Allahabad High Court
Brijiendra Singh Yadav vs State Of U.P. And Others on 2 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(3)AWC2435
Author: R.D. Shukla
Bench: R.D. Shukla
JUDGMENT S.H.A. Raza, J.
1. Petitioner. Sri Brijendra Singh Yadav, who was a member of Higher Judicial Service and at the relevant time, was working as IX Addl. District Judge at Meerut, being aggrieved against the order of removal from service passed by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh on 4.2.1997 in pursuance of an enquiry conducted by Justice T.P. Garg (as he then was), who was appointed enquiry officer by the High Court, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Factual matrix of the case, as set out in the writ petition as well as in the counter-affidavit filed by the opposite parties, in short compass, is that the then Administrative Judge of the Allahabad High Court Mr. Justice R.B. Mehrotra intimated to the Registrar of the High Court that the Administrative Judge received information that inspite of the orders passed by the High Court on 19.5.1992 in First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 arising out of Land Acquisition Case No. 93 of 1987 (District Meerut), the petitioner, who was posted as IXth Addl. District Judge. Meerut, had released amount of Rs. 35 lacs in favour of Smt. Savitri Devi in violation of the interim order passed by the Court. According to the Administrative Judge, the matter being serious one required immediate action.
3. It appears that said information was received by the Administrative Judge through Mr. Justice K. Narayan. The record of the case along with First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 was accordingly summoned by the Administrative Judge and he directed the District Judge to submit a report along with the comments of the Officer. The District Judge. Meerut submitted his report on 13.7.1994 along with the comments of the Officer dated 15.6.1994. Mr. Justice B.K. Singh, who later on took over as the inspecting Judge, after perusal of the report of the District Judge, the comments of the petitioner as well as the record, submitted his report to Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 20.12.1994. Hon'ble the Chief Justice ordered for initiation of the enquiry and the Administrative Committee of the High Court, in its meeting held on 13.1.1995, resolved that the petitioner be suspended from service in contemplation of the enquiry. Accordingly, the petitioner was suspended with effect from 23.1.1995, in contemplation of the enquiry. The Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 1.2.1995 further resolved that the disciplinary proceedings be initiated against the petitioner and a charge-sheet be served upon the petitioner, Hon'ble the Chief Justice was authorised to nominate the enquiry officer. On 7.2.1995 Hon'ble the Chief Justice appointed Mr. Justice T.P. Garg as the Enquiry Judge for holding disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner on 5.8.1995. Petitioner's representation dated 2.7.1995 for revocation of the suspension was rejected by the Court and the petitioner was informed accordingly vide letter dated 20.10.1995. The Enquiry Judge concluded the enquiry and submitted his report to Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 8.7.1996.
4. According to the Enquiry Judge, conduct of the Judicial officer was as such which lowered down the prestige of Judiciary in the eye of general public. The petitioner was held to be guilty of misconduct in accordance with Rule 3 of the U. P. Government Servant's Conduct Rules 1956. The enquiry report was placed before the Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 2.8.1996, which resolved that the explanation of the petitioner be called for within three weeks from the date of the receipt of the enquiry, copy of the enquiry report was accordingly furnished to the petitioner, who submitted his explanation on 12.8.1996.
5. On 27.9.1996, the Administrative Committee in its meeting resolved that the petitioner deserves to be removed from service and the matter be placed before Full Court. The Full Court, in its meeting dated 1.2.1997 after considering the enquiry report and the recommendations of the Administrative Committee, resolved that the recommendation of the Administrative Committee be accepted and, accordingly the record was sent to the State Government and the petitioner was removed from service with effect from 30.4.1997.
6. The following charges were framed by the enquiry Judge :
1. That the Hon'ble Court on 19.5.1992 has ordered in First Appeal No. 426 of 1989, Basant Kumar and another v. Smt. Savitri Devi and another, arising out of LA No. 93 of 1983, Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Savitri Devi and others, that "Till further orders an amount of Rs. 35 lacs out of entire amount "be" deposited in future in the Tribunal, "which" shall not be paid to any party including Smt. Savitri Devi. And also that "List with previous papers. Appeal No. 170 of 1992 and 426 of 1989 shall be listed together."
2. That Hon'ble High Court on 22.5.1992 in F.A. No. 170 of 1992, U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad u. Smt. Savitri Devi, has ordered that, "In the event of deposit the amount payable under the award of S.L.A.O. plus half of the amount given by way of increase by Court below shall be paid to the claimant and remainder shall be kept in some interest bearing security in some nationalised Bank to be paid after disposal of the Appeal."
3. That on 11.5.1993 the Hon'ble Court in F.A. No. 170 of 1992 has ordered C.A. and R.A. have been filed in the application for impleadment made by Basant Kumar and others. It is stated that they are primary heirs of one Ghan Shyam, who was the original owner of the property in dispute.
Request made by them for making reference under Section 18 seems to have been rejected by the District Judge against which they have filed an appeal before this Court, which is First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 (defective). The controversy raised by the applicants was sought to be impleaded in this appeal, is based on the validity of the Will. However. I do not pronounce anything on the validity or otherwise of the Will in this application at this stage. Their inclusion in the appeal will not affect the rights of the other side if they are traceable to a valid source. Therefore, it is necessary to hear them also in this appeal. Mr. Shitla Prasad has not filed any C.A. to the impleadment application.
Considering the application and the C.A. as also the R.A. by the interested persons, I direct that Basant Kumar, Km. Anita and Smt. Santosh Kumari to be added as respondents in this appeal and this appeal be connected with First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 (defective.)"
"List along with the aforesaid connected appeal immediately after vacation."
The interest of the newly added parties, Basant Kumar and others are sufficiently safeguarded by the stay order, dated 22.5.1992 issued by this Court. Therefore, no fresh order needs to be issued on the fresh stay application filed by the newly added parties."
4. That on 27.8.1992 Smt. Savitri Devi moved an application for execution of decree passed in L.A. No. 41 of 1990 in the Court of IV Addl. District Judge, Meerut, against U. P. State and 2 others and the same was registered as Execution Case No. 21 of 1992.
