Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Constable Gyanender S/O Raj Pal Singh vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi Through ... on 22 August, 2007
ORDER
V.K. Bali, J. (Chairman)
1. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 147 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, the Delhi Administration had framed the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the 1980 Rules). By virtue of provisions contained in Rule 15(1) of the said Rules, a fact finding enquiry, which is known as preliminary enquiry, is conducted to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter, to collect prosecution evidence, to judge the quantum of default, and to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. It is quite clear from the reading of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 15, as has also been held in a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Singh v. Union of India an Ors. that a preliminary enquiry is held only in cases of allegation which is of weak character. When, however, the allegations may be of grave nature and specific information is available, there is no bar for the department to order regular departmental enquiry in the first instance or straightway. In case, a preliminary enquiry is held and the same discloses commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the public, regular departmental enquiry or prosecution is ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered or a departmental enquiry should he held. Whereas, there is no dispute and has been also consistently held by this Tribunal, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, and even the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that if the preliminary enquiry may disclose commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the public, the matter shall have to be placed before the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned, who has to apply his mind as to whether a criminal prosecution should be launched or a regular departmental enquiry has to be held, and if such application of mind is not there and the regular departmental enquiry is ordered, the same would be vitiated, but what constitutes preliminary enquiry has been a matter of debate resulting into conflicting decisions by this Tribunal. A police officer who may be facing a departmental enquiry or might have been punished pursuant to such an enquiry, would canvass that any anti-corruption raid, investigation or vigilance enquiry, which may have all the ingredients of an investigation, collection of evidence, identification of defaulter and quantum of default, and collection of evidence, would partake the character of a preliminary enquiry and if the same discloses commission of a cognizable offence and a departmental enquiry is ordered without application of mind by the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned under Rule 15(2), the same would be a nullity. This Tribunal indeed so held while disposing of OA No. 58/2001 Head Constable Hari Kishan v. Union of India an Ors. decided on 4.2.2002, and OA No. 157/2002 Ravinder Singh v. Commissioner of Police an Ors. decided on 17.4.2002. When the same contention was raised in OA No. 340/2004 and connected cases Ranvir Singh and Ors. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. the Bench then seized of the matter referred the case for decision by a larger Bench. While making a reference, however, the Bench did not formulate the questions that needed adjudication. That being so, the Full Bench framed the following three questions for its decision:
1. In what circumstances statements made in pre-inquiry can be brought on the record of the departmental proceedings.
2. Whether anti corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries are covered under the expression "preliminary enquiry" used in Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980.
3. Is it necessary that there has to be an order in writing of initiating the preliminary enquiry by the Authority in order to invoke the provisions of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980.
From the three questions reproduced above, what we are concerned with at this stage is question No. 2. The opinion on question No. 2 was divided. The majority answered the question as follows:
a) There has to be an order to initiate preliminary inquiry by the authority.
b) Preliminary inquiry has to precede the departmental inquiry to collect the facts contemplated under Sub-rule (1) to Rule 15 of the Rules.
c) Anti-Corruption raids, investigation or vigilance inquiries, per-se would not be preliminary inquiries contemplated under Rule 15 of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) rules, 1980. It would vary with the facts of each case, i.e., if there was an order by the authority to hold such an inquiry contemplated under Rule 15 of the Rules, it could be taken to be so.
The conclusion arrived at by Hon'ble Member (Judicial) dissenting with the majority view reads as follows:
Accordingly, I have no hesitation to hold or dissent that a raid and vigilance enquiry on the basis of which a departmental enquiry is ordered need not be ordered by the authority and would be a PE as contemplated under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of the Rules. There is no requirement to weigh the facts and circumstances of each case of an anti corruption raid conducted by Public Grievance Cell to determine its status as a PE. In all cases it would be a PE.
