Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Suresh vs Union Of India Through on 6 July, 2011
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH: NEW DELHI OA NO.218/2005 MA No.3203/2010 MA No.1352/2011 NEW DELHI THIS THE 6th DAY OF JULY, 2011 HONBLE MRS. MEERA CHHIBBER, MEMBER (J) HONBLE DR. RAMESH CHANDRA PANDA, MEMBER (A) 1. Shri Suresh, S/o Late Shri Raja Ram, R/o L-II/116A, DDA Flats, Income Tax Colony, Kalkaji, New Delhi. 2. Shri Sudeep Kr. Kandwah, R/o B-2 Fine Home Apartments, Mayur Vihar Phase-I, Delhi. 3. Shri Raj Kumar, R/o 6/381, Shastri Nagar, Bahadurgarh, Haryana. 4. Shri Chander Mohan, R/o 323-II, Income Tax Colony, Pitampura, New Delhi. 5. Smt. Pramila Rawat, R/o 460 Saraswati Vihar, Gurgaon. 6. Shri Y.R. Rathi, R/o 15/565, Piswa No.8 Jatwara, Bahadurgarh, Haryana. 7. Shri Ajit Singh Soni, R/o 121, Jahaz Appartments, Inder Enclave, Rohtak Road, New Delhi. 8. Shri Bhagwan Shah, R/o 462, I.T. Colony, Pitampura, New Delhi. 9. Shri Anand Dinesh, R/o 170, IT Colony, Pitampura, New Delhi. 10. Smt. Vijay Laxmi, R/o C-5/51, Yamuna Vihar, Delhi. 11. Smt. Sunita Gupta, R/o 118, I.T. Colony, Pitampura, New Delhi-34. 12. Shri Subba Rao, R/o C-192, Pocket-3, Bindapur Dwarka, Delhi. Applicants (By Advocate: Shri B.K. Berera) Versus 1. Union of India through, The Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Deptt. of Revenue, North Block, New Delhi. 2. The Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Deptt. of Expenditure, North Block, New Delhi. 3. The Secretary, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Deptt. of Personnel & Training, New Delhi. 4. The Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Ministry of Finance, Deptt. of Revenue, North Block, New Delhi. 5. The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Mayur Bhawan, 4th Floor, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001. Respondents. (By Advocate: Shri V.P. Uppal) : ORDER : Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda, Member (A):
We are adjudicating the issues in the present OA as this was remanded by the Honble High Court of Delhi in its order dated 22.10.2010 in WP(C) No.386/2007.
2. The Applicants herein have assailed the action of the Respondents in placing them on their promotion as Assistant in the pay scale of `5000-150-8000; they are claiming the pay scale of `5500-175-9000 which has been granted to some of the Assistants of the same office and the same cadre in the office of the Director General of Income Tax (Investigation) and are claiming pay parity with Assistants of Central Secretariat Service (CSS). It is the case of the Applicants that the petitioners in OA No.985/1993 (V.R. Panchal and Others Versus Union of India and Others), were granted pay scale of `5500-175-9000 vide the Tribunal order dated 19.01.1996. The said order of Tribunal was challenged by he Respondents before the Honble Supreme Court in SLP No.2835/1996 which was decided in upholding the Tribunal order. Ultimately, the directions of the Tribunal were implemented. The Applicants case is that they are similarly placed as those petitioners in V.R. Panchals case (supra). No doubt some of the Applicants colleagues had been placed in the revised pay scale of `5500-9000 pursuant to Tribunals orders, but the issue whether Assistants of subordinated and attached offices of the Government are entitled to such revised scale w.e.f. 1.1.86 as applicable to Assistants of Central Secretariat Service (CSS), was agitated in the Tribunal by the Applicants in the present OA which was decided on 17.07.2006 where the Tribunal adjudicated on the basis of the judgment dated 15.03.2001 of the Full Bench in OA No.1901/1999 and connected cases (MVR Rao and Others Versus Union of India and Others reported in ATJ-2002(2)-6) and conclusively held therein on 15.03.2001 that Stenographers Grade-II and Assistant of subordinates and attached offices of the Government of India are not entitled to the pay scale of `1640-2900 [revised to `5500-9000 w.e.f. 1.1.96 as per 5th CPC recommendations]. As Applicants are also Assistants working in subordinate office of Government of India, the issue relating to whom has been decided by the aforesaid Full Bench, the Tribunal did not grant the relief sought for by the Applicants in the present OA, which was dismissed. The Applicants challenged the said order of the Tribunal before the Honble High Court in the Writ Petition (C) No.386/2007. The Honble High Court vide order dated 22nd July, 2010 quashed the Tribunals order dated 17-7-2006 and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the controversy on merits keeping in mind the observations. We take the extract of the relevant parts of the judgment of Honble High Court which read as follows :-
8. The OA filed by the petitioners was however dismissed by the impugned order dated 17.7.2006 by a Division Bench of the CAT only on the ground that the Full Bench of the CAT would apply to the case of the petitioners without consideration of the merits of the claim of the petitioners. We are also informed by the respondents by a reference to the counter-affidavit that different Benches of the CAT in their own facts have applied this Full Bench judgment and that view has been upheld by this court.
9. We are thus faced with the situation where on one hand we have the judgment in V.R. Panchal & others case (surpa) as affirmed by the Supreme Court on merits albeit by a non-reasoned order in respect of Assistants of the Directorate General of Income Tax (Investigation) while on the other hand a Full Bench of the CAT has considered a reference arising from the parity claimed by Stenographers and Assistants of Subordinate and attached offices of Government of India which was answered against them which included the Assistants of Directorate of Income Tax (Income Tax and Audit) Division though not of the Investigation Division.
