannot be
considered. The petitioner was not appointed against a sanctioned
vacant post, but would accept the fact that he was qualified to hold
the post.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record. In the light of the submissions of the learned
counsel, the only issue that calls for consideration is, whether the
petitioner would be entitled for a direction to the
respondents for regularization of his service?
7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The
petitioner is said to have been appointed on 21-11-1997.
Immediately after the appointment along with several others, the
petitioner was also granted equal pay for equal work by a
communication dated 22-10-1999. The petitioner's name finds
place at Sl.No.14. Thus, the petitioner continuously worked from
21-11-1997 and continued to work as on the date of judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of UMADEVI supra. Pursuant to the
7
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of UMADEVI, a
communication comes to be issued by the State to all the
departments that persons who have completed 10 years of service
must be considered for regularization. The communication reads as
follows:
"ಸಂ. ೌ / ಬ ಂ / ನಗೂ / ಆ - 4/2006-07. ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯ,
ೆಂಗಳ!ರು ಾಂಕ: 25.11.2006.
ಇವ()ೆ:
*+ಾ,-.ಾ(ಗಳ/,
.................. *+ೆ,.
1ಾನ2 ೆ,
3ಷಯ: ಘನ ಸ6ೕ ಚ8 ಾ29ಾಲಯದ ;ೕ< ನನ=ಯ ನಗೂ ೌಕರರ >ೇ?ೆಯನು@
ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಸುವ ಕು(ತು.
ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ: 1. ಘನ ಸ6ೕ ಚ8 ಾ29ಾಲಯದ 3E ಅ<ೕಲು ಸಂ.3595/3612/99ರ ,
ಾಂಕ.10.4.2006 ರಂದು ೕGರುವ ;ೕಪI .
2. ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಸುJೊKೕ+ೆ ಸಂ. ಆಸುಇ 25 >ೇಸLಅ- 2003 ಾಂಕ: 25.5.2006
ಮತುK 6.7.2006.
3. ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಅ-ಕೃತ Oಾಪನ ಸಂ.ನಅಇ 95 PಎಂಎR 95(P-11)
ಾಂಕ:15.11.2006.
4. ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಸುJೊKೕ+ೆ ಸಂ. ಆಸುಇ 25 >ೇಸLಅ 2003 (Sಾ)
ಾಂಕ.13.11.2006.
===
Sಾರತದ ಘನ ಸ6ೕ ಚ8 ಾ29ಾಲಯವI ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ (1)ರ , ನಮೂ ರುವ ಪAಕರಣದ ,
ೕGರುವ ಮಹತ=ದ ;ೕ< ನ ಪA.ಾರ ಾಜ2ದ ನಗರ ಸL ೕಯ ಸಂ>ೆLಗಳ , ಾಂಕ-1.1.1986 ಮತುK ಆ
ತರು?ಾಯ 33ಧ ದXೆ ಗಳ , .ಾಯ ವ Yಸು;Kರುವ ನಗೂ ೌಕರರ: >ೇ?ೆ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಸುವ
8
ಬ)ೆZ ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ (2) ಮತುK (3)ರ , ನಮೂ ರುವ ಸುJೊKೕ+ೆಗಳನು@ ಉ+ೆ,ೕ[ ಈ .ೆಳಕಂಡ ಾಲು]
ಷರತುKಗಳನು@ ಪ^ ೈ ದ ನಗೂ ೌಕರರನು@ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಸಲು ಪ(ಗ`ಸಬಹು ೆಂದು ಸabcಕ( ೆ.
1) ಅಂತಹ. ೌಕರರನು@ ಮೂಲತಃ ಮಂಜೂ ಾದ eಾ ಹು ೆfಯ , ೇಮಕ 1ಾGರ ೇಕು,
2) Yೕ)ೆ ಅವರನು@ ೇಮಕ 1ಾಡು?ಾಗ ಅವರು ಸಂಬಂ-ತ ಹು ೆf)ೆ ಗ-ಪG ರುವ
3 ಾ2ಹ Jೆಯನು@ gೊಂ ರ ೇಕು.,
3) Yೕ)ೆ ೇಮಕ)ೊಂಡಂತಹ ೌಕರರು 10 ವಷ ಗ ಗೂ gೆhiನ ಅವ-)ೆ ಸತತ?ಾj ಅ ೇ
ಹು ೆfಯ , .ಾಯ ವ Y ರ ೇಕು.
