Tripura High Court
The State Of Tripura vs Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty on 21 September, 2022
Bench: Indrajit Mahanty, S.G. Chattopadhyay
Page - 1 of 29
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA No. 72 of 2018
1. The State of Tripura,
To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce,
Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
2. The Director,
Department of Industries & Commerce, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West
Tripura, PIN 799010.
3. The Secretary,
Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN 799010.
----- Appellant(s)
Versus
1. Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty,
Son of late Ananta Kumar Chakraborty, resident of A.D. Nagar, Road No.11,
Beltali, P.O. & P.S. A.D. Nagar, PIN 799003, District West Tripura.
-----Respondent(s)
2. Tripura Jute Mills Ltd.
Government of Tripura Undertaking represented by the Managing Director TJML, Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
3. The Managing Director, Tripura Jute Mills Ltd., Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
-----Proforma Respondent(s) WA No. 73 of 2018
1. The State of Tripura, To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce, Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
2. The Director, Department of Industries & Commerce, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
3. The Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
----- Appellant(s) Versus
1. Tripura Chatkall Sramik Union, To be represented by the Secretary, Tripura Chatkall Union Hapania, Agartala West Tripura.
-----Respondent(s) WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 2 of 29
2. Tripura Jute Mills Ltd.
Government of Tripura Undertaking represented by the Managing Director TJML, Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
3. The Managing Director, Tripura Jute Mills Ltd., Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
-----Proforma Respondent(s) WA No. 74 of 2018
1. The State of Tripura, To be represented by the Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce, Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
2. The Director, Department of Industries & Commerce, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
3. The Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799010.
----- Appellant(s) Versus
1. Tripura Jute Mill Karmachari Mancha, To be represented by the Secretary, Tripura Jute Mill Karmachari Mancha, Agartala, West Tripura.
-----Respondent(s)
2. Tripura Jute Mills Ltd.
Government of Tripura Undertaking represented by the Managing Director TJML, Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
3. The Managing Director, Tripura Jute Mills Ltd., Hapania, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006.
-----Proforma Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. S.S. Dey, Advocate General.
Mr. D. Sarma, Addl. GA.
Ms. A. Chakraborty, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.
Mr. D. Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. K. Nath, Adv.
Ms. A. Debbarma, Adv.
Date of Hearing : 25th July, 2022.
Date of Pronouncement : 21st September, 2022.
Whether fit for reporting : YES
WA No.72 of 2018
WA No.73 of 2018
WA No.74 of 2018
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B_E_F_O_R_E_
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. INDRAJIT MAHANTY
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[Per S.G. Chattopadhyay], J
These appeals are directed against the common judgment & order dated 04.09.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of writ petitions being WP(C) No.785 of 2017, WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 whereby the learned Single Judge allowed those petitions. [2] The facts and law involved in these writ appeals being identical, they are taken up together for disposal by a common judgment. [3] Heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Advocate General appearing for the appellants along with Ms. A. Chakraborty, learned advocate. Also heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents along with Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Mr. K. Nath and Ms. A. Debbarma, learned advocates. [4] The factual background of the case is as under:
Pursuant to the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission, Government of Tripura, in acceptance of the same, introduced the revised pay scale for its officers and employees vide notification dated 06.02.1999 and accordingly Tripura State Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1999 was introduced and it was published in the extra ordinary issue of Tripura Gazette on 06.02.1999.
The officers and employees of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. (TJML for short) were also included in the report of the 4th Pay Commission and recommendation was made for revision of their pay scale and allowances. Therefore, the Government of Tripura by issuing a separate notification on 05.07.1999 revised the pay of the WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 4 of 29 officers and employees of TJML w.e.f. 01.04.1999 to give effect to the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission.
[5] Aggrieved thereby, the officers and employees of TJML filed Civil Rule No.139 of 1997 in the High Court contending that in other 32 Government undertakings/statutory bodies in the State, the pay revision in terms of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission was made effective from 01.01.1996 and there was no reason as to why the officers and employees of TJML which was similarly situated would be treated differently.
[6] It is in the aforesaid background coupled with the fact that the officers and employees of TJML were not also provided with House Rent Allowance, Career Advancement Scheme, Compensatory Allowance and Dearness Allowance etc. approached the High Court by filing Civil Rule No.139 of 1997.
[7] The learned Single Judge by his judgment & order dated 28.10.2003 in Civil Rule No.139 of 1997 held that the writ petitioners therein could not make out any enforceable right. Keeping in view the economic condition of TJML, the learned Single Judge held that it was a loss incurring unit and the officers and employees of the unit were not entitled to similar treatment with that of the officers and employees of other 32 PSUs/Government undertakings and statutory bodies. The learned Single Judge having relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.K. Bindal & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors.
reported in (2003) 5 SCC 163 held as under:
"13.....................At this stage, I may also refer to the latest decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Officers & Supervisors of I.D.P.L. v. Chairman & M.D, I.D.P.L. reported in (2003) 6 SCC 490 in which the contentions raised by the petitioners in A.K. Bindal's case (Supra) was reiterated by the petitioners therein. Relying upon the decision of A.K. Bindal's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the writ petition. In view of the above decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the law is now well WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 5 of 29 established that the employees of a Government Company have no legal right to claim that the Government should pay their salary or that the additional expenditure incurred on account of revision of their pay scales should be met by the Government and that the economic viability or the financial capacity of the employer is an important factor which cannot be ignored while fixing the wage structure and revision of pay scales of the employees.
