Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt Vidhya Devi vs The State Of Mp on 7 January, 2020
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh
WP 21834/2019 [ Smt. Vidhya Devi and Ors. Vs. State of MP and Ors.]
and
WP 21831/2019 [ Mukesh Singh Parihar vs. State of MP and Ors.]
Gwalior, dtd. 07/01/2020
Shri MPS Raghuvanshi, Counsel for the petitioners in both the writ
petitions.
Shri S.N. Seth, Counsel for the State in both the writ petitions.
Shri Vivek Jain, Counsel for the respondent No.2- District Cooperative
Central Bank Ltd. Gwalior.
By this common order, WP 21831 of 2019 filed by Mukesh Singh Parihar shall also be disposed of.
(2) For the sake of convenience, the facts of W.P. No.21834 of 2019 shall be taken into consideration.
(3) Writ Petition No.21834 of 2019 has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the notice/order 28/09/2019 (Annexures P1, P2 & P3) by which the respondent No.3 has directed the petitioner No.1 to deposit an amount of Rs.1,38,000/-, the petitioner No.2 to deposit an amount of Rs.5,18,880/- and the petitioner No.3 to deposit an amount of Rs.7,62,680/-, which were fraudulently credited in their account by the Computer Operator Bhupendra Singh.
(4) It is the case of the respondents that one Bhupendra Singh was working on the post of Computer Operator and he is the son of the petitioner No.1 and brother of the petitioner No.3. The petitioners had never sold their crops, however, the said Bhupendra Singh fraudulently entered the names of the 2 petitioners as sellers and deposited the sale proceeds in their account, whereas the names of the actual sellers were not entered in the computer records, as a result of which their sale proceeds could not be deposited in their account, various complaints were made by actual sellers and accordingly, it was found that Bhupendra Singh along with other employees of the Cooperative Society, have played fraud and had fraudulently shown that the petitioners and other persons have sold their crops and fraudulently transferred the sale proceeds to their account, whereas the names of the actual sellers were not entered in the computer records and, therefore, the sale proceeds were not paid to them. (5) Accordingly, it appears that on the report made by Shri FA Khan, Administrator, Primary Agriculture Credit Cooperative Society Limited, Harsi, District Gwalior, a FIR in Crime No.148/2019 has been registered at Police Station Chinor, District Gwalior for offence under Section 409 r/w Section 34 of IPC against Bhupendra Rawat, Rahul Yadav and Jagdish Yadav. It was found that in fact, 33 actual sellers were defrauded and the fraudulent entries were made by Bhupendra Rawat and Rahul Yadav in the name of those persons who had never sold their crops and fraudulently sale proceeds were transferred in their account, whereas the actual sellers were not paid their sale proceeds. It appears that the respondents issued the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 (Annexures P1, P2 & P3) to the petitioners No.1 to 3, directing them to refund the amount which was fraudulently deposited in their account. Otherwise, it was also mentioned that in case of failure to do so, the Administrator, Primary Agriculture Credit Cooperative Society Limited, Harsi, would be compelled to initiate proceedings for their prosecution. 3 (6) Challenging the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 (Annexures P1, P2 and P3), it is submitted by the Counsel for the petitioners that in fact, the Cooperative Society has raised a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act and the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2011 is nothing, but an attempt to pressurize the petitioners to deposit the amount without adjudication of their liability and thus, the same is bad. It is further submitted that until and unless the liability of the petitioners is adjudicated in a dispute filed by the Cooperative Society under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act, they cannot be prosecuted. However, when a detailed procedure has been provided under the MP Cooperative Societies Act for recovery of loss sustained by the Cooperative Society, then a threat to launch the criminal prosecution (FIR) is bad in law. Furthermore, it is submitted that the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 (Annexures P1, P2 and P3) has been issued without conducting any enquiry and thus, the same is bad. (7) Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that Bhupendra Rawat and Rahul Yadav who were working as Computer Operator, had fraudulently manipulated the computer records and in stead of entering the names of the actual sellers, they fraudulently entered the names of the petitioners and other thirty more bogus persons, as a result of which the amount of the said crops was transferred in their account, whereas the actual sellers were denied their sale proceeds. It is submitted that when an objection was raised by the actual sellers, then an enquiry was conducted and it was found that a fraud has been committed by Bhupendra Rawat, Rahul Yadav and Jagdish Yadav and in fact, the Society is now making payment of sale proceeds 4 to the actual sellers out of its own funds.