5. That on 21.5.1992 Sri Prakash Chandra, the IV Additional District Judge, Meerut, on the application 27 (c) of Smt. Santosh Kumari ordered that "Perused the orders of Hon'ble Court dated 29.5.1992. No payment shall be made to any party including Smt. Savitri Devi."
6. That execution case was transferred to the Court of IX Additional District Judge, Meerut, on 30.3.1994 and that you were presiding over that Court at the time. You vide your order, dated 30.4.1994 released the amount of Rs. 35 lacs in favour of Smt. Savitri Devi by allowing her application 103 (c) despite the stay order of the Hon'ble Court dated 19.5.1992. 22.5.1992 and 11.5.1993. The certified copies of which were on the record of the Execution Case No. 21 of 1992 as Paper Nos. 28 (c)/108 (c), 110 (c) and 111 (c) respectively from before 30.4.1994.
And thus you thereby have committed an act of misconduct and serious lapse by misusing your authority as Additional District Judge, Meerut, in passing the aforesaid order, dated 30.4.1994 by disregarding the aforesaid orders of Hon'ble the High Court dated 19.5.1992. 22.5.1992 and 11.5.1993 and therefore, are guilty within meaning of Rule 3, of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.
7. According to the charge-sheet the main charge of misconduct against the petitioner appears to be is that by means of the order dated 30.4.1994 he disregarded the High Court's orders dated 19.5.1992, 22.5.1992 and 11.5.1993. The petitioner emphatically denied the charge and in explanation, he submitted that he was not guilty of any act of misconduct in passing the order dated 30.4.1994.
8. Tracing the background of the case, petitioner submitted that one Ghanshyam Singh was the Bhumidhar of Khata No. 545 and 1568 situated in Tehsil Meerut. Who is alleged to have bequeathed the same to his wife Smt. Savitri Devi through a registered Will dated 16.4.1984. During the life time of Ghanshyam Singh, no till cat ion under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published for acquiring the aforesaid land for the benefit of U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad but after the death of Ghanshyam Singh, Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published. During the acquisition proceedings, Smt. Savitri Devi claiming to be the sole tenure holder of the plots in question on the basis of the Will dated 16.4.1984 staked her claim for the entire amount of compensation, while Smt. Santosh Kumari, who was widow of Swatantra Singh, who predeceased her father, son Basant Kumar, daughters Dimple and Anita claimed l/4th share of compensation money and challenged the validity of the Will dated 16.4.1984 before the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The dispute was referred to the District Judge. Meerut, by Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 30/31 of the Act. That reference Bearing No. 93 of 1987. SLAO v. Savitri Devi and others, was heard and decided by Additional District Judge, Meerut on 31.5.1989 and Smt. Savitri Devi was held entitled to receive the entire amount of compensation. Smt. Santosh Kumari and others filed First Appeal No. 426 of 1989. Basant Kumar and others v. Savitri Devi No court fee was paid by the appellants in the First Appeal No. 426 of 89, so it was marked as 'defective' but the appellants prayed to file the said appeal as indigent persons. In that appeal, following order was passed by the High Court on 28.7.1989 :
"Issue notice returnable by 4th October 1989. Until 17th October, 1989, amount awarded shall not be paid to respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the order dated 31.5.1989 passed by XI Addl. District Judge, Meerut."
On 17.10.1989 following order was passed in the said appeal :
"Interim stay order dated 28.7.1989 is extended till further orders."
9. Petitioner further submitted that inspite of the stay order being granted in favour of Santosh Kumari and others in First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 relating to their claim for a sum of Rs. 3,86,967, 1/4th share of compensation amounting to Rs. 15 lacs, was paid to Smt. Savitri Devi on 27.10.1989 by Sri S.K. Samadhia the then Additional District Judge, Meerut, thereafter, no amount was deposited and the file was consigned to the record room. No execution remained pending.
10. It was asserted by the petitioner that against the Award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 3.8.1987 objection was moved before the Collector. Meerut by Smt. Savitri Devi on 14.8.1987 that the Award was inadequate. The matter was referred to the District Judge. Meerut, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, which was registered as Reference No. 41 of 1990. Savitri Devi v. U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and was tried by Sri Prakash Chandra, the then Additional District Judge. Meerut, who enhanced the amount from Rs. 30 per square yard to Rs. 150 on 18.12.1991 and the total amount, thus, became to Rs. 87 lacs.
11. Aggrieved by that order. U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad filed First Appeal No. 170 of 1992 in the High Court. In that appeal. Basant Kumar and others were not parties in that reference nor any objection was filed by them. They applied for being impleaded as party to the case, but their impleadment application was rejected in the lower court and they did not file any revision or appeal against that order.
12. It was stressed by the petitioner that after the judgment in Land Acquisition Reference No. 41/90 and during the pendency of Appeal No. 170 of 92. Basant Kumar and others applied in their Appeal No. 426 of 1989 for staying the payment of Rs. 35 lacs to respondent No. 1. Mr. Justice K. Narayana passed the following order on 19.5.1992 :
"Counsel for the applicant informed. Sri G.N. Verma. He has, however, not turned up. Let the application be listed for hearing. Till further orders an amount of Rs. 35 lacs, out of the entire amount deposited or to be deposited in future in the Tribunal, shall not be paid to any party including Smt. Savitri Devi."
13. According to the petitioner. It was ex-parte order, which was obtained by Basant Kumar concealing the material facts that Rs. 35 lacs was the subject-matter of First Appeal No. 170 of 1992, in which Basant Kumar and Santosh Kumari were not parties and when the order was passed, on the same day, Mr. Justice K. Narayan passed another order as tinder :
"List with previous papers. Appeal No. 170 of 1992 and 426 of 89 shall be listed together."
