Jharkhand High Court
Mithelesh Kumar Mishra @ Mithelesh ... vs M/S Indusind Bank Limited on 29 July, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
[2025:JHHC:20946]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
C.M.P. No. 688 of 2023
Mithelesh Kumar Mishra @ Mithelesh Mishra,
aged about 50 years, Son of Ramadhar Mishra,
Resident of Qtr. No. IM-55, P.O.-Sindri, P.S.-
Baliapur, Dist.-Dhanbad.
..... ... Petitioners
Versus
1. M/s Indusind Bank Limited, a banking company
incorporated under the provisions of Companies
Act, 1956 having its corporate office at 115, 116,
G.N. Chetty Road, T. Nagar, Chennai-600017
represented by Attorney Holder Rana Brijesh Singh,
Son of Rana Arjun Singh, Branch at Shastri Nagar,
Near Laxmi Petrol Pump, P.S.- Bank More, Dist.-
Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
2. Rameshwar Yadav, Son of Banshi Yadav,
Resident of IM-463, Rangamatiya, P.O. & P.S.-
Sindri, Dist.-Dhanbad.
..... ... Opposite Parties
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Birendra Kumar, Advocate. For the O.P. No. 1 : Mr. Bharat Kumar, Advocate.
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07/ 29.07.2025 Heard Mr. Birendra Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Bharat Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 1.
2. O.P. No. 2 is said to be the proforma opposite party, in view of that notice upon him has not been issued by the co-ordinate bench of this court.
3. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein prayer has been made for setting aside -1- [2025:JHHC:20946] the order dated 18.05.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division)-IX, Dhanbad, in Execution Case No. 72 of 2018, whereby, the show cause filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the learned court.
4. Mr. Birendra Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has taken a vehicle as per loan agreement dated 20.11.2013 being registration No. JH-01-AC-8657 on a loan amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- and the same was to be paid in 46 equal installments. He submits that however the petitioner has not been able to regularly pay the EMI and in view of that arbitration clause of the agreement was invoked by the financer and thereafter the execution case has been filed, wherein the objection has been filed by the petitioner, which has been rejected by the learned court. He submits that the learned court has wrongly passed the impugned order.
5. Mr. Bharat Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 1 has opposed the prayer and submits that the learned court has rightly decided the objection filed by the petitioner herein. He submits that the arbitration Act is a complete jurisdiction and once the arbitration clause is invoked, only the provision made in the arbitration Act is required to be followed and the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. He further submits that the only ground has been taken in the petition to challenge the impugned order that the said was entertained after the lapse of the period of limitation. He further submits that even the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been rejected by the learned court on the point of limitation. He submits that in light of the statute, the limitation cannot be condoned, as has been in the case of -2- [2025:JHHC:20946] Simplex Infrastructure Limited Versus Union of India, reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-18 has held as follows:-
"18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate."
6. In view of the above and considering the statute of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to permit such objections to be raised in this forum would undermine the finality of the arbitral awards and circumvent the statutory scheme established by the Act. Once the parties have availed themselves of the statutory remedies available under the Act and has exhausted the appellate process under the Act, the award attains finality, akin to a judgment of a court of law. Just as a judgment of a court cannot be challenged ad infinitum through collateral proceedings, an arbitral award cannot be subjected to endless relitigation through writ petitions under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, the invocation of Article 227 of the -3- [2025:JHHC:20946] Constitution of India to challenge arbitral proceedings after the dismissal of objections would amount to an abuse of process and a disregard for the principle of issue estoppel.
7. The principles of finality and judicial economy demand that parties abide by the decisions of Arbitral Tribunals and exhaust the statutory remedies available under the Act before seeking recourse to collateral challenges through the writ petitions under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The persistent delay and obstructionist behavior, merit unequivocal condemnation and necessitate the imposition of substantial costs. Delay tactics serve to perpetuate injustice by denying parties their rightful entitlements. In the context of arbitration proceedings, the purpose of arbitration is to provide a swift and cost-effective alternative to traditional litigation. By resorting to delay tactics, the petitioner has sought to frustrate this objective and deny the respondents the benefits of a timely resolution.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sterling Industries Versus Jayprakash Associates Limited and Ors., reported in (2021) 18 SCC 367 has disapproved of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by Arbitral Tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
9. In light of the above, the court finds that there is no merit in this petition, as such, this petition is dismissed. Pending I.A., if any, stands dismissed.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Amitesh/-
[A.F.R.] -4-