Central Administrative Tribunal - Cuttack
N K Tripathy vs D/O Post on 3 January, 2024
1 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CUTTACK BENCH, CUTTACK
O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019
Reserved on: 02.01.2024 Pronounced on: 03.01.2024
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. PRAMOD KUMAR DAS, MEMBER (A)
HON'BLE MR. RAJNISH KUMAR RAI, MEMBER (J)
O.A.No. 260/0096 of 2019
Nanda Kishor Tripathy, aged about 42 years, son of Late
Lokanath Tripathy, At/Po-Kaduapada, Ps/District-
Jagatsinghpur, Odisha.
..... Applicant
-Versus-
1. Union of India, represented through its Director General
of Posts, Daktar Bhawan, NEW DELHI-110001.
2. Chief Postmaster General, Orissa Circle At/Po-
Bhubaneswar, District-KHURDA. ODISHA- 751001.
3. Senior Superintendent of R.M.S. 'N' Division, At/P.O./
District-Cuttack, ODISHA- 753001.
4. Amiya Kumar Mohanty, Sorting Assistants, HRO, R.M.S.
'N' Division, At/P.O./ District-Cuttack, ODISHA--753001.
5. Fani Bhusan Tripathy, Sorting Assistants, SRO, R.M.S. 'N'
Division, Bhubaneswar, District-Khurdha, ODISHA. Pin-
751001.
2 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019
6. Basudev Sahoo, Sorting Assistants, SRO, R.M.S. 'N'
Division, Bhubaneswar, District-Khurdha, ODISHA-751001.
..... Respondents
For the Applicants : Mr. N.Sarkar, Counsel
For the Respondents : Mr. J.K.Nayak, Counsel
O.A.No. 260/0097 of 2019
Sapan Kumar Mohanty, aged about 42 years, son of Late
Krutibas Mohanty, At- Brahmanbhuin, PO- Kalarabanka, PS-
Raghunthpur, Dist-Cuttack, Odisha.
..... Applicant
-Versus-
1. Union of India, represented through its Director General
of Posts, Daktar Bhawan, NEW DELHI-110001.
2. Chief Postmaster General, Orissa Circle At/Po-
Bhubaneswar, District-KHURDA. ODISHA- 751001.
3. Senior Superintendent of R.M.S. 'N' Division, At/P.O./
District-Cuttack, ODISHA- 753001.
4. Amiya Kumar Mohanty, Sorting Assistants, HRO, R.M.S.
'N' Division, At/P.O./ District-Cuttack, ODISHA--753001.
5. Fani Bhusan Tripathy, Sorting Assistants, SRO, R.M.S. 'N'
Division, Bhubaneswar, District-Khurdha, ODISHA. Pin-
751001.
6. Basudev Sahoo, Sorting Assistants, SRO, R.M.S. 'N'
Division, Bhubaneswar, District-Khurdha, ODISHA-751001.
For the Applicants : Mr. N.Sarkar, Counsel
For the Respondents : Mr. B.Swain, Counsel
3 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019
O R D E R
PRAMOD KUMAR DAS, MEMBER (A):
Heard.