10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner before us has strongly canvassed the view that the petitioners cannot be treated differently from other Assistants who succeeded in V.R. Pamchal & others case (supra) and in that behalf has relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in P. Savita and others Vs. Union of India and others AIR 1985 SC 1124. The facts of the said case show that the Third Pay Commission classified the Senior Draughtsman in the Ministry of Defence and Production in two groups and recommended higher pay scale for one group not on any merit-cum-seniority basis, but only on seniority-cum-fitness basis. The work performed by both these types of draughtsman was the same with both set of Draughtsman discharging the same functions and duties. Such a grouping was held to the violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and it was observed that in the performance of the same duties of the same post there cannot be two pay scales.
11. On facts, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the presence of the Assistants of the Directorate of Income Tax (Income Tax and Audit) Division before the Full Bench cannot prejudice the case of the petitioner as there is a finding of fact in V.R. Panchal & Others case (surpa) of the task performed by the Assistants of the Investigation Division being identical to the work performed by the Assistants of the Central Secretariat Service.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand seeks to support the view taken by the CAT in the impugned order by relying on the judgment of the CAT which has found favour by this court in different proceedings in the context of different services. In the alternative, it is submitted that the impugned order has given no factual finding and has passed its judgment only on the views expressed by the Full Bench of the CAT and thus the matter should be remanded back to the CAT to be examined on merits.
We find substance in the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order could not have been passed merely on the basis of the judgment of the Full Bench of the CAT especially in view of the findings in V.R. Panchal & Others case (surpa) which stood affirmed on merits by the Supreme Court. This view was further reinforced by certain observations in the Full Bench judgment of CAT which we have referred to above where the Full Bench judgment seems to suggest that the V.R. Panchal & Others case (supra) would apply on its own facts. There has been no consideration of the comparison of duties of the Assistants in the Directorate of Income Tax Investigation Division with other Divisions like the Income Tax and Audit Division or the other non-successful petitioners before the Full Bench who were Assistants of Subordinate and attached offices of Government of India. We, thus, find that the impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
13. The next question arises as to what course of action has to thereafter follow. Taking into consideration the submissions of learned counsel for the respondent we are inclined to adopt the second course of action of remanding the matter back to the Central Administrative Tribunal. The CAT will have to examine the case of the petitioners keeping in mind specifically that V.R. Panchal & others case (supra) is in respect of the Investigation Division itself and that judgment stands affirmed by the Supreme Court on merits, although by a non-speaking order and the observations made in P. Savita & others case, would thus be relevant to the issue. It is also the case of the petitioners, which will have to be examined, that their duties are not identical to that of the Assistants in the Income Tax and Audit Division and the effect thereof.
14. The impugned order dated 17.7.2006 is accordingly set aside and the matter remanded back to the Central Administrative Tribunal to decide the controversy on merits keeping in mind our aforesaid observations. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
15. OA No.218/2005 be listed before the appropriate Bench of the CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, for directions on 9th August, 2010 and we would expect that since it is a case of remand, the CAT would decide the matter expeditiously.
3. The above judgment of Honble High Court has delineated following aspects to be considered by us in adjudicating the relief of pay pairty claimed by the Applicants. Applicability of the judgment of the Tribunal upheld by Honble Apex Court in V.R. Panchals case (supra) in the present OA; the relevance or otherwise of the observations of Honble Supreme Court in the case of P. Savita and Others (supra); and whether the duties and functions of the Applicants are identical to that of Assistants in Income Tax and Audit Division. In adjunct, we will also examine the issue of pay parity between the Assistants in Secretariat and those in Attached Offices/Subordinate Offices/ non-Secretariat Organisations.
4. In the above background, we may refer here the relief(s) sought for by the Applicants in the present OA. Those are as follows:-
1) Direct the Respondent to give the applicants the revised pay scale of Rs.5500-175-9000 With effect from the date of their appointment as Assistants as the applicants were eligible to the said pay scale from the date of the appointments as Assistants.
2) Direct the respondents to pay arrears of pay and allowance with effect from the date of their respective appointments as Assistants.
3) Direct the Respondents to modify the orders of appointments of the applicants by sanctioning the pay scale of Rs.5500-175-9000 in place of Rs.5000-150-8000.
Award cost to the applicants.
5) Pass such other orders or directions as may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice and in the circumstances of the case.
5. We heard Shri B.K. Barera, learned counsel for the Applicants. He submitted the written arguments on 2.6.2011. While highlighting the background of the case, and judgments in V.R. Panchals case (supra) passed by the Tribunal and upheld by the Honble Supreme Court, he submitted that in para 6 and 7 of the Honble High Court judgment in WP(C) No.386/2007, it was observed that the decision of the Full Bench itself had observed that ratio of V.R. Panchal and others case (supra) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on merits is applicable to its own facts i.e. Assistants in the office of Directorate General of Income Tax (Investigation) which is a post occupied by the Applicants. In the present OA, the Applicants are also Assistant in the office of Director General of Income Tax (Investigation). The Full Bench judgment being generic in nature has no application to the present case, as it has already been distinguished by the Honble High Court in its judgment in the WP(C) No.386/2007.