4) ಾ29ಾಲಯಗಳ ಅಥ?ಾ ಾ2ಯ ಮಂಡ ಗಳ ಆ ೇಶ.ೊಳlಪಟುc 10 ವಷ ಗ ಗೂ gೆhiನ
ಅವ-)ೆ ಅವರನು@ ಮುಂದುವ ೆ ರ ಾರದು- ಅಂದ ೆ ೌಕರರು'
10 ವಷ ಗಳ/ ಅಥ?ಾ ಅದಕೂ] gೆhiನ ಅವ-)ೆ ಮುಂದುವ( ರುವIದು ಾ29ಾಲಯಗಳ/ ಅಥ?ಾ
ಾ29ಾ-ೕಕರಣಗಳ ಆ ೇಶ ಂದ ಆjರ ಾರದು ("---employees have continued to
work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of
courts or tribunals" ) ಎಂಬು ಾjದುf ಾ29ಾಲಯದ ಆ ೇಶಗ ಂದ ಮುಂದುವ( ರುವವರು
ಸು<Aೕಂ.ೋn ಗ-ಪG ದ ಈ ಷರತKನು@ ಪ^ ೈ ದಂJಾjರುವI ಲ,?ಾದf(ಂದ ಇವರುಗಳ
ಸಕA1ಾ;)ೆ ಅಹ ಾಗುವI ಲ,?ೆಂದು ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ (1)ರ ಸುJೊKೕ+ೆಯ , ; oೕಲ]ಂಡ ಅಂಶದ
Y ೆ@+ೆಯ , ಾಂಕ 10.4.2006ರ ನಂತರ ನಗೂ ೌಕರರನು@ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ದ , ಅಂತಹ
ಪAಕರಣಗಳನು@ ಪIನ ಪ(pೕ ಇಂತಹ ಪAಕರಣಗಳ/ ಸು<Aೕಂ.ೋn ;ೕ< ನ
ಅನುಗುಣ?ಾjಲ, ದf , ಅವIಗಳನು@ Yಂಪqೆಯಲು ಕAಮ .ೈ)ೊಳ/lವಂJೆ ಕೂಡ ; ೆ. ಗೂAr 'G'
ದXೆ ೌಕರರನು@ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಸುವ ಕು(ತು *+ಾ, ಮಟcದ ಸs; ಮತುK ಗೂAr ' ' ದXೆ ೌಕರರ
>ೇ?ೆ ಸಕAಮದ ಕು(ತು ಾಜ2 ಮಟcದ ಸs; ಮತುK Jಾಂ;Aಕ ವಗ ದ ಎ+ಾ, ಬ ಂ ಯ >ೇ?ೆ ಸಕAಮದ
ಕು(ತು ಾಜ2 ಮಟcದ ಸs; (Jಾಂ;Aಕ) ಗಳನು@ ರh ಸದ( ಪ(pೕಲ ಾ ಸs;ಗಳ/
ವ Yಸ ೇ.ಾದ .ಾಯ 3tಾನವ ೊ@ಳ)ೊಂಡಂJೆ Jೆ)ೆದು.ೊಳlಬಹು ಾದ .ಾಯ ಕAಮಗಳ
?ೇuಾಪvcಯನು@ ಗ-ಪG ಪ(pಲ ಾ ಸs; ಸSೆಯ ನಡವ ಗಳ ಪA.ಾರ >ೇ?ಾ ಸಕA1ಾ;)ೆ
.ಾನೂನು (ೕJಾ2 ಅಹ ?ಾದ ಅಂ;ಮ ಪvcಯನ=ಯ .ಾನೂನು (ೕJಾ2 ಪ(pೕ 'G' ವೃಂದದ
ಹು ೆfಗ )ೆ ೇಮ.ಾ; gೊಂದಲು ಅಹ ಾದ ಅಭ2x ಗ )ೆ ಸಂಬಂ- ದ *+ಾ,-.ಾ(ಗಳ/ ೇಮ.ಾ;
ಆ ೇಶ ೕಡುವIದು, ' ' ವೃಂದದ ಹು ೆfಗ )ೆ ೇಮ.ಾ; gೊಂದಲು ಅಹ ಾದ ಅಭ2x ಗ )ೆ
ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶಕರು ಆ ೇಶ ೕಡುವIದು ಮತುK Jಾಂ;Aಕ ವಗ ದ ಹು ೆfಗ )ೆ ೇಮ.ಾ;
gೊಂದಲು ಅಹ ಾದ ಅಭ2x ಗ )ೆ 'ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಆ ೇಶ ೕಡುವಂJೆ ; ಗ-ಪGಸ+ಾದ
ಅವ-yಳ)ೆ .ಾ+ಾನು.ಾಲ.ೆ] ಅಗತ2 ಕAಮಗಳನು@ .ೈ)ೊಳlಲು ಎ+ಾ, *+ಾ,-.ಾ(ಗಳ/ ಮತುK
9
ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯ.ೆ] ಆ ೇp ೆ. ಪ^ವ Sಾ3 ಪvcಯನು@ >ಾವ ಜ ಕರ 1ಾY;)ಾj
ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟc ನಗರ ಸL ೕಯ ಸಂ>ೆL, oೕಲ-.ಾ(ಗಳ ಕzೇ(, ಗAಂ{ಾಲಯ ಕzೇ( ಮತುK ೌ ಾಡ ತ
ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯದ , gಾಗೂ ಸ.ಾ ರದ ನಗ ಾ|ವೃ } ಇ+ಾeೆಯ ಸೂಚ ಾ ಫಲಕಗಳ ,
ಪAಕvಸತಕ] ೆಂದು ; ೆ.
