Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Debidas Chakraborty vs West Bengal State Minor Irrigation on 3 April, 2009
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURSIDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present : The Hon'ble Justice Dipankar Datta
W.P. No.16063 (W) of 2007
With
CAN No. 7404 of 2008
Debidas Chakraborty
...Petitioner
Versus
West Bengal State Minor Irrigation
Corporation Ltd. & ors.
...Respondents
Mr. S. C. Bose Ms. Pompey Bose Mr. Nirmalya Biswas ...for the petitioner Mr. S.P. Ghosh Ms. Jolly Chakraborty ...for the respondents 1 and 2 Heard on : 29.1.2009 Judgment on : 3.4.2009 The petitioner is working in the West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Limited (hereafter the Corporation) as an Electrician since 1986. In this writ petition, he has claimed Mandamus for commanding the respondents to appropriately revise his pay scale "in the same manner as has been done in the case of Bankim Chandra Karmakar, Shyamalendu Kundu, Babul Chandra Dutta, Gopal Chandra Biswas and Parthasarathy Bandopadhyay by fixing his pay in the revised scale of pay Rs.4000/--8550/- and to proportionately enhanced the previous pay scale to which he is entitled to in terms of the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Corporation dated 3.11.1981 with effect from his date of appointment."
Since the relief that has been claimed is purely based on grant of identical benefits to similarly placed employees of the Corporation like the petitioner, it would be profitable to take note of the factual situation leading to grant of such benefit to them.
Sri Bankim Prosad Karmakar (hereafter Bankim) who was working as an Electrician under the Corporation since 4.7.1982 invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a writ petition being C.O. 15034 (W) of 1991. In that application, he claimed that he was drawing pay in the scale of Rs.300-685/-. His grievance was that he was entitled to higher scale of pay. The foundation of his case was a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of the Corporation on 3.11.1981 to the effect that scale of pay admissible from time to time to the State Government employees would also be applicable to the employees of the Corporation, so far as analogous posts were concerned. On 4.7.1984, an amendment of the Revision of Pay and Allowance Rules, 1981 was made whereby an electrician working under the State Government, drawing salary in the scale of Rs. 300-600/- became entitled to draw pay in the scale of Rs.380-910/-. Bankim contended that in terms of the resolution of the Board dated 3.11.1981, he was entitled to higher scale of Rs.380- 910/- from July, 1984. The learned Judge hearing the writ petition accepted Bankim's logic. However, relief was declined to him on the ground that the Court of Writ had been approached belatedly. The writ petition, accordingly, was dismissed by an order dated 1.2.1995.
Against the said order, Bankim filed an intra-court appeal. By judgment and order dated 9.2.1996, the appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment set aside. A Mandamus was issued commanding the concerned respondents to revise the scale of pay of Bankim by allowing him the scale of pay of Rs.300-910/- in accordance with the resolution of the Board of Directors dated 3.11.1981 read with the provisions of the ROPA Rules.
A bare perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench referred to above would reveal the satisfaction reached by the Court that there was no delay on the part of Bankim to approach the Court of Writ. A finding of fact was recorded that the Corporation having taken up the case of Bankim praying for permission to allow him draw pay in the revised scale at par with electricians employed under the Government and in October, 1991 the Government having finally turned down such prayer, there was no delay or laches on his part. An additional point which weighed in the mind of the Division Bench was that there was no pleading on the question of acquiescence or delay on the part of Bankim. The Division Bench appears to have considered the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Bhuri Bai (dead) by LRs and others vs State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1987) Supp SCC 690. In compliance with the order of the Division Bench, Bankim was allowed benefits of revised pay scale that was extended to electricians working under the State Government.
