Madras High Court
P. Azeez Ahmed vs State Bank Of India, Vaniyambadi on 2 September, 1994
Equivalent citations: AIR1995MAD194, AIR 1995 MADRAS 194, (1995) 1 MAD LJ 446
ORDER
1. This revision is directed against the order passed in R.F.A. No. 56 of 1991 in R.E.P.No. 12 of 1989 in O.S. No. 105 of 1987 on the file of the Sub-Judge. Thiru-pathur. The petitioner herein is the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder State Bank of India, Vaniyambadi Branch, obtained the decree on 26-10-1988 against the petitioner herein R.P. No. 12 of 1989 was filed for arrest of the judgment-debtor. The execution petition was posted for hearing on 22-4-1991. The judgment-debtor was not present in Court on that date. The judgment-debtor filed a petition under O.21, R. 106(1), C.P.C. and S. 151, C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte order of arrest made against him. According to the judgment-debtor, he noted down the date of hearing wrongly as 24-4-1991 instead of 22-4-1991. When he came to Court on 24-4-1991, he came to know that the order of arrest was made against him on 22-4-1991. According to the judgment-debtor, the Court has not applied its mind with regard to means of the judgment-debtor to pay the decree amount. It is also the case of the judgment-debtor that the decree holder failed to prove that the judgment-debtor has means to pay the decree amount. However, after hearing the counsel for the judgment-debtor, the execution Court came to the conclusion that the burden is heavily on the part of the judgment-debtor to show sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte order of arrest. According to the execution Court no sufficient cause was shown to set aside the ex parte order of arrest. The execution Court pointed out that even on earlier occasion the judgment-debtor allowed the execution petition to go for default and filed a petition to set aside that order. Hence considering all these aspects the execution Court dismissed the petition to set aside the ex parte order. It is against this order, the revision is preferred.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner herein submitted that ex parte order of arrest cannot be made without ascertaining the fact that the judgment-debtor has got means to pay the decree amount. In the present case, the execution Court satisfied itself with the affidavit filed by the decree-holder with regard to the fact that judgment-
debtor has got sufficient means to pay the decree amount. No oral evidence was adduced by the decree-holder to prove that the judgment-debtor has got sufficient means to pay the decree amount. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, ex partc order of arrest passed without finding out whether the judgment-debtor has got means to pay or not is unsustainable. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon the judgments reported in Jolly Geores Vercgesc v. The Bank of Cochin, AIR 1980 SC 470 : 1980 (2) SCR 913. lyyam Perumal v. Chinna Goundem, AIR 1984 Mad 239 and the decision in Kunhi Raman v. Madhavan Nair, 1957 (2) Mad LJ 28 : (AIR 1957 Mad 761).
3. Notice of motion was ordered on 18-8-1994 and served. The name of the respondent is also printed in the cause list. But neither the respondent nor anybody on behalf of the respondent was present when this revision was taken up for hearing.
4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and perused the records carefully. The fact remains that this revision has been filed by the judgment-debtor. The respondent-decrec-holder obtained the decree against the petitioner herein and sought to execute the same before the execution Court. On the dale of hearing, the judgment-debtor was not present. Hence the ex parte order of arrest was passed by the execution Court. The judgment-debtor filed a petition to set aside the ex parte order and that was dismissed by the execution Court. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner that an ex parte order of arrest cannot be made before ascertaining the means, of the judgment-debtor to pay the decree amount. A perusal of the order passed by the execution Court would go to show that ex parte order was passed on the basis of the affidavit filed by the decree-holder wherein it is stated that the judgment-debtor has got means to pay the decree amount. It remains to be seen that in order to satisfy whether the judgment-debtor has got means to pay the decree amount, filing of affidavit alone is not sufficient. It has got to be proved by adducing evidence both orally and documentary. It is only on the basis of the documents filed and the oral evidence adduced, the Court can come to the conclusion whether the judgment-debtor has got means to pay the decree amount or not. This was not done in the present case. In a similar situation. The Supreme Court, in the case of J.G. Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 (2) SCR 913 : (AIR 1980 SC 470) has held as under at page 475; of AIR:
"Equally meaningful is the import of Art. 21 of the Constitution in the context of imprisonment for non-payment of debts. The High Value of human dignity and the worth of the human person enshirned in Art. 21, read with Arts. 14 and 19, obligates the state not to incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and reasonable in its procedural essence. Maneka Gandhi's case as developed further in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration lays down the proposition. It is too obvious to need elaboration that to cast a person in prison because of his poverty and consequent inability to meet his contractual liability is appalling. To be poor, in this land of Daridra Narayana, is no crime and to 'receiver' debts by the procedure of putting one in prison is too flagrantly violative of Art. 21 unless there is proof of the minimal fairness of this wilful failure to pay in spite of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer or other grave illness. Unreasonableness and unfairness in such a procedure is inferable from Art. 11 of the covenant. But this is precisely the interpretation we have put on the proviso to S. 51 C.P.C. and the lethal blow of Art. 21 cannot strike down the provision, as now interpreted.
