Delhi District Court
Parvinder Singh vs Harpreet Kaur on 10 September, 2025
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIJAY SHANKAR,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE - 04, (WEST DISTRICT)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CR NO.:- 187/2024
CNR NO.:- DLWT01-003136-2024
IN THE MATTER OF :-
Parvinder Singh Manocha
S/o Late Sh. Tarlochan Singh
R/o H.No. B-1/138, Paschim Vihar,
New Delhi ....Revisionist
VERSUS
Harpreet Kaur
W/o Sh. Jatinder Singh
R/o H.No. B-15, Sadbhavna Apartments,
Parwana Road, Pitampura, New Delhi .... Respondent
Date of institution of the revision petition : 10/04/2024
Date on which judgment was reserved : 04/09/2025
Date of judgment : 10/09/2025
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10
17:45:05 -0100
CR No. 187/2024 Page No.1 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur
JUDGMENT
1. By way of present judgment, this Court shall conscientiously adjudicate upon criminal revision petition under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") filed by the revisionist against the order dated 05/03/2024 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order') passed by Ms. Kirandeep Kaur, Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act)-03, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in Complaint Case No. 3883/2023 titled as "Harpreet Kaur V. Parvinder Singh."
In the present revision petition, the revisionist has prayed to call the Trial Court Record and to set-aside the impugned summoning order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court.
2. Brief facts necessary for just adjudication of the present revision petition as stated in the present revision petition are that by way of present revision petition, the revisionist has prayed to set-aside the impugned order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court thereby summons were erroneously issued to the accused (revisionist herein). Complaint of the complainant (respondent herein) before the Ld. Trial Court is not maintainable as there is no bank slip/return memo, which is mandatory requirement. Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned summoning order despite the fact that the Ld. Trial Court has no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint. Revisionist is Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:11 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.2 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur an independent businessman and respondent is the sister of the revisionist. Complainant has preferred the complaint u/s 138 NI Act bearing CC No. 3883/2023 before the Ld. Trial Court pertaining to a cheque bearing no. 000197 dated 04/09/2024 amounting to Rupees One Crore. The aforesaid cheque was presented by the complainant to the drawee bank i.e. Punjab & Sind Bank (D-0869), D-21, Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, New Delhi (North-West District). No bank slip/return memo of the drawee bank, where the cheque was presented i.e. Punjab & Sind Bank (D-0869), D-21, Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, New Delhi is attached with the complaint. Bank slip/return memo is undeniably a statutory requirement u/s 146 NI Act and in the absence of the same, prima-facie evidence of certain facts cannot be presumed. In the absence of statutory requirement of bank slip, the Ld. Trial Court has presumed the fact of dishonour of aforesaid cheque and erroneously passed the impugned order dated 05/03/2024. Respondent has malafidely filed an application for request for return memo, written by her to Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi, which is not even the drawee bank. There is no bank slip/return memo of Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi. Respondent has misrepresented the aforesaid application written by her to Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi as return memo on the metadata form. From the stamp of the drawee bank upon the aforesaid cheque, it is apparent that the drawee bank where the respondent has presented the aforesaid cheque was Punjab & Sind Bank (D-0869), D-21, Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, New Delhi and not Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri Branch, Paschim Vihar, New Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:16 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.3 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur Delhi. In the complaint itself, it is mentioned that "the complainant bank, Punjab & Sind Bank, Branch Pushpanjali Enclave, is situated within the jurisdiction of PS Rani Bagh, Delhi". PS Rani Bagh falls within the North-West District, Delhi and not West Delhi. Ld. Trial Court without having the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint, passed the impugned summoning order. Hence, Ld. Trial Court had no territorial jurisdiction to pass the impugned summoning order. Revisionist has not filed any other similar petition against the impugned summoning order dated 05/03/2024 before this Court or any other Court.
