Telangana High Court
C And M.D., Ts Genco And Ano. vs Registrar, Industrial Tribunal And 11 ... on 15 October, 2025
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 33722 OF 2016
O R D E R:
The case of petitioners - TSGENCO is that Respondents 2 to 12 were alleged to have been working as contract labour engaged by a Contractor - M/s FABCONS, Paloncha in Kothagudem Thermal Power Station (KTPS) on the work of annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors. The State Government issued G.O.Ms.No. 41, dated 23-09-1996 prohibiting employment of contract labour in 33 categories in APSEB in exercise of powers conferred under Section 10 (I) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and declaring that orders for absorption of workers would be issued by the department concerned. In terms thereof, the then APSEB issued guidelines for abolition of contract labour working in 33 categories in various generating stations vide B.P.Ms. No. 37, dated 18-05-1997. Subsequently, further instructions were issued vide B.P.Ms. No. 260, dated 19-12-1997 and B.P.Ms.No. 272, dated 31-12-1997. 1.2. Further, it was contended that Respondents' cases were also considered and they were found to be not eligible for 2 absorption. At this stage, Writ Petition No. 26785 of 1998 was filed to declare the results of Petitioners therein. This Court, by order dated 13-10-1998, disposed of the said Writ Petition directing Respondents therein to declare the results of Petitioners. Thereafter, by proceedings dated 19-01-1999, the claim of petitioners was rejected on the ground that they do not come under the 33 abolished categories in APSEB and they are not on rolls as on 23-09-1996.
1.3. In terms of the orders issued in B.P. Ms. No, 37, dated 18-5-1997, B.P. Ms. No. 260, dated 19-12-1997 and B.P. Ms. No. 272, dated 31-12-1997, certain contract labourers working in prohibited categories of employment were considered for absorption. At this stage, Writ Petition No. 6100 of 1999 and batch was filed, wherein this Court vide order dated 16-07-1999 directed Petitioners therein to produce evidence in support of their claim to APGENCO which was directed to reconsider the case of Petitioners therein in the light of the documents produced by them. Pursuant to the said order, GENCO vide GO.Ms. No. 437/GM (HR)/2000, dated 18-09-2000,constituted a Committee consisting of Chief Engineer/Generation, Chief Engineer/O&M, KTPS, General Manager (Administration) and 3 General Manager (HR) to examine the merits of each of the Petitioners and to decide about their entitlement for absorption. Accordingly, the said Committee conducted meetings and after examination of the documents produced, came to the conclusion that 123 Petitioners are fulfilling the conditions prescribed in B.P. Ms. No, 37, dated 18-05-1997 and in respect of the remaining 64 Petitioners, came to the conclusion, as per the evidence produced, that none of the job attended by them as mentioned in the bona fide certificates and/or Field Officers report either do not fall under the purview of the prohibition categories of employment or that Petitioners have not been working as on 23-09-1996, as the case may be, hence, they are not entitled for absorption in terms of B.P.Ms. No. 37, dated 18-05-1997. Pursuant to the orders of this Court, the claim of Petitioners was also considered and they were issued proceedings dated 04-10-2001 rejecting their candidature duly recording that they worked in annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors, which category of job is not included in 33 abolished categories. Hence, they do not meet the pre-requisite conditions laid down in B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated 18-05-1997.
41.4. Further, it was contended by petitioners that Respondents herein filed Writ Petition No. 21719 of 2002. This Court, by order dated 05-02-2003 disposed of the said Writ Petition permitting Petitioners therein to raise an Industrial Dispute before the Industrial Tribunal having jurisdiction as regards their entitlement for absorption or appointment under various orders issued by GENCO. In pursuance of the same, they approached the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal, which, vide Endorsement dated 20-08-2003 refused to entertain the dispute on the premise that Industrial Dispute has to be referred to it by the appropriate Government under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'). Thereafter, Respondents filed WPMP No. 1207 of 2004 in the mentioned Writ Petition and this Court by order dated 12- 07-2004, directed the Tribunal to entertain the dispute raised by Respondents herein as a reference made under Section 10 (1) of the Act and adjudicate the same. The said orders were passed keeping in view of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Limited v. National Union for Water Front Workers and the order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 379 of 2000 and batch, dated 08-09-2003. 5 1.5. It was also contended that pursuant to the order dated 12-07-2004, the Labour Court registered the dispute as I.D. No. 87 of 2004; workmen examined themselves as WWs-1 to 12 and on behalf of management, MW-1 was examined and Exs. W-1 to 56 were marked. The Industrial Tribunal framed the issue:-
" Whether the Petitioners are working in KTPS in any one of the 33 abolished categories and are entitled for absorption?"
