Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
D. Redya Naik vs State Of A.P., Department Of Revenue, ... on 24 September, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(1)ALD1, 1998(6)ALT793
Author: Umesh Chandra Banerjee
Bench: Umesh Chandra Banerjee
ORDER Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.
1. In the present day judicial system, public interest Litigation is a significant step. On the wake of twenty first century, a rigid insistence on the strict rules pertaining to the concept of focus standi cannot be had, moreso, by reason of the changing structure of the society. Law-Courts exist for the society and in the event Law-Courts fall short of the expectation of the people, the Law-Courts would be losing their efficacy resulting in a total failure of the constitutional machinery. Judiciary has a pivotal role to play and in the event the justice administration system fails, the democratic polity, as enshrined in the Constitution would also come to an end and the resultant effect would be a social catastrophe.
2. The concept of locus standi however through the years has had a steady refinement by the Law-Courts and this concept provided the Law-Courts with much greater responsibility for rendering the justice administration system available to the disadvantaged section of the Society. Incidentally, however, this new phenomenon has also over-loaded the Law-Courts rendering ordinary litigants to wait for a further period of time. Law's delay in the Indian Sub-Continent is not unknown. And, this additional burden and responsibility on to the Law-Courts will render the situation more awesome. As such, in the fitness of things, the Law-Courts, though normally shall be entertaining these litigations, ought to exercise great care and caution in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction under this new phenomenon in our jurisprudential system. Justice ought to be made available to the one who cannot afford the luxury of litigation and in the event an organisation guided by social benefit or a public spirited individual approaches the Court for and on behalf of a section of the people by reason of affection of right, there ought not to be any disinclination on the part of the Law-Courts to accept, provided of course, following the caution exercised by Justice Bhagwati in S.P. Gupta v. President of India, , that it ought not to be the act of a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. In this context, reference may also be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma, wherein it has been stated in no uncertain terms that the effect of a public interest litigation should go beyond the sphere of the parties present in the proceedings so as to prevent this ' 'technique'' from being used as an instrument of coercion, blackmail or for other oblique motive. Extreme care and caution ought to be there in the matter of entertaining a petition. It ought not to be used for private gain or individual motive but for general redress to the public at large. The observations of this Court in the case of B. Kistaiah v. Government of India, also seem to be very apposite in the context. This Court observed:
"It is not as if any person can walk into the portals of the Court and lodge a complaint making irresponsible allegations against any officers or the authority concerned. We would like to observe that in public interest litigation cases of this nature the Court would have to make a very strict scrutiny of the pleadings at the threshold itself. The Court has to satisfy to itself about the bona fides of the petitioner in filing the public interest litigation. The petitioners in public interest litigation are bound to disclose their full particulars, details about their avocation and the effort made and methods adopted by them in obtaining and collecting the data and information for filing the public interest litigation. Credibility of the person initiating public interest litigation is an important aspect which requires the attention of the Court at the threshold, otherwise the unscrupulous litigants would hijack the system and use it as an instrument of blackmail. Liberalising the rule relating to standing is no licence granted to one and all for filing cases of their choice in the name of public interest litigation. Relaxation is meant to seek judicial redress by public spirited citizens on behalf of unorganised, poor, weaker Sections of the society. Public interest litigation cases initiated by social and democratic organisations, academicians, social scientists, human rights activists gained a growing acceptance and judiciary recognised them as representatives espousing the cause of community's interest.
This strategic arm of legal aid movement was never intended to resolve and settle personal scores. It was never intended to confer any respectability upon busybodies and meddlesome interlopers.''
3. It is on this backdrop that the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as filed by the petitioner, shall have to be considered and it would be convenient, therefore, to advert to the factual aspects of the matter under consideration at this juncture. Before so doing, however, be it placed on record that this writ petition, in the normal course, was filed before a learned single Judge of this Court. The learned single Judge, upon hearing the matter, was pleased to grant an order of status quo and after some deliberations thought it fit to reserve the judgment in the matter. But subsequently the matter, however, was not dealt with in extenso and it was referred to a larger Bench recording in the order of reference that important questions are involved and the matter ought to be dealt with by a larger Bench. Hence the petition is placed before this Bench for being dealt with appropriately.