14. On 22.5.1992, the High Court in First Appeal No. 170 of 1992 filed by U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, passed the following order :
"Heard learned counsel for the appellant and respondent. With effect from the date, the amount as awarded by Court below is deposited with the Court below, any effort for further execution shall be stayed. In the event of deposit, the amount payable under the Award of Special Land Acquisition Officer plus half of the amount given by way of increase by the Court below, shall be paid to the claimant. The remainder shall be kept under some interest bearing security in some nationalised bank to be paid after disposal of the appeal. It is made clear that any amount, which might have been paid to the claimant under the Award of Special Land Acquisition Officer, shall be taken to have been paid and deducted from the amount to be deposited with the Court below. It is also made clear that With effect from the date of deposit of the amount, the liability of the appellant towards payment of interest shall cease.
However, the execution proceedings shall remain stayed till 31st July, 1992 and the appellant shall be at liberty to deposit by that date."
15. It was further averred by the petitioner in his explanation to the charge-sheet that the order dated 22.5.1992 was a conditional order and the appellant U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad was directed to deposit the entire amount under the Award by 31.7.1992. It was further directed that in case of deposit of the entire amount, the amount payable under the Award of Special Land Acquisition Officer plus half of the amount given by way of increase by the Court below was to be paid to Smt. Savitri Devi, the rest of the amount was kept in some interest bearing security in some nationalised bank. The execution proceedings were to remain stayed till 31.7.1992. The appellant was also given time till 31.7.1992 to deposit the entire amount. Instead of complying with the conditions imposed by the Court, the appellant went in appeal. The Apex Court rejected the appeal on 30.6.1992. The order dated 22.5.1992 exhausted itself on 31.7.1992 due to non-compliance of conditions imposed. The order was not further extended. Thus, according to the petitioner, there was no stay order in favour of U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad in First Appeal No. 170 of 1992 after 31.7.1992 and this fact was mentioned by the inspecting Judge Sri B.K. Singh, the then inspecting Judge, in his report dated 20.10.1992, who was also of the opinion that the order dated 22.5.1992 was a conditional order. The fact that the order dated 22.5.1992 lapsed after 31.7.1992 was acknowledged by Smt. Santosh Kumari herself, who preferred a fresh application for stay, which was rejected by the Court on 11.5.1993, wherein it was indicated that "C.A. and R.A. have been filed in this application for impleadment made by Basant Kumar and others. It is stated that they are Primary heirs of one Shri Ghanshyam who was the original owner of the property in dispute. Request made by them for making reference under Section 18 seems to have been rejected by the District Judge against which they have filed an appeal before this Court, which is First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 (Defective). The controversy raised by the appellants who seeks to be impleaded in this First Appeal is based on the validity of the Will. However, I do not pronounce anything on the validity or otherwise of the Will in this application at this stage. Their inclusion in the appeal will not affect the rights of the other side, if they are traceable to the valid source. Therefore, it is necessary to hear them also in this appeal. Mr. Shitla Prasad has not filed any C.A. to the impleadment application.
"Considering the application and the C.A. and also R.A. filed by the entrusted persons, I direct that Basant Kumar, Kumari Dimple, Kumari Anita and Smt. Santosh Kumari to be added as respondents in this appeal and this appeal be connected with First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 (Defective).
"List along with the aforesaid connected appeal immediately after vacation. The interest of the newly added parties, Basant Kumar and others are sufficiently safeguarded by the stay order dated 22.5.1992 issued by this Court. Therefore, no fresh order needs to be issued on the fresh stay application filed by the newly added parties.
16. According to the petitioner, as order dated 22.5.1992 exhausted on 31.7.1992/1.8.1992 for non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed therein, so the order dated 11.5.1993 was of no effect and seems to have been passed under some misapprehension of facts, because it was not pointed out to the Hon'ble Judge that the order dated 22.5.1992 had become non-est and inoperative, so there was no question of violation or disobedience of the order dated 22.5.1992 or 11.5.1993. because these orders cannot be said to be existing and operative.
17. It was urged further by the petitioner in his explanation that Smt. Santosh Kumari and others were under the impression that order dated 19.5.1992 was not operative, otherwise they would not have pressed fresh stay application on which no fresh order was passed. The Hon'ble High Court never said that the order dated 19.5.1992 was operative. Non-reference of that order establishes that the order dated 19.5.1992 was not in existence on 11.5.1993. The interim order dated 19.5.1992 was operative till further orders of the High Court but as after hearing both the parties, further order was passed on 22.5.1992, which was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, said order superseded the order dated 19.5.1992. The order dated 22.5.1992 was in force till 31.7.1992. It was submitted that before the petitioner no extended order passed in continuation of the order dated 22.5.1992 was filed, so the petitioner bona-fidely believed the statement of the decree holder that no stay order was in existence. It was urged that Sri Ahmad Shamim, XIV Addl. District Judge. Meerut, released Rs. 52 lacs in Execution Case No. 21 of 1992. For the remaining amount, i.e., Rs. 35 lacs, when the application was moved by the decree holder, Sri Ahmad Shamim, Addl. District Judge, asked the parties to file latest position. The entire record of the case was in the Hon'ble High Court, only the copy of the order dated 19.5.1992 was on the record, hence it was necessary to ascertain the facts whether the interim order was still operative. The decree holder filed questionnaire on 4.3.1994 bearing seal of the Hon'ble High Court in the Court of Sri Ahmad Shamim, XIV Addl. District Judge, Meerut. She also filed affidavit in support of it, wherein it was indicated that the order dated 19.5.1992 was no more in existence. Questionnaire filed by Smt. Savitri Devi indicated that the order dated 19.5.1992 regarding stay, was not operative but the reply to the questionnaire as to whether First Appeal No. 426 of 89 and First Appeal No. 170 of 1992 were connected, was in affirmative. In Para 5 of the affidavit, Smt. Savitri Devi specifically and categorically asserted that order dated 19.5.1992 is not operative. Counsel of the opposite party who was present, sought time to file objection.