(8) In reply to the return filed by the respondent No.3, the petitioners have filed their rejoinder and it is submitted that Bhupendra Rawat and Rahul Yadav have been granted anticipatory bail by this Court. It is further submitted a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is pending before the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, therefore, the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 (Annexures P1, P2 and P3) requiring the petitioners to deposit the amount as mentioned in the said notice/order as well as a threat to launch criminal prosecution against the petitioners, is completely unwarranted.
(9) Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
(10) The impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 issued to the petitioner No.1 (Annexure P1) is reproduced as under:-
izfr] Jhefr fo|knsoh jkor iRuh Jh vtc flag (eks 9755948898) fuoklh xzke bZVok rglhy phukSj ftyk Xokfy;j fo"k; % xsgWaw [kjhn (miktZu) dh jkf'k dk Hkqxrku okfil djus ckorA mijksDr fo"k;karxZr ys[k gS fd xsgwW [kjhnh dsUnz phukSj ds vkWijsVj Jh HkwisUnz flag }kjk vkids uke ij 75 fDoaVy dh vkWuykbu [kjhn fcuk eky izkIr fd;s n'kkZ dj vkids cSad [kkrk dzekad 681009794679 lsUVz~y cSad vkWQ bafM;k] 'kk[kk fpukSj es jkf'k 1]38]000@& #i;s xsgwW [kjhnh dh jkf'k ds tek djk dfn;s x;s gSA jkf'k vkids }kjk cSad ls vkgj.k dj mi;ksx dj yh xbZ gSA tcfd vkids }kjk 75 fDoaVy xsgWw laLFkk es tek gh ugh djk;k x;k gSA izca/kd txnh'k ;kno }kjk vius dFku es ;g Li"V fd;k gSA jkf'k 1]38]000@& xyr rjhds ls Ny o diV dj vkids }kjk 'kklu ds /kks[kk/kM+h vkWijsVj HkwisUnz flag ds lkFk feydj dh xbZ gSA laLFkk ds vkWijsVj HkwisUnz flag] jkgqy ;kno ,oa [kjhn izHkkjh txnh'k ;kno ds fo:) mDr jkf'k dh olwyh gsrq Fkkuk phukSj] ftyk Xokfy;j fnukad 27-08-2019 dks ,Q-vkbZ-vkj- ntZ djk nh xbZ gSA iqfyl vkjksfi;ks dks fxjQ~rkj djus dh dk;Zokgh dj jgh gS vkids [kkrs es jkf'k laLFkk vkWijsVj }kjk vkils feyhHkxRk dj 5 "kM+;= iwoZ xyr rjhds ls vkWuykbZu [kjhn (fcuk eky izkIr fd;s) n'kkZ dj jkf'k tek djk nh xbZ gSA vki rRdky jkf'k 1]38]000@& #i;s ftyk lgdkjh dsUnzh; cSad e;kZ- Xokfy;j 'kk[kk fHkrjokj es tek dj jlhn izkIr djsa vU;Fkk dh n'kk es vkids fo:) Hkh vfHk;kstu (,Q-vkbZ-vkj) dh dk;Zokgh djuh gksxhA ftlds fy;s vki O;fDrxr #i ls ftEesnkj jgsxsA Similar notice/order has been issued to the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 and except the amount of embezzlement, the remaining contents are same.
(11) It is contended by the counsel for the petitioners that the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is pending, therefore, the impugned notice/order is bad in law and is an attempt to pressurize the petitioners to deposit the amount before adjudication of their liability.
(12) It is clear from the record that the impugned notice/order was issued on 28/09/2019 and when the petitioners did not deposit the amount as mentioned in the said notice, only thereafter the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act was filed on 07/10/2019. Therefore, it is clear that the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act was filed subsequent to the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019. When the petitioners did not deposit the amount in compliance of the notice/order dated 28/09/2019, then the Cooperative Society was left with no other option, but to raise the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act for recovery of the said amount, otherwise, the Cooperative Society had no other mode to recover the amount as mentioned in the impugned notice/order.