ಆದುದ(ಂದ oೕಲ]ಂಡಂJೆ ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಆ ೇಶ ಸುJೊKೕ+ೆಗಳನ=ಯ ಪ(pೕ ' ' ದXೆ ಯ
ನಗೂ ೌಕರರ >ೇ?ಾ 1ಾY;ಗಳನು@ ಾಂಕ 30.11.2006 ೊಳ)ೆ ಈ .ಾ9ಾಲಯ.ೆ] ಮ•
.ಾ9ಾ ಲಯದ ಜ?ಾ ಾf(ಯುತ ಬ ಂ yಂ )ೆ ಮು ಾfಂ ತಲು<ಸುವಂJೆ .ೋರ+ಾj ೆ.
ತಮ• 3€ಾ= ,
ಸY/-
ೇ ಶಕರು,
ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯ,
ೆಂಗಳ!ರು.
ಪA;ಯನು@:
1. yೕಜ ಾ ೇ ಶಕರು, *+ಾ, ನಗ ಾ|ವೃ } .ೋಶ---- ೆಂಗಳ!ರು )ಾA1ಾಂತರ *+ೆ,
2. ೌ ಾಯುಕKರು/ಮುeಾ2-.ಾ(ಗಳ//ನಗರಸSೆ/ಪIರಸSೆ/ಪಟcಣ ಪಂ‚ಾƒ;."
The petitioner's case was not considered on the score that he had
not completed 10 years of service. The petitioner then submits a
representation on 17-03-2025. The representation reads as follows:
"ರವ()ೆ
1ಾನ2 ಮುeಾ2-.ಾ(ಗಳ/
ಪಟcಣ ಪಂ‚ಾಯತ ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ
ಇಂದ.
3. ಎR. ಕುಲಕ`
„(ಯ ಅ|ಯಂತರರು
ಪ.ಪಂ ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ
10
ನಗರಸSೆ ಾಂqೇ ( yೕಜ ೆ oೕ ೆ)ೆ)
1ಾನ2 ೇ,
3ಷಯ: Sಾರತದ ಸ6ೕ ಚi ಾ29ಾಲಯದ ;ೕ< ನನ=ಯ Jಾಂ;Aಕ ನಗೂ ೌಕರರ
>ೇ?ೆಯನು@ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಸುವ ಕು(ತು.
ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ:1) ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ ಪಟcಣ ಪಂ‚ಾಯತದ >ಾ1ಾನ2 ಸSೆಯ ನಡುವ .ೆ ನಂ.21
ಾಂಕ:21-11-1998
2) 1ಾನ2 ೇ ಶಕರು, ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯ ೆಂಗಳ!ರು ರವರ ಆ ೇಶ
ನಂ. ೌ : ಬ ಂ :ಉ.ಕ: .ಆ : 38:99-2000 ಾಂಕ:22-10-1999
3) ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಆ ೇಶ ಸಂeೆ2 ನಅಇ:140:JA.J¯ï.Dgï:2006 ಾಂಕ:
24-08-2007
4) 1ಾನ2 *+ಾ,-.ಾ(ಗಳ/, ಉತKರಕನ@ಡ ರವರ ಸಕA1ಾ; ಆ ೇಶ ಸಂeೆ2
¥ÀÄgÀ¸À¨És:2:«ªÀ:272(10) 06-07 ಾಂಕ:02-06-2007
5) ಸ.ಾ ರದ ಆ ೇಶ ಸಂeೆ2 ನಅಇ:33:PPಎ:2023(ಇ) ೆಂಗಳ!ರು
ಾಂಕ:18-12-2023
ಈ oೕಲ]ಂಡ 3ಷಯ.ೆ] ಸಂಬಂ- ದಂJೆ ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ (1) ರನ=ಯ ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ ಪಟcಣ
ಪಂ‚ಾಯತದ >ಾ1ಾನ2 ಸSೆಯ ಣ ಯದಂJೆ ತಮ• .ಾ9ಾ ಲಯದ , ಮಂಜೂ ಾ; ಹು ೆfಯ ,
ಾಂಕ:21-11-1998 ರಂJೆ ನಗೂ ೌಕರ ಾj „(ಯ ಅ|ಯಂತರರ ಹು ೆfಯ , >ೇ?ೆ
ಸ ,ಸುJಾK ಇರುJೆKೕ ೆ. ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ (2) ರನ=ಯ 1ಾನ2 ೇ ಶಕರು, ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯ
ೆಂಗಳ!ರು ರವರ ಆ ೇಶದಂJೆ ಸ1ಾನ .ೆಲಸ.ೆ] ಸ1ಾನ ?ೇತನವನು@ ನನ)ೆ ಮಂಜೂರು 1ಾGದ
oೕ ೆ)ೆ ಸದರ ?ೇತನವನು@ ಪqೆಯುJಾK ಬಂ ರುJೆKೕ ೆ.
ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ (3) ರನ=ಯ ಾಜ2ದ 33ಧ ನಗರ ಸL ೕಯ ಸಂ>ೆLಗಳ , >ೇ?ೆ ಸ ,ಸು;Kರುವ ಬ)ೆZ
ಸಕA1ಾ; ಬ)ೆZ ಪ^ಣ 3ವರಗuೆ! ಂ )ೆ ಸ , ದfರ oೕ ೆ)ೆ ಾಜ2 ಮಟcದ ಸs;ಯ (Jಾಂ;Aಕ)
1ಾನ2 .ಾಯ ದp ಯವರ ಅಧ2...Jೆಯ , ಾಂಕ:07-04-2007 ರಂದು ಸSೆ ಜರುj 20
ಅ|ಯಂತರರ ಾಖ+ೆಗಳನು@ ಕೂಲಂಕುಶ?ಾj ಪ(pೕ 1ಾನ2 ಸ6ೕ ಚ8 ಾ29ಾಲಯದ
ಆ ೇಶದನ=ಯ ನನ@ನು@ gಾಗೂ ಇತ ೇ 9 ಜನರನು@ gೊರತುಪG 10 ವಷ ಗಳನು@ ಪ^ ೈ ದ „(ಯ
ಅ|ಯಂತರರನು@ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಆ ೇpಸ+ಾj ೆ.
ಾನು ಾಂಕ:21-11-1998 .ೆ] ನಗೂ >ೇ?ೆ)ೆ >ೇ(ದುf ಾಂಕ:21-11-2008 .ೆ]
10 ವಷ >ೇ?ೆಯು ಪ^ಣ )ೊಂGರುತK ೆ. ಈ)ಾಗ+ೇ ಾನು ಇನೂ@ ಎರಡೂವ ೆ ;ಂಗ ನ , ಅಂದ ೆ
11
ಾಂಕ:31-05-2025 ಕೃ ವೃ;K gೊಂದು;Kದುf, ಸು1ಾರು 26 ವಷ ಗಳ/ ಸ1ಾನ .ೆಲ¸ÉÌ ಸ1ಾನ
?ೇತನ ಅGಯ , >ೇ?ೆ ಸ , ದುf ವೃ;K ನಂತರ ನನ)ೆ ಉಪ*ೕವನ.ೆ] 9ಾವI ೇ ವೃ;K ?ೇತನ
ಗ ೇ ಇದುf, ವಯ>ಾ†ದ ನಂತರ *ೕವನ ವ ಹ‡ೆ ಕಷc >ಾಧ2?ಾಗು;K ೆ.
ಆದf(ಂದ ನನ@ ಮನ3ಯನು@ ಪ(ಗ` ನನ@ >ೇ?ೆಯನು@ ಸಕA1ಾ;)ಾj 1ಾನ2 ಘನ
ಸ.ಾ ರ.ೆ] ಪA>ಾKವ ೆಯನು@ ತs•ಂದ pˆಾರಸು†)ೊ ಸಲು ಸ ,ಸಲು .ೋರುJೆKೕ ೆ.
)ೌರವಗuೆ! ಂ )ೆ,
:17-03-2025
ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ
ತಮ• 3€ಾ= ,
ಸY/-
3. ಎR. ಕುಲಕ`
„(ಯ ಅ|ಯಂತರರು
ಪ.ಪಂ ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ
ನಗರಸSೆ ಾಂqೇ ( yೕಜ ೆ oೕ ೆ)ೆ)"
The case of the petitioner is recommended by the Town Panchayat.
The Communication reads as follows:
"ಕA.ಸ.ಪಪಂಮು:ಅಡ ತ:3ವ: :2024-25 ಾಂಕ:24/03/2025
()ೆ.
1ಾನ2 yೕಜ ಾ ೇ ಶಕರು
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*+ಾ,-.ಾ(ಗಳ .ಾ9ಾ ಲಯ
ಉತKರ ಕನ@ಡ, .ಾರ?ಾರ
1ಾನ2 ೆ.
12
3ಷಯ: pAೕ 3 ಎR ಕುಲಕ` , „(ಯ ಅ|ಯಂತರರು (ಸ1ಾನ .ೆಲಸ ಸ1ಾನ ?ೇತನ)
ಇವರು >ೇ?ೆಯನು@ ಸಕAಮ)ೊ ಸಲು ಸ , ರುವ ಪA>ಾKವ ೆಯನು@ ಸ ,ಸುವ
ಕು(ತು.
ಉ+ೆ,ೕಖ: ಸದ(ಯವರ ಅ* ಾಂಕ: 21/03/2025.