6. Shri Barera further submitted that the Respondents vide letter dated 15-09-2004 issued by the Joint Director of Income Tax (Inv) written to The Under Secretary, Ministry of Finance, CBDT, New Delhi gave full justification for giving higher scale to Assistants working in the Directorate. It has been stated that the sanctioned strength of Assistants in the O/o the Director General of Income Tax (Inv) New Delhi is 26, out of which 12 Assistants are getting the pay scale of `5500-9000 (one Assistant is on deputation) and the remaining 15 Assistants are getting the pay scale of `5000-8000. However, as is evident from the above 15 Assistant who are otherwise similarly placed in all other respect are drawing a lesser scale i.e. `5000-150-8000. Thus, to remove this anomaly it was requested that these 15 Assistants in the Directorate should be given the pay scale of `5500-9000. Shri Barera submits that the said letter also specifies the duties being performed by the Applicants and on the basis of which they strongly recommended to give scale of `5500-175-9000 to the Applicants to remove the anomaly. Shri Barera drew our attention to judgment of Honble Supreme Court in P. Savitas case (supra) and placed his reliance on the dicta that where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts and discharging similar duties should not be treated differently. In accordance with the said judgment of the Honble Supreme Court the Respondents cannot be allowed to create a class within a class by treating the holders of identical post and discharging similar duties to be treated differently in grant of pay scales. It is, therefore, argued that the OA should be allowed by granting the Applicants pay scales of `5500-175-9000 w.e.f. the date of promotion as Assistants in the Office of the Directorate General of Income Tax (Investigation).
7. On behalf of the Respondents Shri V.P. Uppal, learned Senior Counsel of the Government argued the case by controverting the contentions raised by Shri Barera. Respondents submitted written submission on 3.6.2011. (i) It was stated that the Applicants are Assistants in the office of DG Income Tax (Investigation) an attached office of Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance. They are claiming pay scale of `5500-175-9000 which was granted to the Assistants in DGIT (Investigation) on the basis of the plea that a few Assistants in that office have been given the said pay scale in terms of the orders passed in the case of V.R. Panchal & Ors. (supra). It is contended that in Shri M.V.R. Rao & Others case (supra), Full Bench of this Tribunal considered the issue of parity of pay scale of Assistants in the Subordinate and attached offices with the Assistants of CSS and dismissed the claim on the grounds that appointing authorities are different and Assistants nature of duties and responsibilities were qualitatively and quantitatively dissimilar. Based on the decision of the Full Bench, OA No.12026/1999 and OA No.1278/1999 filed by the Assistants of the same office were dismissed. (ii) Shri Uppal would contend that the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in V.R. Panchals case (supra), though mentioned about the dismissal of SLP on merits, but the same being a non-speaking and non-reasoned judgment, would not have binding effect in subsequent cases including the present OA. In this connection, he placed his reliance on the judgments of Honble Supreme Court in Govt. of India Versus Workmen of State Trading Corporation [1997(11) SCC page 641] where it was held that when neither facts nor reasons are stated in earlier order of the Supreme Court such an order was not a binding precedent. In State of U.P. Versus Synthetic & Chemicals [1991 (4) SCC 139] it was held that if facts and reasons were not given, such orders would not be a binding precedent. In this context, Shri Uppal submitted that had the Honble High Court considered the decision in V.R.Panchals case (supra) as a binding precedent, the High Court would have allowed the OA and there was no question of remanding back the case to the Tribunal for examining duties and responsibilities of Assistant working in the office of D.G.I.T. (iii) Shri Uppal referring to the judgment of 5 Member Full Bench of this Tribunal in M.V.R. Raos case (supra), submitted that the Honble High Court of Delhi has upheld the judgment of the Full Bench of the Tribunal while deciding CWP No.2344/99 and number of LPAs by their order dated 31st May, 2002 (DG,ESI Corporation Versus All India ESIC Employees Federation) . Based on these decisions, a number of other Writ Petition like CWP No.3091 of 1999 were dismissed by the Honble High Court on 26.11.2008. It is noticed that the question of parity of pay scales of Assistants of public sector Undertakings with the pay scales of Assistants of CSS was the issue before the High Court, where it noted the judgment of the Full Bench of the Tribunal more specifically the question of parity of pay scales of Assistants of Subordinate office vis-`-vis the Assistants in the C.S.S. and upheld the orders of the Full Bench. He further contended that the recommendation of 5th CPC maintained that the pay scales of the subordinate office should be lower than those in the Secretariat office. Even the 6th CPC has maintained the pay differentials. The same issue was also examined in Civl Writ No.102 of 2001 Mohinder Pal Singh Versus UOI in two other Writs decided on 11th July, 2002 and Honble High Court upheld the pay disparity of Assistants working in the CSS vis-`-vis their counterparts in the subordinate and attached offices. (iv) He further submits that there are large number of judgments of Honble Supreme Court with regard to the various factors that are to be taken into account while considering the question of parity of pay scale. He referred to he judgment in Union of India Vs. Tarit Ranjan Das (2004(1) SCSLJ-47) to state that equality cannot be claimed merely on the basis of designation or the nature of work alone- other factors like, responsibilities, reliabilities, experience, confidentiality involved, functional need and requirements commensurate with the position in the hierarchy, the qualifications required are relevant factors to be considered while allowing the claim for equal pay for equal work., He placed his reliance on the judgment of three judge Bench of Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana Versus Charanjit Singh reported in 2006(1) SCSLJ pages 1-12, where, after analyzing number of cases, it was held that even though persons would do the same work, their quality of work would differ. The judgment quoted by him relates to Govt. of West Bengal Versus Tarun K. Roy, [(2004) 1 SCC 347], a three judge Bench of Honble Supreme Court considered the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in the following terms : Article 14 read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India envisages the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The said doctrine, however, does not contemplate that only because the nature of the work is same irrespective of an educational qualification or irrespective of their source of recruitment or other relevant considerations the said doctrine would be automatically applied. One of the later judgments of the Honble Supreme Court [State of Punjab Versus Surjit Singh and Others (AISLJ-IV-2010-403] has reiterated the decision in earlier cases that experience, process of recruitment, qualifications, quality of work, nature of work, functions, responsibilities etc. are all relevant to decide on equal pay for equal work. (v) Our attention was drawn to the short reply filed by the Respondents on 18.4.2011 to submit that the Assistant in CSS is Non-Gazetted Group B post whereas the Assistants in the Directorate are Non-Gazetted Group C posts. Assistants in the CSS have the duties to contribute in the policy making whereas Assistants in the Directorate look after the duties in the subjects assigned to the Directorate which are not policy matters. He also indicates that the method of recruitment and promotion avenues are different for both Assistants in the CSS and Directorate. IT should be noted that there is no common element not only in regard to duties and responsibilities but also in regard to all other aspects stated in the short counter. (vi) It is contended that the Applicants next post of promotion is Senior Technical Assistant which is in the pay scale of `1640-2900 (pre-revised) and thereafter Technical Research Assistants (`2000-3200) while in the case of Assistants in the CSS the next promotion is to the post of Section Officer which is in the pay scale of `2000-3500 (old pay scale). Shri Uppal, therefore, states that in case the pay scale of `5500-9000 is granted to the Applicants it would tantamount to placing holders of lower as well as the higher posts in the same pay scale which would be treating dissimilar persons similarly and would be directly violative of Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. In fact there would be cascading effect as there would be demand from the holder of Senior Technical Assistant and Technical Research Assistant for upward revision of their pay scales. In this connection, Shri Uppal places his reliance on the observation of Honble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Versus Pratip Kumar Dey [2000 (8) SCC 580] . In view of his above contentions, Shri Uppal submits that the OA should be dismissed with costs awarded to the Respondents.
