Allahabad High Court
Sukh Dev Prasad Puri vs Canara Bank And Others on 23 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(4)AWC2735, [2001]107COMPCAS270(ALL), AIR 2000 ALLAHABAD 97, 2000 ALL. L. J. 816, 2000 A I H C 2797, 2000 (2) CIVILCOURTC 172, 1999 (4) ALL WC 2735, 2001 (107) COM CAS 270, 2000 (1) BANKCLR 48, (2000) 1 BANKCLR 48, (1999) 4 ALL WC 2735, (2000) 2 CIVILCOURTC 172, (2001) 107 COMCAS 270
Author: S.K. Jain
Bench: S.K. Jain
JUDGMENT Palok Basil, J.
1. In the instant First Appeal, the Intricacies involved in civil litigations perhaps stand stretched to the farthest and the point for determination is whether Kothi No. (Old 3) New 4/114-C, Civil Lines, Bagh Farzana, Agra (hereinafter referred to as the disputed property) could be proceeded against in execution of the ex parte decree dated 30.4.1979 arising out of the Original Suit No. 20 of 1977, Canara Bank v. M/s. Modern Tin Printers and others, for recovery of Rs. 2.12.622.64 p. because the said execution is being resisted by the appellant Sukhdev Prasad Puri on the ground that the disputed property has been purchased by him in an auction sale held on 30.10.1985 by the Additional Collector, Agra, in proceedings for realisation of sales-tax dues then pending against the said Firm M/s. Modern Tin Printers and Fabricators, Agra. The Judgment prepared by Hon'ble S. K. Jain. J. In so far as it dismisses the appeal is respectfully concurred, but for the added reasons set out by this Court hereunder.
2. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Advocate for the appellant has argued the matter at length while Sri U. N. Sharma has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 14. Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava has appeared for Canara Bank. Sadar Bazar Branch. Agra, it may be pointed out that before the F.A.F.O. could be admitted, the respondents put in appearance through a caveat' and consequently on 7.11.1998, the appellant's counsel was provided time to file an affidavit bringing on record the necessary facts for effective disposal of the appeal it self and consequently, a supplementary affidavit sworn by Y. K. Sharma was filed by the appellant. The execution of the order of the Court below was stayed until further orders.
3. In order to resolve the controversy between the parties noted above, facts have to be clearly delineated.
4. M/s. Modern Tin Printers and Fabricators, Agra. named as respondent No. 3 in this F.A.F.O. along with which respondent No. 2 and Nos. 4 to 14 appeared to be presently associated (hereinafter referred to as the Firm), were the defendants in Suit No. 20 of 1977 filed by the Canara Bank. As per the statement of account, a sum of Rs. 2,12,622.64 p. was due against the Firm and consequently the said suit was filed by the Canara Bank for recovery of the aforesaid amount with pendents life and future interest at the agreed rate of 16-1/2% per annum. A true copy of the plaint is Annexure-3 to the supplementary affidavit, referred to above. Apart from the named Firm M/s. Modern Tin Printers, Deepak Kumar Wadhera Pramod Kumar Nanda, Vinod Kumar Nanda, Yashoda Devi Puri and Nirmal Nanda are the defendants by name in the suit having been shown as partners of the said Firm. The said suit was decreed on 30.4.1979 by the Second Additional Civil Judge. Agra, for the sum of Rs. 2.12,622.64 p. (Annexure-2 to the supplementary affidavit). Only one more factual aspect may be mentioned here that is that Dharam Pal Singh, respondent No. 2 in this F.A.F.O. is the purchaser of the disputed property in the auction which was conducted by the Amin on 17.8.1998 in pursuance of the orders of the executing court who deposited 1/4th amount at the auction sate and 3/4th amount on 24.10.1998. The executing court had fixed 13.11.1998 for confirmation of the sale which was so ordered on the application of the sale purchaser Dharam Pal Singh moved on 30.10.1998.
5. The appellant's objections under Order XXI, Rule 90. C.P.C. were filed before the executing court on 16.9.1998 through which it was prayed that the auction sale held on 17.8.1998 in pursuance of the execution proceedings in the Original Suit No. 20 of 1977 giving rise to Execution Case No. 19 of 1980 which came to be numbered as Misc. Case No. 68 of 1998. be set aside.
6. It is admitted position that the Firm was adjudged as being in arrears of the sales tax dues and open public auction was held on 4.9,1995 in which the appellant bid highest by offering Rs. 2,40,000 for the disputed property which offer was accepted at the auction and subsequently confirmed by the Commissioner, Agra Division. Agra, on 21.10.1985. The sale certificate was consequently issued on 31.10.1985 by the Additional District Magistrate in favour of the appellant regarding the sale of and purchase by the appellant of the disputed property.
