Madras High Court
Pentasia Chemicals Ltd. vs The Secretary, Pentasia Pattali ... on 11 April, 1991
Equivalent citations: (1991)2MLJ475
JUDGMENT Raju, J.
1. The above writ appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 26.2.1991 made in W.P. No. 1687 of 1991 where under the said petition filed for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent, the Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore, to grant adequate police protection for the petitioner-company for it to carry on its day-to-day activities such as deposit of raw materials and fuels, despatch of finished goods, entry and exit of men, materials and, vehicles carrying raw materials and fuels to and from the petitioner-Company's premises situated at B-5/B -10 SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Kudikadu Village, Cuddalore came to be dismissed.
2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it was stated that the Registered office of the Company is at Madras, that the Company has its factory at Cuddalore and is engaged in the manufacture of Pentaerythritols and Sodium Formate, employing about 82 workmen involved in various kinds of manufacturing activities such as production, maintenance laboratory, boiler operation etc. That apart, about 30 Executives, Managers and Administrative staff are also claimed to be employed. The company is claimed to receive raw materials and fuels such as Methynol, Acetaldehyde, Caustic Soda, Coal, Lecofines and Lignite from various places all over the country and these raw materials and fuels are transported to the factory at Cuddalore through Trucks and Tankers to facilitate production activities.
3. The appellants have also claimed that the workmen employed issued a letter dated 27.10.1990 informing that all of them have joined one Union called Pentasia Pattaly Thozhil Sangam with Registration No. 432/SAT and based at Cuddalore. On the very same date, it appears that a Charter of demands was also served in the letter head of the newly constituted Union. There appeared to have been bilateral discussions and no conclusion was arrived at on the same. On 21.12.1990, the first respondent-Union issued a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Labour II, Madras raising a dispute on the charter of demands, a copy of which was also marked to the appellant. According to the appellant, even before the Deputy Commissioner could initiate any conciliatory proceedings, the Union unilaterally and without reference to such due proceedings, issued a notice dated 8.1.1991 stating that the workmen would go on strike on any day on or after 23.1.1991. In the meantime, the Labour Officer, Cuddalore issued a letter calling upon the appellant and the first respondent Union for discussions on the charter of demands in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner, Labour-II, Madras on 24.1.1991 during his camp at Cuddalore. It is also claimed that the Deputy Commissioner informed both the parties separately that a further discussion would be held on 12.2.1991 and the same was agreed to by the representatives of both the Management and the Union and before such discussion, a further notice was served on the appellant of strike on 25.1.1991 by the first respondent-Union intimating that they have decided to go on strike with effect from 6.00 a.m. on 1.2.1991 and as a matter of fact also struck work from the morning of 1.2.1991 causing undue hardship to the appellant-Company.
4. The appellant further claimed in the affidavit that on the said date the workmen gathered in front of the main gate of the factory and prevented the movement of goods in trucks being carried both inward and outward and having regard to the said obstruction and the alleged threat by the workers to the drivers of the trucks and tankers as well as use of vulgar abusive language against the Executives and threat of their family members, the appellant filed O.S. No. 95 of 1991 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Cuddalore against the first respondent for a permanent injunction restraining the said respondent and their men etc., from interfering with the movement of materials, vehicles or persons going in and coming out of the factory premises at all times. An interlocutory application for an ad-interim injunction was also filed. Since only notice has been ordered in the Civil Court and the matter was reaching a stage beyond control and that supplies have to be effected as undertaken by the contracts with various industries and foreign buyers, they have come up with the present writ petition, seeking police prosecution.
5. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit in which they admit the giving of strike notice and claiming that they would go on strike as per the notice, that the strike is legal and is in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and that inasmuch as O.S. No. 95 of 1991 is pending and no injunction has been granted therein, the relief as prayed for ought not to be granted in the writ petition. It is also stated by the first respondent that the arrears for wages from 1.1.90 are pending and it would be unjust for the appellant to remove the finished goods without settlement of wages.
6. The second respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that the appellant, when contacted informed that the workers, though initially objected for the entering of vehicles, both incoming and outgoing, the vehicles were allowed thereafter, that as a matter of fact the appellants have sent 6 loads of finished products to Goa and Bombay and all these would go to show that there was no law and order problem and the second respondent and his men are discharging their duties as per law. It was also disclosed that on further enquiry, the second respondent came to know that the factory is being run with skeleton staff and the canteen is also functioning and that when the appellants wanted to engage new contract labourers, the striking labourers objected to such a course.