This inspired Sri Shyamalendu Kundu (hereafter Shyamalendu, another electrician working under the Corporation) to claim identical relief from the Court that had been extended to Bankim. He approached the Court in 2000 by filing W.P. No.21378 (W) of 2000. The writ petition was heard on contest and allowed by judgment and order dated 22.2.2005. Learned Counsel for the Corporation had argued that the Corporation being a State-owned undertaking, it was under
the deep and pervasive control of the State and any decision of the Corporation could not be implemented without prior concurrence of the State. Though it was conceded on behalf of the Corporation that Shyamalendu and Bankim were similarly circumstanced and that Bankim had been given the benefit he claimed, a prayer was made before the Court to reexamine the issue independently, irrespective of the judgment of the Court in Bankim's case.
Submission of learned Counsel was found to be not tenable and without basis. The Court held as follows:
"An identical issue had already been decided by another learned Judge of this court. Such decision was upheld by the Division Bench on the issue. The learned single Judge, however, denied such benefit on the ground of delay. The Division Bench extended such benefit ignoring the delay. In my view, the decision of the single Bench so merged with the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Bankim is binding upon me and I am not competent to go into the controversy once again on merits. I hold that Shyamalendu being similarly circumstanced with Bankim is entitled to identical benefit as has been extended to Bankim. I direct the corporation to appropriately revise the pay scale of Shyamalendu as has been done in the case of Bankim. Such compliance must be made within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order."
In terms of the aforesaid order dated 22.2.2005, Shyamalendu was also extended benefits of revised scale of pay.
Thereafter, three other electricians of the Corporation viz. Babul Chandra Dutta, Gopal Chandra Biswas and Partha Sarathi Bandopadhyay (hereafter Babul, Gopal and Partha Sarathi respectively) approached the Writ Court by filing separate writ petitions claiming orders for revision of their scales of pay to Rs. 4000/- -885/-, as had been extended to Bankim and Shyamalendu. Those were heard analogously and allowed by another learned Judge of this Court vide judgment dated 10.11.2006. The same arguments were advanced on behalf of the Corporation that had been advanced earlier. The Court rejected the arguments on the ground that the same had been rejected on earlier occasions by the Court and that the observations of the learned Single Judge in Bankim's case merged with the judgment of the Division Bench and that judgment had been allowed to attain finality. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1962 SC 1893 : M/s. East India Commercial Company Ltd., Cal & anr. Vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, it was held that the law declared by the highest Court of the State of West Bengal namely the Calcutta High Court is binding on the authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence and that the Corporation cannot ignore the law laid down by the Court and is bound to follow it. Ultimately it was held as follows:
"Therefore, now at this stage, they cannot be allowed to say that they cannot give the benefits arising out of the Resolution dated 3.11.1981 to these Petitioners. When benefits are conferred to one set of employees on the basis of a judgment/(s) passed in their favour, the same cannot be snatched away from another set of employees who are similarly situated/placed merely because they could not/did not, for whatever reason, approach a Court of law. If such a situation is allowed to prevail, it would defeat justice and would go against the principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
There is no dispute that the Corporation involved herein is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. This is clear not only from the pleadings made in this case but also from the observations of the learned Single Judge made in the judgment of Bamkim Prasad Karmakar's case which received the seal of approval by the Division Bench. For the reasons above, all these three Writ Petitions must succeed and they are accordingly allowed to do so. A Writ of Mandamus is issued directing the concerned Respondents to appropriately revise the pay scale of the Petitioners in the same manner as has been done in the case of Bankim Prasad Karmakar and Shyamalendu Kundu referred to above within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this Order. All the 3(three) Writ Petitions are accordingly allowed but, in the facts and circumstances involved, there shall be no Order as to Costs. This Order shall be confined only to these Petitioners who, as has been admitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondents, are similarly situated as Bankim Prasad Karmakar and Shyamalendu Kundu."
(emphasis in original) It has been claimed by the petitioner in the petition that Babul, Gopal and Partha Sarathi have eventually been granted benefit of revision of pay scale and that presently are enjoying the higher scale of pay as admissible to the State Government employees holding analogous posts.
Mr. Bose, learned senior counsel for the petitioner reiterated the submissions which he had advanced before the learned Judges who allowed the claims of Shyamalendu, and the other three viz. Babul, Gopal and Partha Sarathi.
