Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sudish Ram vs Mp Madhya Kshetra Vidhyut Vitaran ... on 24 September, 2025
1 WP-17754-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 24th OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 17754 of 2024
SUDISH RAM
Versus
MP MADHYA KSHETRA VIDHYUT VITARAN COMPANY AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajas Pohankar - Advocate for the Petitioner.
Shri Aditya Khandekar- Advocate for the Respondents No.1 - 3.
ORDER
By way of the present petition, challenge is made to Order Annexure P-6 and the Appellate Order Annexure P-8 passed by Deputy General Manager and General Manager of respondent-Company respectively whereby a minor penalty of withholding two annual increments without cumulative effect for two years has been imposed on the Petitioner. The appeal filed against the said Order has been rejected vide Annexure P-8.
2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has raised the sole contention that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority were not substantive holders of the post of Deputy General Manager and General Manager respectively and therefore, the Orders are without jurisdiction.
3. Judgements of various Single Benches of this Court are relied. Further, reliance is made on a judgment of Full Bench of this Court in Girija Shankar Shukla Vs. S.D.O., Harda reported in 1973 MPLJ 411 . However, Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 2 WP-17754-2024 upon considering the aforesaid contentions, it is seen that the said issue has been later settled and put to rest by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gopalji Khanna Vs. Allahabad Bank & Others reported in (1996) 3 SCC 538 . Thereafter, this matter has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court also.
4. So far as the issue of competence of the authority on the ground of the charge sheet and penalty order having been issued by the officer holding current charge of the post is concerned, the said issue has already been conclusively decided by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A .No.575/2020 (P.S. Dhanwal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.) in the following manner :-
11. In the case at hand the State Government exercising its powers under Section 49 E of 1960 Act appointed Shri Pradeep Nikhra, Joint Commissioner, Co-operative (Legal), Bhopal Division, on deputation, as In-charge Managing Director, M.P. State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Bhopal by order No. 1-1/2019/15-2 dated 6.2.2019. Though it is contended that the appointment of Shri Nikhra was as In-charge Managing Director and was thus not a full fledged Managing Director as could have discharged the function and powers of the Managing Director, the fact, however, remains is that said Shri Nikhra was Class I Officer and the appointment was by the State Government under Section 49 E of 1960 Act, and was thus competent to have exercised the powers and functions of Managing Director. In Gopalji Khanna (supra) dwelling on the issue as to whether the power of review available to the Chairman and Managing Director of the Allahabad Bank under Regulation 18 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 could have been exercised by the Executive Director who in the absence of the Chairman and Managing Director was entrusted with the current charge of the duties of offices of the Chairman and Managing Director, held:
"7. With respect to the second contention, it was submitted Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 3 WP-17754-2024 by the learned counsel that the power of review is conferred by Regulation 18. Only the Chairman and Managing Director are specified as reviewing authorities. This statutory power, therefore, can be exercised by Chairman and Managing Director only as they are the named authorities under the statutory provision and cannot be validly delegated to any subordinate authority. Shri Wadhwa, therefore, could not have validly exercised that power. There is no substance in this submission. It is really misconceived. Though the Regulations have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, by the Board of Directors, they cannot be equated with a statute. What the Board of Directors have done by making those Regulations is to regulate the power of taking disciplinary action against the employees of the bank. Moreover, this is not a case where the power of Chairman or the Managing Director came to be exercised by a subordinate official as a result of delegation of that power. Shri Wadhwa while exercising the power of review was really discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director as he was then placed in charge of those offices and was therefore entitled to perform all the duties and functions of those offices. He did not exercise that power on the basis that it was delegated to him. Therefore, the decisions in Barnard Vs. National Dock, Labour Board, Krishna Kumar Vs. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer and Marathwada University Vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention that statutory power can be exercised by the named authority only and cannot be further delegated, require no further consideration. So also, Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar Vs. Union of India and State of Haryana Vs. S.M. Sharma cited by the learned counsel have no relevance. The question which arose for consideration in those cases was whether an officer who substantively holds a lower post and is asked to discharge the duties of a higher post can be considered as promoted to that higher post. This Court held that entrustment of current duties charge of a higher post does not amount to promotion and in such cases the person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of higher post essentially as a stop gap arrangement.Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM
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8. It was next submitted that when a person is entrusted with charge of current duties of a higher post, he can exercise only those powers and perform those functions which are available to the person holding the higher post under executive orders and not those which are conferred by statutory provisions. In support of this submission the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Ajaib Singh Vs. State of Punjab. In that case what had happened was that the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar was invested with powers of a District Magistrate under Section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was also put in charge of the office of the District Magistrate Amritsar, who was transferred. No order appointing him as a District Magistrate under Section 10 (1) was passed. While in charge of the office of the District Magistrate, he passed an order of detention under the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962. That order was challenged on the ground that as the Additional District Magistrate was not appointed as District Magistrate under Section 10 (1) he did not have the power to pass a detention order and, therefore, the order passed by him was without any authority of law and liable to be set aside. This Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Defence of India Act and the Rules, 1962 and the drastic nature of the power and the consequences following from it, observed that the power of detention could only be exercised by the State Government or an officer or authority to whom it was delegated and that the said power could be delegated to an officer or authority who was not lower in rank than the District Magistrate. It was then held that even though the Additional District Magistrate was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate on there being a vacancy in the office of the District Magistrate, he was still not the District Magistrate as he was not appointed as such under Section 10(1) of the Code and therefore, he had no power to pass the order of detention. Even though invested with the powers of a District Magistrate he did not become an officer of the rank of a District Magistrate. In this case we are not concerned with such a provision and therefore are not required to consider whether Executive Director of the Bank when entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director became an officer of the rank of Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM
5 WP-17754-2024 Chairman and Managing Director. Moreover the power of the employer to take disciplinary action against his employee including the power to review an order of penalty, has to be distinguished from the statutory power to detain a person. Therefore, on the basis of this decision it cannot be held that the Executive Director who was merely entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director could not have exercised the power of reviewing the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority.