Therefore, filing of the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act would not have any impact on the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019. In fact, only after issuing a demand mentioned in the impugned 6 notice/order, a cause of action had arisen in favour of the Cooperative Society to file a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act. Accordingly, the first contention of the counsel for the petitioners that the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 is bad in law in the light of pendency of the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is misconceived and is hereby dismissed.
(13) It is next contended by the counsel for the petitioners that since the notice/order dated 28/09/2019 has been issued without conducting any enquiry, therefore, the same is bad. A demand notice has been issued by the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 which was never challenged by the petitioners by raising a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act. In fact, the dispute has been raised by the Cooperative Society for recovery of the said amount.
(14) Furthermore, it is the stand of the respondent No.3 that only after the complaints were received by the original sellers, an enquiry was done and it was found that a fraud has been played by Bhupendra Rawat and Rahul Yadav as well as Jagdish Yadav and the amount mentioned in the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 was fraudulently transferred to the account of the petitioners and other thirty persons and it is the specific stand of the respondent No.3 that neither the petitioners nor other thirty persons had ever sold their crops to the Cooperative Society, but a fraud was committed by Bhupendra Rawat, Rahul Yadav and Jagdish Yadav. Further, the stand of the respondent No.3 is that Bhupendra Rawat is the son and brother of the petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3 respectively. The relationship of Bhupendra 7 Rawat with the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.3 is not disclosed by the petitioners in their petition. Furthermore, since a dispute raised by the Society under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is still pending, thus, any finding with regard to the liability of the petitioners to deposit the amount as mentioned in the impugned notice/ order dated 28/09/2019 would be premature. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned demand notice/order dated 28/09/2019 is bad in law and accordingly, the contention made by the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the liability of the petitioners to deposit the amount mentioned in the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 is hereby dismissed.
(15) It is next contended by the counsel for the petitioners that a threat to launch the criminal prosecution in the form of FIR is nothing, but an attempt to put an unwarranted pressure on the petitioners to deposit the amount which has not been embezzled by them. It is submitted that in fact, the petitioners had sold their crops and the crops were also registered with the Society and the allegation of fraudulent transfer of the amount in their account is bad. (16) So far as the correctness of the allegation of fraudulent transfer of the amount in the account of the petitioners is concerned, it is once again clarified that since a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is pending, therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to make any observation in that regard.
(17) So far as the question of launching the criminal prosecution in the form of FIR is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is nothing but an incorrect expression of steps which the Cooperative Society was 8 intended to take against the petitioners. It is an undisputed fact that on a similar allegation, a FIR in Crime No.148/2019 has also been registered at Police Station Chinor,District Gwalior against Jagdish Yadav, Bhupendra Rawat and Rahul Yadav.
(18) It is well-established principle of law that there cannot be two FIRs for the same offence. Therefore, if the respondents had mentioned that in case of failure to deposit the amount mentioned in the demand notice/order dated 28/09/2019, a criminal prosecution (FIR) shall also be launched against the petitioners, then the said warning cannot be construed that the respondents shall lodge a fresh FIR against the petitioners.
(19) It is well-established principle of law that during the course of investigation if the police finds that some more persons who have not been mentioned in the FIR, have committed an offence, then those persons can always be implicated as an accused in the said investigation. It is not necessary for the Cooperative Society to lodge a separate FIR and at the most, by making a simple application for implicating the petitioners as accused in Crime No.148 of 2019 registered at Police Station Chinor, District Gwalior, a criminal prosecution against the petitioners can be launched. Even if no such application is filed by the concerning Society but still the police has the jurisdiction to implicate of those persons who are involved in the case as accused persons. (20) It is well-established principle of law that this Court cannot supervise the investigation. The Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and others reported in (2014) 2 SCC 532 has held as under:-
9
"24. In the criminal justice system the investigation of an offence is the domain of the police. The power to investigate into the cognizable offences by the police officer is ordinarily not impinged by any fetters. However, such power has to be exercised consistent with the statutory provisions and for legitimate purpose. The courts ordinarily do not interfere in the matters of investigation by police, particularly, when the facts and circumstances do not indicate that the investigating officer is not functioning bona fide. In very exceptional cases, however, where the court finds that the police officer has exercised his investigatory powers in breach of the statutory provision putting the personal liberty and/or the property of the citizen in jeopardy by illegal and improper use of the power or there is abuse of the investigatory power and process by the police officer or the investigation by the police is found to be not bona fide or the investigation is tainted with animosity, the court may intervene to protect the personal and/or property rights of the citizens.