'The words which hurt' or has had since the date of the decree. The means to pay the amount of the decree. This implies, superficially read, that if at any time after the passing of an old decree the judgment-debtor had come by some resources and had not discharged the decree, he could be detained in prison even though at that later point of time he was found to be penniless. This is not a sound position apart from being in human going by the standards of Art. 11 (of the Covenant) and Art. 21 (of the Constitution). The simple default to discharge is not enough.
There must he some element of bad faith beyond mere indiffiernce to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or alternatively, current means to pay the decree or a substantial part of it. The provisions emphasises the need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal or demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree. Here considerations of the debtor's other pressing needs and straitened circumstances will play prominently. We would have, by this construcation, sauced law with justice, harmonised S. 51 with the Covenant and the constitution."
So anso, while considering the provisions of Section 115, C.P.C, and Order 21, Rule 37, C.P.C. this Court, on similar facts, in the case of lyyamperumal v. Chinna Gounder, AIR 1984 Mad 239 following the abovesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the decision cited supra, held that ex parte order of arrest passed without ascertaining the means of Judgment-debtor to pay to decree amount is unsustainable.
5. In similar circumstances in Kunni Raman v. Madhavan Nair 1957(2) MLJ 28 : (MR 1957 Mad 161) this court has held as under: -
"No reason whatever is given as to why arrest is ordered, and the mandatory provisions of S. 51, Civil P.C. have been ignored. Mr. Sesha-Ayyar says that as the petitioner was ex parte, reasons need not be given. I am afraid J cannot agree. Under our law ex parte orders of arrest and orders of arrest after contest are exactly on the same footing and S. 51, Civil P.C, makes no difference whatever between the two cases. Arrest after contest or ex parte involves the same painful consequences to the man arrested."
6. The facts arising in this revision would go to show that the ex parte order of arrest was made by the execuing court without properly ascertaining the means of the judgment-debtor to pay the decree amount. The execution court, merely relied upon the affidavit filed by the decree-holder, on this aspect. No other material was produced to show that the Judgment-debtor has got means to pay the decree amount. In such circumstances, considering the facts arising this case, in the light of the judicial pronouncements cited supra, 1 hold that the ex parte order of arrest made by the execution court in R.E.P. No. 12 of 1989 is liable to be set aside. For the purpose of setting aside the ex parte order, the judgment debtor contended that he has noted down the date of hearing wrongly and therefore he was unable to be present in court when the execution petition was called. Accepting the reasons given by the Judgment-debtor in this regard, I am of the opinion tiat the order passed by the execution court in dismissing the application to set aside the ex parte order of arrest, is also liable to be set aside. Accordingly the ex parte order passed in R.E.A, No. 56 of 1991 stands set aside. R.E.P. No. 12 of 1989 on the file of Sub Judge, Thirupathur, is directed to be disposed of by the execution court after ascertaining whether the Judgment debtor has got means to pay the decree amount. Thus, the execution court is directed to dispose of the execution petition in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of being heard to both sides. Accordingly this revision petition stands allowed. No costs.
7. Petition allowed.