4. We, however, have not been able to appreciate the important questions in the facts of the matter under consideration. Be that as it may, the conspectus of facts depict that there was, in fact, a Government order in which a particular area in a very posh locality of the City of Hyderabad namely, Banjara Hills was earmarked for a commercial complex but subsequently, the same was changed and allotted to N.T.R. Memorial Trust. It is this change which is being objected to by the petitioner herein.
5. Let us recapitulate the words of Justice Bhagwati in S.P. Gupta 's case that it should not be a handi-work of a busybody or an interloper and also the words of Chief Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji in State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma (supra) that it should be restricted to a public sphere and not a private motivation, and see for ourselves at this juncture as to who the petitioner is who has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in a public interest litigation. The petitioner who happens to be a Member of the Legislative Assembly from Dornakal Constituency of Warangal District is not a resident of Banjara Hills, nor Banjara Hills area falls within his constituency. In paragraph 4 of the Affidavit filed in support of the petition the petitioner has stated:
"4. It is submitted that I am elected as a Member of Legislative Assembly from Dornakal Assembly Constituency, Warangal District in the Year 1989 and I am continuing as such for the-second term. I was President of Maripada Panchayat Samithi between 1981-86, thereafter, I was elected as President of the Maripada Mandal Praja Parishad and continued as such till I was elected as Member of Legislative Assembly in 1989. I am a Graduate from Osmania University and I am in public life eversince 1981. As such I have locus standi to question the impugned order in order to safeguard the public properties."
6. Before dealing with this matter any further, however, the contextual facts ought to be noticed at this juncture.
7. In December, 1996, the General Secretary of the Telugu Desam Party made a representation to the Government requesting allotment of Government land to an extent of 2 acres for locating their party office. On 18th January, 1997, the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (for short HUDA) requested the Government to allot the Hermitage premises located on the Hill Fort Road, behind HACA Bhavan (Hyderabad Agricultural Co-operative Association Bhavan) for developing it into a commercial/institutional purpose. In the said letter they expressed their willingness to surrender any of the vacant lands available with HUDA either in Saroornagar or Jubilee Hills or the site at Madhapur Techno Enclave Centres, I, II and III, in lieu of Hermitage. The records depict that in February, 1997, the NTR Memorial Trust was constituted by trust deed dated 15-2-1997 with various objects and reasons as enumerated in the said Deed. We do not deem it fit to go into the details of the same at this juncture since the same does not have any relevance in the matter under consideration. The State Government by letter dated 15-3-1997 informed the General Secretary of the Telugu Desam Party that the Collector, Hyderabad has proposed three alternative places for allotment to the Telugu Desam Party for setting up of their office and requested them to select any one of them and file an application in the prescribed forms to the District Collector, Hyderabad. Subsequently it was informed to the State Government that the Telugu Desam Party has decided to drop the idea of costructing any party office or training centre. The records depict that in April, 1997 the NTR Memorial Trust made a representation to the Government requesting for allotment of land in Plot No.93 of the defunct Jubilee Hills Municipality at Road No.2, Banjara Hills for starting its training centre. In the said representation difficulties were also expressed as regards acquisition of private properties and earlier allotments made in respect of various trusts namely Chandra Rajeswara Rao Trust, CPI, Telangana Martyrs Memorial Trust, Sundaraiah Memorial Trust, CPI, etc., were cited as illustrations. The Government, however, decided to allot the plot on Road No.2, Banjara Hills in favour of the NTR Memorial Trust on lease for a period of 30 years and a memorandum dated 30-4-1997, was duly issued in that effect. In the said memorandum it was duly recorded that it was decided by the Government to transfer the site, on which the crst-while Hermitage Building was located, in favour of the HUDA.