2. It is pertinent to mention that even though the majority view was that unless the preliminary enquiry was ordered by the disciplinary authority/authority to hold such an enquiry under the provisions of Rule 15 of the 1980 Rules, it would not be taken to be so, but while dealing with raids or enquiries by Public Grievances and Redressal Cell, it was observed that since it was not the question formulated, it would be for the Bench to consider whether in the peculiar facts it would be a preliminary enquiry or not.
3. The matter after adjudication by the Full Bench came before the concerned Bench. Even though the report of Public Grievances and Redressal Cell was not pursuant to a preliminary enquiry ordered by the authority mentioned under Rule 15(2), it was held that the same would be a preliminary enquiry. When this matter came up before us (DB) and the learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal recorded by the Division Bench after the matter came up for hearing before it when the Full Bench had decided the question of law, the Bench (DB) was of the view that even though the report by the Public Grievances and Redressal Cell may not have been specifically covered by the Full Bench decision, the law laid down therein that preliminary enquiry would be the only one that may be ordered by a competent authority, the decision by the DB in the said case would be contrary to the decision of Full Bench, this matter was referred to a larger Bench. This is how we are seized of the matter.
4. The anti corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries which may not have been ordered by the competent authority have been held not to be a preliminary enquiry as envisaged under Rule 15(2). The limited question thus before us is as to whether enquiry by the Public Grievances and Redressal Cell would be such a preliminary enquiry or not. Before we, however, may evaluate the contentions of the learned Counsel representing the parties on the limited question framed above, it would be appropriate to refer to Rules 15 and 16(i) of the Rules of 1980, as also the reasons why majority in the Full Bench in Ranvir Singh an Ors. (supra) held that anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries unless ordered by the competent authority, would not be preliminary enquiry as envisaged under Rule 15 (2):
15. Preliminary enquiries. (1) A preliminary enquiry is a fact finding enquiry. Its purpose is (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter(s), (ii) to collect prosecution evidence, (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases where specific information covering the above-mentioned points exists a Preliminary Enquiry need not be held and Departmental enquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary authority straightaway. In all other cases a preliminary enquiry shall normally precede a departmental enquiry.
(2) In cases in which a preliminary enquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the public, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held.
(3) x x x
16. Procedure in departmental enquiries. The following procedure shall be observed in all departmental enquiries against police officers of subordinate rank where prima facie the misconduct is such that, if proved, it is likely to result in a major punishment being awarded to the accused officer:
(i) A police officer accused of misconduct shall be required to appear before the disciplinary authority, or such Enquiry Officer as may be appointed by the disciplinary authority. The Enquiry Officer shall prepare a statement summarising the misconduct alleged against the accused officer in such a manner as to give full notice to him of the circumstances in regard to which evidence is to be recorded. Lists of prosecution witnesses together with brief details of the evidence to be led by them and the documents to be relied upon for prosecution shall be attached to the summary of misconduct. A copy of the summary of misconduct and the lists of prosecution witnesses together with the brief details of the evidence to be led by them and the documents to be relied upon for prosecution will be given to the defaulter free of charge. The contents of the summary and other documents shall be explained to him. He shall be required to submit to the enquiry officer a written report within 7 days indicating whether he admits the allegations and if not, whether he wants to produce defence evidence to refute the allegations against him.
A bare perusal reading of Rule 15(1) would manifest that if a preliminary enquiry is conducted with a view to find out the nature of default and identity of defaulter, to collect prosecution evidence, to judge quantum of default, and to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry, but in such cases where specific information with regard to all above mentioned points is already with the department, the disciplinary authority can straightway order regular departmental enquiry. The regular departmental enquiry, it is settled, has to be ordered by the disciplinary authority. In the context of the language employed in Rule 15(1), the question arose as to whether the preliminary enquiry has also to be ordered by the disciplinary authority or not. With a view to answer the question as above, the majority in the Full Bench placed reliance upon judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh an Ors. ; O.P. Singla and Anr. v. Union of India an Ors. ; and Kehar Singh an Ors. v. The State (Delhi Administration) , and opined as follows:
In other words, the preliminary inquiry has to be by an inquiry officer who has been appointed. Appointment has to be necessarily by the disciplinary authority or an appropriate authority in this regard.