8. Having heard the above contentions of the parties, we perused the pleadings as well. We also studied the relevant judgments relied on and referred to the parties.
9. Honble High Court of Delhi, while remitting this OA for our adjudication, have flagged three issues to be considered and determined. Those are : (i) whether the judgment of this Tribunal in V.R. Panchal and Others case (supra) affirmed by the Honble Supreme Court has binding effect in the present case? (ii) Whether the observations made by Honble Supreme Court in P. Savita and Otherss case (supra) would be relevant to the issue in this present OA. (iii) Whether the duties and responsibilities of the Applicants [Assistants in the Directorate of Income Tax (Investigation)] are comparable with those of the Assistants in the CSS and other Divisions like Income Tax and Audit Division. The specific issue in this point (iii) is whether the duties of Assistants in Secretariat Offices are comparable with the dues of Assistants in the Subordinate Offices and attached Offices?
10. Whether the decision in V R Panchal's case (supra) is binding in the current OA or not is the main issue. Arguments were advanced for and against by the rival parties. The Honourable Supreme Court considered the appeal of the Union of India against the common order passed by this Tribunal on 19-1-1996 in 3 OAs (OA No.144A/1993, OA No.985/1993 and OA No.548/1994 titled as V R Panchal and Others Versus Union of India). In OA No.985/1993, the Applicants were the Assistants in the office of the Director General of Income Tax (an attached office of CBDT Department of Revenue) who claimed pay parity with the Assistants in the CSS. It was stated by the Respondents that the pay scale of Assistants was revised in the OM dated 31.07.1990 with effect from 1.1.1986 and were given pay scale of `1640-2900 and Applicants in the OA continued to get `1400-2600. It was of course known to the Tribunal that the classification, method of recruitment, nature of duties and responsibilities and promotion to higher posts were different for the Assistants in CSS and attached offices. Considering the historical pay parity the Tribunal came to the following conclusion :
In the case before us, Assistants in the Driectorates attached to CBDT and Assistants in CSS were in the same scale prior to issue of OM dated 31.7.90. Thus, for more than 4 decades since establishment of the Directorate, all the previous Pay Commissions till the 4th PC the parity of the pay scales between the two were maintained. There is nothing on record to show that after recommendation of the 4th PC. Which was accepted by the Govt. any new developments occurred to create differentiation between the status of the Assistants working in the Directorates attached to CBDT and that of CSS. The OM dated 31.7.90 has, thus, created disparity between the two and, therefore, the order dated 4/9.12.92 refusing the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900/- to the applicants cannot be sustained on the ground of discrimination.
29. In our view, therefore, the present applicants are entitled to the scales of Rs.1640-2900/- at par with the Assistants in the CSS. After considering the facts in all 3 OAs, the Tribunal passed the orders in following terms :-
33. The applicants till the year 1975, were participating in the CSS/CSSS and were discharging their duties of Stenographers Grade II and Assistants in the same manner as those of Stenographers and Assistants in the CSS/CSSS. It has been asserted in para 4.7 of the OA that the Job contents of the Stenographers Grade II and the Assistants in the DFP was absolutely the same as in the comparable departments. It has been further asserted that status and responsibilities of the applicants in the DFP is in no way inferior than in any of the comparable posts in the CSS. This fact too has not been denied in the reply. Thus, as regards work, duties and responsibilities of the applicants vis-`-vis their counter parts in the CSS/CSSS are concerned, is not in dispute that they are comparable.
34. The point that there is no provision for direct recruitment on the basis of open competition, has already been discussed and found not sustainable, in our discussions in the earlier OAs above.
35. The other point is that pay scale of Stenographers Grade-II of DFP was only Rs.425-70/- whereas those of CSSS was Rs.425-800. It is not disputed that the scale of Rs.425-700/- was revised to Rs.1400-2300/-, but the scale of Stenographers Grade II of DFP was subsequently revised to Rs.1400-2600/- by OM dated 4.5.90 w.e.f. 1.1.86. Thus, the benefit of the scale of Rs.1400-2600/- was made available to Stenographer Grade Ii of DFP w.e.f. 1.1.1986. The reason for doing so has not been brought on record. Whatever may reason, the government in its own wisdom thought it proper to bring the Stenographers Grade-II of DFP at par with CSSS. However, by the impugned order dated 31.7.90 different scale was given to CSS and Stenographer Grade-II of some other departments. The ground mentioned in the OM dated 31.7.90 for putting CSSS in a higher pay scale has not been found tenable, in view of various apex Court judgments, but the Tribunal in various cases. In the present case before us, we are of the view that the case of the applicants who are working as Assistants and Stenographers Grade-II in the DFP cannot be discriminated.