On 6-5-1997 the HUDA handed over the vacant possession of the land of the defunct Jubilee Hills Municipality to the M.R.O., Shaikpet. On the same day i.e., 6-5-1997, the M.R.O., Shaikpet, handed over the vacant possession of the land to Sri D. Srinivasa Rao, Trustee of the NTR Memorial Trust under a panchanama and a plan dated 6-5-1997. Subsequently the Government has issued an order, being G.O. Ms. No.474, dated 4-6-1997, regarding the lease in favour of the NTR Trust for a period of 30 years on a rent of Rs.90,000/- per annum with a provision for enhancement at 10% for every 5 years. Mr. Subba Reddy, learned Advocate appearing for the Trust very candidly submitted in this connection that by reason of the express promise on the part of the Government to allot the plot and also by reason of the issuance of G.O. Ms.No.474, dated 4-6-1997, the NTR Memorial Trust has already paid a sum of Rs.90,000/- towards the lease amount for one year and in fact the lease deed was registered on 17-6-1997. He further contended that by reason of such allotment, the Trust has already spent a sum of more than rupees 80 lakhs on account of work of construction of the buildings from the plinth level up to the pillar level.
8. Mr. Advocate-General, appearing for the State Government contended that, as a matter of fact, there is no irregularity arising in the matter of allotment of the plot and question of maintaining any public interest litigation in the contextual facts of the matter under consideration does not and cannot arise. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Advocate-General on the decision of this Court reported in the case of K.P. Prabhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., , wherein relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deva Gowda, , this Court in paragraph 2 of the report observed that the Law-Court should use proper circumspection before entertaining an application under Article 226 or passing orders thereon on the plea of a general affectation of the public at large. The factual details of the matter under reference before this Court would appear from paragraph 3 of the report to the extent that the petitioner therein had questioned the proceedings dated 13th December, 1994 passed by the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. A writ petition was filed by a third party to a proceeding under the Urban Land Ceiling Act questioning the order passed therein declaring the respondent as a non-surplus holder. This Court recorded that the litigation admittedly pertains to an individual property in question and the Urban Land Ceiling authorities have dealt with the matter as they have deemed fit in terms of the direction of the Court. The parties in the adversorial litigation have chosen not to come up before the Court. On the contrary, a person having no interest in the matter wants to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation. The litigation pertains to the property in question admittedly belonging to a single individual and the matter has been dealt with, by the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities and as such, there being an affectation of right covering the entire public at large does not and cannot arise.
9. The principal grievance of the petitioner in the contextual facts of the matter under consideration is that whereas there ought to have been a shopping complex in the Banjara Hills area in the land in question but instead of having shopping complex thereon, the land has been allotted to the NTR Memorial Trust by the State Government. Assuming the facts to be so, though, however, we do not wish to take cognizance of the matter by reason of the fact, as noted above, that question of affectation of the right of public at large in the contextual facts of the matter under consideration does not and cannot arise, Banjara Hills area is one of the affluent areas of the City of Hyderabad and, as a matter of fact, a trip round the area would not lead to any manner of doubt that there is no dearth of areas earmarked for shopping complex and a large number of shops do exist. As a matter of fact Court can take judicial notice of abundancy of the same in the area in question. There is no social element therefor and without which even the thought of having a public interest litigation does not arise. The concept of pro bono publico has a definite significance and it would be a plain exercise of judicial power to restrict its application to the need of the situation rather than widening its horizon as the recent trend of judicial decisions depict.
10. In any event, to have or not to have a shopping complex cannot be a subject-matter of public interest litigation since that is not a necessity of life, nor it can be said to be an affectation of public right. As such, the petitioner's involvement in the matter has not been appreciated since he is, in any event, not a resident of the Banjara Hills area so as to have the desire of having a shopping complex in that area, nor it is his constituency so that he can call for some supposed benefit to the persons living in the area of his constituency. There is not even remotest possible connection and the petitioner is in no way connected with the area in question, neither there is any primordial reason to feel aggrieved so far as the petitioner is concerned.
11. In that view of the matter, this writ petition is dismissed by reason of the fact that the Court does not feel inclined to entertain a petition of this nature. The issues raised in the order of the learned single Judge, however, are left open to be agitated at a suitable occasion. All interim orders arc vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.