The majority in the Full Bench then, while mentioning that the expression 'preliminary inquiry' has not been defined under the rules, referred to judicial precedents in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India ; The Rt. Rev. B.P. Sugandhar Bishop in Medak v. Smt. D. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser , and some other judicial precedents of the High Courts, to hold that preliminary enquiries are usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry has been made out or not, as also that investigations etc. cannot partake the character of preliminary enquiry for departmental proceedings. The majority in the Full Bench then referred to various orders passed by this Tribunal taking a contrary view, and disagreed with the same. Insofar as the decision of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police, Delhi an Ors. v. R.C. Shekharan Civil Writ No. 1553/2003, decided on 30.4.2003 is concerned, it was held that the question dealt with by the Full Bench was not before the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. On the basis of Rules 15 and 16 and observations made in various judicial precedents, the majority in the Full Bench held that there has to be an order by the competent authority to hold a preliminary enquiry. The conclusion arrived at by the majority in the Full Bench reads, thus:
53. We have mentioned some judgments of the supreme Court. Not only the above precedents from the Supreme Court lend support to what we have recorded above that there has to be an order by the competent authority to hold a preliminary inquiry, but the same conclusions would be arrived at from reading of Rules 15 and 16(iii) of the said Rules. Sub-rule (1) to Rule 15 clearly indicates that a preliminary inquiry is a fact finding inquiry. There are four purposes, i.e., (i) to establish the nature of the default and identity of defaulters (ii) to collect prosecution evidence, (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on record.
54. But in cases where specific information on these points is available, preliminary inquiry need not be held and departmental inquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary authority.
55. The expression "ordered by the disciplinary authority" necessarily has to be read that if preliminary inquiry was to be ordered because the Rules do not permit that preliminary inquiry can be held by any other authority. Any other interpretation would go contrary to the plain language of the Sub-rule (1) to Rule 15.
56. The same conclusion can be arrived at Sub-rule (3) to Rule 15 of the Rules. It prescribes that "All statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry shall be signed by the person making them and attested by enquiry officer." In other words, it provides procedure for preliminary inquiry that statements have to be signed by the person making them in the preliminary inquiry. There is a departure from Section 161/162 of Code of Criminal Procedure where statements recorded during investigation are not required to be signed. But most important aspect is that it has to be attested by an inquiry officer. In other words, the preliminary inquiry has to be by an inquiry officer who has been appointed. Appointment has to be necessarily by the disciplinary authority or an appropriate authority in this regard. Otherwise, there was no purpose of using the expression "inquiry officer". Any person who records his statements and forwards the same with his reports to the disciplinary authority, cannot be taken to be an Inquiry Officer. One shudders to think such an eventuality that a person who has not been appointed, holds preliminary inquiry pertaining to others. Thus, the only logical conclusion can be that preliminary inquiry can only be by an officer appointed for the purpose.
57. Reverting back to Sub-rule (iii) to Rule 16, once again the position is the same. Herein complete departure, as already referred to above, is made from the expression "preliminary inquiry". We have already made a reference that the preliminary inquiry is only contemplated under Rule 15. The scope of Sub-rule (iii) to Rule 16 is pertaining to departmental inquiry. It draws distinction in statements recorded otherwise than the preliminary inquiry. It refers to the statements recorded during investigation, inquiry or trial. It obviously would be not recorded by an officer authorized to conduct a preliminary inquiry.
In view of the observations/findings as reproduced above, the relevant question was answered as reproduced in the earlier part of the order.
5. While dealing with the limited question before us pertaining to enquiries or raids by PGR Cell, the majority in the Full Bench referred to Standing Order (SO) No. 102/1994 pertaining to the functions to be carried out by the Cell. It then referred to report of raid dated 5.10.2000 in the case dealt with by it, and observed thus:
Since this is not the question formulated, it is indeed for the Bench to consider whether in the peculiar facts, it would be a preliminary inquiry or not.