36. The third point that since 5th PC has been announced by the Government and the matter will be taken up with them, the applicants should wait till the recommendations of the 5th PC is also not tenable. The applicants are claiming parity w.e.f. 1.1.1986. The Government has, after, putting the applicants at par with CSS/CSSS created a discrimination by issue of OM dated 31.7.90 and hence this matter can be well decided by this Tribunal
37. In view of our discussions made above, all the three OAs are allowed and the respondents of the respective OAs are directed place the scale of Rs.1640-2900/- but this payment of arrears would be limited to one year prior to date of filing of the respective OAs. However, the fixation of pay will be effective w.e.f. 1.1.1986. If any of the applicant, has, in the meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, retired he will be given consequential benefits thereof. The order and directions given in the case shall be complied with by the Respondents within a period of two months w.e.f. the date of communication of this order. And the Union of India challenged the above order before the Honourable Apex Court in the SLP No.2835/1996 which was decided on 11-7-1996 as follows:
"Delay condoned.
The Special leave petition is dismissed on merits."
11. The orders passed by the Tribunal and upheld by the Honourable Apex Court in the above manner was implemented. The contention of the Learned counsel for the Applicants is that they being similarly placed and circumstanced as the Applicants in VR Panchal and others' case (supra), they should have been granted same pay scale even if they did not approach this Tribunal.The logic shown in their favour is that the above judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court is binding on the Respondents. This contention is very strongly contested by the counsel of the Respondents on the sole ground that the said non speaking judgment of the Honble Apex Court may be binding qua the petitioners of the case in V.R. Panchal and others (supra) but cannot be a judicial precedent to be followed in case of the Applicants in the present OA.
12. In the background of the above controversy as to whether the above decision of Honble Apex Court will have binding effect, we may refer here to the judgements of the Honourable Supreme Court in the subject.
13. The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Synthetics and Chemicals Limited [1991-4 -SCC -139]held that conclusion not preceded by reasoning or rationale, such conclusions cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as contemplated under Article 141 of the Costitution of India. On the binding nature of the judgments Honourable Apex Court extensively discussed in many other cases also .In Govt. of India Versus Workmen of State Trading Corporation [AIR-1999- SC-1532]the Honourable Supreme Court, considering the appeal by the Government of India against the order passed by the Honourable High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No. 3949 of 1990 whereby it was directed to continue the services of the employees of the Leather Garment unit of the State Trading Corporation, who were terminated on the closure of the unit on the same terms and conditions either in the Government Department or in the Government Corporations within three months and in passing this order, the Honourable High Court of Madras based its decision on Honourable Supreme Court's order in G. Govinda Rajulu Versus Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited (AIR 1987 SC 1801), in which a brief order was made, held that the decision of the Supreme Court is virtually a non-speaking order which did not set out the facts and the circumstances in which the direction came to be issued against the Government and the decision on which the High Court had relied could not be treated as a binding precedent.
14. Further, a Constitution Bench Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Krishena Kumar versus Union of India and others (AIR 1990 SC 1782 )the contours of binding precedent and ratio decidendi was laid in the following manner:
"18. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "propositions wider than the case itself required." This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker's Trustees (1882 (7) AC 259) and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (502). Sir Frederick Pollock has also said: "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision."
19. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge - made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury, 4th Edn., Vol. 26, para 573:
"The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgement and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reason than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.""
Honble Apex Court had held in its judgment in the matter of State of H.P. Versus Manoj Kumar [2008-13-SCC-654] that even in court pronouncements and orders reasons to arrive at the decision should be given. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below:
Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The inscrutable face of a sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
15. In view of the above judgments of the Honble Apex Court on the issue of binding precedent/effect of the judgments, we are in agreement with the contentions of the Respondents. It is well neigh evident that the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in V.R. Panchals case (supra) in the SLP No.2835/1996 is not a binding precedent to follow. In case of the judgment of this Tribunal in V.R. Panchals case (supra), it is noted that a 5 Member Full Bench of this Tribunal in Shri M.V.R. Raos case (supra) has considered the issue of pay parity claims of the Assistants of subordinate and attached offices of Government of India with the Assistants working in the Central Secretariat Service; has taken into account the decision of the Tribunal in V.R. Panchals case (supra); many rulings of Honble Supreme Court on equal pay for equal work for their guidance and concluded in the following terms :-
38. Again in Association of AIC & CE Stenographers Vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 1291 the Honble Supreme Court has held that equal pay for equal work is a fundamental right, but equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done and cannot be judged by the more volume of work, because there may be qualitative differences regarding reliability and responsibility. Often the difference may be a matter of degree and there is an element of value judgment in fixing the pay and other conditions of service, but so long as such value judgment is bonafide, reasonable and based on an intelligible criteria which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation such differentiation would not amount to discrimination.
39. Lastly, we place on record the following further observations made in P.K.Deys case (supra) It is an indisputable fact that the pay scales now claimed by the respondent (P.K. Dey) are those prescribed for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector. As already noticed above, it is once again a promotional post for a Naik. Acceding to the claim made by the respondent would not merely result in change in the pay scales but may also lead to alternation of the pattern of hierarchy requiring re-orientation and restructuring of the other posts above and below the post of respondent. Added to this, such consequences are likely to be felt in the various other Central Police Establishments as well. All these which are likely to have a chain reaction, may require further consideration afresh by expert body like the Pay Commission of the Government itself at an appropriate time in an appropriate manner. Courts should normally leave such matters for the widom of administration except the proven cases of hostile discrimination. But in the case on hand, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law stated above, the Division Bench of the High Court was not right in granting the relief itself, straightraway to the respondent; that too, without examining the implications and impact of giving such directions on other cadres. However, we make it clear that the rejection of the claim of the respondent need not been taken as an issue closed once and for all. It is always open to the Government to consider the issue either by making preference to the Pay Commission or itself once again as to the grant of pay scales to the respondent. It is open to the respondent to make further and detailed representation.