3. Revisionist has challenged the impugned order on the grounds, as mentioned in the present revision petition.
Grounds of revision- Impugned order is erroneous and not maintainable. Fact of dishonour of cheque cannot be presumed in the absence of bank slip, which is prima-facie evidence of certain facts. Drawee bank is situated in the territorial jurisdiction of North-West District, Delhi. PS Rani Bagh is situated in the territorial jurisdiction of North-West District, Delhi. Contents of complaint clearly mentioned that the bank of the complainant is situated in the territorial jurisdiction of PS Rani Bagh. Revisionist has been erroneously made an accused in the aforesaid complaint. Application of the complainant was incorrectly/malafidely mis-represented as return memo. Ld. Trial Court ought to have carefully perused the entire record including territorial jurisdiction before Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:23 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.4 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur issuing the summons to the accused. Impugned order has been passed in a mechanical manner without proper appreciation of contents of the complaint. Ld. Trial Court seems to have placed no reliance on the documents, which have been appended with the complaint. Impugned summoning order over-looked the glaring deficiencies in the complaint of the complainant.
4. Respondent has contested the present revision petition of the revisionist by filing detailed reply, wherein preliminary objections have been taken by the respondent that the present revision petition is not maintainable against the summoning order as the same is interlocutory in nature. The claim of the revisionist that the Ld. Trial Court has no territorial jurisdiction is legally untenable. In the present case, the cheque was presented at Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, which falls within the jurisdiction of West Delhi. Ld. Trial Court has rightly passed the summoning order after carefully considering the prima-facie evidence presented by the complainant including the dishonoured cheque and return memo. Summoning order is based on sound legal principles. Return memo issued by the drawee bank is sufficient evidence to establish a prima-facie case u/s 138 NI Act. Revisionist has deliberately mis- represented the facts in the revision petition. Claim of the revisionist that there was no return memo filed with the complaint, is factually incorrect. Return memo was duly filed with the complaint and Ld. Trial Court has carefully examined the same before passing the summoning order. Contention of the revisionist that the return memo from a different branch invalidates Digitally the signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:29 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.5 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur complaint, is contrary to the settled law and it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the return memo from any branch of the drawee bank is valid for the purpose of Section 138 NI Act. Present revision petition is nothing but a dilatory tactic adopted by the revisionist to evade legal liability u/s 138 NI Act. Summoning order is legally valid and the present revision petition has been filed to delay the proceedings. Objection of the revisionist to the validity of the complaint on the ground of non-submission of the return memo is unfounded. Complainant has filed all necessary documents including the cheque, return memo, legal notice and postal receipts as part of the complaint. Contention of the accused that the cheque was not issued in discharge of any legal liability has no basis. Ld. Trial Court has rightly considered the statutory presumption u/s 118 and 139 NI Act, which mandate that the Court must presume that the cheque was issued for consideration unless evidence to the contrary is presented. In the present case, no such contrary evidence has been produced by the revisionist. The present revision petition of the revisionist is merely an attempt to delay the proceedings and to avoid his legal obligations. Respondent has initially visited the Pushpanjali Branch of the bank, where the Bank Manager affixed a stamp on the cheque and informed her that as the account in question was not maintained at the Pushpanjali Branch, she would need to approach the main branch at Jwalaheri for further processing and to obtain the return memo. Respondent has submitted a written application to Jwalaheri Branch and the bank has provided her with a written statement confirming the dishonour of the cheque due to insufficient funds. Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:34 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.6 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur On merits, the para-wise reply has been given by the respondent to the present revision petition of the revisionist by denying the allegations/contentions of the revisionist and the respondent has prayed for dismissal of the present revision petition.
5. This Court heard the arguments on the present revision petition advanced by Ld. Counsel for the parties. Perused the material available on record.
During the course of arguments, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order and the present revision petition against the impugned order is maintainable and impugned order is liable to be set-aside on the grounds as mentioned in the present revision petition. On the other hand, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for the respondent that the impugned order is an interlocutory order and the present revision petition is not maintainable and the Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned order in accordance with law and there is no merits in the present revision petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
Counsel for the revisionist in support of her contentions has relied upon the following case laws:-
(a) M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries Vs. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. {2025 INSC 328}
(b) M/s Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Inderpal Singh {Criminal Appeal No. 1557/2015 decided by the Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:39 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.7 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 24/11/2015}
(c) Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. {AIR 2014 SC 3519}
6. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has challenged the order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court. The impugned order is reproduced as under:-
" 05.03.2024 Ld. PO is also working as duty MM today.
Present: Shri Mukesh Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the complainant.