18. After the aforesaid proceedings before Sri Ahmad Shamim. XIV Addl. District Judge, Meerut, the case was transferred to the Court of the petitioner for disposal of the matter. The opposite party after the lapse of fifty five days filed another questionnaire on 28.7.1994 and also filed the affidavit in that regard. It was urged that nowhere in the alleged affidavit filed by Smt. Santosh Kumari, it was averred that the questionnaire which was filed by Smt. Savitri Devi was tampered, forged or fictitious document, and in the questionnaire filed by Smt. Santosh Kumari dated 22.4.1994, it was not at all mentioned that the order dated 19.4.1992 was still operative. In the said questionnaire, only this much was asked that whether there was any order dated 19.5.1992 passed by the High Court that amount of Rs. 35 lacs be not to be paid to any party including Smt. Savitri Devi. The answer was in affirmative, but as far as the first question in the questionnaire of the opposite party ; as to whether the stay order dated 19.5.1992 has been vacated, was scored out and no answer was given to that question. That question was most relevant and if answered. It would have settled the position regarding the second question. The fact that the order dated 19.5.1992 was passed, was never in dispute since copy of that order was already on the record. The only controversy was as to whether that order dated 19.5.1992 was still operative and on this aspect, the questionnaire of opposite party was silent. As the first question was scored out by or on behalf of Smt. Santosh Kumari for the reasons best known to her, it was sufficient to indicate that the counsel of Smt. Santosh Kumari, who scored out the first question, knew that the order dated 19.5.1992 stood modified, or superseded by order dated 11.5.1993. It was stressed that the questionnaire being the document of the High Court, duly authenticated bearing the signature of the High Court Officer, its authenticity could not be disputed and there existed no justification for a Judicial officer to doubt the genuineness of that questionnaire unless disputed by the opposite party. The petitioner had no option except to believe the affidavit and the questions and answers issued under the seal of the High Court, as correct.
19. It was urged by the petitioner that Smt. Santosh Kumari, on the next date of the passing of the order dated 30.4.1994 by the petitioner releasing the amount in favour of Smt. Savitri Devi, preferred a review application supported by an affidavit requesting the Court to recall/review the order dated 30.4.1994. For the first time Smt. Santosh Kumari alleged in her application that the order dated 19.5.1992 was very clear and there was no further order of the Hon'ble High Court. It was urged that the petitioner immediately passed an order staying the earlier order dated 30.4.1994 and directed the Manager of State Bank of India, Raj Nagar, not to make any payment to the decree holder. Again on 27.5.1994. Smt. Santosh Kumari moved an application against Sri Bhagmal Singh. Advocate, Sri Vinay Bishoi. Advocate, Smt. Savitri Devi, Vijendra. Rajendra. Jitendra sons of Shri Ghanshyam Singh, under Section 340 of the Cr. P.C. and a case against the opposite parties was registered on the same day by the petitioner. It was next asserted that if the petitioner had committed any mistake that was bona-fide one, as there was no intention to pass an order in violation of the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court. The petitioner prayed that he should be exonerated from the charge and the suspension order be revoked.
20. Before the Enquiry Judge, the Presenting Officer relied upon the documentary evidence Ext. P 1 to P12 and closed the evidence. The petitioner, in defence, got himself examined and was cross-examined by the Presenting Officer. In his statement, petitioner relied upon his explanation dated 28.8.1995 Ext. R 1 along with Annexures A-1 to A-5, A-5A, A-6 to A-13. He also relied upon the order of the High Court dated 19.5.1994 Ext, R-2 and the order of the District Judge Ext. R-3 dated 4.9.1995. He was cross-examined by the Presenting Officer and was confronted to the affidavit of Smt. Santosh Kumari Annexure-A-11 and was asked as to why before passing the order dated 30.4.1994, he did not try to verify the fact from the High Court as to whether the stay order was operative. In his reply, petitioner submitted that in view of the averments made in Para 8 of the aforesaid affidavit filed by Smt. Santosh Kumari, there was no need to verify that fact as the averments made in Paras 4 and 8 of the affidavit were self-contradictory. Subsequently, the Presenting Officer preferred an application dated 9.11.1995 before the enquiry officer for leading additional evidence, notice of which was given to the petitioner who filed his reply dated 28.11.1995. The Presenting Officer relied upon the photocopy of the letter dated 4.5.1994 issued by State Bank of India in Execution Case No. 21 of 1992 Ext. P-13 and closed the additional evidence. In rebuttal, the petitioner relied upon his reply Ext. R-4 to the aforesaid application and also tendered as evidence the photo copy of the review application of the opposite parties Ext. R-5. He also stated that his written statement be treated as written argument. No other evidence was led by him in his defence. Petitioner was given opportunity of hearing. He submitted his explanation and stated that it should be treated as his argument as he had nothing to add in that matter.
21. The enquiry Judge in his report dated 8.7.1996 found that all the charges stood proved against the petitioner. In his report, the enquiry Judge referred to the applications dated 3.1.1994 and 4.3.1994 moved by Smt. Savitri Devi for the release of Rs. 35 lacs. Smt. Santosh Kumari filed objection against the said application on 13.4.1994 along with the affidavit. In Para 5 of her affidavit. Smt. Savitri Devi referred to the question-answer form dated 5.2.1994 issued by the High Court, whereby, according to her the stay order dated 19.5.1992 was not operative and so she was entitled to receive the payment of Rs. 35 lacs. Smt. Santosh Kumari filed an affidavit on 28.4.1994. In Para 2 of her affidavit Smt. Santosh Kumari stated that she had read and understood the affidavit of Smt. Savitri Devi dated 25.4.1994 and the same was based on altogether wrong facts. In Para 3 of her affidavit Smt. Santosh Kumari stated that the stay order passed in First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 by the High Court with regard to the stoppage of payment was still operative. In Para 4 of her affidavit Smt. Santosh Kumari has stated that the contents of Para 3 of the affidavit of Smt. Savitri Devi were not admitted. In Para 7 of her affidavit, Smt. Santosh Kumari has stated that Smt. Savitri Devi had moved similar application on earlier occasion, which was dismissed by the XIV Additional District Judge. Meerut on 17.8.1993 and so the second application was not maintainable. In Para 8 of her affidavit Smt. Santosh Kumari has categorically stated that she had herself gone to High Court at Allahabad and had come to know that Smt. Savitri Devi had obtained a question-answer form in First Appeal No. 426 of 1989 on wrong facts and that correct question-answer form was filed by her as Annexure-A to her affidavit. All those documents were admitted by the petitioner. However, the petitioner passed the order dated 30.4.1994 accepting the questionnaire of Smt. Savitri Devi. In his explanation against the charge-sheet, the petitioner has Justified his action in having passed the order dated 30.4.1994. by means of which 35 lacs rupees were ordered to be released in favour of Smt. Savitri Devi. According to him, the interim order dated 19.5.1992 was not operative and the authenticity of the questionnaire was not disputed by the counsel of the other side.