40. In the present case also we have already noticed that grant of the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 w.e.f. 1.1.86 and its corresponding replacement scale of Rs.5500-9000 w.e.f. 1.1.96 to the applicants in the present O.As, which is the scale admissible for promotional posts of Stenographers Grade I, would be tantamount to placing holders of the lower as well as the higher posts in the same pay scale of pay, which would be treating dissimilar persons similarly, and would be directly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
41. In the results the reference is answered in the negative.
16. The above decision of the Tribunal inter alia was taken into account by the Honble Delhi High Court in a batch of 3 Writ Petitions in the matter of Mohinder Pal Singh and Others (supra) and dismissed the claim of pay parity of the petitioners. In Writ Petition No.3091/1999, the Union of India appealed against the orders dated 28.9.2008 of this Tribunal in OA No.527/1997 on the same issue before the Honble High Court of Delhi which was decided on 26.11.2008 by setting aside the Tribunal order on the basis of the judgment in Mahender Pal Singh and Others case (supra). In view of the fact that the Full Bench decision of this Tribunal having been upheld by the Honble High Court, the judgment in M.V.R. Raos case is the binding precedent.
17. Now, we may advert to the second issue : Whether the observations made by Honble Apex Court in the case of P. Savita and Others (supra) would be relevant to the present OA. Before we examine the legal issue of pay parity, it is apt for us to take into our account the facts of the case. The Honourable Apex Court considered the issue of equal pay for equal work in P. Savita and Others Versus Union of India and Others [AIR-1985 - SC -1124], where it was observed that pay differentiation was not based on any intelligible ground. The group of Draughtsmen entitled to the higher scale of pay, were not selected by any process nor was it based on any merit-cum- seniority basis, but was based only on seniority-cum-fitness. There was no denial anywhere that both these types of Draughtsmen did the same work and discharged the same functions and duties. According to the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission, a Draughtsman has to get Rs. 330-10-380-EB- 12-500-EB- 15-560, while Senior Draughtsman, like the appellants, who have become so on promotion, will continue to get the same scale of pay and not the higher scale of pay. In other words, the promoted persons like the appellants, are without any monetary benefit to them. The pay that they would get as Senior Draughtsman, would be the same as a Draughtsman would get under the Third Pay Commission. That is, for the same work and same functions, the appellants would get less pay than the other group of Senior Draughtsmen. The explanation is that this division is based on seniority was not accepted as sufficient to meet the requirements of law. It is the classification of the Senior Draughtsmen into two groups, that is responsible for the higher pay. For this classification, the Government must be able to satisfy the Court of certain other tests which are non-existent, in this case, since it is not in dispute that Senior Draughtsmen, belonging to the two Divisions, do equal and same work. In view of the total absence of any plea on the side of the respondents, that the Senior Draughtsmen who are placed in the advantageous group, do not perform duties more onerous or different from the works performed by the appellants it was held that this grouping violated Art. 14 of the Constitution Honourable Supreme Court observed that "With respect we agree with the conclusion arrived at in the above judgment, that where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts and discharging similar duties should not be treated differently."
In our considered opinion the decision in P.Savita and Others case is clearly distinguishable. It is noted that the above case has facts far different from the present OA. It is the executive created a class within the class senior to get higher pay scale whereas juniors in the same grade will get lower pay scale. In the present OA, the issue is not on the grounds of junior or senior, the case is one group of Assistants by virtue of judicial pronouncements have received pay scale which has been denied to the Applicants as the said judgment is not binding and the judgment of the Full Bench of the Tribunal holds the field.
18. We may also refer to other judgments of Honble Surpeme Court to get guidance of legally well settled position in the matters of pay parity, historical parity of pay scales and equal pay for equal work. Equal pay for equal work has assumed the status of fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as held by Honble Supreme Court in Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union Versus Union of India, [(1991) 1 SCC 619], and also Union of India Versus Dineshan K.K., [(2008) 1 SCC 586] and State of Kerala Versus B. Renjith Kumar [(2008) 12 SCC 219]. However, as observed by the Honble Apex Court in State of Orissa Versus Balaram Sahu [(2003) 1 SCC 250] pay parity would depend upon not only on the nature or volume of work but also on quality of work as regards the reliability and responsibility as well. Different pay scales may be prescribed on the basis of such reliability and responsibility. This ratio has also been reiterated by Honble Apex Court in State of Bihar Versus Bihar State Plus-2 Lecturers Assns.,[(2008) 7 SCC 231].
19. Moreover, in S.C. Chandra and Others Versus State of Jharkhand and Others [2007-8-SCC-279], the Honourable Supreme Court has exhaustibly dealt with the issue of pay parity and powers of the Courts and Tribunal to interfere in the matters of pay fixation and if so on what grounds. It is appropriate for us to take extract of the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment 15. The principle of equal pay for equal work was propounded by this Court in certain decisions in the 1980s, e.g. Dhirendra Chamoli and another vs. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637, Surinder Singh vs. Engineer-in-Chief, C.P.W.D. (1986) 1 SCC 639, Randhir Singh vs. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 etc. This was done by applying Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution. Thus, in Dhirendra Chamoli's case (supra) this Court granted to the casual, daily rated employees the same pay scale as regular employees.
16. It appears that subsequently it was realized that the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work was creating havoc. All over India different groups were claiming parity in pay with other groups e.g. Government employees of one State were claiming parity with Government employees of another State.