Submission heard. The present complaint has been filed u/s 138 NI Act. The complaint, documents and evidence by way of affidavit perused. I take cognizance of the said offence.
Arguments heard on summoning. Record perused.
On consideration of the complaint, annexed documents and verification affidavit of the complainant and in the light of the law lay down in A.C. Narayan Vs. State of Maharashtra (2014) 11 SCC 790, this court is of the opinion that the prima facie there are sufficient grounds for proceedings against the accused for commission of offence u/s 138 NI Act.
The complainant has filed the complaint within limitation period. In terms of inquiry conducted u/s 202 Cr.P.C., all the statutory requirement have been complied with.
Accordingly, let accused be summoned on Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:44 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.8 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur filing of PF/RC, speed post and through electronic mode as well for 04.05.2024.
Complainant is directed to file PF and take steps within 15 days.
Put up for appearance of the accused / furnishing of bail bonds/consideration of notice on the 04.05.2024.
(KIRANDEEP KAUR) MM (NI ACT)-03 (West) THC, Delhi /05.03.2024 "
7. For the sake of ready reference, section 397 Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under:-
Section 397:- Calling for records to exercise powers of revision: (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section
398. Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:49 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.9 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.
8. A plain reading of Section 397 Cr.P.C. makes it manifest that Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. enables the aggrieved parties to question the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed by the inferior court before the revisional court i.e. the High Court or the Sessions Judge as concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court and the Sessions Judge by the Section. Now, it is significant to note that Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. mandates that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceeding. Therefore, express bar is created by the legislation under section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. to entertain revision against an interlocutory order.
The term "interlocutory order" as mentioned in section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. An order which is pure and simple interlocutory order, which do not decide anything finally is to be considered as interlocutory order and no revision against that interlocutory order Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:54 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.10 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur is maintainable under section 397(1) Cr.P.C. in view of the express bar imposed under section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
There are three categories of orders that a Court can pass- final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction- that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the Court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order. An intermediate order is one which is interlocutory order in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order.
9. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Amar Nath & Ors. V. State of Haryana & Anr." {(1977) 4 SCC 137} that:-
"The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order"
as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:45:59 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.11 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as " V.C. Shukla V. State through C.B.I." (AIR 1980 SC 962] that:-
(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained, in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:03 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.12 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused.
It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. V. Fazru" {(2004) 13 SCC 269} that:-
"Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edn. p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:
"An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties."
"Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:08 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.13 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all."
The principles/guidelines regarding the scope of criminal revision petition have also been laid-down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Girish Kumar Suneja V. Central Bureau of Investigation" {(2017) 14 SCC 809} and it was held that :-
"15. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition on a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction - that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:14 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.14 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind - an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceeding would continue.
22. The view expressed in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye was followed in K.K. Patel V. State of Gujarat wherein a revision petition was filed challenging the taking of cognizance and issuance of a process. It was said: (K.K.Patel case, SCC p.201, para11) "11. ..... It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharastra, V.C. Shukla v. State and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:18 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.15 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition - such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us.
Consequently the result of para 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising the extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 Cr.P.C."
It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as "Neelam Mahajan & Anr. V. The State & Ors." {(2016) 229 DLT (CN) 29} that:-
"........ In this regard catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has settled the legal principle while holding that the meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:24 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.16 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur deals. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, if the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the order."
10. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has challenged the impugned order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court thereby cognizance of the offence u/s 138 NI Act was taken and the accused/revisionist was summoned for the offence u/s 138 NI Act.
Now this Court has to see as to whether the impugned order is interlocutory, intermediate or final order.
It is the contention of counsel for the respondent that impugned order is an interlocutory order and the present revision petition is not maintainable against the interlocutory order.
After referring number of judgments, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Urmila Devi V. Yudhvir Singh." {(2013) 15 SCC 624} that order taking cognizance and issuance of summons to the accused is not an interlocutory order and criminal revision against the same is maintainable.
Hence, in view of the law laid down in Urmila Devi case (supra), it is clear that criminal revision is maintainable against the order of cognizance and summoning the accused.
11. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention here the Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:28 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.17 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court.