22. According to the enquiry Judge, although the petitioner referred to the other questionnaire filed by Smt. Santosh Kumari, but he had given no due consideration to the specific reply "yes" given in response to the question "Is there any order dated 19.5.1992 passed by High Court" that the amount of Rs. 35 lacs is not to be paid to any party including Smt. Savitri Devi". Petitioner has also referred to the affidavit dated 28.4.1994 of Smt. Santosh Kumari and asserted that Smt. Santosh Kumari had not controverted the questionnaire issued by the High Court and according to the petitioner, she admitted the said document.
23. The enquiry Judge was of the view that the reasons given by the Charged Officer in his order dated 30.4.1994 were not based on any cogent material on the record and were entirely unconvincing. The petitioner's acceptance of questionnaire submitted by Smt. Savitri Devi Annexure-A-8 to his reply Ext. R-1, and taking it as sufficient proof of the stay order dated 19.5.1992 being not operative, were certainly wrong and unjustified conclusions. Clearly disobeying the directions of the High Court, the petitioner released the amount for oblique motive and extraneous considerations best known to the Charged Officer. The enquiry Judge stated that a perusal of the questionnaire dated 5.2.1994 Annexure-A-8 to written reply Ext. R-l clearly shows that even to the naked eye, there were interpolations and additions with different ink and handwriting showing that, it was not a genuine document. The authenticity of that document was vehemently questioned by the opposite party Smt. Santosh Kumari, not only by filing the counter-affidavit but also filing the counter questionnaire (Annexure-A-10 to Ext. R-l) of a later date clearly mentioning that the stay order dated 19.5.1992 was still operative. But even then, the Charged Officer did not ask the parties to produce the certified copies of various orders of the High Court and to get the authenticity of the questionnaire A-8 verified from the High Court. On the other hand, in his anxiety, to oblige the decree-holder ordered for the release the payment in her favour, by passing the order dated 30.4.1994, which is certainly a flagrant misuse of authority vested in him.
24. The enquiry Judge further was of the view that the question-answer form Annexure-A-8 to written reply of Charged Officer Ext. R-1, filed by Smt. Savitri Devi was certainly not genuine document and the manner in which it had been got prepared, raised doubt and suspicion as there were cuttings/overwriting/ interpolation/ additions on it. The Charged Officer ought to have cared to find out and to verify the authenticity of the aforesaid questionnaire from the High Court but in his anxiety to release the amount, he did not care to do so, and released the amount of Rs. 35 lacs, which is clearly a gross and flagrant misuse of authority vested in him in utter violation of the Court's order dated 19.5.1992. The enquiry Judge concluded that he was of the firm view that the order dated 30.4.1994 was passed by the Charged Officer without any reasonable ground whatsoever and for extraneous considerations. The conduct of the Charged Officer was unbecoming of Judicial Officer of his seniority and rank, which has lowered down the prestige and image of the Judiciary in the eyes of the general public. The petitioner was, thus, held guilty of misconduct as envisaged in Rule 3 of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules. 1956 and the last charge also stood proved against the Charged Officer,
25. Before dealing with the case, it is pertinent to mention that as soon as the order dated 30.4.1994 was passed by the petitioner releasing the amount in favour of Smt. Savitri Devi, Smt. Santosh Kumari on the next day moved an application supported by affidavit for the review of the order dated 30.4.1994. In the said application, Smt. Santosh Kumari averred that on 19.5.1992 the High Court had ordered in F.A. No. 426 of 89, Basant Kumar and another v. Savitri Devi and another, arising out of L.A. No. 93 of 1983 in re Special Land Acquisition Officer u. Savitri Devi and another, that till further orders, amount of Rs. 35 lacs out of the entire amount, be deposited before the Tribunal, which shall not be paid to any party including Smt. Savitri Devi and no further order of the Hon'ble High Court was passed. Said review petition was registered as miscellaneous case and on 3.5.1994 petitioner passed an order listing the review petition on 11.5.1994 and passed an order to the effect that if no payment had been made, it shall be stayed and directed the Manager of the State of Bank of India, not to make any payment to the decree holder. On 27.5.1994 Santosh Kumari moved an application through her counsel under Section 340, Cr. P.C. and a case against Smt. Savitri Devi and others were registered on the same day. Ultimately, on 27.6.1997 in the Court in District Judge, Meerut. In L.A. Reference No. 51 of 1990 in re ; Savitri Devi v. State, by means of four bank drafts bearing No. 817316 to 817319 amounting Rs. 9 lacs 90 thousand, Rs. 9 lacs 90 thousand, Rs. 9 lacs 90 thousand and Rs. 9 lacs 9 thousand 5 hundred, respectively were deposited.
26. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that assuming that the petitioner has committed any mistake in releasing the amount to Smt. Savitri Devi, as soon as the attention of the petitioner was drawn that the order dated 19.5.1992 passed by the High Court was still operative, the petitioner passed the order staying the operation of his previous order and directed the Manager of the State Bank of India, Raj Nagar, not to make any payment to the decree holder and upon an application dated 27.5.1994 preferred by Smt. Santosh Kumari through her counsel, a case against Smt. Savitri Devi was registered on the same day, as a result of which bank drafts for the money, which were released in favour of Smt. Savitri Devi, were deposited in the Court due to the orders passed by the petitioner, which shows that the petitioner has acted bona fide in the matter. It was urged by Kr. Kapil Dev, learned counsel for the petitioner that the contempt proceedings were initiated against the petitioner as well as against Smt. Savitri Devi by the High Court, but the petitioner was exonerated in the contempt proceedings and the entire decreetal amount, which was released to Smt. Savitri Devi was deposited by Smt, Savitri Devi.
27. It was next submitted that the charge against the petitioner is relating to the act, which was done by the petitioner, while acting in his official capacity, hence it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed any act of 'misconduct', meaning of which according to the Stround's judicial dictionary, is 'arising from ill-motive'. Any act of negligence, error of Judgment or innocent mistake cannot constitute an act of misconduct. In this regard, reference was made to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. J. Ahmad, AIR 1979 SC 1022, wherein it was observed ;
"Lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would not themselves constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty or a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct, unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high."
28. It was submitted that while relying upon the questionnaire, the enquiry Judge was of the opinion that the questionnaire filed by Smt. Savitri Devi was certainly not genuine document and the manner in which it was prepared raised doubt and suspicion as there were cuttings and over-writing and interpolation done to it. The Charged Officer should have cared to find out and verify the authenticity of the aforesaid questionnaire from the High Court, but in his anxiety to release the payment, he did not care to do so and released the payment of Rs. 35 lacs, which is clear and gross and flagrant misuse of the authority in utter violation of the Court order dated 16.5.1992. It was urged that there was no evidence that the document was not genuine, inasmuch as, even Smt. Santosh Kumari had not challenged the authenticity or genuineness of that questionnaire when it was filed and if the petitioner relied on the basis of the questionnaire there existed no interim order, ordering the release of the amount, which due to the effort of the petitioner was again deposited, it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed an act of misconduct. At the most, it can be said that instead of relying upon the said questionnaire, the petitioner could have verified about the authenticity of the document from the High Court, but if he had not taken such a preventive measure, at the most it could be said that the petitioner has committed an error of judgment in evaluating the authenticity of that document or did not act with due care and caution in performance of his duties, but such lapse on the part of the petitioner cannot be said to be an act of misconduct.
29. The petitioner was charged that he has committed an act of misconduct and serious lapse by misusing his authority as Additional District Judge, Meerut, in passing the order dated 30.4.1994 by disregarding the orders of the High Court dated 19.5.1992, 22.5.1992 and 11.5.1993 and, therefore, he was guilty of an act of misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules. 1956. But, there existed no charge against the petitioner that he passed the order for oblique motive or extraneous consideration, or that the petitioner, due to ulterior motive, passed the order in favour of the decree holder but the enquiry Judge in his report observed that the order was passed by the petitioner without any reasonable ground whatsoever and for oblique motive and for extraneous consideration.
30. Now the question that arises is as to whether by passing of an order while acting in official capacity, a person can be impeached for committing an act of misconduct, even if the order is erroneous, manifestly illegal or without authority.
31. In Registrar. High Court of Madras v. R. Rajia. JT 1988 (2) SC 5671. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed ;
"that though the High Court, in its administrative jurisdiction has the power to recommend compulsory retirement of a member of the judicial service in accordance with the rules framed in that regard, it cannot act arbitrarily and there has to be material to come to a decision that the officer has outlived his utility. It was also pointed out in this case that the High Court while exercising its power of control over the subordinate judiciary is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers, from being harassed or annoyed by trifling complaints relating to Judicial orders so that the officers may discharge their duties honestly and independently unconcerned by the ill conceived or motivated complaints, made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants."
32. In Dattatraya u. State of Maharashtra and others, 1991 Lab IC 767, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court at Nagpur held in Para 11 of the report as under :
"What we find in the present case is that the petitioner is charge-sheeted not for his conduct, but for the act done by him while acting in his official capacity. If at all the act is without jurisdiction, that can be challenged under the statutes. But it cannot be legitimately said that doing the act without any authority is misconduct for which a Government servant should be punished. To be more specific, the charge nowhere suggests that this act has been done by the petitioner with some ulterior motive of obtaining some advantages for himself or to others. There is not even a whisper thereof either in the charge or in the statement of allegations or even in the orders that came to be passed subsequently. We would understand the charge that the petitioner did this particular act with an ulterior motive of gaining some monetary or other benefits for himself or to others. This could have constituted misconduct for which the Government officer could be legitimately dealt with."
33. In R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajasthan, 1994 Supp (3) SCO 711, petitioner R.C. Sood, a member of Higher Judicial Service in the State of Rajasthan, who was senior District and Sessions Judge and was posted as Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court with effect from 1.7.1989 to 1.2.1994 as well as District and Sessions Judge at Jodhpur with effect from 2.2.1994 to 4.6.1994 and as the District and Sessions Judge. Jaipur city. Jaipur, from 6.6.1994, was placed under suspension with immediate effect by Rajasthan High Court, in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 as a consequence of the decision taken by the Full Court in its meeting held on 20.10.1994 and 21.10.1994. Being aggrieved against the said order, he filed a writ petition before Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
"Obviously, the High Court has taken the view that the said mistake in the date of mentioning '1.1.1995' instead of '1.1.1994' in the advertisement was the result of an interpolation or change in the date made by the petitioner R.C. Sood ; and that it amounted to gross misconduct in view of the consequence flowing therefrom which enabled some undue benefit to some candidates. In the first place, there is no material in the entire record, apart from the fact that the petitioner happened to be posted as Registrar of the High Court at the time when the draft advertisement was finalised and sent for publication in the Gazette, to suggest that the change in the year from '1994' in the original draft to '1995' had been made by the petitioner and none else. Learned Additional Solicitor General showed to us the original draft, and, in all fairness, also pointed out that the ink in which the year '1995' was written in place of '1994' was different from the ink which had been used by the petitioner elsewhere in the same draft. There was no initial at the place of change of the year to indicate who had made that change, much less to suggest that the change had been made by the petitioner. It is obvious that the opportunity for making the change, assuming it was of the kind visualised by the High Court, was available to many others in the Registry including the person who had typed the draft and handled the same after it had been finalised by the petitioner as the Registrar on 7.12.1993. This obvious fact was overlooked by the High Court which proceeded on the erroneous assumption that this change must have been made only by the petitioner and that too for an ulterior purpose, without any material to justify that assumption. The High Court also ignored the fact that this mistake was not discovered by any one in the Registry including the petitioner's successor from February, 1994, till September, 1994, when it was noticed by the Judges Committee, even though the last date for receipt of application was in March, 1994. It is this fallacy which led the High Court from one error to another, till the end."
