Kerala High Court
Thengackal Estate vs Reethammal on 5 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996ACJ1114, (1996)IILLJ511KER
JUDGMENT Ramakrishnan, J.
1. This is an appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 (for short 'the Act') against the order passed by 2nd respondent, Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Deputy Labour Commissioner), Kottayam in W.C.C.58/1992. The 1st respondent has filed W.C.C.58/92 as the widow of one Ramayya claiming compensation of Rs. 47,866.28 on the ground that the death of her husband Ramayya occurred on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the appellant. As per the impugned order, the 1st respondent was found to be entitled for a sum of Rs. 33,823/- as the compensation payable in respect of the death of Ramayya. The appellant has been made liable to pay the said compensation. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
2. According to 1st respondent, deceased Ramayya was employed as a gardener in the small bungalow of the Assistant Manager of Thengackal Estate of which appellant is the Manager. While on duty on July 1, 1991 atabout 11.30 a.m. deceased Ramayya felt chest pain and fell down, and breathed his last on his way to the hospital. It was alleged that at the time when he fell down due to chest pain, he was clearing the bushes and weeds from the court-yard with a spade. On post-mortem, cause of death was found to be asphyxia. Alleging that the deceased has died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the appellant, the 1st respondent has claimed compensation from the appellant, as employer to the extent of Rs. 47,866.28.
3. The Appellant as the 1st opposite party admitted that deceased Ramayya was a worker employed by them and that he died while on duty. However, the appellant contested the case on the ground that the cause of death of the deceased was heart-failure which had absolutely no causal connection with the work the said Ramayya was doing at the time of his death. It was contended that the death was on account of natural causes unconnected with his employment and therefore the death was not on account of any accident arising out of his employment. Accordingly, liability for payment of compensation was denied by the appellant.
4. On behalf of 1st respondent - applicant in W.C.C. 4 witnesses were examined including the 1st respondent and 5 documents were marked as Exts. A1 to A5. On the side of the appellant (respondent in W.C.C.) apart from examining himself as RW-1, two other witnesses were also examined and a statement of average pay of the deceased was produced as Ext.R1. On the basis of the evidence available on record, the 2nd respondent found that Ramayya died on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the appellant and directed the appellant to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 33,823/-
5. The two questions raised in the memorandum of appeal as substantial questions of law arising for consideration in the case are thus:
(i) Whether, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, the 2nd respondent was right in holding that the death of Ramayya by Asphyxia due to heart-failure can be said to be on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment?
(ii) Whether in the absence of evidence to show that the work of the deceased Ramayya and his death due to heart-failure did not have any causal connection, his death can be held to be arising out of and in the course of his employment?
As is evident from the questions formulated, the main question to be considered is whether deceased Ramayya who was admittedly a worker employed by the appellant has died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as a gardener under the appellant?
6. Though in the memorandum of appeal, the appellant has proceeded on the basis that as opposite parry he has disputed the claim of the 1st respondent that the death of Ramayya was not on account of any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, the objection filed and the evidence given by the appellant would indicate that there was no dispute regarding the claim of the appellant that her husband died in the course of his employment. In fact, examined as PW-1, the appellant has categorically admitted that at the relevant time Ramayya was an employee of the Estate and it was while he was working in the bungalow garden that he fell with chest pain. As such, there cannot be any serious dispute about the fact that Ramayya died in the course of his employment. In the light of the post-mortem certificate, marked as Exts A1 and A3, there cannot be any serious dispute about the cause of death also. It was as a result of asphyxia that Ramayya has died on July 1, 1991. In the circumstances the only question to be considered is whether the death of Ramayya on July 1, 1991 while he was in the course of his employment was on account of an accident arising out of his employment?
7. The main contention put forward by the appellant as already indicated is that death of Ramayya was only a natural death resulting from asphyxia having no connection with the work that he was doing when he suffered the chest pain and fell down in the garden where he was working on July 1, 1991.
8. It was submitted that Ramayya was suffering from chest ailment and was having chest pain in the early hours of the morning on July 1, 1991 even before he went for the work and that would show that chest pain was not at all on account of the work he was doing on that day. It was submitted that the work of Ramayya as a gardener was very light and did not involve any exertion of strain which would cause heart failure. On the above basis, it was contended that there is no causal connection between the death and the employment he was having with the appellant. Since the causal connection between the death and the employment is not established, the appellant cannot be made liable for compensation for the death of the deceased, was the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant.
