Allahabad High Court
Sushma Satsangi vs State Of U.P. Thru Prin. Secy. Housing & ... on 22 October, 2019
Bench: Anil Kumar, Saurabh Lavania
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Reserved Court No. - 3 Case :- MISC. BENCH No. - 19168 of 2019 Petitioner :- Sushma Satsangi Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin. Secy. Housing & Urban Plan. & Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Brijesh Kumar Singh Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ratnesh Chandra Hon'ble Anil Kumar,J.
Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
C.M. Application No. 96973 of 2019 [Review Application].
Heard Sri Brijesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the review applicant and Sri Ratnesh Chandra, appears for the L.D.A. Review application for reviewing the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019, passed in the Writ Petition No. 19168 (MB) of 2019 [Smt. Sushma Satsangi v. State of U.P. and others] has been fled after filing of the application (C.M. Application No. 83101 of 2019) for modification/correction of the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019.
By means of the present order, we are deciding both the applications.
With regard to the application for modification/correction of the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019, a preliminary objection has been raised by Sri Ratnesh Chandra, learned counsel for the Lucknow Development Authority (in short "LDA") to the effect that an application for modification/correction of the final judgment is not maintainable. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court passed in the case of State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943.
In response to the above, Sri B.K.Singh, learned counsel for the review petitioner submitted that considering the legal proposition, the review application has been filed for consideration of this Court and accordingly, the same may be taken into account and considered on merits and an appropriate order may be passed thereon.
We have considered the aforesaid facts as well as the law laid down by the Apex Court on the issue that an application for modification/correction challenging the final judgment is not maintainable, we hereby dismiss/reject the application (C.M. Application No. 83101 of 2019) for modification/correction of the final judgment and order dated 15.07.2019.
Sri B.K.Singh, learned counsel for the review petitioner pressed the review application and submitted that the writ petition, wherein the judgment under review dated 15.07.2019 was passed, was filed challenging the order dated 03.07.2019, whereby the premises/building, under construction, of the petitioner was sealed in exercise of the power provided under Section 28 A of the U.P. Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1973'). In the writ petition, the consequential relief was also sought to the effect that the Authorities of the LDA be directed to remove the seal from the premises No. B-1/27-B, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lcuknow and the petitioner may be permitted to construct the building as per the sanctioned map.
Sri B.K.Singh further submitted that this Court interfered in the order dated 03.07.2019, pursuant to which the building of the petitioner was sealed on the ground that the same was passed behind the back of the petitioner and without giving any intimation of postponed date of the proceedings to the petitioner. This Court, by the judgment dated 15.07.2019, under review, quashed the order dated 03.07.2019 and remitted the matter back to the Authority concerned to pass appropriate orders after affording full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and in the final judgment it has also been provided that till the final decision in the proceedings, the parties shall maintain status-quo as it exists today.
On account of the order of status-quo, during the pendency of the proceedings before the competent authority under Section 27 read with Section 28 of the Act of 1973, the petitioner moved the review application. Due to the order of status-quo, the petitioner is unable to construct the building in question as per the sanctioned map particularly the basement portion of the house in issue. The un-constructed basement would cause damage to two Bungalows of Senior IAS Officers adjacent to the premises in issue.
Accordingly, it is prayed that the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019 be reviewed/modified/corrected to the extent that the petitioner may be permitted to construct the basement of the building No. No. B-1/27-B, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lcuknow as per the sanctioned map.
In rebuttal, Sri Ratnesh Chandra, learned Counsel for the LDA submitted that the review application for reviewing of the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019 is neither entertainable nor maintainable on account of the fact that the petitioner has failed to point out any of the grounds as enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
It is further submitted that the assertions made in the affidavit filed in support of the review application also do not warrant review of the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019. It is also stated that the proceedings under Section 27 read with Section 28 of the Act of 1973 would be affected if the petitioner is permitted to raise constructions over the premises in issue as on account of raising the construction, the existing situation on which the proceedings have been initiated, would change.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Before considering the case of the review petitioner, we would like to refer the scope of review. The review as per the settled principle by the Apex Court as well as this Court is to the effect that the review is not a disguise appeal. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, after taking note of various judgment, summarized the principles related to review of an order/judgment. The relevant paras reads as under:-
"12. This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] held as under: (SCC p. 675, para 1) "1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."
13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 222] , this Court, in paras 8 and 9 held as under: (SCC pp. 171-72) "8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845] . For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279] . The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5] . Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except ''where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility': Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib[(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] .
9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record."
14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v.Union of India [1980 Supp SCC 562 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 381] held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12) "12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib[(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1) ''1. ... A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.'"
15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9) "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372] this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11) ''11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.'
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ''reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ''an appeal in disguise'."
16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v.Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54, 56 & 58) "54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
''1.Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.' Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words ''any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC' must mean ''a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule' as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] . Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [AIR 1954 SC 440] , this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC 233] , it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23) ''23. ... [I]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.
Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in--Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality [ILR 1953 Bom 191 : AIR 1953 Bom 133] , that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.' Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance."
17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 651] held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10) "10. ... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."
18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501] , held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12) "11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of ''second innings' which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ramv. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275] 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.
21. Keeping the above principles in mind, let us consider the claim of the petitioner and find out whether a case has been made out for interference exercising review jurisdiction."
In the light of the aforesaid principle, we are considering the prayer made by the review petitioner in the review application. The prayer made by the review petitioner is quoted below for ready reference:-
"WHEREFORE, for facts and reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to modify/correct the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Lavania and further be pleased to permit the petitioner to construct/repair the basement of plot No. B-1/27-B, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lcuknow as per the sanctioned map."
The assertions made in the affidavit filed in support of the review application, wherein the above quoted prayer has been made, the petitioner has made following averments:-
"2. That semi-constructed basement has been sealed by the L.D.A. without giving any opportunity of hearing and just behind the petitioner's plot, there are two bungalows of senior I.A.S. officers of Sri Fateh Bahadur and Shri Kumar Kamlesh as house No. 1/1 and 1/2, Vipul Khand, Gomti Nagar and if the petitioner will not be permitted to construct and repair the basement, there is apprehension about the damages of both bungalows in the current rainy season.
3. That this Hon'ble Court has been pleased to maintain the status quo, as exist today, while allowing the petition on 15.07.2019 filed by the petitioner but petitioner cannot make any arrangement due to order of status quo and not only the petitioner's semi-constructed basement but the two bungalows of senior I.A.S. officers may be damaged.
4. That petitioner undertakes that she will construct the house as per the sanctioned may but the repairing/construction of the basement is very urgent need considering the current rainy season.
5. That LDA has right to seal the building any time if the same will be constructed in contravention of the sanctioned map and it has also right to sanction the compounding map also but at this junction if the petitioner is not permitted to construct or repair the basement, she will suffer irreparable loss and injuries.
6. That on the next date for hearing i.e. 09.08.2019, when the counsel for the petitioner submitted orders passed by this Hon'ble Court with request to open the seal but the prescribed authority of LDA has not passed any order and next date for hearing has been fixed for 30.08.2019 saying that there is order of status quo.
7. That due to heavy rainy season the petitioner as well as her two neighbours construction may be damaged due to digging work of the basement.
8. That under these circumstances, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to review and modify the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019 and permit the petitioner to construct/repair the basement as per the sanctioned map."
We find from the record particularly the writ petition that the assertions made in the affidavit filed in support of the review application are mentioned/find place in paragraphs 15 and 19 of the writ petition and after considering the material available on record, the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019 was passed and on the basis of same the review application has been passed.
In view of the above as well as in view of the scope of review as stated hereinabove, we are not inclined to review the judgment and order dated 15.07.2019. Accordingly, the review application is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 22.10.2019 Arun/-