7. At the time of hearing of the writ petition, the appellants claim to have filed an additional affidavit explaining further difficulties and contending that inspite of law and order situation worsening and the appellants contacting the Sub Inspector of Police, Cuddalore, a skeleton protection not sufficient enough, was given which necessitated the appellant to move this Court to secure police protection for free passage of men and materials in and out of the factory.
8. The learned single Judge, after referring to the details of the case as disclosed in the pleadings and applying the principles contained to the earlier orders of this Court in similar matters dismissed to writ petition that interference by issue of the directions was not called for. The learned Judge observed in the order that no piece of paper has been produced before the Court seeking police protection and that inspite of the strike by the workers, the company was able to transport the goods outside the factory without any police protection. The learned Judge also took into account the pendency of the civil proceedings in denying the relief sought for.
9. Aggrieved, the above writ appeal has been filed and notice of motion was ordered in the light of the claim made that the learned Judge did not take into account the materials furnished in the form of an additional affidavit at the time of hearing. The first respondent was served and they filed a counter affidavit as also a typed set of documents in support of their claim. On behalf of the second respondent, the learned Government Pleader appeared and he brought to the notice of this Court the instructions deceived as on date which referred to certain untoward incidents and details regarding the action taken thereof. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the second respondent will abide by any orders of this Court and has nothing more to add.
10. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing on either said. It was argued on behalf of the appellants, to get over the plea based on the pendency of the civil suit, that the said suit was for an injunction against the workers and that since subsequent events and happenings involved law and order problems, neither the filing nor the pendency of the civil suit will stand in the way of the appellants moving this Court for a direction to the second respondent to give suitable protection.
11. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the counsel on either side. Our attention has been invited to a communication of the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Madras-6 in D1/1605/91, dated 27.3.1991 addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore with copies marked to the appellant as well as the first respondent - Union, the contents of which are as follows:
It was represented by Pentasia Pattali Thozhir Sangam that the question regarding the removal of finished products etc., from Pentasia Chemicals, B-5/B-10, SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Kudikadu needs clarification. As per Court rulings, during strike, removal of finished products by the Management to satisfy customers is permitted. While removal of raw materials and machineries during strike is not permitted. This is for your kind information.
As could be seen from the contents thereof, the same was issued on an issue raised by the first respondent by way of a clarification. The said communication would show that while removal of raw materials and machineries during strike is not permissible, removal of finished products to satisfy customers is permitted. This clarification issued by the Labour Commissioner at the instance of the first respondent is sufficient to suitably guide and apprise the second respondent and his men of their duties and obligations in the matter of according due protection. This is irrespective of the duties enjoined upon the police to deal with any further situation arising on account of any incident involving law and order problem and it may not be possible for this Court to visualise all such contingencies and the police authorities should be well aware of the role they are expected to play and as to how they should deal with a situation, as and when it arises, in accordance with law.
12. No doubt, a negative approach to lawful agitation by the working class to secure higher wages and better living standards and conditions of work cannot be justified under the pretext of enforcing of law and and order in the industrial sector. The apprehension of the first respondent also appears to be that under the garb of police protection, not only the workers who are fighting for their rights are sought to be victimised but the appellant intends declaring a lock-out. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, on instructions informs us that since the conciliation proceedings are pending, there is no question of declaring any lock-out by the Management and that the appellant undertakes not to indulge in any such move. Learned Counsel also fairly states that the Management undertakes that the police protection accorded shall not be used to 'kill' the legitimate trade union activities of the first respondent.
13. We are of the view that in the light of the clarification issued by the Joint Commissioner of Labour and the undertaking given on behalf of the Management as referred to supra, the police will in the interest of the public including the striking employees, accord sufficient protection for the Management to engage in such legitimate activities as have been pointed out by the Joint Commissioner of Labour in his communication dated 27.3.1991 and also to deal with any breach of law and order situation as the occasion demands, ensuring at the same time that police protection accorded is not abused by the Management to curb or restrict the exercise of normal and legitimate trade union activities by the striking workers. The Management shall not be entitled under the Police Protection to either remove the raw materials or any machinery outside the factory and the protection of the police shall be limited to the activities as contained in the communication dated 27.3.1991 of the Joint Commissioner of Labour. Subject to the said modification of the order of the learned single Judge indicated above, the writ appeal, shall in other respects stand rejected; but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.