Delhi District Court
The Present Complaint Is Filed By M/S ... vs Union Of India That Retiring Workmen ... on 16 July, 2010
1
IN THE COURT OF SH. DIG VINAY SINGH, ADDITIONAL
CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE (SPL. ACTS):
CENTRAL: TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CASE NO.2823/3
UNIQUE ID NO.02401R6319662004
In re:
TEXMACO LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
BELGHARIA, KOLKATA, AND
REGIONAL OFFICE AT
508, SURYA KIRAN BUILDING,
KASTOORBA GANDHI MARG,
NEW DELHI110001 .....COMPLAINANT
VS.
RAMAKANT
S/O. SH. SHIV NATH
R/O. QTR. NO.245, OLD BIRLA LINES,
PO BIRLA LINES, KAMLA NAGAR
DELHI110007 .........ACCUSED
DATE OF INSTITUTION OF CASE: 5.10.2004
DATE OF RESERVATION OF JUDGMENT: 16.7.2010
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT: 16.7.2010
U/S. 630 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956
CC no.2823/3
Page
1 of
22 k
2
JUDGEMENT
(a) The serial no. of the case: 02401R6319662004
(b) The date of commission of offence: On and after 30.11.1996 continuously
(c) The name of complainant: TEXMACO LIMITED HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT BELGHARIA, KOLKATA, AND REGIONAL OFFICE AT :
508, SURYA KIRAN BUILDING, KASTOORBA GANDHI MARG, NEW DELHI110001.
(d) The name, parentage, residence: Ramakant s/o. Sh. Shiv Nath
accused. r/o. Qtr. NO.245, Old Birla
Lines, P.O.Birla Lines,
Delhi110007.
(e) The offence complained of/ proved :
U/s.630 of Companies Act,
1956
(f) The plea of accused : Pleaded not guilty.
(g) The final order : Convicted.
(h) The date of such order : 16.7.2010
Brief statement of the reasons for the decision:
1. The present complaint is filed by M/s Texmaco Ltd. against accused Rama Kant. It is alleged that the complainant is duly incorporated company under Indian Companies Act, 1956 and is CC no.2823/3 Page 2 of 22 k 3 proprietor of Textile Mill namely Birla Textiles located at Post Office, Birla Lines, Kamla Nagar, Delhi. It is claimed that complainant company has various employees and housing colonies such as Old Birla Lines, New Birla Lines, Roshanara Building (Shivaji Lines) Birla Lines Officers Flats and Birla Flats, Khilonawala Bagh, etc. and it is claimed that these housing colonies were situated in the vicinity of said mill, to provide accommodation facilities to the employees of the company who were facing difficulty in reaching the mill. It is further claimed that these colonies were established only as the convenience measures for only serving employees and also only employees were allotted accommodation there. It is claimed that Texmaco Ltd. acquired propriety right in the mill as well as housing colonies by virtue of scheme of arrangement between complainant company and M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills in pursuance of order passed by Hon'ble High Court, Delhi on 03.01.1983 in company petitioner No. 59 of 1982. Under this scheme of arrangement all agreements including licence agreements were deemed to be entered into by M/s Texmaco Ltd. and also the complainant company got the right to proceed and initiate the present proceedings against the accused. It is claimed that by virtue of scheme of arrangement all the rights, titles, interest in the property and the power to allot or transfer the properties of M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving were transferred to the complainant company. CC no.2823/3
Page 3 of 22 k 4 All the employees of M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Ltd. were transferred to the complainant company.
2. It is claimed that accused Rama Kant joined the service of the company on 05.01.1978 and the accused was allotted Quarter No. 245, Old Birla Lines, Kamla Nagar, Delhi110007 during his employment by the company. It is claimed that the accused was allotted the quarter as a licensee and was to retain the quarter so long as he remained in the service of the company. It is also claimed that the accused was to hand over the actual, physical and vacant possession of above said property in case of session of service.