ಈ oೕ ನ 3ಷಯ.ೆ] ಸಂಬಂ- ದಂJೆ, ಉ+ೆ,ೕ[ತ ಮನ3ಯಂJೆ, pAೕ 3ೕರಭದAಯ2 ಎR
ಕುಲಕ` , „.ಅ|ಯಂತರ (ಸ1ಾನ .ೆಲಸ ಸ1ಾನ ?ೇತನ) ಇವರು ಪಟcಣ ಪಂ‚ಾಯತ
ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡದ , ನಗೂ ೌಕರ ಾj „(ಯ ಅ|ಯಂತರ ಹು ೆfಯ , ಪಟcಣ. ಪಂ‚ಾಯತ ಸSೆ
ನಡವ ನಂ.21 ಾಂಕ:21.11.1998 ರಂJೆ ೇಮ.ಾ;)ೊಂಡು ಕತ ವ2 ವ Y ದುf,
ಸದ(ಯವ()ೆ ೌ ಾಡ ತ ೇ ಶ ಾಲಯದ ಆ ೇಶ ಸಂeೆ2: ೌ. : ಬ ಂ :ಉ.ಕ.: .ಆ :38:99-
2000 ಾಂಕ:22/10/1999 ರಂJೆ ಸ1ಾನ .ೆಲಸ ಸ1ಾನ ?ೇತನ ಮಂಜೂ( ಆ ೇp ದುf
ಇರುತK ೆ. ಪAಸುKತ ಾಂqೇ ನಗರಸSೆಯ , ಪA; yೕಜ ೆ oೕ ೆ)ೆ ಕತ ವ2 ವ Yಸು;K ಾf ೆ.
ಸದ( pAೕ 3ೕರಭದAಯ2 ಎR. ಕುಲಕ` , „.ಅ. (ಸಕಸ?ೇ) ಇವರು 1ಾನ2 ಸ6ೕ ಚi
ಾ29ಾಲಯದ ;ೕ< ನಂJೆ ಸಕA1ಾ;)ೊ ಸ+ಾದ ಪAಕರಣಗಳನು@ ಉ+ೆ,ೕ[ ಸದ(ಯವರ
>ೇ?ೆಯನು@ ಸಹ ಸಕA1ಾ;)ೊ ಸಲು ಾಖ+ೆಗಳನು@ ಲಗ;Kಟುc ಸ.ಾ ರ.ೆ] ಪA>ಾKವ ೆಯನು@
pˆಾರಸು†)ೊ ಸುವಂJೆ .ೋ(ರುJಾK ೆ. ಈ ಪAಯುಕK ಸದ(ಯವರ ಅ* ಪA;ಯನು@ ಲಗ;Kಟುc
ಮುಂ ನ ಸೂಕK ಕAಮಗಳ)ಾj 1ಾನ2ರ , )ೌರವಪ^ವ ಕ?ಾj ಸ , ೆ.
ವಂದ ೆಗuೆ! ಂ )ೆ,
ತಮ• 3€ಾ=
ಸY/-
ಮುeಾ2-.ಾ(
ಪಟcಣ ಪಂ‚ಾಯತ ಮುಂಡ)ೋಡ
ಲಗತುK
pAೕ 3ೕರಭದAಯ2 ಎR ಕುಲಕ` , „.ಅ|ಯಂತರ (ಸ1ಾನ .ೆಲಸ ಸ1ಾನ ?ೇತನ) ಇವರ ಮೂಲ
ಅ* ಪA;."
Non-consideration of the case of the petitioner for regularization is
what has driven him now to this Court in the subject petition.
13
8. The petitioner has served the 1st respondent for more than
25 years and is on the verge of retirement. It is admitted that the
petitioner was qualified to hold the post and continued to work
against a sanctioned vacant post. In such a case, it becomes
apposite to refer to the judgment of Apex Court in the case of
BHOLA NATH v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND1. The Apex Court
again considers the entire spectrum of law and holds that
regularization of employees who have served for long years against
sanctioned vacant post must be considered and they should not be
left high and dry. The Apex Court has held as follows:
"ISSUE II. Whether the action/inaction of the
respondent-State in not recognizing the appellants'
continuous service for the purpose of regularization is
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India?
10. The learned Single Judge, vide common order,
dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants seeking a
writ of mandamus directing the respondent State to regularize
their services. In doing so, the writ Court placed reliance on the
terms and conditions of the employment agreement entered into
between the appellants and the respondents. The learned Single
Judge, in this regard, recorded the following findings: -
i. The appellants were appointed on a purely contractual
basis pursuant to a decision of the Finance Department to
fill 22 sanctioned posts through contractual engagement,
1
2026 INSC 99
14
the expenditure being met from non-plan funds. Following
issuance of an advertisement and completion of the
selection process, the appellants were appointed by
entering into contracts of employment for an initial period
of one year, extendable from time to time for fixed
durations.
ii. The appellants were granted extensions periodically, with
the last extensions having been issued in the year 2023
as a one-time measure. The respondent-State treated the
said decision as a conscious policy determination, which,
according to the learned Single Judge, did not warrant
interference by the Court.
