M/S. Sri Chaitanya Educational Trust ... vs Ganta Sirisha on 9 June, 2025

[Cites 37, Cited by 0]

Telangana High Court

M/S. Sri Chaitanya Educational Trust ... vs Ganta Sirisha on 9 June, 2025

Bench: G.Radha Rani

           THE HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI

              CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.79 of 2025


ORDER:

This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner-defendant No.1 aggrieved by the order dated 03.01.2025 passed in I.A. No.185 of 2024 in O.S. No.142 of 2024 by the Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad.

2. The facts of the case in brief are that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 - plaintiffs filed O.S. No.142 of 2024 seeking the relief of directing the defendants to vacate the plaint schedule building and to deliver vacant possession of the same to them, to cancel the lease deed dated 05.09.2020 bearing document No.9528 of 2019 on the file of Sub-Registrar, Kodad, in favour of the defendants as the same was obtained by deceiving the plaintiffs and directing the defendants to pay damages @ Rs.5,00,000/- per month for use and occupation of the plaint schedule building from 01.05.2024 along with costs of the suit.

3. As per the averments of the plaint, the plaintiffs were the absolute owners of the plaint schedule building consisting of G+3 floors situated in Kodad Town and Municipality in an extent of 907.5 2 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 Sq. yds. They were represented by their Power of Attorney holder, who was none other than their father. The defendant was a Trust, running Educational Institutions and approached the plaintiffs for taking the plaint schedule building on lease for running educational institution and the plaintiffs also agreed to give the plaint building on lease to the defendants and through their G.P.A. holder entered into an agreement dated 20.09.2018. Later the defendants requested the plaintiffs to execute a nominal registered lease deed for the purpose of obtaining permissions from the Government for running school. As per the request of the defendants, the plaintiffs executed a registered lease deed nominally in favour of the defendants through their authorized representative Danda Venkateswarlu. The defendants got prepared the lease deed and without informing the contents of the lease deed, asked the plaintiffs to sign the same. Having reposed confidence in the defendants, the plaintiffs signed the alleged lease deed which was nominal for the purpose of obtaining permission from the Government for running school. As per the terms of agreement of lease, the monthly rent for the schedule building is Rs.1,81,828/-, but the defendants to evade stamp duty and registration fee to the Government and to cheat the Government and the plaintiff, wrongly mentioned the rent in the lease deed as Rs.10,000/- per month. The defendants did not disclose the same at the time of obtaining signature of 3 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 the plaintiff on the lease deed and cheated the plaintiff and the Government and evaded the actual stamp duty and registration fee to be paid on the actual rent of the schedule building taken on lease. As such, the plaintiffs contended that the alleged lease deed was non-est in the eye of law on the principle of non-est factum and that the same was not legally valid and was liable to be cancelled.

3.1. They further submitted that the defendants took possession of the plaint schedule building on 19-.09.2019 and agreed to pay rent as per the area available for occupation. The lessee agreed to pay 10% enhancement of rent for every 2 years. At the time of agreement, the rent was mentioned as Rs. 1,75,567/-, but it was specifically mentioned in the agreement that the plinth area shall be determined after completion of construction of the building and the rent was payable for the actual plinth area available for occupation. As such, as the plinth area increased after construction of the building, the rent was fixed at Rs.1,81,828/- as per the actual area of occupancy i.e. 28,664 Sq.ft. As per clause 3 of the agreement of lease, the lease period is for 10 years and the lessors and lessee had the option of terminating the lease by serving a notice of six months in advance from either side. The plaintiffs and the defendants agreed for other terms and conditions mentioned in the lease agreement and the defendants occupied the plaint schedule building and running a school in the plaint 4 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 schedule building. As per the said clause, if the lease deed was to be registered, the plaintiff will have to bear the expenses for registration and for obtaining permission from Government if the lease deed was registered, the defendants had to bear the expenses for registration. The lease was not registered by the plaintiffs but the defendants obtained a nominal registered lease deed for obtaining permission from Government. The defendants kept the plaintiffs in dark without disclosing the contents of the lease deed and obtained the lease deed by wrongly mentioning the lease amount therein to avoid stamp duty and registration fee to Government and cheated the plaintiffs and the Government. The defendants paid rent for some time as agreed at the rate of Rs.1,81,828/-, but later committed default in payment of rent and committed breach of contract. The defendants failed to pay the rents for two months completely i.e. for the months of April and May, 2020 and paid only half of monthly rent for 16 months from June, 2020 to September, 2021.