1.6. Petitioners contended that misconstruing the evidence available on record, the Tribunal passed an Award directing Petitioners herein to absorb Respondents 2 to 12 into the services of APGENCO in terms of B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated 18- 5-1997, B.P. Ms. No. 260, dated 19-12-1997 and B.P. Ms. No. 272, dated 31-12-1997. The Award is wholly misconceived and irrational. Aggrieved by the same, this Writ Petition is filed on the ground that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that, it is the specific case of the Petitioners herein that annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors is not included in 33 abolished categories. Workmen failed to produce any documentary evidence to show that annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors form part of 33 abolished 6 categories. The nature of contract awarded for annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors do not form part of the 33 categories specified in G.O. Ms. No. 41, dated 23-09-1996, B.P. Ms No. 37, dated 18-05-1997 is issued for appointment of contract labour engaged against 33 abolished categories in generating stations. To fulfil the conditions, one should have been working in 33 abolished categories in various generating stations and they should have been working as on issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 41, dated 23-09-1996. Since the nature of work awarded i.e. annual maintenance does not form part of 33 abolished categories, workmen are not entitled for absorption into service. The findings of the Labour Court that Respondents workmen are working in the coal mill which is one of the 33 abolished categories is erroneous and misconceived. The annual maintenance of Vapour Fans and Worm Conveyors do not form part of the coal mill activities. It was contended that observations of the Labour Court in Para 35 and 36 are contrary to the evidence available on record and it does not support the case of workmen. In Ex. W-8, it was recorded that FABCONS works are indirectly related to 33 abolished categories. Even if such an observation is taken into 7 consideration, it cannot be termed that Respondents are working in one of the 33 abolished categories. Thus, the observations of the Tribunal are wholly out of context and do not support the stand of Respondents that they are working in one of the 33 abolished categories. Ex. W-7 was marked through WW.8. However, he failed to produce copy of the LS. Agreement. Therefore the observation made by the Tribunal at Para 37 is without any basis. It is for Respondents to prove that they were working in a contract in coal mill. In the absence of the same, the certificate dated 20-9-2009 issued at the behest of Respondents 2 to 12 cannot be treated as a valid document for determining that they are working in one of the 33 abolished categories.
1.7. It was further contended that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that Exs. W-15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 11, 43, 48 and 53 are bona fide certificates referred to in Para 18 of the award. The said documents do not support the stand of Respondents. The said certificates are with reference to L.S. Agreement No. 93/96-97, dated 04-11-1996, whereas one should have been working as on 23-09-1996. Therefore, the said certificates do not support the stand of Respondents. The 8 Labour Court in Para 23 and 24 rejected to look into the service certificates of Respondents. Thus, there is no evidence available on record to show that Respondents were working against one of the 33 abolished categories as on 23-09-1996 which is one of the specific conditions in terms of B.P.Ms. No. 37, dated 18-05-1997, B.P. Ms. No. 260, dated 19-12-1997 and B.P. Ms. No. 272, dated 31-12-1997. Thus, there is no evidence available on record before the Labour Court to grant the relief in favour of Respondents. The observations of the Labour Court at Para 29 are wholly misconceived and erroneous. It is for workmen to prove that they were working against the prohibited categories and working as on the date of issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 41, dated 23-9-1996. In the absence of the same, no relief could have been granted in favour of Respondents holding that they are working against one of the 33 abolished categories. The Labour Court gravely erred in referring to Judgment in Harinandan Prasad v. Employer I/R To Management of Food Corporation of India 1 which has no application, in as much as, to claim for absorption, one should have fulfilled the conditions specified in B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated 18-5-1997, B.P. 1 (2014) 7 SCC 190 9 Ms. No. 260 dated 19-12-1997 and B.P. Ms. No. 272, dated 31-12-1997. The observations of the Labour Court at Para 42 are misconceived and erroneous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Limited case held that there is no automatic absorption consequent on the notification under Section 10 (1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. The only benefit they are entitled to under Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. In terms of Para 125 (6), the benefit to be given is to give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if they are found suitable by relaxing the conditions as to the maximum age taken into consideration, the age of worker at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relax the condition as to the academic qualification other than technical qualification. Thus, the findings of the Labour Court are wholly erroneous. Similarly, the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ONGC v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union2 has no application as the workmen claims to be engaged through a contractor but not directly working with GENCO. The observations of the Labour Court at para 46 are contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In those 2 (2015) 6 SCC 494 10 circumstances, petitioners sought for quashing of Award in I.D.No.87 of 2004, dated 21.12.2015.