11. ... On the contrary this Court has observed therein that the confirmed holder of a substantive post would be discharging the functions attached to the post and when some one is placed in that very post in an officiating capacity or directed to hold charge of the post, he would be required to perform the duties and discharge the functions of the post rendering identical service. In paragraph 10 of the judgment it is further observed as under : ( SCC p.273) "
.......it may be that the confirmed holder of the post may be away and not in a position to discharge the duties and some one may be appointed in an officiating capacity or may be directed to hold charge but nonetheless such holder of the post will have to perform duties and discharge functions attached to the post."
12. After considering the above decisions and Regulations 2(n) and 18, we are of the opinion that as the Executive Director Shri Wadhwa was entrusted with the charge of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director he became entitled to exercise all the executive powers, perform duties and discharge functions attached to those offices and, therefore, the order of penalty passed by him was legal and valid."
12. The decision in Girja Shankar (supra) relied by the Appellant/Petitioner is of no assistance as the same was, as is evident from the observation in paragraph 16 thereof, "in situation like those under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, which mandates that "No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by a authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed." Being trite it is that the suspension is not a punishment, the Appellant/Petitioner is not benefited by the decision in Girja Shankar (supra)."
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM6 WP-17754-2024
5. This Court also in WP No.4164/2024 has decided the said issue in the following manner:-
"8. The issue of the incompetence of charge sheeting authority has been raised on the sole ground that the charge sheeting authority was holding current charge of the post of the Chief Engineer. It is clearly admitted by counsel for both the parties that the Chief Engineer is the competent authority to issue the charge sheet as per the applicable Rules. However, competence is challenged on the ground that Shri R.K. Sthapak was holding substantive post of Superintending Engineer and only current charge of the post of Chief Engineer. Thus, he could not act as disciplinary authority to issue the charge sheet, which ought to have been issued by the disciplinary authority. Counsel for the petitioner had heavily relied on judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court in WP No.20351/2020.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the issue whether a person who holds for the time being, charge of office of higher post can exercise the powers of disciplinary authority vested in the said higher post. The said issue has been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that the current charge holder is entrusted with the charge of office of higher post and thus, he becomes entitled to exercise all executive powers, perform duties and discharge functions attached to such office and, therefore, the order of penalty passed by him as disciplinary authority remains legal and valid. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gopalji Khanna Vs. Allahabad Bank and others (1996) 3 SCC 538 has held as under:
"7. Shri Wadhwa while exercising the power of review was really discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director as he was then placed in charge of those offices and was therefore entitled to perform all the duties and functions of those offices. He did not exercise that power on the basis that it was delegated to him. Therefore, the decisions in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [(1953) 1 All ER 1113 : (1953) 2 WLR 995] , Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Asstt. Electrical Engineer [(1979) 4 SCC 289 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 1] and Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan [(1989) 3 SCC 132 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 436] , relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention that statutory power can be exercised by the named authority only and cannot be further delegated, require no further consideration. So also, Ramakant Shripad Sinai Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 7 WP-17754-2024 Advalpalkar v. Union of India [1991 Supp (2) SCC 733 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 115 : (1992) 19 ATC 85] and State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma [1993 Supp (3) SCC 252 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1072 : (1993) 25 ATC 594] cited by the learned counsel have no relevance. The question which arose for consideration in those cases was whether an officer who substantively holds a lower post and is asked to discharge the duties of a higher post can be considered as promoted to that higher post. This Court held that entrustment of current duties charge of a higher post does not amount to promotion and in such cases the person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of higher post essentially as a stopgap arrangement.