7. It may be mentioned here that Canara Bank moved an application for attachment before judgment of the disputed property and by specific order of the trial court dated 7.11.1977, the disputed property was attached before judgment and as stated above, the suit itself was decreed on 30.4.1979. whereafter the Bank started Execution Case No. 19 of 1980 on 12.12.1980.
8. The remaining factual development which has become the genesis for the bone of contention between the parties to this litigation is that the execution proceedings started on 12.12.1980 as Execution Case No. 19 of 1980 was dismissed in default on 15.2.1985. Restoration Case No. 22 of 1985 was filed by the Canara Bank on 12.3.1985, i.e., within the time allowed by law and executing Court passed an ofder on 18.7.1986 restoring the execution case to its original number.
9. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Canara Bank had filed a writ petition in this Court being W.P. No. 651 of 1986 whereby the Bank challenged the proceedings initiated by the Sales Tax Department for selling the disputed property for recovery of the arrears of the sales tax. This writ petition was dismissed summarily on 15.5.1986. A true copy of the order was filed, relevant portion of which reads as under :
"The petitioner is the Canara Bank, it has advanced a loan to certain private parties. It was proceeding to recover the Joan through the civil court. As against the person to whom the Bank had advanced the loan, sales tax was due and the Sales Tax Department was also proceeding against them as arrears of land revenue.
We cannot accept the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the dues of the Bank have priority over the dues recoverable by the Sales Tax Department.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed."
10. In this very connection. It was further pointed out that Canara Bank thereafter filed an Original Suit No. 1445 of 1987 on 6.8.1987 praying for a declaration that the property which was auctioned in the proceedings for realisation of the sales-tax arrears was so done subject to the charge of the Divisional Manager of the Canara Bank over the disputed property. That suit was entertained on which notices were Issued and defendant No. 4. i.e., the appellant filed a written statement. This Suit No. 1445 of 1987 was dismissed on 27.7.1992 in default of the plaintiff. It is also not denied that the Bank had moved an application paper No. 85C in the executing court to make the appellant a party in the execution case but did not press it upon which it was dismissed as not pressed on 10.3.1995. Ultimately in the executing court, report of the Amin was called on 19.9.1996 whereupon the Amin reported that the disputed property was auctioned in the proceedings for recovering sales tax dues. As noted above, the appellant objected vide his application dated 13.7.1998 but the disputed property was put to open public auction on 17.8.1998 on which date the respondent No. 2 Dharampal Singh purchased the disputed property. According to the appellant's case, he came to know of the said auction dated 7.8.1998 only on 24.8.1998 and then preferred objections, referred to above.
11. In view of the factual background, the only surviving question is whether the disputed property which remained under attachment before judgment and on the decree being passed it was sought to be proceeded against in the execution proceedings, continued to be so attached inspite of the dismissal of the execution case in default on 15.2.1985 though it was restored on 18.7.1986, the restoration application having already been filed on 12.3.1985.
12. Of course, the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ravi Kant said that the proceedings for the sales tax dues was a lawful action and purchase of the disputed property by the appellant would take it out of the execution proceedings initiated by the Canara Bank on the strength of the decree obtained by it in the Original Suit No. 20 of 1977. Simultaneously. it was argued that the executing court has wrongly held that the appellant did not file any objection specifically under Order XXI. Rules 89 and 90. C.P.C. and. therefore, the objections as framed by the appellant to the actual auction sale of the property in favour of the respondent No. 2 Dharampal Singh was illegal.
13. Sri U. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the auction purchaser Dharampal Slngh and Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava, learned counsel for the Canara Bank have vehemently argued that attachment before judgment goes with the decree and. therefore, continues until execution proceedings are brought to an end on merits and would not cease just because there was an order of dismissal in default though it was restored subsequently.
14. Coming now to the actual controversy, therefore, attention shall have to be fixed on the provisions as contained in Order XXXVIII, Rule 5 C.P.C. It may be emphasised here that the very purpose of the attachment of a property before pronouncement of the judgment when a suit is pending is dependent on the apprehension "That defendant, with Intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree, that may be passed against him" is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property or to remove it from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. It is, therefore, obvious that the attachment or property which is ordered by the trial court even before a decree is passed ensures the availability of such property at the time of execution of the decree.