(i) Complainant (respondent herein) had filed the complaint u/s 138 NI Act against the accused (revisionist herein). Vide order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizance of the offence u/s 138 NI Act was taken and the accused was summoned for the offence u/s 138 NI Act. On 11/02/2025, notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence u/s 138 NI Act was framed against the accused, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. On 15/05/2025, application u/s 145(2) NI Act was filed by the accused. On 16/07/2025, it was observed by the Ld. Trial Court that an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant is fit to be given to the accused u/s 145(2) NI Act and the matter was fixed for cross-examination of CW-1 for 16/10/2025.
(ii) Complainant Harpreet Kaur had filed the complaint case u/s. 138 NI Act against the accused Parvinder Singh and the same is pending before the Ld. Trial Court.
It is mentioned in the complaint u/s.138 NI Act of the complainant that the complainant is the real sister of the accused. Father of the complainant and accused had expired on 27/12/2020 and after the death of father of the accused, behaviour of the accused has been drastically changed towards the complainant. During his lifetime, father of the parties had asked the accused to divide the cash amount, which was left behind by him, equally 1/3rd share each. Complainant had approached the accused to divide the share of the cash amount and accused had assured and promised to divide the father's properties amongst all three of them and to distribute the money equally left behind by their father.
Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:33 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.18 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur Father of the parties had verbally informed that he intended to give a certain sum to the accused Parvinder Singh and his wife Tripat Kaur due to their assistance and they would provide both sisters with Rupees One Crore each. As per promise and assurance, the accused had issued a cheque no. 000197 dated 04/09/2023 amounting to Rupees One Crore drawn on Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri Branch, New Delhi and at the time of issuance of the said cheque, the accused assured that the said cheque will be honoured on its presentation. Upon the assurances given by the accused, the complainant has presented the aforesaid cheque in her bank i.e. Punjab & Sind Bank, Branch Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, Delhi on 12/09/2023 but the said cheque was got dishonoured with the reason 'funds insufficient' vide returning memo dated 12/09/2023. Despite request and number of telephonic reminders by the complainant, the accused has failed to make the payment to the complainant. Thereafter, the complainant has sent a legal notice dated 21/09/2023 to the accused through her counsel and the same was duly delivered/served. Despite the service of legal notice, the accused neither paid the cheque amount nor given the reply to the legal notice within the stipulated time period of 15 days.
(iii) Complainant had also filed her evidence by way of affidavit, wherein she re-iterated and re-affirmed the contents of her complaint u/s. 138 NI Act.
Complainant in her pre-summoning evidence had examined summoned witness i.e. CW-1 Sh. Parmod Kumar, Officer, Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri Branch, Paschim Vihar, Delhi.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10
17:46:38 -0100
CR No. 187/2024 Page No.19 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur
(iv) Vide order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizance of the offence u/s 138 NI Act was taken and the accused was summoned for the offence u/s. 138 NI Act.
12. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has challenged the impugned order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, thereby cognizance of the offence u/s 138 NI Act was taken and the revisionist/accused was summoned for the offence u/s. 138 NI Act.
It is well settled law that the Magistrate, at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning, has to see as to whether a prima-facie case has been made out for taking cognizance and summoning the accused. For the purpose of cognizance and summoning the accused, there should be sufficient incriminating material available on record.
Before proceeding further, it is relevant to discuss the case laws relating to the cognizance and summoning of the accused.
The parameters for taking cognizance and summoning order have been defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "State of Gujarat V. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta" {AIR 2019 SC 2499} and it was held that :-
"22. In so far as taking cognizance based on the police report, the Magistrate has the advantage of the charge sheet, statement of witnesses and other evidence collected by the police during the investigation. Investigating Officer/SHO collects the necessary evidence during the investigation conducted in compliance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:46:43 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.20 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur and in accordance with the rules of investigation. Evidence and materials so collected are sifted at the level of the Investigating Officer and thereafter, charge sheet was filed. In appropriate cases, opinion of the Public Prosecutor is also obtained before filing the charge sheet. The court thus has the advantage of the police report along with the materials placed before it by the police. Under Section 190 (1)(b) Cr.P.C., where the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence upon a police report and the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate directs issuance of process. In case of taking cognizance of an offence based upon the police report, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons for issuing the process. In cases instituted on a police report, the Magistrate is only required to pass an order issuing summons to the accused. Such an order of issuing summons to the accused is based upon subject to satisfaction of the Magistrate considering the police report and other documents and satisfying himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In a case based upon the police report, at the stage of issuing the summons to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record any reason. In case, if the charge sheet is barred by law or where there is lack of jurisdiction or when the charge sheet is rejected or not taken on file, then the Magistrate is required to record his reasons for rejection of the charge sheet and for not taking on file. In the present case, cognizance of the offence has been taken by taking into consideration the charge sheet filed by the police for the offence under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477A and 120B IPC, the order for issuance of process without explicitly recording reasons for its satisfaction for issue of process does not suffer from any illegality.