6. It is absolutely clear from reading of the majority view of the Full Bench that anti corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries per se would not be preliminary enquiries conducted under Rule 15 of the 1980 Rules, and the same vary with the facts of each case, i.e., if there was an order by the competent authority to hold such an enquiry contemplated under Rule 15, it could be taken to be so. Even though, while answering the question it has also been mentioned that it would vary with the facts of each case, but the variance even on facts would be only if anti corruption raids, etc., have been ordered by the authority contemplated under Rule 15. Read carefully, the answer to question No. 2 is that anti corruption raids, etc., would not be preliminary enquiries unless ordered by the disciplinary authority. In the context of the law laid down by the majority in the full Bench, it appears that the question with regard to enquiries/raids by the PGR Cell may not have been left open.
7. We have already reproduced in the earlier part of the order the dissenting view recorded by the Hon'ble Member (Judicial). When the matter after decision by the Full Bench came before the Division Bench, it was urged on behalf of the applicant that as per SO No. 102/1994, the Commissioner of Police on 29.11.1994 authorised and had set up a Public Grievance Cell headed by an ACP to pay special attention to the allegations of public regarding corruption by the Delhi Police and in that view of the matter one of the functions and authorization was to attend complaint and conduct enquiry, and on the basis of this enquiry, follow up action is taken. By referring to the SO and the raid conducted by the PGR Cell on 5.10.2000, it was further argued that the report was submitted to the disciplinary authority for appropriate action, which culminated into a departmental enquiry. It was further urged that in the enquiry preceding the departmental enquiry evidence was collected, defaulter was identified, the misconduct was quantified, and the same was done to facilitate a regular departmental inquiry. In the circumstances, SO No. 102/1994 and delegation to the ACP by the Commissioner of Police would be a deemed general order for holding a regular preliminary enquiry. The learned DB in OA No. 1613/2004 on the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel held thus:
27. As regards violation of Rule 15(2) of the Rules, having passed a general order by the Commissioner of Police, authorizing the ACP, PRG Cell, and enquiry in the present case is an authorized enquiry on a deemed general order passed, as the enquiry revealed the quantum of default, collection of evidence and identifying defaulters and default the same partakes the character of a PE under Rule 15(1) of the Rules and for want of any reasons recorded by the Joint Commissioner of Police as to holding of an enquiry or registering a case, which is a mandate in case cognizable offence is disclosed against a police officer, which is applicable in the present case. Non-compliance of Rule 15(2) has not only vitiated the order of enquiry but also subsequent punishment. In this view of ours we are fortified by the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ravinder Singh's case (supra).
8. It may be recalled that the contention of the learned Counsel was that as per SO No. 102/1994 the Commissioner of Police on 29.11.1994 had authorised and had set up a PG Cell headed by an ACP to pay special attention to the allegations of public regarding corruption by the Delhi Police. One of the functions and authorization was to attend to complaint and conduct enquiry, and on the basis of this enquiry, follow up action was to be taken. On the basis of the contention of the learned Counsel as noted above, the learned DB held that the Commissioner of Police had passed a general order authorizing ACP, PGR Cell to hold an enquiry in the case dealt with by the Cell and the same would be an authorized enquiry on a deemed general order passed. Inasmuch as, the enquiry revealed the quantum of default, collection of evidence and identifying the defaulter and default, the same would partake the character of a preliminary enquiry under Rule 15(2) of the 1980 Rules.