15. In this connection, the plaintiff-decree-holder may render himself too vulnerable if for some reason, the executing court dismisses the execution proceedings in default of appearance of the decree-holder even though the reasons for such absence may be very valid. Continuity of the attachment of the property attached, therefore, has to be ensured in the execution proceedings. Therefore, the language used in Order XXXVIII. Rule 5, C.P.C.. as noted above, has to be interpreted so as to continue to embrace the attached property until the execution matter is finally dealt with. Any contrary interpretation would lead to further unholy alliance between an unscrupulous judgment-debtor and some irresponsible officer. Civil Procedure Code has no other provision by which attachment of the property may be permissible before the decree is passed.
16. It may be useful to simultaneously refer to the provisions contained in Order XXI, Rule 11. C.P.C. which lays down the manner for making application for execution. Rule 2 (j) (ii) permits execution of a decree. "By the attachment, or by the attachment and sale, or by the sale without attachment, of any property". Comparing this provision with the provisions contained and the language used in Order XXXVIII. Rule 5. C.P.C., it has to be held that the basis of the attachment of property before judgment is the apprehension of the plaintiff of dismemberment of defendant's property and, therefore, defendant's property may be attached. The attached property then becomes the subject-matter of execution under Order XXI, Rule 11. C.P.C. because the trial court had ordered the property to be attached prior to passing of the Judgment. Interpretation sought to be put by Sri Ravi Kant that attachment of the property vanishes with the dismissal of the execution proceedings in default and would not stand automatically restored inspite of the restoration of the execution proceedings, is not acceptable at all as such an interpretation is likely to subserve an unscrupulous Judgment-debtor rather than lowest and innocent decree-holder.
17. The Full Bench decision of our Court in Abdul Humid v. Mst. Asghari Begum, AIR 1953 All 173 is a direct decision on the point. It has been held therein that "The provisions of Order XXI, Rule 57 do not apply to attachments effected before judgment. Consequently, on the dismissal of an execution application for default of the decree-holder, the attachment before judgment does not cease".
18. The very provision contained in Order XXI. Rule 57 starts with the words that "Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree and the Court, for any reason, passes an order dismissing application for the execution of the decree......". Therefore, sub-rule (2) of Rule 57 of Order XXI will have and also the provisions of sub-rule (1) shall have no applicability whatsoever on a property which stood attached before the decree was passed and consequently it will remain attached till the final decision of the execution proceedings. Sri Ravi Kant has placed reliance upon a decision in S. Noordeen v. T. V. Reddiar and others, 1996 (3) SCC 289, in order to lend support to his arguments. On the facts involved in the cited case, the ratio has no application whatsoever to the present dispute. On the other hand, the decision in D. B. Naik v. Rambha Bai, AIR 1962 Bom 236, on which reliance has been placed by Sri U. N. Sharma and Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava to a large extent follows the dictum of the Full Bench of this Court and, therefore, supports the view proposed to be taken in this appeal. The disputed property which was attached before judgment continued to remain attached during the execution proceedings in which the said disputed property was put to auction by the executing court which was purchased by the auction-purchaser-respondent No. 2, namely, Dharampal Singh.
19. The executing court was, therefore, perfectly right in auctioning the disputed property in the said execution proceedings and rightly rejected the objections filed by the appellant.
20. Before parting with, it may be pointed out that any one who was connected with the activities in the legal proceedings necessary for securing the money of the Canara Bank have been consistently defaulting with the result that this unnecessary litigation has been dragged on for nearly 25 years. One is amazed at the timing of the purchase of the disputed property by the appellant Sukhdev Prasad Puri that is on 30.10.1985 in the proceedings for the sales tax recovery against the Firm M/s. Modern Tin Printers just within the period of the execution proceedings being in hibernation, that is. the period between it was dismissed in default on 15.2.1985 and an application was moved for its restoration on 12.3.1985, and it was actually restored by the executing court on 18.7.1986. Sukhdev Prasad Puri is apparently in hand in glove with all those who want to defeat the payment to the Bank of the sum of Rs. 2,12.622 for which it had filed suit on 20.1.1977. Therefore, Sukhdev Prasad Puri is fully aware of the proceedings going on for recovery of the money advanced by the Canara Bank to the firm M/s. Modem Tin Printers.
21. The respondents' counsel also drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the appellant has not deposited the amount as envisaged by the amended provisions brought about by the State of U. P. In Order XXI, Rule 90 (i) (b). Be that as it may. the fact remains that the appellant admittedly got the property when the decree was subsisting and the execution proceedings had been initiated and. therefore, so long as the attachment before the judgment continued, the appellant could not be a purchaser of the said property against the charge of the Canara Bank which did not obliterate by any legal provision or factual development noted above.
22. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs. The interim stay order is vacated.
S.K. Jain, J.