9. Pleadings and the evidence in the case would clearly establish that Ramayya had some chest complaint and had suffered some chest pain in the early hours of the morning on July 1, 1991 even before he went for the work. Admittedly, Ramayya, at the time when he fell down in the garden with chest pain was doing work with a spade in discharge of his duties as a gardener employed by the appellant. It is also an admitted fact that on his way to the hospital, he died on July 1, 1991 itself. The postmortem certificate would show the cause of death as asphyxia resulting from heart attack. These facts and circumstances, either admitted or proved by the oral and documentary evidence in the case, would in our view, clearly establish that but for the strain due to the work he was doing the unexpected death would not have occurred. We say so because it is the appellant's own case in the written statement that Ramayya had chest complaint and had chest pain in the early hours of the morning of July 1, 1991 even before he went for the work. In the circumstances, it will only be reasonable to conclude that the strain even if it was a normal strain connected with the employment was the reason for the death. Even proceeding on the basis that Ramayya was suffering from chest ailment and was prone to heart attack, the circumstances in the case would clearly indicate that the strain due to the work he was doing was the cause which accelerated his death due to heart attack. As such, in our view, the circumstances established in this case are sufficient to establish the required causal connection between the death and the employment.
10. In the United India Insurance Co. v. C.S. Gopalakrishnan and Anr. (1989-II-LLJ-30) this Court, while dealing with the requirement of causal connection between the employment and the death in order to bring the accident within Section 3 of the Act, has stated thus at page 33:
".... it is not necessary that it should be established that the workman died as a result of exceptional strain or some exceptional work that he did on the day in question. If the nature of the work and the hours of work caused great strain to the employee and that strain caused the unexpected death, it can be said that the workman died as a result of an accident which has arisen in the course of his employment.:
Understanding the expression 'accident' as an 'unlocked for mishap' or as an 'untoward event' which is not expected or designed, we feel that in the state of health which Ramayya was having at the relevant time, the employment as a gardener has at- least accelerated his death or that his death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment and as such the death of Ramayya has arisen out of his employment. We find sufficient support in taking the' above view in the lucid exposition of law made by Chagla, C.J. in Laxmibai Atmaram v. Chairman and Trustees, Bombay Port Trust (1954-I-LLJ-614) which reads thus at page 616:
".... But, if the employment is a contributory cause, or if the employment has accelerated the death, or if it could be said that the death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then the employer would be liable and it could be said that the death arose out of the employment of the deceased."
We have no doubt in our mind that the work Ramayya was doing at the time when he suffered chest pain has been a contributory cause of the death if not the sole cause. Same is the view taken in the following decisions dealing with more or less similar facts and circumstances:
(1) Devshi Bhonji Kohana v. Mary Bumo (1985-II-LLJ-70)(Ker) (2) Executive Engineer v. Janaki 1978 KLT 897 (3) Assam Rlys. and Trading Co. v. Saraswati Devi AIR 1963 Assam 127 & (4) Zubeda Bano v. Maharashtra S.R.T. Corporation (1991-I-LLJ- 66) (Bom) In the Assam Railway's case a Full Bench of the Assam High Court in detail considered all aspects about death caused as a result of heart disease of employees while they were in the course of their employment. After a thorough analysis it has been held thus:
"Even in cases where a person has been suffering from heart disease, if the nature of the work has contributed to the deterioration of the heart and his death, the personal injury can be said to arise out of his employment. The case where the deceased was not suffering from any previous heart disease, is to my mind a stronger case and in such circumstances, if he suddenly gets a heart attack while proceeding to perform his duty, the accident can be nothing but arising out of his employment."
In Zubeda Bano's Case a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held thus at p.69:
"Heart injury when brought about by a strain due to work in the employment and (not by natural wear and tear) is compensable though pre-existing condition may have been the contributory element and this is irrespective of the percentage of the part played by either of them viz., the work and the condition."
11. In the light of the principles laid down in the various decisions, we do not think that any substantial question of law is involved in the appeal as the question has already been settled by various decisions of this Court and other High Courts. In taking the above view we find sufficient justification in the statement of law made by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in N.L. Lalan v. V.A. John (1972-II-LLJ-273) which runs as follows: at page 274-275:
"A question of fact, however, substantial, cannot be substantial question of law. So also a simple question of law cannot be called a substantial question of law. To be so, it must be of great public importance or be one which arises so frequently as to affect a large class of people or be basic to the operation of the Act itself. Where the question is covered already by precedents or the law on that aspect is well settled , the mere difficulty of applying the facts to that "law cannot make it a substantial question of law"
Even assuming that the question raised is a substantial question of law, we are of the view that the question has been rightly decided by the 2nd respondent and no interference is called for with the order on the ground that the questions raised in the appeal have been wrongly decided by the 2nd respondent.
As such, we do not find any ground to admit this appeal. Appeal is accordingly dismissed in limine.