9. We have given our anxious thoughts to the whole issue, but with respect, we are unable to concur with the view of the Division Bench reproduced above. The contention of the learned Counsel representing the applicant that a general order of Commissioner of Police, authorizing ACP, PGR Cell would be a deemed general order for holding a preliminary enquiry as envisaged under Rule 15(2) of the 1980 Rules, was accepted without referring to the order SO No. 102/1994 and the contents thereof. Perusal of SO No. 102/1994 would demonstrate that the Additional Commissioner of Police on 29.11.1994 ordered setting up in each Delhi Police District a Public Grievance Cell headed by an ACP. The general order does not refer to holding enquiries by ACP, PG Cell nor the same anywhere refers to finding out quantum of default, collection of evidence and identifying the defaulters and the default committed by a police officer. Bare perusal of relevant part of SO No. 102/1994 reproduced below would manifest that it is not a general order authorizing ACP, PG Cell to conduct enquiries as envisaged under Rule 15(1):
1. GENERAL In order to prevent violation of human rights, enquire into the allegations of its violation by a Delhi Policeman and impart training to sensitise the force to honour these rights, a Public Grievance Cell, headed by an ACP, will be set up in each Delhi Police Distt. This Cell shall also deal with the complaints filed by the public with the DCP or to the Cell and pay special attention to the allegations of corruption and custodial crime or every description.
4. FUNCTIONS Following shall be the important duties of the ACP:
(i) To attend to all the complaints coming to the office of the DCP or to the Cell with their grievances.
(ii) To conduct enquiries into complaints where prima-facie evidence of corruption is found, violation of human rights and gross mis-conduct on the part of the subordinate officers causing harassment to public are made out, and submit a report to the D.C.P.
(iii) To monitor the follow-up action on these enquiry reports.
(iv) To monitor the enquiry reports and follow-up action upon all other complaints received in the Districts.
(v) To ensure timely replies/reports upon complaints in which reports are called for by the PHQ and the Vigilance Branch.
(vi) To monitor the progress of departmental enquiries in cases where departmental action is recommended by them.
(vii) To monitor the compliance of all Standing Orders/Circular Orders issued on the subjects relating to dealing with public such as Human Rights, making of arrests, treatment of arrested persons, summoning of women to police stations, arrest of women, and to the family of accident victims etc. and other facilities given to the persons in police custody.
(vii) To hold regular meetings with subordinate officers and men at police stations to educate them on Civil Liberties, Human Rights, Rights of arrested persons and check their awareness of various orders issued by PHQ on these subjects from time to time.
(viii) To conduct surprise checks at police stations to assess the level of compliance of such Standing and Circular Orders and give a checking report to the District D.C.P.
(ix) To ensure that the next of kin of victims of fatal accidents are given copies of documents required for filing claims, within one month of registration of the case.
5. ANALYSIS OF DATA REGARDING COMPLAINTS The Cell shall categorise all the complaints received in the District under the following 7 heads and maintain complaints data category wise.
1. Non-registration of case.
2. Minimisation of crime.
3. Harassment in police station.
4. Beating.
5. Extortion of money/bribe.
6. Inaction on the part of local police.
7. Other allegations.
The Cell shall also analyse the above data police station-wise and suggest to the district DCP remedial measures if complaints under any particular head are abnormally high in the area of any particular police station. Such data, police station-wise, shall also be sent to the office of DCP/Vigilance once in every quarter in the proforma, given at Annexure-A.
6. PUNISHMENTS The Cell shall maintain data regarding departmental action taken/ punishment awarded to police personnel following enquiries conducted by the Cell and following enquiries by the Vigilance Branch. They shall send quarterly returns thereof to DCP/Vig. Branch, PHQ in the proforma given at Annexure-B.
7. SUSPENSION/INVOLVEMENT OF POLICEMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES The Cell shall maintain rank-wise data of policemen placed under suspension in the Districts separately for suspensions following enquiries by the Cell, following enquiries by a Vigilance Branch of the PHQ, following involvement in criminal cases and for departmental irregularities and send quarterly reports to DCP/Vigilance in the proforma given at Annexure-C. Quarterly data regarding policemen involved in criminal cases, but not suspended shall be sent on proforma given at Annexure-D.