14. In the light of my findings that the T.J.M.L. is a loss- incurring unit and cannot even pay regular salary to its employees and that most of the looms of the units having been out of order with the production level far below the optimum level and the further fact that the Government is unwilling to extend budgetary support to help the T.J.M.L. pay the revised pay scale with effect from 1.1.1996 it is thus not permissible for this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners, and to do so would be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case, which, to my mind, is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the fact that the T.J.M.L. being a loss incurring unit can be no ground for non-payment of the revised scale of pay etc. has been completely answered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases.
15. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that fixing 1.4.1999 as the cut-off date for revising the pay-scale of the petitioners' Association is arbitrary and not sustainable in law inasmuch as the employees of the other public sector units were paid the revised pay scale with effect from 1.1.1996, Choice of a date cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances', see Union of India Vs. Sudhir Kumar in (1994)
4 SCC 212. In this case, in view of the position taken by the State Government that it could not provide budgetary support for payment of enhanced/revised pay scale, it cannot be held that fixing of different cut-off date for the petitioners' Association is arbitrary or whimsical. In the State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that financial constraints are valid considerations for framing or modifying a policy. Again, in Union of India v. Lieut. E.Iacuts (1997) 7 SCC 334, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that additional financial outlay required was a relevant consideration for determination of cut-off date. It was further held that if a benefit is conferred upon a given date bearing in mind all relevant factors, it cannot be considered arbitrary or unreasonable. Therefore, the petitioners' Association has no legitimate grievance against the impugned WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 6 of 29 action of the respondents. That apart to grant the reliefs claimed by the Petitioners' Association on the facts and circumstances of this case would be to shut the realities highlighted by the respondents and will have disastrous consequences leading to the closure of the unit itself to the detriment of the employees of the T.J.M.L. including members of the petitioners' Association. Therefore, I reluctantly agree with the submission of the learned Advocate General that this writ petition is a suicidal writ petition. I have gone through the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the various submissions made by him but in the view that I have taken I do not propose to discuss them in detail.
16. For what has been stated above, this writ petition is devoid of merits, and is hereby dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs."
[8] Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.139 of 1997, the officers and employees of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. filed WA No.74 of 2003 which was decided by the Division Bench of the High Court on 08.04.2011. [9] The Division Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge and held that if TJML was a loss incurring unit, it was the bounden duty of the State Government to take remedial measures and the same could not be a ground to deny the claim of revision of pay scales as per recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission to the officers and employees of TJML w.e.f. the date on which officers and employees of other autonomous bodies were given the benefit. The Division Bench of the High Court viewed that in many other PSUs which were running at a loss, the State Government implemented the recommendations of 4th Pay Commission by providing revised pay scales and allowances to their officers and employees. As a consequence, the Division Bench allowed the appeal and directed the State respondents to revise the pay and allowances of the officers and employees of TJML at par with their counterparts in other 32 organizations w.e.f. 01.01.1996 viewing as under:
WA No.72 of 2018WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 7 of 29 "49. The learned single Judge has held in the impugned judgment and order dated 28.10.2003 that the officers and employees of the TJM are not entitled to get similar treatment with that of other 32 PSUs/Govt. undertakings/statutory bodies. Such a finding has been recorded on the ground that the economic condition of TJM is not viable and that the same is a loss incurring unit. While answering the issue against the petitioners-appellants, the learned single Judge primarily proceeded with that notion in mind, without however, taking into consideration the case of other 32 organizations, about which mention has been made above. It has been held by the learned single Judge that the petitioners do not have any enforceable right to claim parity with the employees of other PSUs of the State Govt. Deviating from the facts and issues involved in the writ petition, the learned single Judge has gone into the area of evaluation of jobs for the purpose of pay scales with the observation that the same must be left to the expert body. In the instant case we are not concerned with as to whether the employees of TJM perform the same nature of job like that of their counterparts in other PSUs. It was never the pleaded case of the respondents that the distinction has been made upon evaluation of the duties and responsibilities of the employees.
50. The learned single Judge has also held that there cannot be any formation of opinion that the employees of TJM and the employees of other PSUs belonged to and constitute the same class. While holding so, the learned single Judge has taken note of the aforementioned fact relating to the exclusion of TJM from the purview of 3rd Pay Commission at the instance of the Managing Director of TJM, unmindful of the fact that the Govt.
itself considered the recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission in respect of TJM with the distinction of making the effective date differently. The learned single Judge has also held that the petitioners have failed to discharge their burden to establish that they and for that matter the employees of TJM and their counterparts in other PSUs belonged to the same class and that the employees of TJM have been subjected to hostile discrimination for non-payment of revised pay scale w.e.f. 1.1. 1996 or DA, CAS, HRA and CA to them.