23. Appellant Sukh Dev Prasad Puri has filed this appeal for setting aside the judgment and order dated 24.10.1998, passed by learned IInd Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) in Execution Case No. 19 Of 1980 arising out of the Original Suit Wo. 20 of 1977, Canara Bank v. M/s. Modem Tin Printers and Fabricators, Agra, a partnership firm situated at 176-Gwalior Road. Agra. Canara Bank filed Original Suit No. .20 of 1977 for recovery of the loan amounting to Rs. 2,12.622.68 paise and the said suit was decreed on 20.4.1979. During the pendency of the suit, an application for attachment before judgment was filed on behalf of Canara Bank and vide order dated 7.11.1977 the property situated in Bagh Farzana, Agra was attached and the defendant was restrained from transferring the property in suit till further orders. Thereafter the decree holder--Bank filed Execution Case No. 19 Of 1980 on 12.12.1980. Also the. aforesaid firm M/s. Modern Tin Printers and Fabricators had not paid the sales-tax dues, consequent to which the sales-tax department sought to recover the arrears of sales tax and the property in question was auctioned publicly on 4.9,1985 and was purchased by appellant Sukh Dev Prasad Puri and Vijay Kumar Katlyar for Rs. 2.40,000. The sale in favour of the appellant was confirmed. A true copy of the sale certificate has been filed and marked as Annexure-I. It is stated that before the Sales Tax Officer, Canara Bank had filed objections. It is further alleged that the aforesaid Execution Case No. 19 of 1980 arising out of Original Suit Wo. 20 of 1977, Canara Bank v. M/s. Modern Tin Printers and Fabricators. Agra. was dismissed for default on 15.2.1985 and later on restored on 18.7.1986. In the meantime on 30.10.1985. the properly in question was auctioned as the Sales-tax Department had proceeded to recover the arrears of sales-tax due on the said firm and the property was purchased by appellanl Sukh Dev Prasad Puri and Vijay Kumar Katiyar on 4.9.1985 as stated above. Thereafter, Canara Bank (decree-holder) filed Original Suit No. 1445 of 1987 for declaration that the property was auctioned and sold subject to the charge of the Canara Bank. This suit was dismissed for default of the plaintiff in presence of the counsel for defendant. Ultimately, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court that the dues of Canara Bank had no priority over the dues recoverable by Sales-tax Department and as such the writ petition was dismissed. In execution of the decree in favour of Canara Bank, the property was auctioned and purchased by Dharampal Singh respondent No. 2.
24. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ravi Kant that as the property was purchased by Sukh Dev Prasad Pur! on 20.10.1985 in an auction held on the initiation of the Sales-tax Department, the sale had become absolute and rights of purchaser under the said auction are protected inasmuch as the execution proceeding filed on behalf of the Canara Bank had been dismissed for default on 15.2.1985 and were restored only on 18.7.1986.
25. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that once the property had been attached before Judgment on 7.11.1977 on an application moved by the Canara Bank in Original Suit No. 20 of 1980, Canara Bank v. M/s. Modern Tin Printers and Fabricators, the fact that no execution proceedings were pending on the day when the property in question was purchased in auction by Sukh Dev Prasad Puri on 20.10.1985 will not alter the situation.
26. We have considered over the matter and are of the opinion that there is force in the contention of the respondents.
27. It was held in the case of Abdul Hamid and others v. Mst. Asghari Begum, AIR 1953 All 173, that the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 57 do not apply to attachments effected before judgment. Consequently, on the dismissal of an execution application for default of the decree-holder, the attachment before Judgment does not cease. In another case Dattatraya Baliram Naik and others v. Rambhabai and others. AIR 1962 Bom 236. upholding the aforesaid view, it was held that in the case of an attachment before judgment of property, where there has been a decree followed by an execution petition for the purpose of bringing the attached property to sale, upon the dismissal of such an application for execution on account of the decree-holder's default in taking steps to enable the Court to proceed further with the execution. Order XXI. Rule 57 do not operate and the attachment continues.
28. We are fortified in our view by the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid cases that even if the execution application is dismissed in default, the order of attachment before Judgment does not cease.
29. It has been next argued that it was mandatory for the Court to decide the objection filed by the appellant under Order XXI, Rule 90. C.P.C. and same has not been decided. The perusal of the record shows that the said objections were considered and the Court did not find any force in the objections filed under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C.
30. Under the circumstances, we do not find any force in the appellant's argument that the Court below did not consider and dispose of the appellant's objections filed under Order XXI, Rule 90. C.P.C.
31. In view of the aforesaid discussion of the evidence on record and the proposition of law laid down by various High Courts, we are of the opinion that this appeal has no force and is liable to be dismissed.
The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. The interim stay order is vacated.