2. While making the above contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri G. Vidya Sagar representing Ms. K. Udaya Sri,n learned Standing Counsel for petitioners relied upon the following decisions.
a. Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani 3 b. R.M. Yellatti v. Asst. Executive Engineer 4 c. Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd v. Mohd Rafi 5.
3. Per contra, it was contended on behalf of respondents that the present counter-affidavit filed by Respondents is similar to that which arose in I.D. No. 105 of 2002 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal wherein the Labour Court passed the Award dated 09-09-2005 directing GENCO to absorb the services of Petitioners therein and that the said Award was confirmed by this Court in Writ Petition No.9057 of 2006 and the same was affirmed in Writ Appeal No. 370 of 2007 and Civil Appeal No.9793 of 2010. Therefore, sought for a direction to confirm the Award dated 21-12-2015 in I.D.No.87 of 2004. In this 3 (2005) 5 SCC 100 4 (2006) 1 SCC 106 5 (2009) 11 SCC 522 11 regard, it is stated that Petitioners in the present I.D cannot be treated on par with the Petitioners in I.D. No. 105 of 2002. Therefore, the Award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal in I.D.No. 105 of 2002 as confirmed by this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court has no application to the facts of this case. Further, it was contended that Petitioners in I.D.No. 105 of 2002 and Petitioners in I.D.No.87 of 2004 are part of Petitioners in W.P.Nos.6100 of 1999: 6424 of1999:
13527 of 1999 and 12152 of 1998. In the said Writ Petitions, a Committee was constituted regarding absorption of contract labour in the Unit of Chief Engineer (OM), KTPS. The Committee vide its report dated 20-12-2000 considered merits of each of the Petitioners covered in the above Writ Petitions. In the said report, 104 Petitioners covered in Writ Petition No. 6100 of 1999; three Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 6424 of 1999: eight Petitioners in Writ Petition No.13527 of 1999 and Petitioners in Writ Petition No.12152 of 1998 were held to hve fulfilled the conditions specified in B.P.Ms.No.37, dated 18-05-1997:
B.P.Ms.No.260, dated 19-12-1997 and B.P.Ms.No.272, dated 31-12-1997. The report of the said Committee was forwarded to the Head Office of the then A.P.GENCO. In the said report, 12 Petitioners in I.D.No. 105 of 2002 were found to be eligible.
However, Petitioners in I.D.No.87 of 2004 were found to be not eligible for absorption. The said report was forwarded to the Head Office. The Head Office of A.P.GENCO vide Memo dated 01-10-2001 deleted the names of Petitioners in I.D.No. 105 of 2002 on the premise that they were not working on the cut-off date i.e. 23-09-1996. Aggrieved by deletion of their names at the Head Office, Petitioners in I.D.No. 105 of 2002 raised Industrial Dispute. Since their names are found at the first instance and later being removed, the Labour Court interfered with the decision of the Head Office and passed an Award directing to absorb them in terms of the recommendations of the First Committee. Thus, the same was confirmed by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court, whereas in respect of Petitioners in I.D.No.87 of 2004, their names were not recommended in the First Committee report dated 20-12-2000 or in the subsequent Memo dated 01-10-2001. Therefore, there cannot be any comparison with Petitioners in I.D.No.87 of 2004 and I.D.No.105 of 2002. Thus, according to respondents, Writ Petition is misconceived and is liable to be rejected.13
4. While contending as above, respondents relied on the following decisions a. Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. 6 b. Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation 7.
c. Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan 8 d. KVS Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation 9.
e. Steel Authority of India Ltd v. National Union Waterfront Workers 10
5. Heard Sri P. Sridhar Rao, learned counsel for Respondents 2 to 12 and perused the record.
6. Whether Award in I.D.No.87 of 2004 dated 21.12.2015 requires any interference by this Court.
7. The Tribunal, while proceeding with I.D.No.87 of 2004 had recorded the point for consideration as "whether petitioners (respondents) were working in KTPS in any one of the 33 abolished categories and are entitled for absorption and while deciding the matter in favour of respondents, the Tribunal observed as under:
" 18. The petitioners/WWs1 to 11 spoke of their case on the point and filed xerox copies of -6
(2014) 6 SCC 434 7 (2010) 3 SCC 192 8 AIR 1964 SC 477 9 (2015) 12 SCC 39 10 (2001) 7 SCC 1 14 (1) bona fide certificates said to have been prepared by the officials of the KTPS, Exs. W15. W19, W23, W27, W31, W35, W39, W11, W43, W48, W53;
(2) certificate dated 20.9.2000 along with a list of workers with their bio data,, said to have been issued by the Managing Partner of M/s FAB CONS and countersigned by the officials of the KTPS, Ex.W7 (3) service certificates said to have been issued by their contractor, Exs.W16 and W17, W20 and W21, W24 and W25, W28 and W29, W32 and W33, W36 and W37, W40 and W41, W12 and W12A. W44 and W45, W49 and W50 and W54 and W55.