51. The petitioners-appellants have clearly demonstrated that they have been discriminated in the matter of granting the said benefits. They have also demonstrated that they stand on equal footing like that of other PSUs. It was never the contention of the respondents that the petitioners are a class apart and cannot be equated with that of the other PSUs. Their plea before the amendment of the writ petition and after the amendment, has been noted above, from which it cannot be WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 8 of 29 said that the petitioners failed to discharge their burden relating to their claim of discrimination in the matter of pay and allowances.
52. The learned single Judge while shifting the burden to the petitioners to prove that the payment of revised pay scales and other allowances would be available from the income/profit generated by operating the manufacturing units of TJM, failed to take note of the fact that in respect of other PSUs, it is the State Govt. which took the burden to provide additional fund required for the said benefits. If the TJM is a loss incurring unit, as has been held by the Apex Court in Harayana State Minor Irrigation ( supra), it is the bounded duty of the State Govt. to take remedial measures and the same cannot be a ground to deny the claim of revision of pay scales.
53. The petitioners having clearly demonstrated that if not all, many PSUs are running at a loss and the Govt. has implemented the recommendation of the 4th pay Commission by providing revised pay scales to their employees and other allowances, the learned single Judge ought to have considered that aspect of the matter instead of singling out the petitioners and for that matter the employees of TJM, shifting the burden to them to prove that they are at par with their counterparts in other organizations. The fact of the matter is that the petitioners clearly demonstrated the disparity in the matter of revision of pay and allowances, which the respondents tried to defend with their shifting pleas in the original counter affidavit and the subsequent affidavits filed after the amendment of the writ petition.
54. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that writ appeal and for that matter the writ petition deserves to be allowed and consequently we set aside and quash the impugned judgment and order dated 28.10.2003 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Rule No.139/1997. As a consequence, direction is issued to the respondents to treat the petitioners and for that matter the officers and employees of the TJM at par with their counterparts in other 32 organizations, entitling them to the revised pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and other allowances, such as, HRA, CA, CAS and DA etc.
55. The writ appeal is allowed and consequently, the writ petition also stand allowed, without however, any order as to costs."
[10] It would appear from the judgment aforesaid passed by the Division Bench that the question regarding applicability of the pay scale in terms WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 9 of 29 of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission to officers and employees of TJML w.e.f. 01.01.1996 instead of 01.04.1999 was examined by the Division Bench and the Division Bench was of the view that the revised pay scale was made effective from 01.01.1996 in respect of all the other 32 PSUs/undertakings/statutory bodies in Tripura whereas an exception was made in respect of TJML in whose case the revised pay scale was made effective from 01.04.1999. The High Court observed that no reason was discernible for doing so except the plea of economic condition of TJML and the said plea was not acceptable to the Division Bench because the Division Bench found that such plea was belied by the own action of the State respondents in asking other PSUs to work out the requirements of the additional funds and furnish proposals for additional financial liability for implementing the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission in their organizations. High Court held that such conduct amounted to discriminatory treatment in respect of the officers and employees of TJML which called for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. [11] The State of Tripura challenged the judgment and order dated 08.04.2021 passed by the Division Bench in WA No.74 of 2003 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of preferring SLP(C) No.20837 of 2011. At that stage, the workers' union of TJML also filed their intervention application before the Hon'ble Apex Court as a matter of precaution. But as they were not petitioners before the High Court, the Apex Court rejected their intervention application by an order dated 25.10.2016 while dismissing the Civil Appeal No(s).10411 of 2016 arising out of said SLP(C) No.20837 of 2011 filed by the State against the Division Bench judgment. The Hon'ble Apex Court confined the relief to the members of Tripura Jute Mills Officers' Association taking note of the fact that it was the association WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 10 of 29 who had agitated the matter before the High Court. The Apex Court thus upheld the judgment of the Division Bench granting benefit of the 4th Pay Commission to Tripura Jute Mills Officers' Association w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and allowed interest @ 6% on the amount due to each of the officers/employees w.e.f. the date of the Division Bench order i.e. from 08.04.2011. The Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reads as under:
"Application(s) for intervention and impleadment are dismissed. Leave granted.
Upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties the appeal is disposed of in the following terms:
1. The order of the Division Bench granting the benefit of the Fourth Pay Commission to the respondent-Tripura Jute Mills Officers Association w.e.f. 01.01.1996 is maintained.
2. Interest at the rate of 6% on the amount due to each of the officers/employees with effect from the date of the Division Bench Order i.e. 08.04.2011 be paid.
3. The amount due with interest, as aforesaid, be paid within a period of four months to the concerned officers-employees and/or to their legal heirs/representatives, as the case may be.
4. The above relief will be confined to the members of the Tripura Jute Mills Officers Association as it is the said Association who had agitated the matter before the High Court."
