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[Cites 4, Cited by 3]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Dev Raj Sharma vs State Of Haryana And Ors. on 3 January, 1994

Equivalent citations: (1995)110PLR333

JUDGMENT
 

R.S. Mongia, J.
 

1. The petitioner, who was working as a Sanskrit Teacher, was placed under Suspension on 11.9.1986 as a Criminal, case under Sections 323, 336, 325 and 506 I.P.C. was pending against him. The petitioner was acquitted by the trial Court on 26.7.1989. It was observed by the trial Court that there was absolutely no evidence against the accused.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that after his acquittal, he had informed the Headmaster of Government High School, Jadaula (Kaithal) from where he was suspended, that he had been acquitted by the criminal Court. This assertion is sought to be supported from a certificate issued by the Headmaster of the school dated 18.2.1993 (copy annexure P-9).

The Certificate reads as under:-

"Certified that Shri Dev Raj Sharma, Sanskrit Teacher, Government high School, Jadaula (Kaithal) was suspended vide D.E.O. letter No. E-1/86/597 Dated 5.9.86, the copy of the decision of the criminal case which was pending against him and received by this School on 2.9.89. In accordance with the record of the School, the same was sent to Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Guhla for information vide despatch No. 6634 dated 4.11.1989."

3. It is further the case of the petitioner that he received a letter from the office of the Sub Divisional Education Officer, Pehowa on 7.1.1992 asking for information from the petitioner as to for which offence and on which date he was suspended and if he had been acquitted, whether he informed the office or not. The petitioner gave reply thereto on 9.2.1992 that he had already informed the District Education Officer, Kurukshetra. The petitioner was ultimately reinstated on 29.3.1992.

4. It has been averred in the written statement that a charge-sheet has been served on the petitioner on 29.7.1993 for holding a departmental enquiry and the matter is still pending.

5. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition in this Court being civil Writ Petition No. 13738 of 1992 inter alia praying for regularisation of the suspension period from 11.9.1986 to 28.3.1992 and for granting full salary and allowances for the said period. The writ petition was disposed of on 16.10.1992 in the following terms:-

"The sole grouse of the petitioner in this writ petition pertains to non-regularisation of his suspension period from 11.9.86 to 28.3.92. The petitioner had not approached the authorities in this regard. Thus, no interference on the writ jurisdiction side is called for. The petitioner, if so advised, should file representation before the concerned authority and the authority is directed to dispose it of within three months of receipt thereof."

In pursuance of the order of this Court referred to above, the District Education Officer, Kurukshetra passed an order on 7.1.1993 (copy Annexure P-8) rejecting the claim of the petitioner primarily on the ground that after the acquittal of the petitioner on 26.7.1989 by the Court, he did not bother to inform the department of this acquittal. Rather, he concealed the fact of his acquittal and received suspension allowance till 17.8.1992 when the order of reinstatement had been passed. It was only on 8.2.1992 that the petitioner informed about the factum of his acquittal in the criminal case.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in fact the petitioner had informed the headmaster of the School from where he was suspended about the factum of his acquittal. This fact is sought to be supported, as observed earlier, by the certificate of the headmaster dated 8.2.1993 (copy Annexure P-9). He further submitted that there was no question of the petitioner not informing the respondents about his acquittal as on his reinstatement, he would have got the full pay and would not have remained satisfied only with the substance allowance which was about 50% of the salary, he further submitted that accordingly to Note 9 below Rule 7.3 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I (as applicable to Haryana) - Where a Government employee under suspension is acquitted by a Court of Law and the order reinstating him is passed some-time after the date of acquittal, full pay and allowances have to be paid from the date of acquittal to the date of re-joining of duty and the period counted as duty for all purposes. He still further submitted that after a period of six months of suspension with effect from 11.9.1986, the petitioner was entitled to be considered for enhancement in the subsistence allowance under Rule 7.2 of the rules ibid and consequently, it was argued that in any case the petitioner was entitled to the enhancement in the suspension allowance.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it was the duty of the petitioner to inform the concerned authorities about the factum of his acquittal and a suspended employee is not ipso-facto entitled to full salary on his reinstatement. So far as the period of suspension from 11.9.1986 to 26.7.1989 (the date of acquittal) is concerned, he submitted that necessary orders as required under Rule 7.3 would be passed.

8. It would be apposite to notice note 9 below Rule 7.3 which is reproduced below:-

"Note 0. - Where a Government employee under suspension is acquitted by a Court of law and the order reinstating him is passed some time after the date of acquittal, full pay and allowances have to be paid from the date of acquittal to the date of re-joining duty and the period counted as duty for all purposes whereas for the period from the date of suspension/removal/dismissal to the date of acquittal he is to be allowed pay and allowances as directed by competent authority under sub-rule (4) or sub-rule (5) of this rule, as the case may be."

9. From the reading of the above note, it is evident that after a suspended employee is acquitted by a Court and the order reinstating him is passed later on, he is entitled to full pay and salary for the period after acquittal to the date of reinstatement. This will of course be subject to a suspended employee furnishing requisite certificate or affidavit, if any, to the effect that he has not earned anything during the period of suspension or has not been gainfully employed etc. On the facts of this case, as there is no rebuttal to Annexure P-9 referred to above, I am of the view that the petitioner did inform the headmaster about the factum of his acquittal and the headmaster in turn informed the next higher authority. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to full pay and salary from 26.7.1989 to 29.3.1992 (the dates of acquittal and of reinstatement respectively). This will however, be subject to the petitioner furnishing, if asked for, the requisite certificate/affidavit that he had not been gainfully employed or had earned anything during the period referred to above. Further the respondents are required to pass an order under Rule 7.3 regarding the period from 11.9.1986 to 26.7.1989 as is clear from Note 9 ibid. As has been held in 1991(1) R.S.J. 570, the respondents need not wait till the out come of the disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner, they must pass an order under Rule 7.3 read with Note 9 regarding the above said period.

10. Consequently, I allow this writ petition, set aside the order of the District Education Officer, Kurukshetra dated 7.1.1993 (Annexure P-8) and direct the respondents to pay the salary of the petitioner for the period from 26.7.1989 to 23.3.1992 subject to his furnishing certificate/affidavit or any other requisite information that may be asked for by the respondents. The respondents shall also pass an order regarding the period of suspension from 11.9.1986 to 26.7,1989 and the payment during that period. Let these directions be carried out within a period of three months from the receipt of the copy of the same from the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.