"It is obvious that this mistake could not benefit anyone who had already attained the age of 45 years on 1.1.1994 which was the upper age limit, since that person would undoubtedly grow older in age on 1.1.1995. The only benefit could be to anyone who did not satisfy the requirement, of lower age limit of 35 years on 1.1.1994 and would attain that age on 1.1.1995. The logical exercise to perform was, therefore, to see if there was any candidate BO benefited, and, if so, whether the petitioner was in any manner connected with him. It is obvious that no one in the High Court had even considered this aspect, inasmuch as, when we put this question, the learned Additional Solicitor General on instructions told us that the record did not contain even a list of all the candidates with reference to their age to reveal this aspect. The learned Additional Solicitor General asked the officer of the High Court present to assist him to prepare such a list from the record which shows that there may be some candidates who attained the age of 35 years between 1.1.1994 and 1.1.1995. But then there is Absolutely nothing to indicate that any of them is in any manner connected with the petitioner, much less that the petitioner has any interest in them. It is difficult to appreciate how the Committee comprising of Mr. Justice M.P. Singh and Mr. Justice R.S. Kejriwal could reach the conclusion quoted earlier, more particularly as under :
"This Committee has examined the record in detail and is of the tentative view that Shri R.C. Sood, the then Registrar, is responsible for the forgery committed in the record."
This part of the conclusion that the action amounted to 'forgery' is indeed astounding since forgery has a legal connotation amounting to an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.
On a careful examination of the entire record placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, we have no doubt that the view taken by the High Court and the consequent action against the petitioner, to say the least, is wholly arbitrary, unwarranted and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is unsustainable and must be struck down.
This case leaves us very sad. Entrustment of the 'control' of the subordinate Judiciary to the High Courts by enactment of the relevant provisions in the Constitution of India, particularly Article 235 therein is for the purpose of ensuring their independence and protection from executive interference. At a time when fairness and non-arbitrariness are the essential requirements of every administrative State action, it is more so for any administrative act of the Judges. It is necessary that members of the subordinate judiciary get no occasion to think otherwise. We are afraid, this incident appears to shake this faith. We do hope it is an inadvertent exception.
Writ petition filed by Sri R.C. Sood was accordingly allowed and the entire enquiry disciplinary proceedings initiated by the High Court against the petitioner, together with the Full Court resolutions dated 20.10.1994 and 21.10.1994 as well as the order dated 22.10.1994 placing the petitioner under suspension were quashed. The High Court was directed to take all necessary consequential steps pursuant to and in accordance with that decision, forthwith. The Rajasthan High Court was also directed to pay Rs. 10,000 as costs to the petitioner.
34. It so happened that the agony of the petitioner Sri R.C. Sood was not over even after the Judgment mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs. A second disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the High Court by its resolution dated 5.1.1995 and 6.1.1995, which was again assailed before Hon'ble Supreme Court. At the relevant time the petitioner, Sri R.C. Sood was posted as Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. A complaint was filed against him. Additional Registrar (Vigilance) dealing with all the charges levelled against Sri Sood on the complaint, after recording evidence of the witnesses indicated that all the witnesses have testified about good conduct, integrity and Tightness of Shri Sood. The Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court passed an order on 31.1.1994 to the effect that there was no grain of truth in the allegations levelled against Shri Sood. It appeared that the complaint was filed against Sri Sood out of malice. The Chief Justice was of the view that the complaint was the handiwork of, some mischief-mongers. Thus, the complaint was filed as no action was needed to be taken against Sri Sood. The matter again came up for consideration before the Chief Justice for the reason that the preliminary enquiry against Sri Sood was conducted by Additional Registrar (Vigilance) an officer subordinate to him. Certain other complaints were received by the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court against Sri R.C. Sood. A fresh enquiry was initiated against Mr. R.C. Sood by resolution of the Full Court. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case. Hon'bte Supreme Court in R. C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan. (1998) 5 SCO 493, referring to its earlier observations in R. C. Sood v. Rajasthan High Court (supra) held :
"This case leaves us very sad. Entrustment of the 'control' of the subordinate judiciary to the High Courts by enactment of the relevant provisions in the Constitution of India, particularly Article 235 therein is for the purpose of ensuring their independence and protection from executive interference. At a time when fairness and non-arbitrariness are the essential requirements of every administrative State action, it is more so for any administrative act of the Judges. It is necessary that members of the subordinate Judiciary get no occasion to think otherwise. We are afraid, this incident appears to shake this faith. We do hope it is an inadvertent exception."
35. In Sanjiv Dutta, Deputy Secretary. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi and others, (1995) 3 SCC 619, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
"None is free from errors, and the judiciary does not claim infallibility. Our legal system in fact acknowledges the fallibility of the Courts and provides for both internal and external checks to correct the errors. Together, they go a long way to ensure judicial accountability. The law thus provides procedure to correct Judicial errors."