[12] Thereafter, Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty filed WP(C) No.785 of 2017 which was heard by the learned Single Judge along with WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 filed by the workers' union of TJML. The matter was disposed of by the common judgment impugned. Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty is an officer who stands superannuated. His claim was not accepted by the State on the ground that he was not a member of the association. No justification has been tendered by the respondents to distinguish his case for fixation of pay in the revised scale w.e.f. 01.01.1996 as decided by the Division Bench by judgment dated 08.04.2011 passed in WA No.74 of 2003. The workers' WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 11 of 29 union in WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 agitated before the learned Single Judge that there were 33 public sector/Government undertakings/statutory bodies including Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. All the officers and workers of 32 public sector/Government undertakings/statutory bodies were extended the benefit of the 4th Pay Commission with other allowances such as HRA, CA, CAS, DA etc. w.e.f. 01.01.1996 whereas the case of the officers and workers of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. were treated differently and they were given revised pay scale w.e.f. 01.04.1999 with no rational basis attached to it. The workers' union i.e. the writ petitioners contended before the learned Single Judge that there was a hostile discrimination in the matter of pay and allowances granted to them as a result of which they were getting much lesser pay than their counterparts in other PSUs.
[13] One of the objections raised by the State respondents before the learned Single Judge was that after their intervention application in Civil Appeal No(s).10411 of 2016 arising out of SLP(C) No. 20837 of 2011 was rejected by the Hon'ble Apex Court, at least they could not prefer any writ petition. Learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned held that the submission of the State respondents (appellants herein) was without substance for the reason that the Apex Court has not permitted the intervention at the stage of Special Leave to Appeal for the reason that they were not parties to the proceedings before the Division Bench of this Court, but that will not debar the workers' union in filing their separate petition and rejection to their intervention application by the Apex Court would not non suit the claim of the petitioners, which they have raised in the instant writ petitions.
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Page - 12 of 29 [14] The other objections raised by the State respondents against the claim of the workers' union were dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned in the following manner:
"17. As regards the counter affidavits filed by the State respondents and also by the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. in the cases of Union are almost in the same footings just to non suit the claim of the members of the Union who are indisputably the employees of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. raising number of preliminary objections which might appeal to the Court to non suit their claim since on principles the issue has been threadbare examined by the Division Bench of this court in its judgment dt. 8th April, 2011 of which reference has been made & finally held that the officers of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. are entitled for their fixation in the pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996 instead of 1st April, 1999 as sanctioned by the Govt. under its notification dt. 5th July, 1999 keeping in view the parity with other officers and workers of 32 Public Sector Undertakings/Statutory bodies etc. where the benefit of 4th revision of pay has been extended consistently with no discrimination w.e.f. 1st January, 1996 such action of the respondents indeed was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
18. The objection raised by the respondents is that the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. Workers Union earlier preferred Civil Rule No.641/97 claiming pay revision along with DA, CA, HRA and CAS but that came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 19.09.2017 and it was not agitated at least by the Union any further. But this objection does not hold good for the simple reason that the writ petition was filed by the workers Union in 1997 and the State Govt. under its notification dt. 5th July, 1999 has granted them the benefits of revision of pay scale w.e.f. 01.04.1999. Thus the subsequent notification dt. 5th July,1999 was not the subject matter of challenge and particularly its applicability which was effected from 01.04.1999, rejection of the writ petition may not be of any substance and would not deprive the rights of the petitioners in claiming the reliefs what being prayed in the writ petition.
19. Another objection raised by the respondents in the written statement is that after their intervention application filed by the petitioner-Union being rejected by the Apex Court at least they could not prefer any writ petition. The submission is without substance for the reason that the Apex Court has not permitted the intervention at the stage of a special leave to appeal for the reason that they were not parties to the proceedings before the WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 13 of 29 Division Bench of this Court, but that will not debar the Union in filing their separate petition and rejection of their intervention application by the Apex court would not non suit the claim of the petitioners, which they have raised in the instant writ petitions."
[15] Having viewed thus, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions and directed the State respondents as under:
"22. The writ petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed to revise the pay scales of the members of the petitioners-Union including employees of Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. which are covered under the notification dt.5th July, 1999, at par with their counterparts in 32 Public Sector Undertakings/Statutory Bodies/Govt. Undertakings etc. entitling them to the revised pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and other allowances such as HRA, CAS, CA, DA etc. as considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Judgment dt. 8th April, 2011."
[16] The basic stand of the State appellants in the present appeal are as under:
(i) The learned Single Judge should not have entertained the claim of the workers' union after their intervention application was rejected by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it was specifically stated in paragraph 4 of the Apex Court's judgment dated 25.10.2016 that the relief shall be confined to the members of Tripura Jute Mills Officers' Association as it is the said association who had agitated the matter before the High Court.
(ii) By a bipartite agreement between the management of TJML and the recognized trade unions, the pay structures of the workers of TJML was determined. Therefore, they were not entitled to claim revision of pay under the recommendations of 4th Pay Commission.
