Karnataka High Court
Smt. Maramma vs The Tahsildar, Sirguppa And Others on 21 November, 1998
Equivalent citations: ILR1999KAR1203, 2000(3)KARLJ393
Author: B. Padmaraj
Bench: B. Padmaraj
ORDER
1. None appears for the petitioner. When the matter has reached for hearing, there is absolutely no representation on the side of the petitioner. Learned Government Pleader for respondents 1 to 3 is present and he has been heard in the matter. Learned Counsel for the other respondents is absent. There is absolutely no representation on their side also. Learned Government Pleader has contended that in the light of the decision of the Full Bench in Gururaj alias Gurunath Govindrao Mutalik Desai v State of Karnataka and Others, the impugned order made by the Deputy Commissioner at Annexure-D may not be maintainable and since the Deputy Commissioner has not considered the matter on merits, it has to be remanded back to the third respondent/Deputy Commissioner for consideration of the revision on merits.
2. The short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the third respondent/Deputy Commissioner was justified in dismissing the revision filed before her on the ground that a revision does not lie on an appellate order passed by the Assistant Commissioner by the impugned order as Annexure-D. In Gururaj's case, supra, the Full Bench of this Court has held as under:
"16. In Srimanmaharaja Niranjana Jagadguru Mallikarjuna Murugharajendra Mahaswamy Matadipathy v Deputy Commissioner, Coorg, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. It was held therein that in exercise of his powers under Section 136 of the Land Revenue Act, the Deputy Commissioner has no power to revise the appellate order under sub-section (2) thereof. Section 136(2) uses the expression 'final' as regards the order of the Appellate Authority made under that provision and there are no express words in any other provision enabling a revision and when the Appellate Authority makes an order under Section 136(2) of the Land Revenue Act, the order made by the original authority under Section 129 of the Act merges with the latter and therefore the Deputy Commissioner has no power to interfere with the order made under Section 129 of the said Act when it has been a subject-matter in appeal. That decision stood on the scheme and scope of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. It was pointed out therein that the expression rendering an Appellate Authority as final would be rendered otiose, if it were a subject-matter for revision. But, we cannot subscribe to that rationable, with respect, because where an order of authority is rendered final whether the same is subject to further revision should be understood in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to earlier wherein it is explained that the meaning to be attributed to expression 'final' will depend upon the scheme of the provisions of the Act and cannot be read in isolation. Merely because an expression 'final' is used, it cannot be said that a revision would not lie against such an order".
3. It has to be stated that even though the decision of the Assistant Commissioner under Section 136(2) of the KLR Act is declared to be final, there is no bar to revision of that order under Section 136(3) by the Deputy Commissioner. The order of the Assistant Commissioner under Section 136(2) is to be treated as an order passed under Section 129 and not an independent order. That being so, so long as the matter pertains to Sections 127 and 129, the finality attached to an order made in appeal under Section 136(2) is subject to the power of revision by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act. In that view of the matter and in the light of the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in Gururaj's case, supra, I hold that a Revision lies under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act against an order made by the Assistant Commissioner in a proceeding arising under Sections 127 and 129 of the KLR Act. I am therefore of the view that the order made by the Deputy Commissioner at Annexure-D cannot be sustained and hence it is liable to be set aside. Since the Deputy Commissioner has dismissed the revision petition solely on the ground that it is not maintainable and has not considered the case on merits, it would be just and proper for this Court to remit the matter to the third respondent/Deputy Commissioner for disposal of the Revision on merits.
4. In the result, therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The impugned order made by the third respondent/Deputy Commissioner at Annexure-D is hereby set aside and the matter shall stand remitted to the third respondent/Deputy Commissioner, which shall be disposed of on merits in accordance with law by restoring the matter to its original number after affording opportunity to all the parties concerned including the present petitioner and the contesting respondents.