On the other hand, Mr. Ghosh, learned Counsel for the Corporation reiterated before this Court by referring to the Affidavit-in-Opposition that in all cases of extension of pecuniary benefits to the employees of the Government undertakings etc. the approval of the Government is always to be obtained before benefits are granted. In particular, he referred to Annexure 'R-1' being Order no.8494 dated 26.8.1986 issued by the Finance Department, Government of West Bengal in support of his submission.
This Court has heard learned Counsel for the parties. For reasons assigned hereafter, this Court, with utmost respect, is unable to agree with the views of the learned single Judges referred to above.
In its order dated 1.2.1995, the learned Judge while allowing the claim of Bankim noticed the fact that several representations had been made by him about his entitlement to the higher scale of pay which had never been turned down by the Corporation; instead, the Corporation referred the matter continuously to the State of West Bengal for a positive sanction of the Government for the purpose of implementing higher scale. His Lordship held:
"In my opinion, this was wholly wrong. The Minor Irrigation Corporation is not subservient to the State of West Bengal. Although in its articles it has declared itself to be bound by the declaration of the broad policies of the State Government yet there is nothing in the Memorandum or the Articles which curtails the absolute autonomy of the Corporation in such a manner that it has to knock at the door of the State Government every time its Board of Directors adopts a resolution of any importance or consequence. Although in the eye of law the Corporation is autonomous it did not in practice exercise its powers of independence."
This Court has looked into the records of the writ petition filed by Bankim being C.O. 14034 (W) of 1991. Although in the counter affidavit the Corporation had pleaded that it could not "go beyond any order or instruction of the Government, particularly in matters of payment involving the revision of the pay and emoluments of the Corporation" and that "prior permission or instruction of the Government is required in regard to payment of any such financial benefits to its employees", the order of the Finance Department dated 26.8.1986 was not placed on record for consideration by the Court. The said order dated 26.8.1986, however, was placed on record before the learned Judge who dealt with the writ petition of Shyamalendu. His Lordship, for reasons extracted (supra), did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the Corporation.
The judgment of the learned Judge allowing the writ petitions filed by Babul, Gopal and Partha Sarathi also did not consider the effect of the Government Order dated 26.8.1986 which reads as follows:
"From : Shri S.V. Krishnan, Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal.
To : The Secretary, C & S S I Department.
Sir,
Reference is invited to the instructions contained in Chief Secretary's Circulars No. 4236 (32)-F dated 3.5.74 and No.8178 (44)-F dated 19.7.81 to the effect that in all cases of extending pecuniary benefits to the employees of the Government Undertakings etc. the approval of Government is always to be obtained before benefits are granted.
2) It is, however, noted with grave concern that certain undertakings have recently increased the number of promotion posts in their offices without the approval of Government in violation of the instructions contained in the Circulars mentioned above. Orders for the withdrawal of the benefits so extended have had to be issued by Government.
3) The view already held by Government is that no Government companies, Statutory bodies or Corporations should create posts, allow pay revision or scale benefit, sanction bonus etc. without prior approval of Government.
4) You are, therefore, requested to issue once again necessary directives in this respect to the Undertakings under the administrative control of your department."
To the mind of this Court, once instructions had been issued by the Government since 3.5.1974 to the effect that extension of pecuniary benefits to the employees under the Government Undertakings would require the approval of the Government before such benefits are granted and the Corporation, itself being a Government Undertaking, and/or any of its employees not having challenged the terms of the Government Orders dated 3.5.1974, 19.7.1984 and 26.8.1986, no order could have lawfully been passed by the Writ Court directing the Corporation to extend revised pay scale to the electricians who had approached Court.
It appears to this Court on a reading of the judgment dated 22.2.2005 on the writ petition of Shyamalendu that the learned Judge was of the view that the decision given by the learned Judge holding Bankim entitled to higher pay scale was upheld by the Division Bench and that the Division Bench extended benefit to Bankim ignoring the delay. The learned Judge considered the Division Bench decision to be binding and hence held that His Lordship was not competent to decide the controversy once again on merits.