iii. The appellants were held not entitled to regularization
under the regularization scheme framed by the
respondent-State in the year 2015, as modified in 2019,
which prescribed completion of ten years of continuous
service as on the cut-off year 2019. It was further noted
that the appellants had not laid any challenge to the
validity of the said regularization scheme.
iv. Since the appellants were appointed on a contractual
basis and continued only through periodic extensions, it
was held that they did not possess any statutory or legal
right to continue in service once the contractual period,
including its extensions, came to an end.
v. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the appellants were
fully aware, and were put to notice on each occasion of
renewal, that their engagement was contractual and
limited to a specified tenure. In view thereof, the learned
Single Judge held that no question of legitimate
expectation or enforceable right to renewal or
regularization could arise, nor could any right be said to
have crystallised in their favour.
vi. It was further noted that the appellants had not been
replaced by another set of contractual employees. On the
contrary, the material on record indicated that the
respondent-State had undertaken regular recruitment and
appointed nine persons as regular employees through a
fresh advertisement.
15
10.1. Aggrieved by the decision of the writ Court, the
appellants preferred intra-Court appeals before the High Court.
The learned Division Bench upheld the judgment of the writ
Court and recorded the following findings: -
i. The law relating to regularization or absorption of
contractual employees was held to be well settled,
namely that such employees are governed by the terms
and conditions of their engagement, the relationship
being founded upon a bilateral contract between the
employee and the employer.
ii. It was further held that the terms and conditions of a
contract cannot be altered, nor can new conditions be
introduced, by issuance of judicial directions, as doing so
would amount to impermissible re-writing of the contract.
Once the parties have consciously entered into
contractual terms, they cannot subsequently resile
therefrom or question those conditions.
State as model employer: -
11. At the outset, we find it necessary to express our
disapproval of the manner in which the High Court has
approached the present lis. The controversy before the Court
was not one of mere acquiescence or implied waiver of rights.
The High Court, in our view, has proceeded on a mechanical
application of precedents without engaging with the core
constitutional issues involved, thereby reducing the dispute to
one of acceptance of contractual terms, divorced from its larger
constitutional context.
11.1. This Court has consistently held that the
State, being a model employer, is saddled with a
heightened obligation in the discharge of its functions. A
model employer is expected to act with high probity,
fairness and candour, and bears a social responsibility to
treat its employees in a manner that preserves their
dignity. The State cannot be permitted to exploit its
employees or to take advantage of their vulnerability,
helplessness or unequal bargaining position.
16
11.2. It therefore follows that the State is required
to exercise heightened caution in its role as an employer,
the constitutional mandate casting upon it a strict
obligation to act as a model employer, an obligation from
which no exception can be countenanced.
Fundamental Rights and their waiver:
11.3. In the present case, the appellants were appointed
by the respondent-State against sanctioned posts of Junior
Engineers (Agriculture), with the engagement being described
from the inception as contractual in nature. The terms and
conditions governing the engagement stipulated that the
appointment would be for an initial period of one year,
extendable thereafter subject to satisfactory performance.
11.4. The respondent-State accordingly granted
extensions to the appellants from time to time until the
year 2023, when it was expressly clarified that the
extension being granted would be the last. It was
thereafter that the appellants approached the High Court
by filing writ petitions seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the State to regularize their services.
11.5. The consistent case of the appellants has
been that the respondent-State's refusal to grant
regularization is arbitrary and therefore warrants judicial
interference. Article 14 of the Constitution casts a
negative obligation upon the State to treat all persons
equally, and arbitrariness, being antithetical to the
equality principle, is proscribed as violative of Article 14.
11.6. The Constitution Bench in Basheshar Nath v.
Comm. Income Tax - 1958 SCC OnLine SC 7, long ago
clarified that fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution are incapable of waiver. Consequently, if the
action of the respondent-State is found to be violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution, the mere fact that the
appellants' engagement was governed by contractual
terms and conditions cannot be construed as a waiver of
their fundamental rights.
17
Unconscionable Agreements- Contract between Lion and
Lamb:
12. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v.
Brojo Nath Ganguly - (1986) 3 SCC 156, this Court
acknowledged the increasing imbalance in the bargaining power
of contracting parties. The Court held thus: -
"89. . . . We have a Constitution for our country. Our
judges are bound by their oath to "uphold the
Constitution and the laws". The Constitution was
enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country social
and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution
guarantees to all persons equality before the law
and the equal protection of the laws. The principle
deducible from the above discussions on this part
of the case is in consonance with right and reason,
intended to secure social and economic justice and
conforms to the mandate of the great equality
clause in Article 14. This principle is that the
courts will not enforce and will, when called upon
to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable
contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a
contract, entered into between parties who are not
equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an
exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court
can visualize the different situations which can
arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to
give some illustrations. For instance, the above
principle will apply where the inequality of
bargaining power is the result of the great
disparity in the economic strength of the
contracting parties. It will apply where the
inequality is the result of circumstances, whether
of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to
situations in which the weaker party is in a
position in which he can obtain goods or services
or means of livelihood only upon the terms
imposed by the stronger party or go without them.