2. In so far as OA No. 96 of 2019 is concerned, Ld. Counsel for the applicant, by placing reliance on the pleadings and documents filed in support thereof has submitted that on 28.04.1995 the father of the applicant while working as Jamadar in RMS "N" Division Cuttack retired on medical invalidation on his own request. As per the rules, appointment on compassionate ground was sought by the applicant and his case was approved by the CRC on 30.04.1996 as was intimated to him vide letter dated 06.05.1996. In letter dated 21.06.1996, he was intimated to appear before the Sr. Suptd. RMS "N" Division along with documents for verification and, after verification, vide letter dated 21.06.1996, he was directed to report at Postal Training Centre, Darbhanga on 08.07.1996 on payment of stipend as admissible under Rules. On successful completion of training, vide letter dated 04.09.1996 he was directed to undergo practical training for fifteen days. In letter dated 30.10.1996, the applicant was allotted to the unit of SRO RMS "N" Division for casual engagement against the leave vacancy of Sorting Assistant until regular appointment under compassionate appointment quota. Private respondents Nos. 4 to 6 were also appointed as casual sorting assistant on 4 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 compassionate ground on 09.06.1998. In letter dated 24.09.1999, he was informed that as per the recommendation of the CRC dated 17.02.1999, he was reallotted to RMS "N" Division Cuttack where he reported on the same date. Vide letter dated 30.09.1999, the applicant was sent for training for 15 days. Vide order dated 28.10.1999, he was appointed as Sorting Assistant temporarily in scale of pay Rs. 4000-6000/- w.e.f. 19.10.1999 and was confirmed vide order dated 30.03.2005 with immediate effect. Vide order dated 27.08.2011, private respondents 4 to 6 were appointed on regular basis, however, their date of regularization was antedated to 01.07.1998 vide orders dated 07.07.2014 and 12.05.2015. The applicant submitted representation on 19.09.2015 requesting antedating his date of regularization as was done in case of private respondents 4 to 6 followed by reminder dated 02.11.2015. Since, no consideration was given, he approached this Tribunal in OA 312/2017, which was disposed of on 25.05.2017 with direction for consideration of his representation. The respondent No.2 rejected his representation and the reason of rejection was communicated to him vide letter dated 17.08.2017. He had challenged the said order of rejection in OA No. 461/2018, which was withdrawn on 27.08.2018. It is stated that in the aforesaid circumstances, the applicant has filed the present OA on 10.12.2018 challenging the order of rejection dated 17.08.2017 with the following reliefs: 5 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019
(i) Hold/declare/order that the impugned order dated 17.08.2017 passed by Respondent No.2 was/is bad, illegal and non est in the eye of law and thereby quashed the same;
(ii) Direct/order the Respondents No. 1 and 2 to anti-
date the date of regularization as 30.10.1996 and fix the pay and seniority accordingly;
(iii) Hold/Declare/order that the Applicant is senior to Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 for all purpose and thereby fix the seniority of the application (sic) over and above the respondent No. 4 to 6;
(iv) Pass such other order(s) or issue direction(s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the bona fide interest of justice."
3. Learned Counsel for the Respondents did not dispute the factual aspects of the matter. However, placing reliance on the counter, it has been stated that the applicant was regularly appointed/regularized w.e.f. 30.03.2005 but he did not make any grievance in so far as his retrospective regularization, as is claimed in this OA. He submitted representation only after expiry of a period of ten years i.e. on 19.09.2015 and 02.11.2015. Thereafter, alleging non- consideration of his representation, he approached before this Tribunal in OA No. 312 of 2017, which was disposed of on 25.05.2017, with direction for consideration of his representation. In compliance of the order of this Tribunal, his representation was considered, rejected and intimated to him in letter dated 17.08.2017. It is stated that as per law, disposal of representation for a belated claim, in compliance of the order of Court/Tribunal, cannot revive a claim which had set at rest long since and/or cannot give rise a fresh cause of action. 6 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 Further, it is stated that if according to the Applicant the rejection was in any manner illegal, he should have appealed against such order of rejection, as per the Rules. But he did not do so and straightaway approached this Tribunal which is impressible in law. Hence by invoking Section 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Respondents have primarily questioned the very maintainability of this O.A. in the present form. In so far as merit of the matter is concerned, it has been stated that there was no regular vacancy available for appointment of the applicant on compassionate ground. Therefore, after the recommendation of the CRC, the applicant was engaged against leave vacancies of SAs until his regular appointment is made on availability of vacancy in the grade of SA. In the initial engagement order dated 30.10.1996, it was specially made known to him that his engagement is against leave vacancy which will not be counted for the purpose of any service benefits and having accepted the same he discharged his duties. Thus, his claim that he should be regularized from the date of his initial engagement on casual basis against the LR vacancy is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Further, it is stated that the Applicant cannot claim the benefit at par with Shri S/Shri Amiya Kumar Mohanty, Basudev Sahoo and Fani Bhusan Tripathy since all the three above were allowed service benefits, seniority and notional fixation of pay from the date of their initial casual engagement as per the orders of the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa dated 28.09.2010 in W.P (C) Nos. 11481, 7 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 11507, 11508 and 12115 of 2004. Accordingly, Respondents' counsel has prayed for dismissal of this OA by applying the provision under section 20 & 21 of the A.T. Act, 1985 as also merit.