37. For issuance of process against the accused, it has to be seen only whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At the stage of issuance of process, the Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:20 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.21 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur Court is not required to weigh the evidentiary value of the materials on record. The Court must apply its mind to the allegations in the charge sheet and the evidence produced and satisfy itself that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. The Court is not to examine the merits and demerits of the case and not to determine the adequacy of the evidence for holding the accused guilty. The Court is also not required to embark upon the possible defences. Likewise, 'possible defences' need not be taken into consideration at the time of issuing process unless there is an ex-facie defence such as a legal bar or if in law the accused is not liable."
It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Sonu Gupta V. Deepak Gupta & Ors." {Crl. Appeal No.285-287 of 2015 decided on 11/02/2015} that :-
"At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence, or, in other words, to find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor he is required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials will lead to conviction or not. It is also well settled that cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. Hence at the stage of framing of charge an individual accused may seek discharge if he or she can show that the materials are absolutely insufficient for framing of charge against that particular accused. But such exercise is required only at a later stage, as indicated above and not at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning the accused on the Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:26 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.22 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur basis of prima facie case. Even at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial. It is also a settled proposition of law that even when there are materials raising strong suspicion against an accused, the court will be justified in rejecting a prayer for discharge and in granting an opportunity to the prosecution to bring on record the entire evidence in accordance with law so that case of both the sides may be considered appropriately on conclusion of trial."
It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Bhushan Kumar & Anr. V. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr." {AIR 2012 SC 1747} that :-
"Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued."
It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Nagawwa V. Veeranna Shivallngappa Konjalgi" {AIR 1976 SC 1947} that :-
"At the stage of issuing the process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with allegations made in the complaint or the Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:31 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.23 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur evidence led and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of the inquiry under s. 202 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited -limited to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint: (1) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process had been made out and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In proceedings under s. 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standing and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not.."
13. Complainant had filed the complaint u/s 138 NI Act against the accused and the same is pending before the Ld. Trial Court. Vide impugned order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizance of the offence u/s 138 NI Act was taken and accused was summoned for the offence u/s. 138 NI Act.
For the sake of ready reference, section 138 NI Act is reproduced as under:-
Section 138- Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:36 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.24 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
(b)the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, `debt or other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.
Ingredients of Section 138 NI Act have been specified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Gimpex Private Limited V. Manoj Goel" {(2021) SCC Online SC 925} as under:-
" The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are:
(i) The drawing of a cheque by person on an account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account;
(ii) The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:40 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.25 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur of any debt or other liability;
(iii) Presentation of the cheque to the bank;
(iv) The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account;
(v) A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque; and
(vi) The drawer of the cheque failing to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within 15 days of the receipt of the notice".
It is also relevant to discuss the other relevant provisions of NI Act. Section 6 NI Act has prescribed the definition of cheque and cheque is Negotiable Instrument within the meaning of section 13 of the Act. Section 30 NI Act talks about the liability of the drawer.
Section 20 NI Act talks about inchoate stamped instruments. Section 87 talks about effect of material alteration of a Negotiable Instrument.
Section 118 NI Act talks about presumptions as to negotiable instruments of consideration, date, time of acceptance, time of transfer, order of endorsement, stamps and holder in due course.
Section 139 NI Act deals with presumption of law in favour of holder of a cheque. It provides that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. It is a rebuttable presumption of law Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:45 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.26 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur and the burden of proving that a cheque has not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused.