8. It was next submitted that when a person is entrusted with charge of current duties of a higher post, he can exercise only those powers and perform those functions which are available to the person holding the higher post under executive orders and not those which are conferred by statutory provisions. In support of this submission the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 2 SCR 845 : AIR 1965 SC 1619 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 553] . In that case what had happened was that the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar was invested with powers of a District Magistrate under Section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was also put in charge of the office of the District Magistrate Amritsar, who was transferred. No order appointing him as a District Magistrate under Section 10(1) was passed. While in charge of the office of the District Magistrate, he passed an order of detention under the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962. That order was challenged on the ground that as the Additional District Magistrate was not appointed as District Magistrate under Section 10(1) he did not have the power to pass a detention order and, therefore, the order passed by him was without any authority of law and liable to be set aside. This Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962 and the drastic nature of the power and the consequences following from it, observed that the power of detention could only be exercised by the State Government or an officer or authority to whom it was delegated and that the said power could be delegated to an officer or authority who was not lower in rank than the District Magistrate. It was then held that even though the Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 8 WP-17754-2024 Additional District Magistrate was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate on there being a vacancy in the office of the District Magistrate, he was still not the District Magistrate as he was not appointed as such under Section 10(1) of the Code and therefore, he had no power to pass the order of detention. Even though invested with the powers of a District Magistrate he did not become an officer of the rank of a District Magistrate. In this case we are not concerned with such a provision and therefore are not required to consider whether Executive Director of the Bank when entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director became an officer of the rank of Chairman and Managing Director. Moreover the power of the employer to take disciplinary action against his employee including the power to review an order of penalty, has to be distinguished from the statutory power to detain a person. Therefore, on the basis of this decision it cannot be held that the Executive Director who was merely entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director could not have exercised the power of reviewing the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority."
10. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that a person holding the current duty charge of higher post was really discharging the functions of that higher post as he was placed in charge of both offices and was therefore, entitled to perform all duties and functions of those offices. It was further held that the judgments in the matter of exercise of statutory powers have no relevance because disciplinary powers cannot be deemed to be statutory powers but are really executive powers. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered and distinguished the case of Hari Chand Aggrawal Vs. Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. and others AIR 1969 SC 483 and Ajaib Singh Vs. Gurbachan Singh and others Vs. AIR 1965 SC 1619, on which the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Girja Shankar Shukla Vs. SDO, Harda 1973 MPLJ 411 was based.
11. In the present case, it is not the case of petitioner that Shri R.K. Sthapak was placed in charge of current duties of Chief Engineer as a stop gap arrangement. It is not in a dispute that he was regularly holding the current charge of higher post of Chief Engineer. It is not a case where a person having come in charge as a stop gap arrangement has exercised the powers vested in the higher office but it is the case in which Shri R.K. Sthapak was in fact regularly holding the current charge of higher post. Thus, in the opinion of this Court Shri R.K. Sthapak was having the power Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 9 WP-17754-2024 to act as disciplinary authority and discharge the functions of disciplinary authority vested in Chief Engineer.
12. The aforesaid issue also cropped up before Division Bench of this Court in WA No.157/2017. It was a case where the Superintending Engineer holding current charge of Chief Engineer in another electricity distribution company of Madhya Pradesh, suspended an employee discharging the functions of disciplinary authority vested in Chief Engineer. The aforesaid matter ultimately went to the Division Bench and the Division Bench in WA No.157/2017, M.P. Madhyak Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Vs. Vikas Gupta and others decided on 06/04/2017 has held that a person holding the lower post was given current duty charge of the post of Chief General Manager by the competent authority. Thus, he was competent to act as Chief General Manager and pass an order of suspension. The Division Bench held as under:
"The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the learned Single Bench on 15.02.2017 in W.P.No.6335/2016 whereby an order of suspension of the respondent herein on 01.09.2016 was found to be passed by a person who was not substantively working as Chief General Manager and thus not competent to pass an order of suspension. The petitioner was working as Assistant Engineer, Baraghat City Circle, Gwalior. He was suspended by Shri S.K. Upadhyay said to be working as Chief General Manager, Gwalior Region. The challenge to the suspension was on the ground that Shri S.K. Upadhyay was holding substantive rank of the Deputy Chief General Manager. Though on 26.02.2016 he was given current duty charge of the post of Chief General Manager but after his substantive promotion as Deputy Chief General Manager on 24.06.2016, there was no order of their current duty charge of the post of Chief General Manager, therefore, order of suspension is illegal.