4. In reply thereto, relying on the leadings in the OA as also rejoinder, learned counsel for the Applicant has submitted that the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa vide order dated 28.09.2010 in W.P (C) Nos. 11481, 11507, 11508 and 12115 of 2004 directed to the Respondents- Department to consider the case of the Applicants therein in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr vs M.Mallavan in Civil Appeals Civil Appeal No. 7773 of 2009. Accordingly, Respondent- Department considered and vide order dated 12.05.2015 (A/8 series) granted the service benefits, seniority and notional fixation of pay from the date of initial casual engagement S/Shri Amiya Kumar Mohanty, Basudev Sahoo and Fani Bhusan Tripathy, who were appointed like the present Applicant on compassionate ground. Hence by filing representations the Applicant prayed for grant of the said benefit in his favour. When the representation was not considered he approached this Tribunal. In compliance of the order of this Tribunal, the Respondents considered and rejected the prayer of the Applicant vide order dated 17.08.2017. Thereafter, the Applicant filed OA No. OA No. 461/2018 before this Tribunal which was withdrawn on 27.08.2018 with liberty to file better petition and accordingly, the instant OA was filed by the applicant on 8 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 10.12.2018. According to him, there was no delay and, the Applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in this O.A.
5. We have considered the arguments advanced by parties and perused the records.
6. The law of limitation finds its root in the maxims "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium" which means that in the interest of the state as a whole there should be a limit to litigation and "vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt" which means the law will assist only those who are vigilant with their rights and not those who sleep upon it. The law of limitation specifies the statutory time frame within which a person may initiate a legal proceeding or a legal action can be brought. The Law of limitation prescribes a time period within which a right can be enforced in a Court of Law. The time period for various suits has been provided in the schedule of the Act. The main purpose of this Act is to prevent litigation from being dragged for a long time and quick disposal of cases which leads to effective litigation. If a case is filed after the expiry of the time prescribed it will be barred by the Limitation. It means that a suit brought before the Court after the expiry of the time within which a legal proceeding should've been initiated will be restricted. Keeping in mind the aforesaid dicta, the Legislation consciously made provisions providing period within which one can approach the Court of Law and I so far as Central Administrative Tribunal is concerned the said provision has been provided 9 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 under section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which provides as under:
"21. Limitation - (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, -
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause
(a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where -
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates ; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or , as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section(2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."10 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019
7. It would be relevant to refer to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court on the point of limitation:
7.1 In the case of S.S.Rathore v. State of M.P., AIR 1990 SC 10 wherein it was held as under:
"20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' ,period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle.
21. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation under S. 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Subsection (1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub-section (3). The Civil Court's jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as Government servants are concerned, Article 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58.
22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case until the appeal or representation provided by a law is disposed of, accrual of cause of action for cause of action shall first arise only when the higher authority makes its order on appeal or 11 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 representation and where such order is not made on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation."
(Emphasis added) 7.2 In the case of Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal & Ors., (1999) 8 SCC 304, the Apex Court held as under:
"7. On perusal of the materials on record and after hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the explanation sought to be given before us cannot be entertained as no foundation thereof was laid before the Tribunal. It was open to the first respondent to make proper application under Section 21(3) of the Act for condonation of delay and having not done so, he cannot be permitted to take up such contention at this late stage. In our opinion, the O. A. filed before the Tribunal after the expiry of three years could not have been admitted and disposed of on merits in view of the statutory provision contained in Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The law in this behalf is now settled, see Secretary to Government of India v. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad, 1995 Supp (3) SCC
231.
8. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order passed by the Administrative Tribunal on August 6, 1996 in O. A. No. 631 of 1994 is set aside and the said O. A. is dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Civil Appeal Nos. 3119 of 1997 and 3120 of 1997 are allowed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs."
(Emphasis added) 12 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 7.3 In D.C.S. Negi v. Union of India & Ors. decided on 07.03.2011 in SLP (C) No.7956/2011(CC No.3709/2011) the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dismissing the Appeal, has emphasized that the Administrative Tribunal established under the Act is duty bound to first consider whether the application is within limitation, and that an application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21 (3). The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court are extracted below:
"A reading of the plain language of Section 21 makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3)."
(Emphasis added) 7.4 In the case of Union of India & Others v. M.K.Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, 2009 (14) Scale 425 wherein it was held as under:
"14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and 13 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 directing appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr.
- 2009 (10) SCC 115:
"The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex- employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored."
15. When a belated representation in regard to a `stale' or `dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so, the date of such decision can not be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the `dead' issue or time barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a 14 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.
16. A Court or Tribunal, before directing `consideration' of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a `live' issue or whether it is with reference to a `dead' or `stale' issue. If it is with reference to a `dead' or `state' issue or dispute, the court/Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration' without itself examining of the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect."
(Emphasis added) 7.5 In State of Tripura Vs. Arabinda Chakraborty, (2014) 5 SCALE 335, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"18. It is a settled legal position that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the cause of action takes place. Had there been any statute giving right of appeal to the respondent and if the respondent had filed such a statutory appeal, the period of limitation would have commenced from the date when the statutory appeal was decided. In the instant case, there was no provision with regard to any statutory appeal. The respondent kept on making representations one after another and all the representations had been rejected. Submission of the respondent to the effect that the period of limitation would commence from the date on which his last representation was rejected cannot be accepted. If accepted, it would be nothing but travesty of the law of limitation. One can go on making representations for 25 years and in that event one cannot say that the period of limitation would commence when the last representation was decided. On 15 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 this legal issue, we feel that the courts below committed an error by considering the date of rejection of the last representation as the date on which the cause of action had arisen. This could not have been done."
(Emphasis added) 7.6. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Apex Court has been ruled thus:
"Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ―procrastination is the greatest thief of time‖ and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
7.7. In the case of U.P.Jalnigam and another vs Jaswant Singh and Another, (2007) l SCC (L&S) 500, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that when a person is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, his writ 16 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to a person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years 7.8. Further, in the case of Rup Diamonds vs Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 356- it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that those people who were sitting on the fence till somebody else took up the matter to the court for refund of duty cannot be given the benefit.