36. In Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar and others. JT 1999 (1) SC 459, relying upon the earlier decision in Registrar, High Court Madras v. R. Rahila (supra). Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
"The word 'consult' in its ordinary meaning means to ask advice or to take 'counsel'. The Governor is thus a 'consultor' and the High Court is the 'consultee' which is treated as an expert body in all matters of service including appointments, disciplinary action, compulsory retirement, etc. relating to State Judicial Services. Since the Governor cannot act on his own unless he has consulted the High Court, the Constitution has conferred upon the High Court a sacred and noble duty to give the best of advice or opinion to the Governor and advice tendered after due deliberation and after taking into consideration all the relevant material and record relating to the problem on which consultation is made or advice is sought by the Governor. It is, therefore, essentially a matter of trust and confidence between the Governor and the High Court. The High Court cannot act arbitrarily in giving its opinion to the Governor or else it will be a betrayal of that trust. If the advice is not at all supportable by any material on record and is arbitrary in character, it may not have any binding value."
"It has already been pointed out by this Court in Registrar. High Court of Madras v. R. Rajia, JT 1988 (2) SC 5671, that though the High Court. In its administrative jurisdiction, has the power to recommend compulsory retirement of a member of the judicial service in accordance with the rules framed in that regard, it cannot act arbitrarily and there has to be material to come to a decision that the officer has outlived his utility. It was also pointed out in this case that the High Court while exercising its power of control over the subordinate Judiciary is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers, from being harassed or annoyed by trifling complaints relating to judicial orders so that the officers may discharge their duties honestly and independently unconcerned by the ill conceived or motivated complaints, made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants."
As the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that there was no material on the basis of which opinion could have been reasonably formed that it would be in public interest to retire the appellant, the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner, was quashed.
37. In Zuniarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1999 SC 2881. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
"To maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi-Judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law. e.g., in the nature of some extraneous consideration influencing the quasi judicial officer, if every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers tike the appellants. The entire system of administrative adjudication where under quasi-Judicial powers are conferred on administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute if officers performing such functions are inhibited in performing their functions without fear or favour because of the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings. When we talk of negligence in a quasi-judicial adjudication, it is not negligence perceived as carelessness, inadvertence or omission but as culpable negligence. A wrong interpretation of law cannot be a ground for misconduct. Of course it is a different matter altogether if it is deliberate and actuated by mala fides."
38. In Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1999 SC 1018. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
"The recommendation of the High Court on the basis of which the appellant, who held the rank of Addl. District & Sessions Judge, was compulsorily retired from service, exhibits the tragic fact that the highest judicial body of the State which abhors anything done contrary to the rule of law or done in a whimsical manner or arbitrarily, can itself act in that manner on the administrative side. Still, the plea that High Court Judges suffer from "spilt personality" cannot be accepted for the pleasant fact that though on the administrative side they might have had acted as ordinary bureaucrat, once they done the robes, they forget all their previous associations and connections."
39. In Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and others. AIR 1999 SC 677, Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that if the decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse.
40. In the instant case although no charge was framed against the petitioner to the extent that he had passed the order for oblique motive or extraneous consideration, hence the enquiry Judge ought not to have observed that the order was passed by the petitioner without any reasonable ground for oblique motive and extraneous consideration, particularly when there existed no evidence that the petitioner passed the order for oblique motive and for extraneous consideration and particularly when the petitioner was not given an opportunity to rebut that charge. At the most. It can be said that the petitioner did not, while passing the order, take adequate precautions and acted carelessly or negligently in relying upon the answer to the questionnaire, which was produced before him, on behalf of Smt. Savitri Devi. He could have sought the clarification or further information, even if the genuineness of that document was doubtful, from the High Court as to whether there was any stay order or not, but on account of that negligence, error of Judgment, or lack of efficiency or failure to attain the highest standard of judicial ability, if any, the petitioner would not be deemed to have committed an act of misconduct, particularly when there was no allegation made either in the imputation of charges that the order was passed for either oblique motive or extraneous consideration and there existed any evidence upon which the enquiry Judge could have reached to that conclusion that the petitioner passed the order with oblique motive and for extraneous consideration, i.e., for obtaining some personal advantage or monetary gain. It is rightly said that a Judge is yet to born who has not committed any mistake.
41. Any error of judgment, which may be unintentional, cannot be considered to be an act of misconduct, the suspicion cannot be a substitution for a proof, presumption and assumption cannot lead to a conclusion that the petitioner has committed an act of misconduct with oblique motive and for extraneous consideration. The finding arrived at by the enquiry Judge, which is not based on any definite charge of which no opportunity was given to the petitioner to rebut the charge, cannot be accepted.
42. Before the petitioner, a public document and questionnaire and its reply was produced. How the petitioner, who is subject to the control of the High Court could have overlooked it, particularly when it was not the case of Smt. Santosh Kumari that it was a forged document and it contained interpolation. The document was issued under the hand and seal of the High Court. The petitioner while ordering for the release of the amount has taken a possible view. The another view that he should have got it verified from the High Court was also possible but for that reason, the petitioner could not have been punished.
43. Contempt proceedings were drawn against the petitioner more or less for the same cause. The petitioner was exonerated but Smt. Savitri Devi was held guilty. Against the order passed by the petitioner, a review petition was filed before the District Judge, on behalf of Smt. Santosh Kumari and others. The District Judge by a well reasoned and detailed order dismissed the review petition. The enquiry Judge overlooked that aspect of the matter inasmuch as, when on Judicial side a person is not found to have committed an act of misconduct, how in departmental proceedings he can be removed from service.
44. There existed no evidence on the record to indicate that the questionnaire and its answer, which was filed by Smt. Savitri Devi was not at all issued by any official of the High Court. Even the official who issued the answer to the questionnaire was not produced before the enquiry Judge to substantiate that the questionnaire was genuine or a forged document. No evidence was led to prove that the said document was issued at the behest of the petitioner. There is nothing on record to indicate that any departmental proceedings were drawn against the official, who has issued the questionnaire.
45. In view of what we have indicated hereinabove, writ petition succeeds and is allowed with all consequential benefits. A writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order of punishment dated 30.4.1997 contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition, 19 issued.