(iii) Learned Single Judge did not appreciate the fact that there was delay and latches on the part of the workers' union to approach the High Court seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018
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(iv) Learned Single Judge did not consider the fact that payment of the revised pay scale from 01.01.1996 to the officers and workers of TJML would lead to a huge financial burden on the State exchequer which in turn will affect implementation of other development and infrastructure schemes. [17] Learned Advocate General has further argued that economic viability of the industrial unit or the financial capacity of the employer is a relevant consideration in the matter of revision of pay scales of the employees. It is contended by Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General that TJML has been out of order over a long period of time and at the relevant time its production level was far below the optimum level and the unit was not in a position to pay even the monthly wages of its officers and employees. Considering the financial capacity of the unit, the State Government fixed the cut off date for giving effect to the revised pay scale from 01.04.1999 and the learned Single Judge has erroneously fixed the cut off date from 01.01.1996 without taking into consideration the financial capacity of the employer. It is argued by learned counsel that the employees cannot claim any enforceable legal right for revision of pay scales if the company is sustaining loss continuously over a period and does not have the financial capacity to revise or enhance the pay scales. To nourish his contention, learned Advocate General has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Uptron Employees' Union, CMD & Ors. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 319 which has observed as under:
"13. This Court specifically held that the economic viability or the financial capacity of the employer is an important factor which cannot be ignored while fixing the wage structure, otherwise the unit itself may not be able to function and may have to close down which will inevitably have disastrous consequences for the employees themselves.WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018
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14. The same legal position has been reiterated by this Court in the case of Officers & Supervisors of I.D.P.L. v. Chairman & M.D., I.D.P.L. and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 490 this Court observed in paras 7 and 8 as under:-
"7. In the above background, the question which arises for consideration is whether the employees of public sector enterprises have any legal right to claim revision of wages that though the industrial undertakings or the companies in which they are working did not have the financial capacity to grant revision in pay scale, yet the Government should give financial support to meet the additional expenditure incurred in that regard.
8. We have carefully gone through the pleadings, the annexures filed by both sides and the orders passed by the BIFR and the judgments cited by the counsel appearing on either side. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent drew our attention to a recent judgment of this Court in A.K. Bindal v. Union of India (2003) 5 SCC 163 in support of her contention. We have perused the said judgment. In our opinion, since the employees of government companies are not government servants, they have absolutely no legal right to claim that the Government should pay their salary or that the additional expenditure incurred on account of revision of their pay scales should met by the Government. Being employees of the companies, it is the responsibility of the companies to pay them salary and if the company is sustaining losses continuously over a period and does not have financial capacity to revise or enhance the pay scale, the petitioners, in our view, cannot claim any legal right to ask for a direction to the Central Government to meet the additional expenditure which may be incurred on account of revision of pay scales. We are unable to countenance the submission made by Mr. Sanghi that economic viability of the industrial unit or the financial capacity of the employer cannot be taken into consideration in the matter of revision of pay scales of the employees."
We may observe that in both these cases the earlier decision of this Court in Heavy Engg. Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and (1969) 1 SCC 765 was noticed and applied."
[18] Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General has also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Bindal & Anr. (Supra) wherein two relevant questions, namely whether the employees of a Government company are civil servants having the right to claim that the Government should pay their salary WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 16 of 29 or that the additional expenditure incurred on account of revision of their pay scales should be made by the Government and whether the employees of public sector enterprises have any legal right to claim that though such undertakings, in which they are working did not have the financial capacity to grant revision in pay scales, yet the Government should give financial support to meet the additional expenditure incurred in that regard came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in which the Apex Court observed as under:
"17. The legal position is that identity of the Government Company remains distinct from the government. The Government Company is not identified with the Union but has been placed under a special system of control and conferred certain privileges by virtue of the provisions contained in Sections 619 and 620 of the Companies Act. Merely because the entire share holding is owned by the Central Government will not make the incorporated company as Central Government. It is also equally well settled that the employees of the Government Company are not civil servants and so are not entitled to the protection afforded by Article 311 of the Constitution (Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, (1989) 3 SCC 448). Since employees of Government Companies are not government servants, they have absolutely no legal right to claim that government should pay their salary or that the additional expenditure incurred on account of revision of their pay scale should be met by the government. Being employees of the companies it is the responsibility of the companies to pay them salary and if the company is sustaining losses continuously over a period and does not have the financial capacity to revise or enhance the pay scale, the petitioners cannot claim any legal right to ask for a direction to the Central Government to meet the additional expenditure which may be incurred on account of revision of pay scales. It appears that prior to issuance of the Office Memorandum dated 12.4.1993 the Government had been providing the necessary funds for the management of Public Sector Enterprises which had been incurring losses. After the change in economic policy introduced in early nineties, the Government took a decision that the Public Sector Undertakings will have to generate their own resources to meet the additional expenditure incurred on account of increase in wages and that the Government will not provide any funds for the same. Such of the Public Sector Enterprises (Government Companies) which had become sick WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 17 of 29 and had been referred to BIFR, were obviously running on huge losses and did not have their own resources to meet the financial liability which would have been incurred by revision of pay scales. By the Office Memorandum dated 19.7.1995 the Government merely reiterated its earlier stand and issued a caution that till a decision was taken to revive the undertakings, no revision in pay scale should be allowed. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity, legal or constitutional in the two Office Memorandums which have been challenged in the writ petitions."