8. In the instant case, no separate application has been filed seeing to condone the delay. The applicant has himself admitted that he was engaged on casual basis against leave vacancy as per order dated 30.10.1996. On 28.10.1999, he was appointed as Sorting Assistant temporarily w.e.f. 19.10.1999 became permanent on 30.03.2005. He had neither submitted any representation nor ventilated his grievance before any court of law against his casual engagement or regularization, thus, became satisfied with the decision of the authorities and slept over the matter thereby allowing the matter set at rest relating to his seniority position in the grade of Sorting Assistant. He himself admitted that the private respondents 4 to 6 raised their voice before the authorities and before the appropriate court of law and, in compliance of the order, they were regularized retrospectively vide orders dated 07.07.2014 and 12.05.2015. Thereafter, the applicant woke from the slumber and 17 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 submitted representation on 19.09.2015. The applicant has not furnished any plausible explanation for not agitating his grievance at the right moment. Therefore, the representation submitted by the applicant on 19.09.2015 became stale cannot save the period of limitation since submission of the representation would not save the period of limitation, which commences on 30.10.1996 when he was engaged on casual basis against leave vacancy or 28.10.1999 when he was appointed on temporary basis or latest by 30.03.2005 when he was permanently appointed. One cannot claim to save the limitation merely by making a representation. On this score, the case of the applicant is hit by the Section 21 of the AT Act, 185/Law of Limitation. In other way, the rejection of the representation by order dated 17.08.2017, by the order of this Tribunal, cannot save the limitation as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of M.K.Sarkar (supra) and Arabinda Chakraborty (supra). In so far as the stand of the Applicant that when date of regularization was antedated in respect of the Respondent Nos. 4 to 6, he is entitled to the same is concerned, it is observed that they have approached before this Tribunal at the right time and in compliance of the order of this Tribunal which was upheld by the higher forum, their regularization was antedated but the applicant slept over and submitted representation only after their regularization. Hence by application of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of U.P.Jalnigam 18 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 (surpa) and Rup Diamonds (supra), the applicant is not entitled to the relief for delay and laches.
OA No. 97/2019
Record reveals that in this case, the father of the applicant while working as Jamadar in RMS "N" Division Cuttack retired on medical invalidation on his own request on 02.04.1993. As per the rules, appointment on compassionate ground was sought by the applicant and his case was approved by the CRC vide letter dated 30.01.1996. On 25.03.1996, he was intimated to appear before the Sr. Suptd. RMS "N" Division along with documents for verification and, after verification, vide letter dated 21.06.1996, he was directed to report at Postal Training Centre, Darbhanga on 08.07.1996 on payment of stipend as admissible under Rules. On successful completion of training, vide letter dated 04.09.1996 he was directed to undergo practical training for fifteen days. In letter dated 30.10.1996, the applicant was allotted to the unit of SRO RMS "N" Division for casual engagement against the leave vacancy of Sorting Assistant until regular appointment under compassionate appointment quota. Private respondents Nos. 4 to 6 were also appointed as casual sorting assistant on compassionate ground on 09.06.1998. In letter dated 24.09.1999, he was informed that as per the recommendation of the CRC dated 17.02.1999, he was reallotted to RMS "N" Division Cuttack where he reported on the same date. Vide letter dated 30.09.1999, the applicant was again sent for 19 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 training for 15 days. Vide order dated 28.10.1999, he was appointed as Sorting Assistant temporarily in scale of pay Rs. 4000-6000/- w.e.f. 19.10.1999 and was confirmed vide order dated 30.03.2005 with immediate effect. Vide order dated 27.08.2011, private respondents 4 to 6 were appointed on regular basis, however, their date of regularization was antedated to 01.07.1998 vide orders dated 07.07.2014 and 12.05.2015. The applicant submitted representation on 19.09.2015 requesting antedating his date of regularization as was done in case of private respondents 4 to 6 followed by reminder dated 02.11.2015. Since, no consideration was given, he approached this Tribunal in OA 312/2017, which was disposed of on 25.05.2017 with direction for consideration of his representation. The respondent No.2 rejected his representation and the reason of rejection was communicated to him vide letter dated 17.08.2017. He had challenged the said order of rejection in OA No. 461/2018, which was withdrawn on 27.08.2018. Respondents filed the counter and rejoinder has also been filed taking the same and similar stand as that in OA No. 96/2019. It is felt not necessary to repeat the stand once again. In view of the detailed discussions made in OA No. 96/2019, the fact and issue being same and similar to that of the above case, the applicant herein is not entitled to the relief sought in this case due to delay and laches.
9. In view of the facts and law discussed above, both the OAs stand dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, leaving the parties to bear 20 O.A.Nos. 260/0096 and 97 of 2019 their own costs. Registry is directed to keep a copy of this order in OA No. 97/2019.
(Rajnish Kumar Rai) (Pramod Kumar Das) Member (Judl.) Member (Admn.) RK/PS