17. Fixation of pay scale is a delicate mechanism which requires various considerations including financial capacity, responsibility, educational qualification, mode of appointment, etc. and it has a cascading effect. Hence, in subsequent decisions of this Court the principle of equal pay for equal work has been considerably watered down, and it has hardly ever been applied by this Court in recent years.
18. Thus, in State of Haryana vs. Tilak Raj (2003) 6 SCC 123, it was held that the principle can only apply if there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups. Even if the employees in the two groups are doing identical work they cannot be granted equal pay if there is no complete and wholesale identity, e.g., a daily rated employee may be doing the same work as a regular employee, yet he cannot be granted the same pay scale. Similarly, two groups of employees may be doing the same work, yet they may be given different pay scales if the educational qualifications are different. Also, pay scale can be different if the nature of jobs, responsibilities, experience, method of recruitment, etc. are different.
19. In State of Haryana and others vs. Charanjit Singh and others (2006) 9 SCC 321, discussing a large number of earlier decisions it was held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court that the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot apply unless there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups. Moreover, even for finding out whether there is complete and wholesale identity, the proper forum is an expert body and not the writ court, as this requires extensive evidence. A mechanical interpretation of the principle of equal pay for equal work creates great practical difficulties. Hence in recent decisions the Supreme Court has considerably watered down the principle of equal pay for equal work and this principle has hardly been ever applied in recent decisions.
20. In State of Haryana & another vs. Tilak Raj & others (2003) 6 SCC 123, the Supreme Court considered the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in the context of daily wagers of the Haryana Roadways. After taking note of a series of earlier decisions the Supreme Court observed:
"A scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily wager, he holds no post. The respondent workers cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and allowances. To claim a relief on the basis of equality, it is for the claimants to substantiate a clear cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination before becoming eligible to claim rights on a par with the other group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination. No material was placed before the High Court as to the nature of duties of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is an abstract one.
'Equal pay for equal work' is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula".
21. In State of U.P. and others vs. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh, AIR 1998 SC 303, the Supreme Court observed that even if persons holding the same post are performing similar work but if the mode of recruitment, qualification, promotion etc. are different it would be sufficient for fixing different pay scale. Where the mode of recruitment, qualification and promotion are totally different in the two categories of posts, there cannot be any application of the principle of equal pay for equal work.
22. In State of Haryana vs. Jasmer Singh and others AIR 1997 SC 1788, the Supreme Court observed that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not always easy to apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work of different persons in different organizations. Persons doing the same work may have different degrees of responsibilities, reliabilities and confidentialities, and this would be sufficient for a valid differentiation. The judgment of the administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities, which attach to the post, and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally was not open to interference by the court.
23. In Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers (Recognized) and others vs. Union of India and others AIR 1988 SC 1291, this Court observed :
"In this case the differentiation has been sought to be justified in view of the nature and the types of the work done, that is, on intelligible basis. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less, it varies from nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula".
24. It may be mentioned that granting pay scales is a purely executive function and hence the Court should not interfere with the same. It may have a cascading effect creating all kinds of problems for the Government and authorities. Hence, the Court should exercise judicial restraint and not interfere in such executive function vide Indian Drugs & Pharmacheuticals Ltd. vs. Workmen, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 408.
25. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution, and the judiciary should not ordinarily encroach into the executive or legislative domain. The theory of separation of powers, first propounded by the French philosopher Montesquieu in his book and the Spirit of Laws' still broadly holds the field in India today. Thus, in Asif Hameed vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [AIR 1989 SC 1899] a three Judge bench of this Court observed (vide paragraphs 17 to 19) :
"17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look on the inter se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognized under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State. Legislature, executive and judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and executive, the two facets of people's will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self imposed discipline of judicial restraint.
.
19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers."
26. In our opinion fixing pay scales by Courts by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high Constitutional principle of separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Realizing this, this Court has in recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups (and there too the matter should be sent for examination by an expert committee appointed by the Government instead of the Court itself granting higher pay).
27. It is well settled by the Supreme Court that only because the nature of work is the same, irrespective of educational qualification, mode of appointment, experience and other relevant factors, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot apply vide Government of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy and others (2004) 1 SCC 347.
28. Similarly, in State of Haryana and another vs. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association (2002) 6 SCC 72, the principle of equal pay for equal work was considered in great detail. In paragraphs 9 & 10 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed that equation of posts and salary is a complex matter which should be left to an expert body. The Courts must realize that the job is both a difficult and time consuming task which even experts having the assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found it difficult to undertake. Fixation of pay and determination of parity is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. Granting of pay parity by the Court may result in a cascading effect and reaction which can have adverse consequences vide Union of India and others vs. Pradip Kumar Dey (2000) 8 SCC 580.
20. Guided by the law set in various judgments of the Honble Apex court, we would like to identify the principles which run through those judgments on the pay parity controversy. Those are as follows:-
(a) pay scale fixation is purely executive function and courts and Tribunals should not direct in fixing pay scales;
(b) the principle of equal pay for equal work should not be applied unless there is a complete and wholesale identity between the two groups;
(c) even to find out the wholesale and complete identity, the best forum is an expert body like Pay Commission;
(d) the Pay Commission which goes into at great depth on the pay anomalies and the issues of pay parity undertake in depth examination from various angles with full facts on the issues, is the appropriate authority to decide such matters;
(e) it is the claimants of equality to substantiate the basis of equivalence and resultant discrimination;
(f) even if the persons holding same post doing similar work but if the mode of recruitment, qualification, promotion etc. are different, pay parity would not be admissible; and
(g) persons doing the same work in different organizations may have different responsibilities, reliability, confidentiality which are sufficient reasons for pay disparity;
21. In view of well settled legal position on the issue of pay parity, we are of the considered opinion that the observation of Honble Apex Court in P. Savita and Others case (supra) does not come to support of the Applicants in the present OA.