26. One of the responsibilities of the police is protection of life, liberty and property of citizens. The investigation of offences is one of the important duties the police has to perform. The aim of investigation is ultimately to search for truth and bring the offender to book.
39. However, the investigation/inquiry monitored by the court does not mean that the court supervises such investigation/inquiry. To supervise would mean to observe and direct the execution of a task whereas to monitor would only mean to maintain surveillance. The concern and interest of the court in such "Court-directed" or "Court-monitored" cases is that there is no undue delay in the investigation, and the investigation is conducted in a free and fair manner with no external interference. In such a process, the people acquainted with facts and circumstances of the case would also have a sense of security and they would cooperate with the investigation given that the superior courts are seized of the matter. We find that in some cases, the expression "Court- monitored" has been interchangeably used with "Court- supervised investigation". Once the court supervises an investigation, there is hardly anything left in the trial. Under the Code, the investigating officer is only to form an opinion and it is for the court to ultimately try the case based on the opinion formed by the investigating officer and see whether any offence has been made out. If a superior court supervises the investigation and thus facilitates the formulation of such opinion in the form of a report under Section 173(2) of the Code, it will be difficult if not impossible for the trial court to not be influenced or bound by such opinion. Then trial 10 becomes a farce. Therefore, supervision of investigation by any court is a contradiction in terms. The Code does not envisage such a procedure, and it cannot either. In the rare and compelling circumstances referred to above, the superior courts may monitor an investigation to ensure that the investigating agency conducts the investigation in a free, fair and time-bound manner without any external interference."
(21) Thus, this Court by quashing the impugned notice/order dated 28/09/2019 cannot take away the right of the Investigating Officer to implicate the petitioners as accused in the FIR at Crime No.148 of 2019 registered by Police Station Chinor, District Gwalior and also cannot restrain the respondent No.3 from making an application to the Investigating Officer to implicate the petitioners as accused persons.
(22) It is next contended by the counsel for the petitioners that since the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is already pending, therefore, launching of criminal prosecution during the pendency of such dispute is unwarranted and the same cannot be done. It is submitted that the MP Cooperative Societies Act provides a complete procedure for recovery of loss sustained by the Cooperative Society and since it is a complete procedure in itself, therefore, launching a criminal prosecution is bad. (23) The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rameshwar and Others, reported in 2009(11) SCC 424 has held as under:-
''48. Mr. Tankha's submissions, which were echoed by Mr. Jain, that the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was a complete Code in itself and the remedy of the prosecuting agency lay not under the criminal process but within the ambit of Sections 74 to 76 thereof, cannot also be accepted, in view of the fact that there is no bar under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, to take resort to the provisions of the general criminal law, particularly when charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are involved.'' 11 (24) Thus, merely because a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is pending against the petitioners would not debar the police to investigate the matter and the notice/order dated 28/09/2019 in which it was mentioned that the criminal prosecution would be launched, cannot be quashed.
(25) It is next contended by the counsel for the petitioners that since the dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is still pending, therefore, until and unless the liability of the petitioners is decided in the said dispute, no criminal prosecution can be launched.
(26) It is well-established principle of law that the civil suit as well as the criminal proceedings can go simultaneously. The Supreme Court in the case of Devendra and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in (2009) 7 SCC 495 has held as under:-
''13.There cannot, however, be any doubt or dispute whatsoever that in a given case a civil suit as also a criminal proceeding would be maintainable. They can run simultaneously. Result in one proceeding would not be binding on the court determining the issue before it in another proceeding. In P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu[AIR 2008 SC 1884 : (2008) 5 SCC 765], the law was stated, thus (SCC p.769 para 11) :
"13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case."