The learned Single Bench allowed the writ petition holding that the present appellants could not clarify as to how the Managing Director of the appellant-Corporation could have delegated the authority of discharging of the function of the Chief General Manager on Shri Upadhyay. After observing so, the learned Single Bench held as under:
"In view of this fact, it is apparent that when the delegation of powers exercising the disciplinary authority is clearly vested in a Chief General Manager or the Executive Director or the Chief Engineer of the region and admittedly the person Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 10 WP-17754-2024 who issued impugned suspension order was not substantively working as Chief General Manager and who admittedly misrepresented himself to be Chief General Manager in the impugned order inasmuch as he was vested with the authority power as Dy. Chief General Manager and was only authorized to exercise the powers of Chief General Manager by the Managing Director, the impugned order cannot be said to have been passed by a competent authority and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed and is hereby quashed."
Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant refers to Annexure-R/1 dated 26.02.2016 wherein Shri S.K. Upadhyay was posted against the post of Deputy Chief General Manager on current charge basis. He was also directed to look after the work of Chief General Manager. The relevant extract from the order reads as under:
"Shri S.K. Upadhyay, GM(O&M), Hoshangabad is hereby posted on current charge basis as Dy. Chief General Manager, O/o CGM(GR), Gwalior, till further orders. The posting of Shri S.P. Upadhyay, GM on current charge basis as Dy. Chief General Manager is without prejudice to affecting the seniority of any order GM-SE(T&D). He is directed to look after the work of Chief General Manager (GR), Gwalior and is authorized to exercise the powers of Chief General Manager, with effect from 01.03.2016 till further orders. Sd/- (Vivek Porwal) Managing Director".
It is thereafter Shri S.K. Upadhyay was substantively posted as Deputy Chief General Manager by an order passed by the Chief General Manager but there is no order of revocation of order passed by the Managing Director authorizing Shri S.K. Upadhyay to exercise the powers of Chief General Manager as well. The relevant part of order dated 24.06.2016 reads as under:
"Shri S.K. Upadhyay, Dy Chief General Manager (T&D) on current charge and presently looking after the work of Chief General Manager (GR), Bhopal is hereby appointed temporarily to officiate until further orders as Dy. Chief General Manager-Addl. Chief Engineer and posted at the present place of posting w.e.f. the date of assuming charge. 2. The above appointment will be on probation and shall be governed by the provisions contained in Circular No.01- 05/58 dtd 29.04.89 read with 01-05/1/93 dated 18.07.1989, No.01-05/1/1-25473 dtd 21.04.90 No.01-13/1 dtd 09.01.95 and read with Circular No.01-13/3422/19 dated 01.07.05."
The appellants have referred to the delegation of powers on Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM 11 WP-17754-2024 behalf of Corporation including upon its Managing Director. PartA Section-III Clause 7 empowers the Managing Director to entrust current charge of higher office in the post of Class- I and Class-II without prejudice to the seniority of the officers. It is thus contended that the Managing Director has passed an order to authorize Shri S.K. Upadhyay to exercise the powers of Chief General Manager by the order dated 26.02.2016, which order has not been superseded or varied in any manner by Chief General Manager when Shri S.K. Upadhyay was promoted on substantive basis as the Deputy Chief General Manager. Since the current duty charge was granted by the Managing Director of the Corporation in terms of statutory delegation, therefore, it cannot be said that Shri S.K. Upadhyay was not competent to pass an order of suspension.
We find that the order passed by the learned Single Bench is not sustainable. Shri Upadhyay was given current duty charge of the post of Chief General Manager. The said order has not been varied in any manner after Shri Upadhyay was promoted substantially on the post of Deputy Chief General Manger. Therefore, he was competent to act as Chief General Manger and pass an order of suspension. We do not find any error in the order of suspension passed by Shri S.K. Upadhyay on 01.09.2016. Therefore, the order of the Learned Single Judge cannot be said to be legal. The same is accordingly set aside.
At this stage, learned counsel for the writ petitioner (respondent herein) states that he has remedy of filing an appeal against the order of suspension.
If it is so, the respondent may avail such remedy in accordance with law.
With the aforesaid liberty, writ appeal stands allowed and disposed of."
13. The order of coordinate Bench relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in WP No.20351/2020 does not take into account the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gopalji Khanna Vs. Allahabad Bank and others (1996)3 SCC 538 as well as the judgement of Division Bench of this Court, wherein it has been clearly held that a person holding lower post but having entrusted with regular charge of higher post can exercising powers of disciplinary authority. It appears that both these orders were not placed before the coordinate Bench. Thus, this Court finds itself bound by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as that of the Division Bench.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM12 WP-17754-2024
6. In view of the above, the grounds raised by the petitioner regarding competence of authority of the disciplinary authority and charge-sheeting authority are discarded.
7. Since no other point is pressed therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, the Petition fails and is dismissed.
(VIVEK JAIN) JUDGE veni Signature Not Verified Signed by: KRISHNA SINGH Signing time: 9/26/2025 10:33:48 AM