The view of the learned Judge in His Lordship's judgment dated 10.11.2006 while dealing with the claims of the other three electricians appears to be that the judgment of the Division Bench has been allowed to attain its finality and, therefore, the Corporation could not lawfully deny benefits to those three electricians having accepted the orders passed by this Court allowing the claims of Bankim and Shyamalendu.
In Bankim's case, the learned Judge did not have the occasion to consider the Government Order dated 26.8.1986 since it was not placed before His Lordship. In view of the said Government Order, this Court is unable to hold that the Corporation is not subservient to the State and that the Corporation has absolute autonomy to give effect to its own decision of extending identical scale of pay admissible from time to time to the State Government employees, so far as analogous posts are concerned. The learned Judge noticed that in its Articles, the Corporation declared itself to be bound by the declaration of broad policies of the State Government; if that is so, the Corporation was bound by the Government Orders dated 3.5.1974, 19.7.1984 and 26.8.1986. On the face of these Government Orders, the finding arrived at by the learned Judge, in the opinion of this Court, does not commend to be correct.
The learned Judge dealing with Shyamalendu's case erred in holding that the Division Bench had upheld the decision of the learned Judge on the identical issue. In this connection, the observations of the Division Bench may be noted:
"In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the Corporation had adopted a resolution but did not give effect to the same and that the resolution that was passed was not revoked or rescinded by the Corporation and according to the Corporation the same could be given effect for want of permission of the Government but the learned trial Judge has held on this point against the respondents, accordingly, on this point we cannot make any adjudication as the issue is not before us in this appeal in the absence of any cross-objection or cross appeal".
It is clear that the Division Bench refrained from giving a decision in the absence of a cross-objection or cross-appeal. Therefore, to hold that the Division Bench upheld the decision given by the learned Judge on the issue is an incorrect recording of fact. The reason given by the learned Judge for not accepting the stand of the Corporation thus does not appeal to this Court and it feels free not to share such a view.
The learned Judge dealing with the cases of the other three electricians did not assign any independent reason for allowing the claims but merely followed the earlier decisions. It is noteworthy that the learned Judge confined the relief only to the petitioners before His Lordship.
What would indeed be the effect of the Government Orders on the claims of the several petitioners before the Court was not discussed at all by any of the learned Judges. That the Government Order dated 26.8.1986 was not addressed to the Corporation, as contended in the reply affidavit, is hardly relevant since by it, a policy decision of the Government was being conveyed for universal application and it was not confined to any particular organization or corporation but to all the Government companies, statutory bodies or Corporations. It is settled law that no order of an authority can be ignored unless finding is recorded that it is illegal (see : Pune Municipal Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 2007 SC 2414).
This Court, therefore, has no hesitation to overrule the submission of Mr. Bose that the Corporation should now be directed to allow higher scale of pay to the petitioner.
In the circumstances, this Court would hold that so long the Government Orders referred to above govern the field and are not set aside and/or quashed by this Court on a challenge being thrown to it, approval of the Government would be necessary for the Corporation to extend pecuniary benefits for its employees and in the absence of such approval, a direction on the Corporation to extend pecuniary benefits would not be legal, valid and proper.
There is another factor weighing in the mind of the Court to decline relief to the petitioner. On his own showing, the petitioner joined service of the Corporation as an Electrician in 1986. For long 20 years or more the petitioner did not ventilate any grievance that he was placed in a scale of pay not commensurate with his entitlement. Apparently, he has been encouraged to approach the Court of Writ on Bablu, Gopal and Partha Sarathi being extended similar benefits that had been extended first to Bankim and then to Shyamalendu. The first time he approached the Managing Director of the Corporation with a prayer in this behalf was on 4.4.2007. Since there was no response, he had his lawyer sending a notice dated 28.6.2007 claiming benefits of higher scale of pay. That notice having yielded no result, this Court was approached in the later part of July, 2007. There is no explanation worth the name for the belated approach. The Writ Court has been approached for claiming benefit of previous decisions. It is settled law that benefit of a judgment is not extended to a case automatically. The Division Bench held that there was no delay on facts. That decision cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner since it has not been placed on record that prior to 4.4.2007, he had made any representation claiming higher scale of pay. Incidentally, Bankim's claim was refused by the learned Judge on the ground of delay.