It will also apply where a man has no choice, or
rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent
to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a
prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of
rules as part of the contract, however unfair,
unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that
contract or form or rules may be. This principle,
18
however, will not apply where the bargaining power of
the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This
principle may not apply where both parties are
businessmen and the contract is a commercial
transaction. In today's complex world of giant
corporations with their vast infrastructural organizations
and with the State through its instrumentalities and
agencies entering into almost every branch of industry
and commerce, there can be myriad situations which
result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between
parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal
bargaining power. These cases can neither be
enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must judge
each case on its own facts and circumstances."
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, the Court has held that the Constitution
obliges courts to advance social and economic justice and to
give effect to the equality mandate under Article 14.
Consequently, courts will neither enforce nor hesitate to
invalidate contracts, or contractual clauses, that are unfair or
unreasonable when entered into between parties with unequal
bargaining power.
12.1. Relying on the aforesaid reasoning, another
two Judge Bench in Pani Ram v. Union of India - (2021)
19 SCC 234, reiterated that the guarantee of equality
under Article 14 extends even to situations where a
person has no meaningful choice but to accept imposed
contractual terms, however unfair or unreasonable they
may be. Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court
observed thus: -
"23. As held by this Court, a right to equality
guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India would also apply to a man who has no choice
or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his
assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in
a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of
rules as part of the contract, however unfair,
unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that
contract or form or rules may be. We find that the
said observations rightly apply to the facts of the
present case. Can it be said that the mighty Union of
19
India and an ordinary soldier, who having fought for the
country and retired from Regular Army, seeking re-
employment in the Territorial Army, have an equal
bargaining power. We are therefore of the considered
view that the reliance placed on the said document
would also be of no assistance to the case of the
respondents."
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, it is clear that Courts are empowered to
invalidate unconscionable elements of a contract where
the parties lack the ability to exercise any real or
meaningful choice in negotiating its terms. In the present
case, the appellants were left with no alternative but to
accept the conditions unilaterally prescribed by the
respondent-State in order to secure their livelihood and
sustain a source of income. It would be entirely
unrealistic to assume that, in such circumstances, an
employee seeking temporary employment could
meaningfully negotiate or assert a position against the
overwhelming might of the State machinery.
12.2. At this juncture, the analogy of apples and
oranges serves as a useful reminder that certain
relationships are inherently incapable of being assessed
on an equal plane. A contract between the State and an
employee stands on a similar footing. The State, in such a
relationship, assumes the role of a metaphorical lion,
endowed with overwhelming authority, resources and
bargaining strength, whereas the employee, who is yet
an aspirant, is reduced to the position of a metaphorical
lamb, possessing little real negotiating power. To suggest
parity between the two, i.e. the lion and the lamb, would
be to ignore the stark imbalance that defines the
relationship.
12.3. Therefore, where a lion contracts with a lamb,
the inequality is not incidental but structural, and it is
precisely this disproportion that calls for judicial
sensitivity. In such situations, the conscience of
Constitutional Courts must inevitably tilt in favour of
protecting the lamb. We have no hesitation in holding
that Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to act to
20
safeguard those who are vulnerable to exploitation, so
that employees are not compelled to meekly submit to
the demands of a vastly dominant contracting party like
the State, but are instead assured that constitutional
protections will intervene to prevent such exploitation.
Legitimate Expectation of the employees: -
13. Another facet requiring consideration in the
case of contractual employees, such as the present
appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
Where employees have continued to discharge their
duties on contractual posts for a considerable length of
time, as in the present case, it is but natural that a
legitimate expectation arises that the State would, at
some stage, recognize their long and continuous service.
It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions
granted by the Executive, that such employees continue
in service and refrain from seeking alternative
employment, notwithstanding the contractual nature of
their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to
advert to the principles governing the doctrine of legitimate
expectation as enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare
Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma - (2024) 16 SCC
598, wherein it was held as follows: -
"63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the
following features regarding the doctrine of legitimate
expectation:
63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based
on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or
anticipation;
63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise
either from an express or implied promise; or a
consistent past practice or custom followed by an
authority in its dealings;
...
63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the
realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate
action can be taken only when a public authority
21
breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent
past practice, without any reasonable basis.
...
64. The aforesaid features, although not
exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help us in
deciding the applicability of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at
hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation,
jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to
maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action.
It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation
of contracts between private parties, wherein the
doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field."
(emphasis laid)
It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the
expectation with which such contractual employees
continue in the service of the State. The repeated conduct
of the employer-State in expressing confidence in their
performance and consistently granting monetary
upgrades & tenure extensions reasonably nurtures an
expectation that their long and continuous service would
receive further recognition.