[19] Further in paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Apex Court held that economic viability or financial capacity of the employer is an important factor which cannot be ignored while fixing the pay structure. The Court observed as under:
"22.......................The other case, All India namely, Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation v. Government of India, (2002) 3 SCC 554 arose out of interlocutory applications and contempt petitions which were filed for implementation of the direction issued in the earlier case namely, South Malabar Gramin Bank (2001) 4 SCC 101. Any observation in these two cases to the effect that the financial capacity of the employer cannot be held to be a germane consideration for determination of the wage structure of the employees must, therefore, be confined to the facts of the aforesaid case and cannot be held to be of general application in all situations. In Associate Banks Officers' Assn. v. State Bank of India, (1998) 1 SCC 428 it was observed that many ingredients go into the shaping of the wage structure of any organisation which may have been shaped by negotiated settlements with employees' unions or through industrial adjudication or with the help of expert committees. The economic capability of the employer also plays a crucial part in it; as also its capacity to expand business or earn more profits. It was also held that a simplistic approach, granting higher remuneration to workers in one organisation because another organisation had granted them, may lead to undesirable results and the application of the doctrine would be fraught with danger and may seriously affect the efficiency and at times, even the functioning of the organisation. Therefore, it appears to be the consistent view of this Court that the economic viability or the financial capacity of the employer is an important factor WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 18 of 29 which cannot be ignored while fixing the wage structure, otherwise the unit itself may not be able to function and may have to close down which will inevitably have disastrous consequences for the employees themselves. The material on record clearly shows that both FCI and HFC had been suffering heavy losses for the last many years and the Government had been giving considerable amount for meeting the expenses of the organisations. In such a situation, the employees cannot legitimately claim that their pay scales should necessarily be revised and enhanced even though the organisations in which they are working are making continuous losses and are deeply in the red."
[20] Learned Advocate General has further argued that financial constraints of the employer is always a valid ground for introducing a cut off date to limit the benefit to its employees after calculating the financial implications which cannot be termed as irrational or arbitrary. Learned Advocate General, therefore, argued that learned Single Judge erred in exercising power of Article 226 of the Constitution in the present case. Counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board represented by its Chairman vs. TNEB-Thozhilalar Aykkiya Sangam by its General Secretary reported in (2019) 15 SCC 235 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:
"22. The main source of finance of the Electricity Board is the State Government; the Board is run by the State Government. Unless the funds are provided by the State Government, the Electricity Board would not have sufficient funds of its own to pay the wages and the revised Dearness Allowance to its employees. Considering the financial difficulties which the State Government was facing, the revision of the Dearness Allowance from the above said dates at above said rate cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any reason.
23. While considering the grievance of wage structure or Dearness Allowance, the importance of considering the financial implications while providing benefits to employees has been noted by the Supreme Court in number of judgments. The Supreme Court in Workmen v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1969) 1 SCC 266 while dismissing the appeal preferred by the workmen, has confirmed the view taken by the Tribunal which rejected the demand of the employees of the Board for WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 19 of 29 Dearness Allowance that it should be fixed with the scale prescribed for the Ahmedabad Mill Owners' Association on the ground that the Board does not have the capacity to meet the additional expenditure that would have to be incurred if such demands are acceded to.
24. The Supreme Court in Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Workmen, (1969) 2 SCR 113 after referring to Kamani Metals & Alloys Ltd. v. Workmen, (1967) 2 SCR 463 has laid down that one-hundred per cent neutralisation is not advisable as it will lead to inflation and therefore, dearness allowance is often a little less than one-hundred per cent neutralisation. Explaining the purpose of Dearness Allowance and that it should depend upon the ability of the employer to bear such burden, the Supreme Court held as under:- (Bengal Chemical case, (1969) 2 SCR 113) "(1) Full neutralization is not normally given, except to the very lowest class of employees.
(2) The purpose of dearness allowance being to neutralise a portion of the increase in the cost of living, it should ordinarily be on a sliding scale and provide for an increase on the rise in the cost of living and a decrease on a fall in the cost of living. (3) The basis of fixation of wages and dearness allowance is industry-cum-region.
(4) Employees getting the same wages should get the same dearness allowance, irrespective of whether they are working as clerks or members of subordinate staff or factory workmen. (5) The additional financial burden which a revision of the wage structure or dearness allowance would impose upon an employer, and his ability to bear such burden, are very material and relevant factors to be taken into account."
(emphasis supplied)
25. In T.N. Electricity Board v. R. Veerasamy , (1999) 3 SCC 414 which has been relied upon by the respondent, in which TNEB itself was the appellant, the Supreme Court while dealing with the prospective application of a pension scheme observed that financial constraint is a valid ground for introducing a cut-off date and took note of the financial burden that the Board will have to borne if the scheme would be made effective retrospectively.
26. In State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6 SCC 754, the Supreme Court negatived the contention of the employees that the decision of the Central Government/State Governments to limit the benefit only to certain employees WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 20 of 29 after calculating the financial implications thereon, was irrational or arbitrary and held as under:-
"28..........the final recommendations of the Pay Commission were not ipso facto binding on the Government, as the Government had to accept and implement the recommendations of the Pay Commission consistent with its financial position. This is precisely what the Government did. Such an action on the part of the Government can neither be characterised as irrational, nor as arbitrary so as to infringe Article 14 of the Constitution."