10. In the functions to be carried out by the Cell, no doubt one of the same is to conduct enquiries into complaints, but the said enquiry has to be related to corruption, violation of human rights and gross misconduct on the part of subordinate police officers causing harassment to public. The sole purpose of the enquiry is to find out corruption amongst police officials and for violation of human rights, and gross misconduct causing harassment to public. The purpose is not to hold departmental enquiry. In the functions to be carried out by the Cell, one enumerated at Sl. No. (vi) is to monitor the progress of departmental enquiries in cases where departmental action has been recommended by them. Function of the Cell enumerated at Sl. No. (ii) to conduct enquiries into complaints where prima facie evidence of corruption etc. is found, has to be read with other functions enumerated in para 4, and in particular the one at Sl. No. (vi). The said function is to monitor the progress of departmental enquiries in cases where departmental action is recommended by the Cell. If the function of the Cell enumerated at Sl. No. (ii) is to partake the character of a deemed order of holding enquiry under Rule 15(1), there was no question to ascribe one of the functions of the Cell to recommend departmental action and monitor progress of departmental enquiries. Referring the case to the concerned department for holding a departmental enquiry and to monitor the progress of the same would clinch the issue beyond any pale of controversy. The purpose of creating a Public Grievance Cell is not to hold a departmental enquiry least the one envisaged under Rule 15(1) of the 1980 rules. We are of the firm view that departmental enquiries have to be ordered by the concerned department where an employee is engaged for discharging his duties. It is the disciplinary authority of an employee alone who would be authorised to order departmental enquiry. Rule 15(1) also makes it clear that an enquiry, be it a preliminary or regular one, has to be ordered by the disciplinary authority. Disciplinary Authority has been defined under Rule 4(iv) of the 1980 Rules. The same means the authority competent to award punishment as prescribed in the Delhi Police Act, 1978. Major punishments as referred to in Rule 5 from Sl. Nos. (i) to (vii) are to be awarded by an officer not below the rank of the appointing authority or above, whereas minor punishments mentioned at Sl. No. (vii) may be awarded by the authorities specified in Sub-section (i) of Section 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978. Surely, the disciplinary authority may be different in case of different employees. ACP may not be a disciplinary authority for all the police officials against whom departmental enquiry may be ordered. That apart, we are convinced that if anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries are not to be preliminary enquiries contemplated under Rule 15 of the Rules of 1980, the enquiries/raids conducted by the PG Cell also cannot be such preliminary enquiries. The Cell created under SO No. 102/1994 is a part and parcel of the vigilance, and the enquiries conducted by vigilance have been specifically held not to be preliminary enquiries as envisaged under Rule 15(1). Interpretation of Rule 15(1) with regard to preliminary enquiries covered thereunder, in the manner done by the majority in the Full Bench apart, we are independently of the view that anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries by PG Cell, if are considered to be preliminary enquiries as envisaged under Rule 15(1), would result into anomalous situations, and some times may result into complete injustice. We are not elaborating but can nevertheless foresee possibilities of misuse by fertile minds and for myriad reasons.
11. The learned Counsel representing the applicant has no other argument but for the one raised in OA No. 1613/2004 Const. Raj Karan v. Government of NCT of Delhi an Ors. (supra) which found favour with the learned Division Bench and to which view, we, as already mentioned above, are unable to subscribe. However, in all fairness, we must mention that the learned Counsel had relied upon decision of a Division Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 2126/2001 in the matter of R.C. Shekharan v. Government of NCT of Delhi an Ors. decided on 12.8.2002. In the said case, the matter proceeded on the basis of admission in the counter affidavit filed by the department that there was a preliminary enquiry conducted against the applicant in the said case which had disclosed commission of a cognizable offence. There was no question involved in the said case whether the enquiry conducted would partake the character of a preliminary enquiry as envisaged under Rule 15(1).
12. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that the answer to question No. 2 in para (c) thereof by the majority in the Full Bench in Ranvir Singh an Ors. (supra) would also include raid/enquiry by the Public Grievance Cell. That being so, we partly overrule the judgment of the Division Bench in Const. Raj Karan (supra) insofar as it holds a view contrary to the one held above.
13. Let the matter be placed before the appropriate Bench for further orders.