19. As per the counter and as per the evidence of the KTPS divisional Engineer V. Muralikrishna, MW1, the departmental officials of the APGENCO/APSEB prepared the bona fide certificates of the petitioners based on available records. In the cross-examination, MW1 admitted that the bona fide certificates were prepared on the basis of the attendance register, wage register and muster rolls. It is not the case of the respondents that the bona fide certificates are not in their custody.
Somehow, the petitioners obtained copies of the bona fide certificates and filed them. And the said documents were admitted in evidence without any objection from the respondents. It is not the case of the respondents that Exs.W15, W19.' W23. W27, W31, W35, W39, W11, W43, W48, W53 are not copies of the bona fide certificates in their custody.
20. It is the case of the respondents, and the copies of the bona fide certificates filed by the petitioners also show, that the petitioners were employed in the KTPS through M/s FAB CONS, Paloncha, against contract agreement and were attending to annual maintenance of vapour fans. and worm conveyors in the Boiler Area as on 23.9.1996.
21. Ex.W7 was admitted in through WW8. V.Pattabhi Ramaiah, WW8, deposed that he was working as a contractor in the KTPS from 1987 and that he issued Ex.W7. MW1 admitted that M/s FAB CONS contractor was carrying out their works from 1987 and that the contents of Ex.W7 are true and correct.
22. As per Ex.W7, the petitioners were engaged for overhauling, rectification and annual maintenance works of vapour fans and worm conveyors under the following agreements:
(1) K2.Agreement No.27/1987-88 (2) K2.Agreement No.331/1988-89 (3) K2.Agreement No.287/1988-89 (4) K2.Agreement No. 94/1989-90 (5) K2.Agreement No.241/1989-90 (6) LS.Agreement No.33/1990-91 (7) LS.Agreement No.16/1990-91 (8) LS. Agreement No.171/1990-91 (9) LS.Agreement No.29/1991-92 (10) LS.Agreement No.37/1991-92 (11) LS.Agreement No.47/1992-93 (12) LS.Agreement No.60/1993-94 (13) LS.Agreement No.88/1994-95 (14) LS.Agreement No.64/1995-96 (15) LS.Agreement No.93/1996-97 (16) LS.Agreement No.110/1997-98 (17) LS.Agreement No.68/1997-98 15 (18) LS.Agreement No.68/1999-2000 (19) LS.Agreement No.125/1999-2000 Some of them worked in overhauling of PC Feeders during 1987-88.
Some of them are still continuing and are executing the same Works. They had worked on 23.9.1996 and attended the complaints. Their service particulars are mentioned against their names:
(1) G.Lalu. July 1989 to till date (2) G.Kotilingam. July 1989 to till date (3) G.Mallalah. July 1989 to till date (4) S.Subrahmanyam. January 1989 to till date (5) B.Laxman. July 1989 to till date (6) P.Narayana. June 1993 to till date (7) V.Sreekanth June 1992 to till date (8) B.Prasad. February 1990 to till date (9) J.Venkatanarayana. June 1988 to till date (10) N.Babu Rao. 3.2.1987 to 31.12.1996 (11) N.Madhava Rao. 1.3.1987 to 1.10.1997
23. It is the evidence of WW12 that in the year 1998 he issued service certificates to the petitioners when they were called for interview, that the petitioners lost the certificates and that he again issued service certificates to the petitioners on their demand. Exs. W16 and W17, W20 and W21, W24 and W25, W28 and W29, W32 and W33, W36 and W37, W40 and W41, W12 and W12A, W44 and W45, W49 and W50 and W54 and W55, all copies of the service certificates, are issued by him.
24. In the cross-examination, it was elicited from WWs1 to 11 that the original service certificates are with them. But the original service certificates were not produced. There is no explanation for non-production of the originals. Therefore, xerox copies of the service certificates cannot be looked into.
25. WWs1 to 11 claimed that they attended to replacement of vapor bends and burners, mill discharge duct, erection of scaffolding and furnace cleaning, overhaul of mill motors and fans, etc., in the Boiler Area. WW12 said he inaintained a record of the petitioners' work in PC feeders, vapor fans, worm conveyors and coal circuits.
26. Records pertaining to the works executed on the orders placed by the KTPS were not summoned from M/s FAB CONS. WW12 brought only attendance register and wages register for the year 1996. He did not bring any other record. In the absence of relevant records, it is difficult to conclude that the petitioners Mattended to replacement of vapour bends and burners, mill discharge duct, erection of scaffolding and furnace cleaning and overhaul of mill motors and fans in the Boiler Area.
27. The evidence on record shows that for 12 years from 1987 onwards the KTPS got executed annual mainteriance works of vapour fans and worm conveyors only through M/s FAB CONS. But the respondents are describing the said work as 'not perennial', 'piece rated job', 'sporadic' and 'contingent' and are contending that the work does not fall under any of the 33 abolished categories of employment:
28. MW1 stated in the cross-examination that they maintained record of the works awarded to the contractors. He further stated that the works awarded to the 16 contractor will be throughout the year but added that they are emergency, periodical and once in a year as well. He admitted that the work done by the contract labour is supervised by the AEs, the ADEs and the DEEs and that at times they make suggestions. In the re-examination, he asserted that the period of annual maintenance in the KTPS is around 15 days.
29. No record was produced by the respondents to show that M/s FAB CONS executed the works entrusted to it only within 15 days during any contract period. In the absence of such record, the plea that the work executed by M/s FAB CONS through the petitioners is not perennial but is sporadic and contingent, cannot be accepted.
30. It is said the cases of the petitioners were rejected after considering the report of the Committee consisting of the CEE (O&M), KTPS, the CEE (Gen). VS. Hyderabad, the GH (Adm), VS, Hyderabad and the GM (HR), VS, Hyderabad. As per the rejection orders dated 4.10.2001, Exs. W14, W18, W22, W26, W30, W34, W38, W42, W47, W52 and W56, the authorities concerned examined the cases of the petitioners by verifying all the relevant records and documents and also ascertained the material and facts of the case.
31. The report of the Committee and the records and documents allegedly considered by the authorities concerned for considering the cases of the petitioners along with others, are material documents in this case but they were not filed by the respondents.
32. Xerox copy of a letter dated 12.7.2000 between the CE, O&M, KTPS, Paloncha and the GM(HR), APGENCO, VS, Hyderabad, filed by the petitioners was marked as Ex.W8.
33. It was contended that Ex.W8 is not admissible in evidence 'and is not proved and, therefore, it cannot be looked into.
34. Ex.W8 was admitted in evidence through WWB without any objection as regards its admissibility and its mode of proof. Therefore, the contention raised cannot be accepted.
35. When Ex.W8 was confronted to him, MW1 stated that he did not see it at any point of time and is not aware of it. It is not the case of the respondents that the original of Ex.W8 is not in their custody. And none was examined to prove that aspect.
36. In Ex.W8, it was reported to the GM(HR), APGENCO, that M/s FAB CONS, Paloncha had been working in worm conveyors of V and VI Units which are part of coal milling circuit which transport pulverized bunkers and PC Feeders and finally to the furnace and the works are indirectly related to the 33 abolished categories.
37. MW1 denied that worm conveyors and vapour fans is a part of coal milling. But in the further cross-examination he stated that there is no nomenclature for each part of work as a department to look after in the coal mill. In the coal mill, there will be works of annual overhaul of the mill, replacement of bowls, repairs to the mill drum, arresting coal powder leaks, etc. The coal next will be shifted to boilers through mill outlet pipes. The worm conveyor transports and distributes the coal among the PC bunkers. For this, vapour fans also function. This is the process for generating electricity. Even therwise also, the power can be generated by burning the coal in the furnace.
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38. From the evidence on record, it is clear that the petitioners were working in the coal mill, which is one of the 33 abolished categories, but they were denied the benefit of absorption.
39. The grievance of the petitioners is that as per the guidelines laid down in BP Ms Nos.37, 260 and 272 many similarly placed workmen were absorbed and, therefore, they are also entitled to the same benefit.
40. The pleading and the evidence of the respondents is that all the candidates who fulfilled the twin conditions specified in GO MS No.41 were absorbed.
41. In Hari Nandan Prasad v. Employer I/R to Management of FCI [2014(7) SCC
190), it is observed: "... wherever it is found that similarly situated workmen are regularized by the employer itself under some scheme or otherwise and the workmen in question who have approached Industrial/Labour Court are at par with them, direction of regularization in such cases may be legally justified, otherwise, non-recularization of the left over workers itself would amount to invidious discrimination qua them in such cases and would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Thus, the Industrial adjudicator would be achieving the equality by upholding Art. 14, rather than violating this constitutional provision."
42. The evidence on record shows that even after issuance of GO Ms No.41, the respondents continued the petitioners as contract labour in the coal mill and denied their legitimate right of absorption.
43. In ONGC Ltd. v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union (2015(5) SCALE 353], the workmen were appointed on term basis vide memorandum of appointment issued to each one of the workmen concerned in the year 1988 by the Corporation who continued their services for several years. Thereafter, they were denied their legitimate right to be regularized in the permanent posts of the Corporation. The Court held: "... it is a clear case of an unfair labour practice on the part of the Corporation as defined under Section 2(ra) of the Act (the Industrial Disputes Act), which is statutorily prohibited under Section 25T of the Act and the said 'action of the Corporation warrants penalty to be imposed upon it under Section 25U of the Act." and dismissed the appeal against the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras whereby the High Court dismissed the writ appeal filed by the Corporation against the dismissal of its writ petition challenging the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Tamil Nadu, wherein it was held that non- regularization of the concerned workmen in the dispute is not justified and directed the Corporation to regularize the services of the concerned workmen.
44. In view of the above said unfair labour practices committed by the respondents, the petitioners are entitled for absorption.
45. It was contended that after the absorption process and as per the judgment in SAIL case, the APGENCO canceled the proceedings in BP Ms Nos.37, 260 and
272. But no material was placed on record to accept the said contention.
46. It was next contended that as per the judgment in SAIL case, there is no concept of automatic absorption. The petitioners are not seeking automatic absorption: Therefore, the judgment in SAlt case is not applicable to the facts of the case.
47. For the foregoing reasons, the point is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.
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48. IN THE RESULT, the petition is allowed directing the respondents to absorb the petitioners into the services of the APGENCO in terms of BP Ms Nos.37, 260 and 272 issued by the erstwhile APSEB.
8. Before delving with the issue on hand, it is apposite to refer to the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court which declared the law as to when the orders of Industrial Tribunal can be interfered by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8.1. In Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as Under:
15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.
16. It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338] , with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that: (SCC p. 348) 19 "49. (m) ... The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court."
It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, para 49) "49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it."
Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further the ends of justice.
17. In Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [(2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] this Court held that: (SCC p. 205, para 20) "20. ... In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with compensation of Rs 87,582 by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the Regulations."
18. The power of judicial review of the High Court has to be alluded to here to decide whether or not the High Court has erred in setting aside the judgment and order of the Labour Court. In Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 198] this Court referred to the position held on the power of judicial review in Reid v. Secy. of State for Scotland [(1999) 2 AC 512 : (1999) 2 WLR 28 : (1999) 1 All ER 481 (HL)] wherein it is stated that: (Heinz India (P) Ltd. case [Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 198] , SCC pp. 470-71, para 68) 20 "68. ... 'Judicial review involves a challenge to the legal validity of the decision. It does not allow the court of review to examine the evidence with a view to forming its own view about the substantial merits of the case. It may be that the tribunal whose decision is being challenged has done something which it had no lawful authority to do. It may have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decision itself it may be found to be perverse, or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what was required. Or the decision may be found to be erroneous in respect of a legal deficiency, as for example, through the absence of evidence, or of sufficient evidence, to support it, or through account being taken of irrelevant matter, or through a failure for any reason to take account of a relevant matter, or through some misconstruction of the terms of the statutory provision which the decision-maker is required to apply. But while the evidence may have to be explored in order to see if the decision is vitiated by such legal deficiencies it is perfectly clear that in case of review, as distinct from an ordinary appeal, the court may not set about forming its own preferred view of the evidence.'(Reid case [(1999) 2 AC 512 : (1999) 2 WLR 28 : (1999) 1 All ER 481 (HL)] , AC pp. 541 F-542 A)"
19. Therefore, in view of the above judgments we have to hold that the High Court has committed a grave error by setting aside the findings recorded on the points of dispute in the award of the Labour Court. A grave miscarriage of justice has been committed against the appellant as the respondent should have accepted the birth certificate as a conclusive proof of age, the same being an entry in the public record as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the birth certificate mentioned the appellant's date of birth as 27-6-1940, which is the documentary evidence. Therefore, there was no reason to deny him the benefit of the same, instead the respondent Board prematurely terminated the services of the appellant by taking his date of birth as 27-6-1937 which is contrary to the facts and evidence on record. This date of birth is highly improbable as well as impossible as the appellant's elder brother was born on 27-1-1937 as per the school leaving certificate, and there cannot be a mere 5 months' difference between the birth of his elder brother and himself. Therefore, it is apparent that the school leaving certificate cannot be relied upon by the respondent Board and instead, the birth certificate issued by BMC which is the documentary evidence should have been relied upon by the respondent. Further, the date of birth is mentioned as 27-6-1940 in the 21 LIC insurance policy on the basis of which the premium was paid by the respondent to the Life Insurance Corporation on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, it is only just and proper that the respondent should have relied on the birth certificate issued by BMC on the face of all these discrepancies as the same was issued on the order of JMFC.
8.2. Likewise, in Harjinder Singh's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
"10. ... The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State."
(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [AIR 1958 SC 923] , AIR p. 928, para 10.)
22. In Y.A. Mamarde v. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act [(1972) 2 SCC 108] , this Court, while interpreting the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: (SCC pp. 109-10) "The anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be 22 in supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-Constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This directive principle of State policy being conducive to the general interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour will find its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity."
23. The Preamble and various articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of every individual becomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, Dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation of every section of the society.
24. In a developing society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst to reach the ladder of justice. The philosophy of welfare State and social justice is amply reflected in large number of judgments of this Court, various High Courts, National and State Industrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 23 Factories Act, 1948; Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different States.
25. In Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor [(2001) 1 SCC 118 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 152 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 3] , R.P. Sethi, J. observed that:
(SCC p. 127, para 21) "21. After independence the concept of social justice has become a part of our legal system. This concept gives meaning and significance to the democratic ways of life and of making the life dynamic. The concept of welfare State would remain in oblivion unless social justice is dispensed. Dispensation of social justice and achieving the goals set forth in the Constitution are not possible without the active, concerted and dynamic efforts made by the person concerned with the justice dispensation system."
26. In LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre [(1995) 5 SCC 482] , K. Ramaswamy, J. observed that social justice is a device to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity. The State is obliged to provide to workmen facilities to reach minimum standards of health, economic security and civilised living. The principle laid down by this law requires courts to ensure that a workman who has not been found guilty cannot be deprived of what he is entitled to get. Obviously when a workman has been illegally deprived of his device then that is misconduct on the part of the employer and employer cannot possibly be permitted to deprive a person of what is due to him.
27. In 70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrine of laissez faire and the theory of hire and fire. In his treatise: Democracy, Equality and Freedom, Justice Mathew wrote:
"The original concept of employment was that of master and servant. It was therefore held that a court will not specifically enforce a contract of employment. The law has adhered to the age-old rule that an employer may dismiss the employee at will. Certainly, an employee can 24 never expect to be completely free to do what he likes to do. He must face the prospect of discharge for failing or refusing to do his work in accordance with his employer's directions. Such control by the employer over the employee is fundamental to the employment relationship. But there are innumerable facets of the employee's life that have little or no relevance to the employment relationship and over which the employer should not be allowed to exercise control. It is no doubt difficult to draw a line between reasonable demands of an employer and those which are unreasonable as having no relation to the employment itself. The rule that an employer can arbitrarily discharge an employee with or without regard to the actuating motive is a rule settled beyond doubt. But the rule became settled at a time when the words 'master' and 'servant' were taken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the household, were not his own, but those of his paterfamilias. The overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the judicial opinion which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the employee. Such a philosophy of the employer's dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic simplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers. The conditions have now vastly changed and it is difficult to regard the contract of employment with large-scale industries and government enterprises conducted by bodies which are created under special statutes as mere contract of personal service. Where large number of people are unemployed and it is extremely difficult to find employment, an employee who is discharged from service might have to remain without means of subsistence for a considerably long time and damages in the shape of wages for a certain period may not be an adequate compensation to the employee for non- employment. In other words, damages would be a poor substitute for reinstatement. The traditional rule has survived because of the sustenance it received from the law of contracts. From the contractual principle of mutuality of obligation, it was reasoned that if the employee 25 can quit his job at will, then so too must the employer have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason. And there are a number of cases in which even contracts for permanent employment i.e. for indefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that they lack mutuality of obligation. But these cases demonstrate that mutuality is a high-sounding phrase of little use as an analytical tool and it would seem clear that mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement and that lack of mutuality is simply, as many courts have come to recognise, an imperfect way of referring to the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation on the employer's right of discharge i.e. lack of consideration. If there is anything in contract law which seems likely to advance the present inquiry, it is the growing tendency to protect individuals from contracts of adhesion from overreaching terms often found in standard forms of contract used by large commercial establishments. Judicial disfavour of contracts of adhesion has been said to reflect the assumed need to protect the weaker contracting part against the harshness of the common law and the abuses of freedom of contract. The same philosophy seems to provide an appropriate answer to the argument, which still seems to have some vitality, that the servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered to him."
28. In Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa [(1979) 1 SCC 477 :
1979 SCC (L&S) 39] , the employer invoked the theory of hire and fire by contending that the respondent's appointment was purely temporary and his service could be terminated at any time in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment which he had voluntarily accepted. While rejecting this plea as wholly misconceived, the Court observed:
(SCC p. 486, para 25) "25. ... It is borrowed from the archaic common law concept that employment was a matter between the master and servant only. In the first place, this rule in its original absolute form is not applicable to government servants. Secondly, even with regard to private employment, 26 much of it has passed into the fossils of time. 'This rule held the field at the time when the master and servant were taken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the household, were not his own, but those of his paterfamilias.' The overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo-American jurisprudence of the 18th century and the first half of the 20th century, which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the employee. 'Such a philosophy', as pointed out by K.K. Mathew, J. (vide his treatise: Democracy, Equality and Freedom, p. 326), 'of the employer's dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic simplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers.' To bring it in tune with vastly changed and changing socio-economic conditions and mores of the day, much of this old, antiquated and unjust doctrine has been eroded by judicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application to persons in public employment, to whom the constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available. The argument is therefore overruled."