27. It is within the power of the Board to set a cut-off date for payment of revised Dearness Allowance keeping in view its financial constraints. Moreover, the settlement agreement and the decisions taken by the Board in the Board Proceedings are to be harmoniously construed. Having regard to the financial difficulties which the State Government was facing, the appellant-Board being a State Government undertaking, decided to adopt the State Government's revised Dearness Allowance at the same rate and from the same date. In view of extremely difficult financial situation, not only the State Government employees but all the employees of various other corporations were granted revised Dearness Allowance at the rate of 49% only w.e.f. 01.10.2002 and 52% w.e.f. 01.07.2003. The respondent(s) union cannot insist for revision of Dearness Allowance at a higher rate than what was being paid to the State Government employees."
[21] Finally, learned Advocate General argued that claim of the petitioners was clearly barred by the doctrine of laches. Moreover, the Apex Court by judgment & order dated 25.10.2016 in Civil Appeal No(s). 10411 of 2016 clearly limited the relief to the members of TJML Officers' Association. The judgment of the Court, therefore, was in personam which was expressly stated in the said judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. The workers' union who wanted to get similar benefit should have satisfied the Court that their petition did not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence which they failed to satisfy. In support of his contention, counsel has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 21 of 29 Ors. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 in which the Apex Court has observed as under:
"22.2 However, this principle is subject to well-recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3 However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like [see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721]. On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.
23. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 22 of 29 passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only was there unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above.
24. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as well as that of the Tribunal. There shall, however, be no order as to costs."
Learned Advocate General has, therefore, argued that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is devoid of merit which warrants interference in appeal.
[22] Regarding the submission of the learned Advocate General that the members of the workers' union should be treated as fence-sitters and their claim is defeated by laches and delays, Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents has contended that in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors. (Supra), the Apex Court has succinctly held that the normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit and not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [23] Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior advocate has further referred to paragraph 21 of the judgment impugned wherein the learned Single Judge has held that submission with regard to delay and laches is without substance for the reason that the grievance agitated was pending in the High Court for a sufficient long time and once the Division Bench of the Court on principle arrived at a conclusion that the State action was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and once the Court held that the officers of the TJML were entitled to pay revision w.e.f. 01.01.1996, there is no reason for the Government to take a different stand WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 23 of 29 against the workers of TJML and delay and laches may not come in their way, moreso, when no third party right has accrued.
[24] Counsel appearing for the respondents has further argued that doctrine of laches has no application in the present context since denial of the revised pay scales to the workers of TJML w.e.f. 01.01.1996 has resulted in a successive or recurring wrong. In support of his contention, counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. Yogendra Shrivastava reported in (2010) 12 SCC 538 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment has held as under:
"18. We cannot agree. Where the issue relates to payment or fixation of salary or any allowance, the challenge is not barred by limitation or the doctrine of laches, as the denial of benefit occurs every month when the salary is paid, thereby giving rise to a fresh cause of action, based on continuing wrong. Though the lesser payment may be a consequence of the error that was committed at the time of appointment, the claim for a higher allowance in accordance with the Rules (prospectively from the date of application) cannot be rejected merely because it arises from a wrong fixation made several years prior to the claim for correct payment. But in respect of grant of consequential relief of recovery of arrears for the past period, the principle relating to recurring and successive wrongs would apply. Therefore the consequential relief of payment of arrears will have to be restricted to a period of three years prior to the date of the original application. [See: M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 and Tarsem Singh(2008) 8 SCC 648 ]"
[25] Counsel also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 to contend that where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy. Observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgment is as under:
"6. In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 274 this Court held:WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018
Page - 24 of 29 "8......The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
* * *
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.......... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years."
7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re- fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.
8. In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 25 of 29 justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to the date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances."
[26] Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in (2003) 6 SCC 1 (Kapila Hingorani vs. State of Bihar) and (2005) 2 SCC 262 (Kapila Hingorani vs. State of Bihar) counsel further contends that the appellants cannot deny parity in the matter of pay and allowances to the officers and employees of TJML. According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel, the learned Single Judge has correctly held in the judgment impugned that rejection of the intervention application of the respondents by the Apex Court would not non suit their claim because the intervention was not permitted at the stage of Special Leave to Appeal for the reason that they were not parties to the proceedings before the Division Bench of the High Court, that does not disentitle them to seek appropriate remedy from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Counsel has further contended that the appellants have on principle agreed to grant revised scale of pay in terms of the recommendations of the 4 th Pay Commission for which they have also issued a notification on 05.07.1999. Pursuant to the direction of the Court, the benefit has been extended to the officers of TJML w.e.f. 01.01.1996. The workers of TJML having been similarly situated cannot be denied the parity. Counsel, therefore, urges the Court to uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge by dismissing the appeals. [27] Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel representing the parties. Perused the entire record. In WA No.74 of 2003, the Division Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Kapila Hingorani vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 6 SCC 1 and (2005) 2 SCC 262 in which WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 26 of 29 the Apex Court held that the State owned corporations/PSUs/statutory bodies being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the State Government having deep and pervasive control over such bodies has an additional duty to protect the Constitutional rights of their employees. [28] With regard to the plea of the State that TJML being a sick unit, the State was not in a position to provide its employees the benefit of revision of pay, the Division Bench held that in respect of other 32 PSUs in the State, pay revision in terms of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission was made effective from 01.01.1996. In their case, they were even asked to furnish proposal to the State Government for fund for meeting the additional financial liability arising out of the implementation of the 4th Pay Commission recommendations. Such discriminatory treatment in respect of TJML was not accepted by the Division Bench. The Division Bench viewed that it cannot be said to be a case of reasonable classification warranting non interference of this Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This apart, it was also observed by the Division Bench that the plea of the State in their original counter affidavit prior to the amendment of the writ petition was completely different. In the original counter affidavits submitted by them in the writ petition it was never pleaded by the State that because of the economic condition of the TJML its officers and employees were not entitled to claim pay parity/revision of pay at par with other PSUs. It was contended by the State that TJML from its very inception maintained different pay structure and in fact when the 3rd Pay Commission was constituted, the Managing Director of TJML requested the Government to exclude TJML from the purview of the said Pay Commission but such decision of the Managing Director was not backed by any decision and/or WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 27 of 29 a resolution of the Board of Directors of TJML. The Division Bench held that admittedly TJML was very much within the purview of the 2nd Pay Commission and since its inception, all along followed the pay structures of the State Government employees.