14. Now, this Court shall proceed to decide the present revision petition of the revisionist on merits.
By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has challenged the impugned summoning order dated 05/03/2024 mainly on the ground that the Ld. Trial Court was/ is not having territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act of the complainant.
Section 142 (2) NI Act talks about the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act. Section 142 NI Act is reproduced as under:-
142. Cognizance of offences.--
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)--
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:
[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.]
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:50 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.27 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.] [(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,--
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or
(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.] Law relating to territorial jurisdiction of the Court to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act has been elaborated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries V. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd." {2025 INSC 328} and it was held that :-
" 61. It is clear on a reading of Section 142(2)(a) and the Explanation thereto that, for the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10
17:47:54 -
0100
CR No. 187/2024 Page No.28 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur
62. A conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) along with the explanation thereof, makes the position emphatically clear that, when a cheque is delivered or issued to a person with liberty to present the cheque for collection at any branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered or issued to the branch of the bank, in which, the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, and the court of the place where such cheque was presented for collection, will have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint alleging the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. In that view of the position of law, the word 'delivered' used in Section 142(2) (a) of the NI Act has no significance. What is of significance is the expression 'for collection through an account'. That is to say, delivery of the cheque takes place where the cheque was issued and presentation of the cheque will be through the account of the payee or holder in due course, and the said place is decisive to determine the question of jurisdiction.'' It was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as " Prakash Chimanlal Sheth V. Jagruti Keyur Rajpopat" {2025 INSC 897} that :-
" As regards territorial jurisdiction for instituting a complaint in relation to dishonor of a cheque, Section 142(2)(a) of the NI Act makes it clear that Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:47:58 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.29 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur an offence under Section 138 thereof should be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction, if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account is situated. This provision, as it stands after its amendment in 2015, was considered in Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh and this Court affirmed that Section 142(2)
(a) of the NI Act vests jurisdiction apropos an offence under Section 138 thereof in the Court where the cheque is delivered for collection, that is, through an account in the Branch of the Bank where the payee maintains that account."
It was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as " Yogesh Upadhyay & Anr. V. Atlanta Ltd." {Transfer petition (Crl.) No. 526-527 of 2022 decided on 21/02/2023} that :-
"11. Perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons in Amendment Act 26 of 2015 makes it amply clear that insertion of Sections 142(2) and 142-A in the Act of 1881 was a direct consequence of the judgment of this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra). Therefore, the use of the phrase: 'shall be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction......'in Section 142(2) of the Act 1881 is contextual to the ratio laid down in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra) to the contrary, whereby territorial jurisdiction to try an offence under Section 138 of the Act of jurisdiction 1881 over vested the in the Court drawee bank and having not the complainant's bank where he had presented the Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:48:03 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.30 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur cheque. Section 142(2) now makes it clear that the jurisdiction to try such an offence would vest only in the Court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the Bank where the cheque was delivered for collection, through the account of the payee or holder in due course, is situated. The newly inserted Section 142-A further clarifies this position by validating the transfer of pending cases to the Courts conferred with such jurisdiction after the amendment.
12. The later decision of this Court in Bridgestone India Private Limited Vs. Inderpal Singh [(2016) 2 SCC 75] affirmed the legal position obtaining after the amendment of the Act of 1881 and endorsed that Section 142(2)(a) of the Act of 1881 vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for an offence under Section 138 in the Court where the cheque is delivered for collection, i.e., through an account in the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account. This Court also affirmed that Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod (supra) would not non-suit the company in so far as territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 was concerned."
15. It is the contention of the revisionist that the Ld. Trial Court was/ is not having the territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act of the complainant.
Now, this Court shall examine the aspect of territorial jurisdiction Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:48:07 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.31 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur of the Ld. Trial Court to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act of the complainant.
Cheque in question, request for return memo, copy of demand notice dated 21/09/2023, postal receipt and reply dated 05/10/2023 of notice were filed by the complainant alongwith her complaint u/s 138 NI Act before the Ld. Trial Court. Cheque in question bearing no. 000197 dated 04/09/2023 amounting to Rupees One Crore drawn on Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was stated to be issued by the accused. There is an endorsement dated 11/09/2023 of 'insufficient balance' upon the aforesaid cheque by the Punjab & Sind Bank, D-21, Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi-110034. There is an endorsement of the Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi upon the 'request for return memo', which was addressed by the complainant to Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi.