29. The doctrine of laissez faire was again rejected in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer [(1984) 1 SCC 1 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 42] , in the following words: (SCC p. 9, para 12) "12. In the days of laissez faire when industrial relation was governed by the harsh weighted law of hire and fire the management was the supreme master, the relationship being referable to contract between unequals and the action of the management treated almost sacrosanct. The developing notions of social justice and the expanding horizon of socio-economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry, namely, those who invest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital. Moving from the days when whim of the employer was suprema lex, the Act took a modest step to compel by statute the employer to prescribe minimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given. The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employers in industrial establishments to 27 define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them. The movement was from status to contract, the contract being not left to be negotiated by two unequal persons but statutorily imposed. If this socially beneficial Act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief."
30. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts' approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalisation and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d'être of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganised workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating by-lanes and side-lanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman/employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood.
8.3. In Syed Yakoob's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
" 7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been 28 frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction 29 conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168] 8.4. In KVS Ram's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
10. In the writ petition, while setting aside the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court passed in Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan [Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, (2007) 9 SCC 86 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 668] and also another judgment of the High Court and observed that a person who practices fraud for securing employment cannot perpetuate on the ground of delay and the learned Single Judge faulted the Labour Court for exercising discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service. In our considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the tribunal, only, when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In our view, when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court.
11. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477] , the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under the Motor 30 Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under : (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7) "7. ... A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated 31 before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised."
12. In Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd. [Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 434 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 291] , it was held as under : (SCC pp. 440-41, paras 15-16) "15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well-settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well-reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.
16. It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338] , with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that : (SCC p. 348) '49. (m) ... The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.' 32 It was also held that : (SCC p. 347, para 49) '49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it.'"
13. Emphasising that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, the courts are to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] , this Court has held as under : (SCC p. 205, para 21) "21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty- bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
'10. ... The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.' 33 (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923] , AIR p. 928, para 10.)"
14. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment [K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corpn., Writ Appeal No. 390 of 2008, decided on 3-9-2012 (KAR)] cannot be sustained.
9. From the above enunciation of law, what is clear is that High Court cannot exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as Appellate Court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points and the same is permissible only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record thereby leading to interference of this Court to the Award passed by the Labour Court. Further, in regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding and also if a finding of fact is 34 based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an effort of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Further, the High Court should also bear in mind that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court.
10. The examination of the Tribunal with respect to evidence adduced more particularly the evidence adduced by WW8 through Ex.W8 as to the fact that respondents had been working in worm conveyors of V and VI Unit which are part of coal milling circuit which transport pulverized bunkers and PC Feeders and finally to the furnace and the works are indirectly related to 33 abolished categories. Further, the Tribunal in its explicit terms at Paras 36 to 38 observed that the evidence on record clearly established that respondents were working in the coal mill which is one of the 33 abolished categories but they 35 were denied the benefit of absorption in terms of BP.No.37 dated 18.5.1997, BP.Ms.No.260 dated 19.12.1997 and BP Ms.No.272 dated 31.12.1997 (Exs.W2 to W4).
11. This Court also finds concurrence with the view expressed by the Tribunal regarding the similarly-placed workmen being absorbed in terms of BP Ms.Nos.37, 260 and 272 by relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court at Paras 41 and 43 of the Tribunal's order.
12. Now coming to the decisions relied upon by the petitioners more particularly S. Mani's case (supra); R.M. Yellatti's case (supra) and Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd.'s case, all these decisions speak about the law with respect to burden of proof to be always be rested on workmen who is claiming service benefits. There is no difficulty and quarrel with the said proposition of law as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the instant case, workmen have discharged their burden of proof by adducing evidence and the Tribunal felt such evidence adduced by respondents as adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding is within the 36 exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as such the said points cannot be agitated again by petitioners before writ court.
13. Therefore, viewed from any angle, this Court is loath to accept the contentions of petitioners for reasons aforementioned and feels that the Award of the Labour Court does not require any interference as the same is without any serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record as such High Court cannot exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as Appellate Court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points.
14. In the result, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
15. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.
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NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J 15th October 2025 ksld