[29] As stated, the Hon'ble Apex Court maintained the judgment of the Division Bench in Civil Appeal No(s).10411 of 2016 arising out of SLP(C) No.20837 of 2011 but the relief was confined only to the members of Tripura Jute Mills Officers' Association as it was the said association who had agitated the matter before the High Court. After the said judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the workers' union instituted WP(C) No.510 of 2017 and WP(C) No.525 of 2017 in which the learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned held that the objection raised by the State that after their intervention application filed by the workers' union was rejected by the Hon'ble Apex Court, they could not prefer any writ petition was without substance for the reason that the Apex Court did not permit the intervention at the stage of Special Leave to Appeal because they were not parties to the proceedings before the Division Bench, but that would not debar the workers' union in filing their separate petition and rejection of their intervention application by the Hon'ble Apex Court would not non suit their claim, which they have raised in the present writ petition. We cannot, but agree with the said observation of the learned Single Judge.
[30] With regard to the objection of the State on the ground of delay and laches of the petitioners in approaching the Court, the observation of the learned Single Judge is reproduced hereunder:
"21...................The submission is without substance for the reason that the grievance agitated was pending in this Court for a sufficient long time and once the Division Bench of this Court on principles has arrived to a conclusion that the action WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 28 of 29 of the respondents was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and the defence in segregating the officers/workers of the TJML from other 32 Public Sector Undertakings/Govt. undertakings/Statutory bodies etc. amounts to discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and once held that the entitlement of the officers who approached for their revision of pay w.e.f. 01.01.1996, there is no reason for the Govt. to take any different stand against the workers of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. who are indeed employees of the TJML and it was expected from the Govt. to come forward after lost the battle on principle to extend the benefits to the workers who are also the employees of the Tripura Jute Mills Ltd. and at least the delay and laches may not come in way of the petitioners, more so, when no third party right has accrued or defeated in the interregnum period and that will not defeat the rights of the petitioners in claiming the relief of fixation of pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1996 as decided by the Division Bench of this Court under its judgment dt. 8th April,2011 of which a detailed reference has been made by me."
[31] In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any reason to disagree with the said findings of the learned Single Judge. There cannot be any doubt that the members of the workers' union of TJML (respondents herein) were not treated equally with the similarly situated workers of other public sector undertakings/Government undertakings/statutory bodies etc. in the State in revising their pay scale in terms of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission. The recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission have been made effective from 01.04.1999 in the case of the private respondents whereas the benefit of such pay revision is given to the employees of other PSUs w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and such discrimination has been made without any rational basis. As such, the learned Single Judge has committed no error in directing the State to revise the pay scales of the members of the workers' union including other employees of TJML at par with their counterparts in other 32 PSUs w.e.f. 01.01.1996 along with other allowances such as HRA, CAS, CA and DA etc. WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018 Page - 29 of 29 [32] In the additional affidavit submitted on behalf of the State appellants on 15.03.2022, it has been stated that the pay of the employees of TJML has already been notionally revised as applicable to the corresponding posts in other PSUs in terms of ROP Rules, 2009 raising their pay and allowances. In the reply submitted on behalf of the respondent workers' union, it has been stated that even though benefit has been given from 2009 and that too notionally, the members of the workers' union have been deprived of the benefits from 01.01.1996 to 01.01.2009.
[33] In view of the above, while dismissing the appeals, we direct the State appellants to provide the benefit of the revised pay scales and allowances to the private respondents i.e. the members of the workers' union and other employees of TJML and also to respondent Dr. Parimal Kanti Chakraborty w.e.f. 01.01.1996 in terms of the judgment impugned of the learned Single Judge after adjustments of the dues already paid to them within a period of 6 (six) months from today.
[34] In terms of the above, the writ appeals stand disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY), J (INDRAJIT MAHANTY), CJ Rudradeep WA No.72 of 2018 WA No.73 of 2018 WA No.74 of 2018