Reference in this connection may be made to several decisions of the Apex Court.
In State of Karnataka vs. S.M. Kotrayya, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 267, the respondents woke up to claim the relief that was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Thereafter, the State approached the Apex Court when it was observed as under:
"Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay."
Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538, the Apex Court reaffirmed the rule that if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows:
"The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan: (1995) 6 SCC 684. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage."
In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 395 it was observed as follows:
"9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987, R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief."
In Govt. of W.B. vs. Tarun K. Roy, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347, the Apex Court considered delay as a serious factor disentitling the respondents relief. Therein it was observed as follows:
"34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar : 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."
In U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464, these previous decisions were duly considered. Thereafter, the Court held as follows:
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
'In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.'
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if similar relief is to be given to the persons who have not approached the court that will unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment to these persons in terms of two years' salary and increased benefit of pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the court after their retirement. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others. We have been given a chart of those nine persons, who filed writ petitions and obtained stay and are continuing in service."
Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in its decision in A.P. Steel Re-rolling Mill Ltd. vs. State of Kerala & ors., reported in (2007) 2 SCC 725.
It must be placed on record that it was not argued on behalf of the Corporation that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. This Court has noticed that the Division Bench while considering the appeal of Bankim had considered the decision of the Apex Court in Bhuribai (supra) and in support of its order held that there was no pleading on the question of acquiescence or delay on Bankim's part.
In Bhuribai (supra), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh being the first appellate court took up the question of limitation on its own motion without there being any plea regarding limitation raised by the Government in its written statement in the Trial Court and ultimately the suit was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground of limitation. While setting aside the order of the High Court, the Apex Court proceeded to observe as follows:
"We do not think that the High Court was justified in taking up the question suo motu and finding that the suit was barred by limitation."
On the face of provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as well as a catena of decisions of the Apex Court holding to the contrary, this Court being a Court of Writ does not consider itself bound by a stray decision given in connection with civil proceedings.
Grant of relief, which is discretionary, would not depend on whether the respondents have taken a specific plea that a wit petition is not maintainable. It would always be open to a Court of Writ to decide upon judicious exercise of discretion, irrespective of any demur raised by the respondents, as to whether the person aggrieved deserves relief or not. Decisions are legion that delay and laches would disentitle a party to relief. Even if breach of a fundamental right is alleged, the matter would still be within the discretion of the Court (see Durga Prasad vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 769).
However, in a claim of the present nature, granting an employee a particular scale less than his entitlement is a continuing wrong. The decision in Shiv Dass vs. Union of India, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274, while dealing with a claim of non-payment of pension, is apposite. It was ruled as under:
"In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.*****".
If on the issue to be framed hereunder the answer is in the affirmative and the petitioner is held entitled to higher scale of pay, the Court may have to consider the date from which relief can be extended to him.
Since this Court has disagreed with the views of the learned Judges on the broad question of entitlement of the petitioner to receive a higher scale of pay without the approval of the Government, an order of reference would be the proper course for it to follow. Accordingly, it is directed that the cause papers be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate order for having an answer on the following issue:
"Despite the policy decision of the Government to the effect that extension of pecuniary benefits to the employees of the Government Undertakings would require the approval of the Government before such benefits are granted, whether the petitioner, an employee of a Government undertaking, can be granted benefits of higher scale of pay at par with Government employees working in analogous posts without the approval of the Government issued in this behalf ?"
Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be furnished to the applicant within 4 days from date of putting in requisites therefor.
(DIPANKAR DATTA, J.)