3. It is claimed that the accused ceased to be in the employment of the company w.e.f. 30.11.1996 as the working of the mill was closed down w.e.f. 30.11.1996 in pursuance of order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in petition No. 4677 of 1981. It is claimed that accused has failed to hand over the actual, physical and vacant possession of above said property despite cessation of service from company. It is also claimed that as per observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.W.P. No. 4677/1985 titled as M. C. Mehta Vs Union of India that retiring workmen shall been entitled to remain the quarter for a period of 1 ½ years. It is claimed that Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. W. P. No. 153 dated 22.09.1998 had ordered statusquo which was modified by subsequent order dated 11.01.1999 wherein proceeding for eviction including those under Section 630 of the CC no.2823/3 Page 4 of 22 k 5 Companies Act were allowed to be continued. It is further claimed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has order dated 19.02.2002 observed that employees residing in quarters have no rights and has dismissed IA No. 153/1997.
4. The accused was summoned by Ld. Predecessor Court and notice was framed U/s 630 of the Companies Act in terms of section 251 Cr. PC to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. To prove his case, the complainant has examined only one witness Radhey Shayam who is an attorney holder of the company as PW1. The PW1 has deposed that he is an attorney holder of the company and was authorized to sign and verify the complaint. The PW1 has proved the copy of the resolution of his authorization as Ex. PW1/1, Power of Attorney as Ex. PW1/2, Certificate of Incorporation as Ex. PW1/3. PW1 has deposed that M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills was taken over by the complainant company by virtue of scheme of arrangement passed by Hon'ble High Court in petition No. 39/82 dated 03.01.1983. PW1 has proved the scheme of arrangement and order as Ex. PW1/4. PW1 has further deposed that the accused was allotted residential accommodation on 05.01.1978, due to his being in the service of the company but even after the cessation of the service of the accused w.e.f. 30.11.1996, he has failed to vacate the quarter allotted to the accused. PW1 was cross examined at length by the Counsel for the accused but nothing CC no.2823/3 Page 5 of 22 k 6 material came out of his cross examination.
6. After the conclusion of Prosecution Evidence, the accused was examined U/s 313 Cr. PC read with Section 281 Cr. PC. All the incriminating evidence was put to the accused. In his statement, the accused admitted that the complainant company is duly incorporated under Companies Act and Mr. R. S. Sharma is duly authorized attorney to file the complaint. He admitted that the property in question (Quarter No. 245, Old Birla Lines, P.O. Birla Lines, Kamla Nagar, Delhi) was let out by the M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills to him, but he claimed that it on rent.
7. The accused in his defence examined only one witness Mahender Pal who also admitted that property in question was allotted by M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills. No documents were proved by the accused in his defence.
8. The defence taken by the accused is that the property in question does not belong to the complainant and the real owner of the company is M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills. The accused has contended that he is a tenant not a licensee under the company. He has also contended that vacation of the Quarter No. 245, Old Villa Lines, P.O. Villa Lines, Kamla Nagar, Delhi is a civil dispute and the appropriate forum is a civil court and not proceeding U/s 630 of the Companies Act.
9. It is settled law that the scope of inquiry in a proceedings u/s CC no.2823/3 Page 6 of 22 k 7 630 is extremely restricted in law and the case is to be confined within those narrow ambit's without permitting any delay. The provision contained in Section 630 has been purposely enacted by the legislature with the object of providing a summary procedure for retrieving the property of the company. It is the duty of the Court to place a broad and liberal construction on the provision in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. In Atul Mathur v. Atul Kalra and another, 1989 (4) SCC 514, it was held that the purpose of enacting Section 630 is to provide speedy relief to a company when its property is wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld by an employee or an exemployee. I n, 1993 CRI. L. J. 2791"K. G. K. Nair v. P. C. Juneja", also it is held that, the provisions of S. 630 are intended to provide speedy and efficacious redress in cases where company's property is wrongfully withheld and that the scope of the enquiry in a proceeding under Section 630 is extremely restricted in law and, consequently, the parties be confined within those narrow ambits without being permitted to dilate or protract the proceeding through extraneous avenues.
In the case of S. K. Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 3294 = 2002 AIR SCW 3827 the case pertained to Section 138 of the Railways Act which is somewhat similar to section 630 of the Companies Act and which provides a CC no.2823/3 Page 7 of 22 k 8 procedure for summary delivery of property, detained by a railway servant, to the railway administration,. It was observed as follows:
"The object of the aforesaid Section is to provide speedy summary procedure for taking back the railway property detained by the railway servant or his legal representative. Properties include not only dwelling house, office or other building but also books, papers and any other matters. This would mean that the Section embraces in its sphere all unlawful detention of any railway property by the railway servant............................... The word 'discharge' used in context is of widest amplitude and would include cessation of relationship of employer and employee, may be by retirement, resignation, dismissal or removal. This Court in Union of India v. B.N. Prasad [(1978) 2 SCC 462] considered Section 138 and held that a close perusal of the section clearly reveals that the provision has widest amplitude and takes within its fold not only a railway servant but even a contractor who is engaged for performing services to the railway, and the termination of his contract by the Railway amounts to his discharge, as mentioned in Section 138. The Court also observed that the said provision is in public interest and must be construed liberally, broadly and meaningfully so as to advance the object sought to be achieved by the Railways Act..............".
10. A tenant or a licensee cannot question that the title of the landlord as the ownership has transferred from M/s Birla Cotton Spinning and CC no.2823/3 Page 8 of 22 k 9 Weaving Mills to the complainant company. Section 116 of the Evidence Act provides, No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given."
In the case of Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, (AIR 1915 Privy Council at p. 98), the Privy Council observed as follows:
"A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord." (Emphasis supplied).
In the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 3569 = 2006 AIR SCW 1073 it is observed that a person, who comes upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall not be permitted to deny that such person had title to such possession at the time when such license was given. An equitable principle of estoppal has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section. CC no.2823/3
Page 9 of 22 k 10 It is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant's entry into possession on the admission of the landlord's title that the principle of estoppal is attracted. To the same effect is judgment in Sheikh Noor and another v. Sheikh G. S. Ibrahim (dead) by LRs AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 4163= 2003 AIR SCW 3784.
In Krishna Prasad Lal v. Barabani Coal Concern Ltd. (AIR 1937 P.C. 251) , "It (Sec. 116) deals with one cardinal and simple estoppal and states it first as applicable between landlord and tenant and then as between licensor and licensee, a distinction which corresponds to that between the parties to an action for rent and the parties to an action for use and occupation".
In the case of S. K. Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma (supra) the case pertained to Section 138 of the Railways Act which is somewhat similar to section 630 of the Companies Act and which provides a procedure for summary delivery of property, detained by a railway servant, to the railway administration,. It was observed as follows:
CC no.2823/3
Page 10 of 22 k 11 "13. Further, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the railway administration has to prove that the property in question was belonging to it before invoking Section 138 is totally misconceived because once it is admitted that respondent was given possession of the premises in question by order dated 1711967 as he was entitled for the same while working as CPRO of the Department, he could not be permitted to deny the title of the railway administration. Admittedly, respondent was inducted because he was in railway service. Now, he is estopped from challenging the title of the appellant over the premises in question.
For this purpose, we would refer to Section 116 of the Evidence Act....."
"14. Second part of the aforesaid section clearly provides that no person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny the title to such person to such possession of the property. He cannot deny the same during the pendency of such license or sub lease. Such estoppal continues to operate so long as licensee or sub tenant has not openly restored possession by surrender to such person. This rule of estoppal would cease to operate only after such licensee or subtenant has been evicted......"
It was also held that "16. In this view of the matter, respondent cannot be permitted to CC no.2823/3 Page 11 of 22 k 12 contend that property was not belonging to the railway administration. Whether the railway administration is owner, mortgagee, lessee or licensee is not required to be decided in such proceedings at the instances of sublessee or licensee of railway administration."
11. The other contention of the accused that the appropriate forum the remedy is civil court is also not tenable. The legislature has in his wisdom made a special provision regarding wrongful retaining of the company property U/s. 630 of the Companies Act. This provision has been made to stop the mischief of person retaining the property of company otherwise the remedy of civil court is available to the company. If the remedy of civil court was thought fit enough by the legislature it would not have made available remedy of Section 630 of the Companies Act. The legislature was quite aware of the harm which would have resulted if only ordinary civil remedy would have been available to the company. The company would have to adopt the lengthy process of civil remedy to get back the possession of the property.
12. The accused has contended that he is a tenant in the quarter and not a licensee, but the accused has failed to substantiate this contention with any documentary evidence. The accused on the other hand has admitted that the property in question was allotted to him by the predecessor of the complainant company during his course of CC no.2823/3 Page 12 of 22 k 13 employment. From the above facts, it is clear that the accused was allotted this property for his personal use only and he was not authorised to sublet it to other persons. It is clearly established that the property in question was allotted to the accused as a licensee. Even if the contention of the accused is admitted for arguments sake that he was a tenant under the company, the accused has failed to show any rent agreement with the company. The accused has failed to show that he has deposited the rent amount with the company or with the Rent Controller after cessation of his services. He has not filed any application with the Rent Controller for the deposition of rent. From the reasons mentioned above, the contention of the accused that he is a tenant of the property in question, can't be accepted.
13. The accused has raised the contention that the complainant has failed to prove the power of attorney, which authorised him to file the complaint. He has also contended that the complainant has failed to prove minutes book, Board of Resolution, but the contention of the accused can't be accepted, as Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly provides that once there is a duly notarized power of attorney, than it shall be presumed to be true, unless the contrary is proved. Section 85 provides the word 'shall presumed', which means that once the basic conditions are established, it is obligatory on the Court to presume that the power of attorney has been duly authorised. The CC no.2823/3 Page 13 of 22 k 14 burden of disproving the power of attorney lies on the accused, which he has failed to discharge.
14. Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly provides that once there is a duly notarized power of attorney, than it shall be presumed to be true, unless the contrary is proved. The expression used is 'shall presume' which shows that the section is mandatory and the Court has to presume that all necessary requirements for the proper execution of the power of attorney were duly fulfilled before the notary public. It is noticed that the power of attorney on record is legally and properly notarized and it fulfills all the ingredients of section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act. The accused has not produced any evidence to disprove the power of attorney of the company. No objection was raised at the time when these documents were being exhibited in evidence as to its mode of proof.
In the case of Jugraj
Singh v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1971
SUPREME COURT 761 before a three judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme court it was argued, that to invoke S. 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that a Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney and to have been executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public was duly executed and authenticated, that authentication of the power of attorney had to be in a particular form, and that it was not sufficient that a witness should have signed the document, be he a Notary CC no.2823/3 Page 14 of 22 k 15 Public or any other. It was argued that, it ought to have been signed by the persons named in S. 85 and should have been authenticated properly. It was argued that the authentication should have shown on its face that the Notary Public had satisfied himself that executor was the real person who had signed the power of attorney before him and, the power of attorney was invalid because it did not show on its face that the Notary Public had satisfied himself that it was Mr. X who executed the document. Negating the contention that the Notary Public did not say in his endorsement that Mr. X had been identified to his satisfaction, it was held as follows;
"But that flows from the fact that he endorsed on the document that it had been subscribed and sworn before him. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts and we are satisfied that he must have satisfied himself in the discharge of his duties that the person who was executing it was the proper person."
In the case of M/s. Northland Traders and others v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1994 Allahabad 381 it is observed as follows:
" 11. ...... it would also be presumed that the person executing the power of attorney on behalf of a corporate body was competent to do so. In the present case Sri M.K. Bose had executed the power of attorney in favour of K.N. Pandey which was duly authenticated by a notary public as mentioned in Section 85. The CC no.2823/3 Page 15 of 22 k 16 Court is, therefore, bound to presume that the power of attorney was duly executed and authenticated. This presumption, however, is a rebuttable presumption and it was open to the defendants to challenge the authority of the attorney or to prove that the power of attorney was invalid or that the person acting on the basis of such power of attorney was not duly authorised. No such evidence has come from the side of the defendants. On the contrary PW. 1 K.N. Pandey had deposed that (sic) the Senior Branch Manager and was authorised to sign and verify the plaint and to file the suit. There being no evidence in rebuttal the court below was, therefore, justified in holding that K.N. Pandey was authorised to sign and verify the plaint."
In the case of Citibank N.A., New Delhi, Plaintiff v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur, Defendant. AIR 1982 DELHI 487 it was held that execution of power of attorney by a Bank's Executive Officer and Cashier delegating certain powers to one employee of that Bank and Document bearing Bank's seal and attested by Notary Public raises a presumption that power of attorney is executed by the Bank. Presumption that the officers executing the document had authority to execute it on behalf of the Bank also arises. Word "person" in Section 85 includes legal person. (Paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 28).
Similarly in the case of Smt. Kulsumunnisa, CC no.2823/3 Page 16 of 22 k 17 Appellant v. Smt. Ahmadi Begum and others, Respondents. AIR 1972 ALLAHABAD 219 (V. 59 C 58) (Division Bench): and in the case of Yogesh Singh Sahota, Petitioner v. Niranjan Lal Gupta, Respondent. AIR 1981 DELHI 222. It is held, that a Power of attorney along with verifications are to be presumed to be true u/S.85.
In the case of Kamla Rani and Ors. v. M/s. Texmaco Ltd. AIR 2007 DELHI 147, which was a case of this very complainant on the same facts, it was one of the contentions, of the employee, before High Court that the eviction petitions were not filed under a proper authorisation. It was held as follows;
" 33. Authentication by a notary public is a solemn act performed by the notary public whose duty is to ensure that the executant is the person before him and is identified to his satisfaction. Once a document is authenticated by a notary public, it will be presumed that the document was duly executed and was in order. The use of the expression 'shall presume' shows that the section is mandatory and the Court has to presume that all necessary requirements for the proper execution of the power of attorney were duly fulfilled before the notary public. As observed in AIR 1984 (363) (sic) M/s. E. C. and E.Co. Ltd. v. M/s. J. E. Works, if two conditions are satisfied, firstly the power of attorney being executed before a notary public and secondly it being authenticated by a notary public, CC no.2823/3 Page 17 of 22 k 18 a presumption would arise under Section 85 about the executant of the power of attorney.
34. Onus would thus lie on the opposite party to prove to the contrary.
35. It is well settled that authentication would mean more than mere execution. Where proof of authentication surfaces, benefit of Section 85 has to be granted.
36. No negative evidence has been brought on record, none has been shown to me by the petitioners.
37. The purpose of Section 85 of the Evidence Act appears to be that a duly executed and authenticated power of attorney can be proved under Section 85 without undue expenses to be incurred by producing the executant thereof or the original board resolution.
38. The reason is obvious. Banks, insurance companies and multinational companies empower officers to institute and file suits on their behalf. Large number of suits are filed by these organisations. If the original board resolution or the executant of the power of attorney has to submit itself/himself before the Court as a sine qua non to prove the power of attorney, practical difficulties would arise and unnecessary expenses would be incurred by the organizations to prove the document in the aforenoted manner.
39. I am in full agreement with the view taken by CC no.2823/3 Page 18 of 22 k 19 the learned Rent Control Tribunal that the authority of the person who had signed and verified the petition as also instituted the eviction petition stood duly proved by means of production of the authenticated and notarised power of attorney bearing the seal of the notary public.
40. Decision of the Supreme Court reported as AIR 1997 SC 3 Union Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar is additionally relied upon by me. The said decision states that where a suit has been filed on behalf of a corporate body and is duly prosecuted by the person who had filed the suit, a presumption would arise that the person concerned was authorised to do so."
15. The accused has also contended that the Texmaco company is not his landlord, but the accused has claimed that the property in question belongs to M/s. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. It is clear that the property in question was held by a unit of Birla Textiles Mills, which was as a result of scheme of arrangement, which is Ex. PW1/4, for transfer of the predecessor in interest company to M/s. Texmaco Ltd. Perusal of the said document reveals that on page 5 in the order of petition, it is specifically written as follows.
" a) That all the property, rights, and powers of the said transferor company specified in the first , second and third parts of the Schedule II hereto and all the other property, rights and powers of the said transferor company be transferred without further act or CC no.2823/3 Page 19 of 22 k 20 deed to the said transferee company and accordingly the same shall, pursuant to section 394(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, be transferred to and vest in the said transferee company for all the estate and interest of the said transferor company therein but subject nevertheless to all charges now affecting the same, and
b) That all the liabilities and duties of the said transferor company by transferred without further act or deed to the said transferee company and accordingly the same shall , pursuant to section 394(2) of the Companies Act , 1956, be transferred to and become the liabilities and duties of the said transferee company: and c ) That all proceedings now pending by or against the said transferor company be continued by or against the said transferee company; and
d) All contracts, deeds, bonds, agreements and instruments of whatever kind or nature relating to the said units of Birla Cotton shall continue to be in full force and effect against or in favour of Texmaco as the case may be and enforced as fully and effectively as if Texmaco instead of Birla Cotton had been a party thereto.
16. In the case of Kamla Rani and Ors. v. M/s. Texmaco Ltd. (Supra), which was a case of this very complainant on the same facts, the contention raised that the complainant is not the owner, and all other contentions raised before this court, were also answered in favour of the complainant, and for the sake of brevity it would be relevant to CC no.2823/3 Page 20 of 22 k 21 quote the observations which are as follows:
"25. Ownership is not relevant for the reason a person may be a landlord without being an owner.
26. A company may take premises on a 30 year lease from the owner with a permission to induct its employee as a tenant/sub tenant. Such an employee to whom the said permission is allotted would be a tenant under his company and the allotment would be pursuant to his employment. Such an allottee cannot resist the eviction, if otherwise grounds are made out.
27. Even otherwise, under the directions of the Supreme Court, 68% land had to be handed over to DDA for being maintained as open area. DDA has not become the owner of the said land. Ownership would vest in DDA when possession is handed over.
28. It would be the obligation of the company to evict its tenants including heirs of the tenants and hand over possession to DDA.
29. But, I rest my decision on firmer grounds. A tenant who accepts a person as his landlord is estopped from questioning the title of his landlord.
30. The petitioners are therefore estopped from questioning the title of M/s. Texmaco Ltd. for the reason either they or their predecessorininterest were inducted as a tenant by the predecessorininterest of M/s. Texmaco Ltd." CC no.2823/3
Page 21 of 22 k 22
17. By virtue of the scheme of arrangement, what was acquired by the complainant was a unit of said company i.e. M/s Birla Cottons Spinning and Weaving Mills and not the company M/s Birla Cottons Spinning and Weaving Mills, itself. Therefore even if the company M/s Birla Cottons Spinning and Weaving Mills still exits, the rights of the complainant does not get effected in the unit so taken over by virtue of the scheme of arrangement by orders of Delhi high court.
18. Accordingly the complainant has succeeded in proving its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the accused is found guilty and thus convicted for the offence u/s 630 of The Companies Act 1956.
ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 16th July, 2010 (DIGVINAY SINGH) ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE SPECIAL ACTS, CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI CC no.2823/3 Page 22 of 22 k