13.1. Another Constitution Bench in State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi - (2006) 4 SCC 1, cautioned that
the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily
be extended to persons whose appointments are
temporary, casual or contractual in nature. The relevant
extract of the judgment reads as follows: -
"47. When a person enters a temporary
employment or gets engagement as a contractual
or casual worker and the engagement is not based
on a proper selection as recognised by the
relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the
consequences of the appointment being
temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a
person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate
expectation for being confirmed in the post when
an appointment to the post could be made only by
following a proper procedure for selection and in
cases concerned, in consultation with the Public
Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of
22
legitimate expectation cannot be successfully
advanced by temporary, contractual or casual
employees. It cannot also be held that the State has
held out any promise while engaging these persons
either to continue them where they are or to make them
permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such
a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be
invoked to seek a positive relief of being made
permanent in the post."
(emphasis laid)
However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified
that the bar against invocation of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation applies only to those temporary,
contractual or casual employees whose engagement was
not preceded by a proper selection process in accordance
with the extant rules. Consequently, where such
engagement is made after following a due and lawful
selection procedure, there is no absolute bar in law
preventing such employees from invoking the doctrine of
legitimate expectation.
Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements:
13.2. In the present case, the respondent-State had
engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned posts since
the year 2012. It was only towards the end of the year 2022
that the respondents communicated that no further extension of
the appellants' engagement was likely to be granted.
13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid
action is not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in
clear derogation of the equality principles enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State
initially engaged the appellants in their youth to
discharge public duties and functions. Having rendered
long and dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be
left to fend for themselves, particularly when the
employment opportunities that may have been available
to them a decade ago are no longer accessible owing to
age constraints.
23
13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis
for the respondent-State's decision to discontinue the
appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service.
We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship
between the appellants and the respondent-State was
mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of
the appellants' experience and institutional familiarity,
while the appellants remained in public service. In such
circumstances, any departure from a long-standing
practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the
legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be
supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking
order.
13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a
conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has
satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and
has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight,
be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to
accept the justification advanced by the respondents as
the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends
to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether
their engagement is contractual or regular.
13.6. This Court has, on several occasions,
deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging
employees under the nominal labels of "part-time",
"contractual" or "temporary" in perpetuity and thereby
exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In
Jaggo v. Union of India- 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826, this
Court underscored that government departments must
lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment,
and evolved the test of examining whether the duties
performed by such temporary employees are integral to
the day-to-day functioning of the organization.
13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam - 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 221 and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India - (2024) 9 SCC
327, this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind
reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to
temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It
was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a
shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued
24
for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The
Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a
distinction between appointments that are "illegal" and
those that are merely "irregular", the latter being
amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the
prescribed conditions.
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P - 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1735, this Court strongly deprecated the
culture of "ad-hocism" adopted by States in their capacity
as employers. The Court criticized the practice of
outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to
evade regular employment obligations, observing that
such measures perpetuate precarious working conditions
while circumventing fair and lawful engagement
practices.
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-
time employees, such as the appellants, constitute an
integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of
the State continues to function. They are not merely
ancillary to the system, but form essential components
thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution,
therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a
manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions
of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such
part-time and contractual employees are guided by
fairness and reason.
13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to
persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State's
contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the
appellants' engagement denudes them of constitutional
protection. The State, having availed of the appellants'
services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant
to a due process of selection and having consistently
acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in
the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision,
abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge
behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is
manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of
the State to act as a model employer, and fails to
withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.
25
FINAL CONCLUSION:
14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing
paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:
I. The respondent-State was not justified in
continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant
posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of
contractual engagement and thereafter denying
them consideration for regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing
engagement solely on the basis of contractual
nomenclature, without either recording cogent
reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for
regularization cannot override constitutional
guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does
not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and
contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary
State action from constitutional scrutiny.
IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on
contractual labels or mechanical application of
Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or
to discard long-serving employees in a manner
inconsistent with fairness, dignity and
constitutional governance.
26
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the
respondent-State to forthwith regularize the
services of all the appellants against the sanctioned
posts to which they were initially appointed. The
appellants shall be entitled to all consequential
service benefits accruing from the date of this
judgment.
15. Accordingly, the present appeals are disposed of and
all writ petitions are allowed and the judgments dated 17th
September, 2024, 15th October, 2024 and 2nd December,
2024, in LPA Nos. 390 of 2024, 356 of 2024 and 368 of 2024,
respectively, passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
are set aside.
16. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court, the petition
deserves to succeed, for a direction to the respondents to consider
the case of the petitioner for regularization of his services.
27
9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) Mandamus issues to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization of his service, bearing in mind the observations made by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment and to pass necessary orders in accordance with law, within an outer limit of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
(iii) The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits that would flow from the order to be passed as above.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS