Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Barkhoo Ram vs Central Board Of Customs And Central ... on 27 August, 2025
O.A./443/2012
(Reserved on 20.08.2025)
Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad
Original Application No.443 of 2012
th
Pronounced on this the 27 Day of August, 2025.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)
Barkhoo Ram s/o Sri Pancham Ram r/o village- Foxganj, Post
Office-Hussainpur, District-Ghazipur.
...........Applicant
By Advocate: Shri Dharmendra Tiwari
Versus
1. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue, Government of India, North Block, New
Delhi-110001.
2. The Chairman Central Board of Excise and Customs, North
Block, New Delhi-110001.
3. Narcotics Commissioner, Government of India, Ministry of
Finance, Central Bureau of Narcotics, 19, The Mall, Morar,
Gwalior (M.P.)-474006.
4. Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, Narcotics House, Neemuch,
(M.P.)-458441.
5. General Manager, Government Opium and Alkaloid Works,
Ghazipur, U.P.
6. District Opium Officer, Neemuch II, M.P.
7. Smt Jagjit Pavadia, Narcotics Commissioner, Government of
India, Ministry of Finance, Central Bureau of Narcotics, 19, The
Mall, Morar, Gwalior (M.P.)-474006.
8. Sri S. Faheem Ahmad, the then Deputy Narcotics Commissioner,
through Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, Narcotics House,
Neemuch, (M.P.)- 458441.
...Respondents
By Advocate: Shri Rajni Kant Rai
MADHU
KUMARI
Page 1 of 16
O.A./443/2012
ORDER
By Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A) Present Original Application has been filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following relief:
"1. Issue writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the records of the case and set aside the entire disciplinary proceeding including suspension order dated 30/31.07.2009, charge sheet dated 23.04.2010, enquiry report dated 14.12.10, order dated 25.2.11 of the Disciplinary authority compulsorily retiring the applicant from the service and order dated 24.2.12 of the appellate authority/Narcotics Commissioner and also the entire disciplinary proceeding including charge sheet dated 15.1.10, enquiry report dated 8.9.10 and order dated 1.11.10 of the disciplinary authority reverting the applicant from the post of Inspector to the post of Upper Division Clerk and the charge sheet dated 9.7.10 and direct the respondents to join the applicant in service as Inspector with all consequential benefits treating all period as duty and award damages for the loss incurred by the applicant and for mental agony underwent by him and also exemplary cost may be awarded on the respondents for harassing and torturing the applicant with oblique and malafide intention.
2. Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the functioning of the applicant as Inspector or as Superintendent, if promoted.
3. Issue any other writ, order or direction to which this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. Brief facts of the case are that the applicant was appointed as Lower Division Clerk on 01.06.1976 and confirmed on 06.07.1980. He was promoted to the post of Upper Division Clerk MADHU KUMARI Page 2 of 16 O.A./443/2012 on 17.10.1988 and later to the post of Inspector on 28.09.1995. He was transferred to Government Opium and Alkaloids Works, Ghazipur from Neemuch on 02.06.2000 and then to Neemuch on 24.04.2006. Thereafter on 22.07.2009, the applicant was given a show cause notice by the deputy Narcotics Commissioner to show cause as to why disciplinary proceedings may not be issued against him for not performing the job of presenting officer as expected. The applicant replied to the show cause notice on 23.07.2009 and on 27.07.2009, he wrote a letter seeking permission to issue summons under section 67 of NDPS Act.
3. On 29.07.2009, the applicant marked his duty for 30.7.09 at 9.30 AM to appear and seek extension of judicial custody of the accused of the case crime no. 2/09 from the court situated at Chittaurgarh. On 30.07.2009, the applicant met with an accident on the way while returning from the court on the motorcycle of the department. Vide order dated 30/31.07.2009, the applicant was suspended in respect of the aforesaid accident for damaging the motor cycle of the department. After recovering, the applicant submitted an application dated 02.09.2009 for revoking the suspension.
4. On 15.01.2010, the applicant was given a charge sheet by the deputy narcotics commissioner alleging the charge of failure to perform the duty of presenting officer. On 27.01.2010, the applicant submitted a reply to the charge sheet. The disciplinary authority appointed an inquiry officer on 19.03.2010 and directed him to submit an inquiry report. The Inquiry officer submitted the Inquiry report to the disciplinary authority on 08.09.2010. The applicant was given the inquiry report on 15.09.2010. Subsequently, the disciplinary authority passed the punishment order dated 01.11.2010 reverting the applicant from the post of Inspector to the post of Upper Division Clerk. The applicant filed an appeal before the Narcotics commissioner against the order dated 01.11.2010 on 16.11.2010.
MADHU KUMARI Page 3 of 16 O.A./443/2012
5. On 23.04.2010, the applicant was given a second charge sheet in respect of the motorcycle accident. Then the inquiry officer submitted the inquiry report with respect to the second charge sheet on 14.12.2010 and the applicant was given the same on 20.12.2010 to which he submitted his reply on 03.01.2011. Eventually, the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment dated 25.02.2011 compulsorily retiring the applicant from the service. The applicant filed an appeal against the order dated 25.02.2011 before the Narcotics commissioner on 11.03.2011.
6. Then on 09.07.2010, he was given a third charge sheet leveling the charge of insubordination. The enquiry officer submitted an enquiry report with respect to the third charge sheet on 12.05.2011 stating the charges to be proved against the applicant to which the applicant submitted his explanation on 20.06.2011, and while the matter relating to the third charge sheet was still pending, the present Original Application was filed.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Submission of learned counsel for the applicant is that the entire disciplinary proceeding initiated against the applicant is malafide and prejudicial and has been done in colourable exercise of the power by the authorities. The charges leveled against the applicant are vague, trivial and do not qualify to the misconduct as defined under Rule 3 (1) (i) (ii), (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rule, 1964. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer against the applicant regarding misconduct in both the enquiry reports, are perverse and irrational. There was no Jeep or any other vehicle readily available in the office of District Opium Officer, Neemuch II and as such there was no other way except to use the motor cycle available in the office to carry out the government work. The applicant, who was investigating officer of the case crime no.2/09 at the time of the accident, is entitled to get protection of Sections 59 and 69 of NDPS Act for any action done in good faith in compelling circumstances and as such the charge sheet dated 23.4.2010 issued MADHU KUMARI Page 4 of 16 O.A./443/2012 in respect thereof, enquiry report dated 14.12.2010, order dated 25.2.2011 of the disciplinary authority and the order dated 24.2.2012 of the appellate authority relating thereto are wholly illegal and bad in law. The applicant being the investigating officer enjoyed very onerous duties and liabilities to conduct the investigation fairly and effectively and as such he has not committed any misconduct in discharging the same. Section 219 of IPC clearly provides public servants in judicial proceedings corruptly making reports etc contrary to law is punishable and as such the same was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the applicant's case.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that the CCR of the applicant of the last three years are excellent (2006-07), very good (2007-08) and excellent (2008-09) and as such order of punishment of compulsorily retiring the applicant from the service is punitive and in fact it is an order of removal of the applicant from the service. There is no indication in the order that any aspect of public interest has been taken into consideration and as such the order compulsorily retiring him is bad for non application of the mind and for want of material particulars. The enquiry officer has recorded findings in both the charge sheets stating the charges against the applicant proved on the basis of non application of mind and there has been no preponderance of probabilities before arriving at the findings by the enquiry officer in the enquiry reports. The applicant was not given the rules/documents as demanded by him during the enquiry and as such there has been violation of the principle of natural justice in the matter. The order has been passed for collateral purposes and no objective view of overall performances of the applicant has been taken into account before compulsorily retiring him from the service and there is no material on the basis of which the respondent no.3 has formed a reasonable opinion that the applicant has outlived his utility or he has lost his efficiency and has become dead wood. It is very malafide on the face of it, to retire the applicant compulsorily after reversion to UDC for the MADHU KUMARI Page 5 of 16 O.A./443/2012 bonafide work of an inspector. The punishment awarded to the applicant in the facts and circumstances of the case, is shockingly disproportionate to the charges leveled. It is argued that even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders are arbitrary, illegal, invalid and not in accordance with law and as such the same are liable to be set aside by this Hon'ble tribunal.
10. Submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that the chargesheet was issued to the applicant on the ground of not properly performing the assigned work. A disciplinary action under Rule 14 or 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rule 1965 can be initiated against any employee for his/her misconduct. The discussion made by the disciplinary authority under Para 7 of order dated 25.02.2011 is without prejudice and based upon inquiry report, evidence and other relevant documents available on record. The disciplinary authority under Rule 14 and 12 of the CCS CCA Rules 1965 is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and to impose penalty on any employee for his/her misconduct after not getting a satisfactory reply. It is submitted that Section 59 of NDPS Act, 1985 pertains to failure of officers in duty imposed by or under this Act, while the applicant has not performed the official work properly. The penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed on applicant under Rule 11 of CCS 9CCA) Rules 1965 for his proved misconduct and there is no relevance of section 59 or 69 of NDPS Act in the case. The applicant, without obtaining permission and without possessing a valid driving license, took away a government motorcycle and met with an accident which eventually caused a financial loss of Rs. 6224/- towards its repair. The aforesaid act of the applicant put his own life to danger and that of other persons too, which not only comes under misconduct or carelessness but is a serious offence. After following the procedure prescribed in CCS(CCA) Rules the departmental inquiry was initiated. The applicant preferred appeal against the order of punishment which was rejected by the appellate authority. It is argued that against the order of appellate authority, a revision MADHU KUMARI Page 6 of 16 O.A./443/2012 is mandatory, but the applicant, without preferring revision against the order of punishing as well as appellate authority, approached this Hon'ble Court which is not permissible in law.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that under the law it is settled that there is limited scope of interfering in order passed after conducting departmental proceedings. In the present case the respondents after following the procedure prescribed in law passed the impugned order which is just, proper and legal in the eye of law. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs. N. Gangaraj decided on 14.2.2020 specifically held in para 15 that:-
"The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence as if the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is restored."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar Upadhyay Vs. The Director General, SSB and others decided on 20.4.2022 has held in paragraph 8 as under:-
8. On the judicial review and interference of the courts in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to:
i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as 'Wednesbury principles'.
In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was observed that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord MADHU KUMARI Page 7 of 16 O.A./443/2012 Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken.
ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under:
"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being factfinding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra), in paragraph 19, it is observed and held as under:
"19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the MADHU KUMARI Page 8 of 16 O.A./443/2012 co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable."
12. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire documents.
13. Perusal of the charges leveled against the applicant in the charge sheets reveal that the applicant has been issued the same for not properly performing the assigned work of presenting officer, mis-presentation of rules and regulations and insubordination. Several irregularities in performing the aforesaid duty which includes not cross-examining the charged official, not raising objection, straight away accepting the version of witness without any doubt on the credibility, trying to give undue advantage to the charged officers etc.
14. The applicant had also taken a vehicle of the department without permission and without any valid driving license, putting his life along with others in danger. Section 69 of NDPC Act, 1985 pertains to "Protection of action taken in good faith" whereas the act of the applicant cannot come under the purview of this Act since he has illegally acted in the matter by taking the department vehicle without permission and without valid driving licence. Section 59 of NDPS Act, 1985 pertains to "Failure of officers in duty" for which the officers shall only be indulged for 'lawful excuses' but in the present case, neither the act of the applicant can be assumed to be in good faith nor his act can be construed to be legal from any angle. The malafide intention of the authorities has been argued by the applicant to be the motive behind the allegations and punishment but the same is not justified at any stage as the charges against the applicant have been proved on the basis of documentary evidence and available record. The additional documents demanded by the applicant have not been MADHU KUMARI Page 9 of 16 O.A./443/2012 supplied to him because of their irrelevance and the same has been duly informed to the applicant. The charge sheets issued to the applicant on the grounds of insubordination, doubtful integrity, negligence, non performing assigned duties etc, all of which are serious in nature, have been duly inquired as per the rules and the disciplinary authority has imposed the punishment after giving the charged official the opportunity to make his reply.
15. If we take into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, the scope of intervention of this Tribunal in such matters have been restricted by the various case laws both in terms of interfering with the findings made in the inquiry as well as the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary officer. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs. N. Gangaraj (supra) and Anil Kumar Upadhyay Vs. The Director General, SSB and others (supra) has already been quoted in para 7 above. In a catena of judgments by the Apex Court, it has been held that the judicial review in the disciplinary matters should not be in the form of re-appreciation of evidence. The Courts should only look at the correctness of process and not get into re-evaluation of evidence before the Inquiry Officer. The findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority which are affirmed or diluted by the Appellate Authority/Revisional Authority should not be interfered with unless the applicant shows that the order is without jurisdiction; or that there is procedural irregularity in conducting the enquiry. The Apex Court in the case of S.R.Tewari vs. Union of India 2013(7) Scale 417 has held as under:-
"The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the Court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the Court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons MADHU KUMARI Page 10 of 16 O.A./443/2012 amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice".
16. In a large number of cases including the case of Bank of India v.
Apurba Kumar Saha; (1994) 2 SCC 615, State Bank of India and Others v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006) 7 SCC 212, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao; AIR 1963 SC 1723, Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup; AIR 1957 SC 82, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Graver, 1995(6) SCC (L&S) 279-1996(1) SLJ 145 (SC), Deokinandan Sharma v. UOI and Ors., 2000 SCC (L&S) 1079, State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar & Another (2011 STPL (web) 904) and Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raghubir Singh and another, CWP No. 1154/2014 decided on 06.05.2014 by Punjab and Haryana High Court, the underline theme is that the High Court/tribunal does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. They have to see whether there is violation of natural justice and fair play or any procedural irregularity committed by the inquiry officer, Disciplinary authority and due procedure was adopted strictly in accordance with the service rule.
17. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India versus P.Gunasekaran 2015 (2) S.C.C. 610 in paras 12, 13 & 20 has held as follows:-
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re- appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
MADHU KUMARI Page 11 of 16 O.A./443/2012 b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
XX XX XX
19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the MADHU KUMARI Page 12 of 16 O.A./443/2012 conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, blamelessness, sincerity, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values."
18. The Apex Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. Reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749 again has been pleased to observe that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings the Court/Tribunal are not competent and cannot appreciate the evidence. In this regard, the Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-
"The Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding the charges against the appellant to have been proved. After consultation with the UPSC, the appellant was dismissed from service by an order dated 29.10.1986. The Tribunal after appreciating the evidence, upheld all the charges as having been proved but converted the order of dismissal into one of compulsory retirement. The delinquent filed an appeal challenging the finding on merits, and the Union filed an appeal canvassing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment imposed by it. Allowing the appeal of the Union of India and dismissing that of the delinquent.
Per Ramaswamy and Jeevan Reddy, JJ "Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives MADHU KUMARI Page 13 of 16 O.A./443/2012 support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."
19. In another case the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v.
Upendra Singh reported in 1994(3)SCC 357 has been pleased to observe that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary enquiry is very limited. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-
"In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be."
20. The Apex Court has also observed in regard to scope of judicial review as well as in regard to the quantum of punishment in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Md. Ayub Naaz reported in 2006 (1) SCC 589 as under:-
"10. This Court in Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 while considering the quantum of punishment / proportionality has observed that in determining the quantum, role of administrative authority is primary and that of court is secondary, confined to see if discretion exercised by the administrative authority caused excessive infringement of rights.
In the instant case, the authorities have not omitted any relevant materials nor any irrelevant fact taken into account nor any illegality committed by the authority nor the punishment MADHU KUMARI Page 14 of 16 O.A./443/2012 awarded was shockingly disproportionate. The punishment was awarded in the instant case, after considering all the relevant materials and, therefore, in our view, the interference by the High Court on reduction of punishment of removal is not called for."
21. In the case of Union of India Vs. S.S. Ahluwalia reported in 2007 Law Suit (SC) 950, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-
"The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of disciplinary proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved. In such a case the court is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment. In an appropriate case in order to avoid delay the court can itself impose lesser penalty."
22. In the case of State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N Marak reported in 2009 Law Suit (SC) 1935, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held as under:-
"A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefore. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review."
23. Lastly in the case of Director General, RPF Vs. Sai Babu reported in 2003 Law Suit (SC) 117, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold as under:-
"4. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellants urged that the learned Single Judge was not right and justified in modifying the order of punishment, having observed that the respondent was a habitual offender and due to dereliction of duties, the punishment of stoppage of increments for three years was already ordered in 1984 and that there was no improvement MADHU KUMARI Page 15 of 16 O.A./443/2012 in the conduct of the respondent. He alternatively submitted even if the learned Single Judge was of the view that the punishment imposed was grossly or shockingly disproportionate, punishment could not have been modified but the matter could be remitted to the disciplinary authority to re-examine the issue in regard to the imposition of penalty on the respondent. He further submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court did not go into the merits of the contentions and simply endorsed the view taken by the learned Single Judge."
24. In light of the deliberations made hereinabove with respect to the facts and circumstances of the present case and in light of the aforesaid case laws, it is markedly clear that there lies no scope for intervention of this Tribunal with regard to the relief claimed by the applicant in the present matter. Thus, the Original Application is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the O.A. is dismissed. All associated M.A.s also stand disposed of. No costs.
(Mohan Pyare) ( Justice Om Prakash VII)
Member (A) Member (J)
Madhu
MADHU
KUMARI
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