22. In view of the discussions and conclusions arrived earlier on two issues, we now take up the third issue, namely, whether duties and responsibilities of the Applicants are comparable with those of the Assistants in the CSS and other Divisions like Income Tax and Audit Division of the Respondents? It is appropriate for us to mention that Assistant post exists in Central Secretariat, its subordinate and attached Offices. Recruitment of Assistants in all these three places vary as the Assistants in CSS are recruited through competitive examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) whereas recruitment to the attached and subordinate offices are not conducted by UPSC. Further, promotion in Revenue Department for the Assistants belonging to the CSS is to the grade of Section Officer whereas in case of the Assistants in the Directorate of Income Tax (Investigation), their immediate promotion is to the level of Senior Technical Assistant followed by further promotion to the grade of Technical Research Assistant. It is noted that the disparity in pay structure has been continuing since the 5th CPC and even in the 6th CPC has continued. The duties and responsibilities of the Applicants are basically non policy and based on Divisions specific duties whereas the Assistants in the CSS have the functions to assist directly the Under Secretaries and other Officers on policy matters. Assistants in CSS discharge arduous duties. There is clear distinction that exists in the duties and functions of the categories of Assistants belonging to Secretariat offices and attached/subordinate offices. The same has been taken note by this Tribunal while deciding the M.R.V. Raos case (surpa) by the 5 Member Full Bench. In this context, it is appropriate for us to note that 6th CPC has clearly recognized the distinction between the Secretariat office on one side and Attached and Subordinate Offices on the other.
23. In view of the above legal setting on pay parity and equal pay for equal work, it is noted that 6th CPC has already considered the issue raised by the Applicants and the 6th Central Pay Commission has recommended two distinct and exclusive pay scales and grade pay.
24. It is trite law that pay fixation is a complex matter, the best authority to analyze and fix the pay is the Pay Commission. Further, it is legally well settled that even if the persons doing the same work having the same nomenclature like PSs, ASOs, Stenographers and Assistants, the pay parity need not be admissible as their recruitment, educational qualification, experience, promotion prospects, responsibilities, reliability and confidentiality matters which they may be handling would be different from other groups. These are sufficient reasons to maintain pay disparity between two groups even with same designation. In the present case, we find that the pay disparity which started earlier was continued in the 5th CPC. Even the 6th CPC has allowed the disparity between the Assistants working in the Secretariat and the Attached/Subordinate Offices. It is noted that the Chapter 3.1 of the 6th CPC recommendation dealt very comprehensively the issues brought before it on the subject of disparity between Secretariat and Field Offices. The role and responsibilities of the Secretariat and Field Officers have been identified to be different. Parity of certain posts, disparity in other posts, anomaly in pay scale have been analysed in Para 3.1.7 and the 6th CPC has given its recommendations in Para 3.1.8 to 3.1.15. Para 3.1.9 provides the pay structure of LDC to Director levels in the Secretariat in Pay bands and grade pay whereas Para 3.1.14 gives the pay structure for non-Secretariat Organisation. We perused Swamys Compilation of 6th CPC Report (Part I pages 141 to 147 ) and Swamys Manual on Office Procedure 2006 and 2009. In the definition Chapter at entry 53, Secretariat Offices are defined as those which are responsible for formulation of the policies of the Government and also for the execution and review of those policies. As per this definition, the Organisations viz DGIT (Investigation) where the Applicants are working cannot be termed as Secretariat. On the contrary, the Non-Secretariat Organisations where the Applicants are working are either attached offices or subordinate offices. The attached offices connotes that such offices are generally responsible for providing executive direction required in the implementation of the policies laid down by the department to which they are attached. They also serve as repository of technical information and advise the department on technical aspects of question dealt with by them. The meaning of subordinate offices signifies that these function as field establishments or as agencies responsible for the detailed execution of the policies of Government. They function under the direction of an attached office or directly under a department. Having examined the definitional aspects and the averments made by the Respondents, we are of the opinion that there exist distinction in the works, functions and responsibilities between the Secretariat and non-Secretariat Organisation. If there is functional dissimilarities, there is bound to be financial disparity in pay and allowances.
25. In view of the above analyses and the reasons given, we come to the considered conclusion that there exists dis- similarities of duties and responsibilities of the Applicants compared to the functions and responsibilities and duties of the Assistants in CSS. Therefore, on this score, we find that the Applicants failed to convince us in interfering in the matters of pay parity claimed by them in the OA.
26. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and having been guided by the settled position in law with regard to the pay parity and more specifically guided by the Full Bench judgment of this Tribunal in M.V.R. Raos case, (supra) we come to considered conclusion that the judgment of this Tribunal in V.R. Panchal & Others case (supra) upheld by Honble Supreme Court would not be applicable for the Applicants in the present OA and the said judgment would be applicable only for the petitioners in V.R. Panchal and Otherss case (supra) and on the other hand the facts of the present OA are fully covered by the decision of this Tribunal in M.V.R. Raos case (supra). We are also of the considered opinion that the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in P. Savita and Otherss case (supra) being of the year 1985 and subsequently, the law on the issues of equal pay for equal work and pay parity having been developed by the Honble Supreme Court which has been discussed by us within and in view of the latest position, we are of the opinion that judgment of Honble Supreme Court in P. Savita and Others is clearly distinguishable for the present OA. We are also of the opinion that duties and responsibilities of the Applicants being dis-similar to those of the Assistants in CSS, the pay parity claimed by the Applicant in the present OA would not be applicable.
27. In view of the above reasons, the Original Application being devoid of merits is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.
( Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda ) ( Mrs. Meera Chhibber )
Member (A) Member (J)
/rk/