It is mentioned by the complainant in her complaint u/s 138 NI Act that the aforesaid cheque was presented by her in Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi on 12/09/2023. But as per testimony of summoned witness i.e. CW-1, the aforesaid cheque was presented in Punjab & Sind Bank, Pushpanjali Enclave branch on 11/09/2023. There is no documentary evidence available on Trial Court record to show that the aforesaid cheque was presented by the complainant at Punjab & Sind Bank, Jwalaheri, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi on 12/09/2023. No reasonable explanation has been adduced on record by the respondent/complainant for the same.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10
17:48:12 -0100
CR No. 187/2024 Page No.32 of 35
Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur It is mentioned by the complainant in her complaint u/s 138 NI Act that the aforesaid cheque was presented by her on 12/09/2023. As per testimony of summoned witness i.e. CW-1, the aforesaid cheque was presented on 11/09/2023. As per legal notice dated 21/09/2023 of the complainant, the aforesaid cheque was presented on 11/09/2023. There is an endorsement dated 11/09/2023 of 'insufficient balance' upon the aforesaid cheque by the Punjab & Sind Bank, D-21, Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi-110034. There is no documentary evidence available on Trial Court record to show that the aforesaid cheque was presented by the complainant on 12/09/2023. No reasonable explanation has been adduced on record by the respondent/complainant for the same.
It is specifically mentioned by the complainant in para 19 of her complaint u/s 138 NI Act that " that the complainant bank i.e. Punjab & Sindh Bank, Branch Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi, is situated within the jurisdiction of P.S. Rani Bagh, Delhi within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, hence, this Hon'ble Court has got the jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint ". Complainant in her complaint u/s 138 NI Act herself admitted that her bank is Punjab & Sind Bank, Branch Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi. It is also admitted by the complainant that the aforesaid bank is situated within the jurisdiction of PS Rani Bagh. The area of Pitampura as well as PS Rani Bagh falls within the territorial jurisdiction of North-West District and not within the territorial jurisdiction of West District.
In view of the above, it is clear that the cheque in question was Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:48:16 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.33 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur presented in Punjab & Sind Bank, D-21, Branch Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi-110034 on 11/09/2023. Endorsement regarding 'insufficient balance' was also made by the Punjab & Sind Bank, D-21, Branch Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi-110034 on 11/09/2023. As per para 19 of the complaint u/s 138 NI Act of the complainant, the bank of the complainant is Punjab & Sind Bank, Branch Pushpanjali Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi.
16. It is well settled law that the Revisional Court will usually not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Ld. Trial Court and the Revisional Court will interfere only, if it is found that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or if it is found that the Ld. Trial Court has ignored settled principles of law.
On perusal of impugned order passed by the Ld. Trial Court, it is clear that while passing the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court has not dealt with the aspect of its territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act of the complainant.
In view of the law laid down in Shri Sendhur Agro, Prakash Chimanlal Sheth and Yogesh Upadhyay cases (supra) and provisions of Section 142 (2) NI Act, it is clear that the Ld. Trial Court was not having the territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint u/s 138 NI Act of the complainant.
17. Applying priori and posteriori reasonings and the aforesaid case laws referred by this Court, the present revision petition of the revisionist is Digitally signed by VIJAY VIJAY SHANKAR SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10 17:48:21 -0100 CR No. 187/2024 Page No.34 of 35 Parvinder Singh Manocha V. Harpreet Kaur allowed. Accordingly, impugned order dated 05/03/2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court is set-aside. No order as to costs. Nothing stated herein shall tantamount to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Ld. Trial Court is directed to return the complaint u/s 138 NI Act to the complainant for presenting the same before the Court having territorial jurisdiction to try, entertain and to adjudicate the same.
Trial Court Record be sent back alongwith the copy of this judgment. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.09.10
17:48:26 -
0100
Announced in the open Court
on 10/09/2025 (VIJAY SHANKAR)
ASJ-04 (West)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 187/2024 Page No.35 of 35