[See also Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, 2009 (5) SCALE 527] ***** ******
25. Mr. Das, furthermore, would contend that the order of the High Court dated 17.10.2005 would operate as res judicata. With respect, we cannot subscribe to the said view. The principle of res judicata has no application in a criminal 12 proceeding. The principles of res judicata as adumbrated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the general principles thereof will have no application in a case of this nature.'' The Supreme Court in the case of M. S. Sheriff and Another vs. State of Madras and Others, reported in AIR 1954 SC 397 has held as under:-
''15.As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decision in the civil and criminal Courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of the Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.'' The Supreme Court in the case of P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu reported in (2008) 5 SCC 765 has held as under:-
''11. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. [See M.S. Sheriff v. State of MadrasAIR 1954 SC 397,Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah(2005) 4 SCC 370 and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants(2005) 12 SCC 226]'' The Supreme Court in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam and Another vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Another, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 528 has held as under:-
''22. It is, however, now well settled that ordinarily a criminal proceeding will have primacy over the civil proceeding. Precedence to a criminal proceeding is given having regard to the fact that disposal of a civil proceeding ordinarily takes a long time and in the interest of justice the 13 former should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. The law in this behalf has been laid down in a large number of decisions. We may notice a few of them.
23. In M.S. Sheriff & anr. vs. State of Madras & Ors. [AIR 1954 SC 397], a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized of a question as to whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending; it was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence. In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was held that the law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. It was held that the only relevant consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment.
24. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own merit, keeping in view the evidences brought before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding. The question came up for consideration in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87], wherein this Court inter alia held: (SCC p.97, paras 30-
31) "30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
-- (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;
(4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution 14 by B against A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of B over the property. In such case, A may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first question which would require consideration is -- whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant -- its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case."
25. It is, however, significant to notice that the decision of this Court in M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & anr. etc. vs. Union of India & ors. [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled, stating: ( K. G. Premshanker case (2002) 8 SCC 87 , SCC p.28 para 33) "33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand case are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act."
Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not be binding on a civil court.'' The Supreme Court in the case of Guru Granth Saheb Sthan Meerghat Vanaras s. Ved Prakash and Others, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 622 has held as under:-
''7. A Constitution Bench of this Court in M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 397 has considered the question of simultaneous prosecution of the criminal proceedings with the civil suit. In paragraphs 14,15 and 16 of the Report, this Court stated as follows:(AIR P.399) "14. . . . . . . . It was said that the simultaneous prosecution of these matters will embarrass the accused. . . . . but we can see that the simultaneous prosecution of the present criminal proceedings out of which this appeal arises and the civil suits will 15 embarrass the accused. We have therefore to determine which should be stayed.
15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S. 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
8. The ratio of the decision in M.S. Sheriff1 is that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to which of the proceedings - civil or criminal - must be stayed. It was held that possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts cannot be considered as a relevant consideration for stay of the proceedings as law envisaged such an eventuality. Embarrassment was considered to be a relevant aspect and having regard to certain factors, this Court found expedient in M.S. Sheriff1 to stay the civil proceedings. The Court made it very clear that this, however, was not hard and fast rule; special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. M.S. Sheriff1 does not lay 16 down an invariable rule that simultaneous prosecution of criminal proceedings and civil suit will embarrass the accused or that invariably the proceedings in the civil suit should be stayed until disposal of criminal case.'' (27) From the above-mentioned well-settled principles of law, it is clear that the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed only on the ground that civil suit is pending. Even otherwise, it is well-established principle of law that the findings of the Criminal Court are neither binding on the Civil Court nor such findings have any relevancy. Accordingly, if the Cooperative Society decides to launch criminal prosecution against the petitioners, then the same cannot be quashed on the ground that a dispute under Section 64 of MP Cooperative Societies Act is pending.
(28) No other argument is advanced by the counsel for the petitioners. (29) Accordingly, in the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned demand notice/order dated 28/09/2019 (Annexures P1, P2 and P3) issued to the petitioners does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(30) The interim order dated 16/10/2019 is hereby vacated. (31) In view of the above observations, Writ Petition No.21831/2019 filed by Mukesh Singh Parihar is also dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) Judge MKB MAHENDRA KUMAR BARIK 2020.01.14 18:04:02 +05'30' VALSALA VASUDEVAN 2018.10.26 15:14:29 -07'00'