3.2. The defendants sent a letter requesting the plaintiffs to defer payment of rent for the months of March 2020 to June 2020 due to Covid pandemic prevailing at that time. The plaintiffs got issued a reply notice dated 20.04.2020 to the defendants stating that they took loan from the Bank for construction of the schedule building and as per the moratorium granted by the Bank to the plaintiffs, they would extend the same time to 5 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 the defendants in payment of rent and agreed to defer the payment of rent for the months of April and May 2020. As per the terms and conditions of the lease agreement there was a clause for enhancement of 10% increase of rent for every two years and the defendants were liable to pay enhanced rent after two years. But, the defendants paid 5% enhanced rent only instead of 10% for the period from July 2022 to October 2022. Since November, the defendants are not paying the rents regularly with 10% enhanced rent and committed default. As per the account statement filed by the defendants itself, there was an outstanding due of rent of Rs.18,29,249/- to be paid to the plaintiffs as on October 2022. After that regular monthly rent with 10% enhancement was due from November 2022 onwards. The plaintiffs orally demanded the defendants and when they committed breach of terms of agreement of lease, got issued a legal notice to the defendants on 17.01.2023 demanding to pay the arrears of rent. After the legal notice was issued, the defendants paid some amounts towards arrears, but still the defendants were due an amount of Rs.18,75,756/- as on September 2023. The defendants were not regular in payment of rents and were committing default. As such, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to vacate the schedule premises and issued a legal notice on 06.10.2023 to the defendants terminating the lease by giving 6 months prior notice as per the terms of the agreement of lease and 6 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 demanded the defendants to pay the arrears of rent and to vacate the schedule building by 30.04.2024. The plaintiffs keeping in view the welfare and future of the children and not to disturb their academic year, did not demand the defendants to vacate the paint schedule building in the middle of the academic year though the defendants committed default in payment of rents. The defendants were trespassers after 30.04.2024 as the lease was terminated. The defendants received the notice and did not pay the arrears nor gave any reply.

3.3. As the defendants were trying to remain in possession of the schedule building without vacating, the plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and for injunction on the file of the Junior Civil Judge Court, Kodad, vide O.S. No.241 of 2023 to restrain the defendants from admitting students and running the school in the schedule building from 01.05.2024 onwards and the same was pending. The court granted interim injunction but the same was suspended by the Senior Civil Judge, Kodad vide C.M.A.No.7 of 2024. As the defendants did not vacate the plaint schedule building and not paying arrears of rent, the plaintiffs got issued a legal notice dated 02.05.2024 to the defendants demanding them to vacate the schedule building, claiming damages at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per month. But, the defendants failed to respond to the said notice, as such filed the present suit seeking the above reliefs.

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 3.4. It was also mentioned in the plaint that there was an Arbitration clause in both the unregistered and registered lease deeds, but as the matter involved in the suit was not against the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, as such, the suit proceedings before civil court were maintainable under law. The plaintiffs claimed that the suit was within limitation as per Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and had shown the cause of action as it arose on 19.09.2019 when the defendants occupied the schedule building and on 20.09.2018 when the plaintiffs and the defendants entered into the agreement of lease and on 11.04.2020 when the defendants requested to defer payment of rent for the months of April and May 2020 till the situation was normalized and on 20.04.2020 when the plaintiffs got issued a reply notice to the defendants and on various other dates like 17.01.2023 when the plaintiff got issued notice to the defendants demanding them to pay the arrears of rent and on 17.12.2022 and on 06.10.2023 terminating the lease and demanding them to pay the arrears of rent and on 02.05.2024 further demanding to pay damages of Rs.5,00,000/- per month for the use and occupation of the schedule building after termination of lease and on subsequent days when the defendants failed to vacate the schedule building and failed to pay the damages as demanded by them.

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025

4. The defendants subsequently filed a petition under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that it was not disclosing the cause of action and as being barred by law of limitation. The Executive Trustee and Authorized signatory of the defendant No.1 filed an affidavit in support of the petition submitting that the plaintiffs admitted in the plaint that the lease agreement dated 20.09.2018 was not a registered one and also asserted that they had executed a registered lease deed and the plaint did not disclose that the plaintiffs-respondents had issued any notice under the registered lease deed. The registered lease deed was subsisting and remains uninfringed. Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908, would declare that a lease deed if duly registered, would take precedence as regards the property comprised therein against every unregistered document relating to the same property. Thus, the rights of the petitioner-Defendant No.1 under the registered lease deed would have supremacy over the unregistered lease agreement. Under the registered lease deed, defendant No.1 was entitled to continue in the suit schedule property until 31.07.2029, as such the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC for not disclosing cause of action.

4.1. It was further submitted that the plaint was not clear as to whether the plaintiffs were seeking cancellation of the lease document 9 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 No.9528/2019 or alternatively to declare the same as null and void. Article 58 of the Limitation Act provided for a three-year limitation when the right to sue first accrued to obtain a declaration with respect to any documents as null and void. Similarly, Article 59 provided for the limitation of three years to have the instrument canceled after it first became known to the plaintiffs. Thus, if the relief was for the cancellation of the document, the respondents -plaintiffs were required to invoke the limitation of Article 59 by asserting the date of knowledge for entitlement to sue. If the respondents-plaintiffs were seeking a declaration of the document as null and void, they were required under Article 58 by asserting when the right to sue first accrued. The plaint would not disclose any pleading showing the event of commencement of limitation for the said relief. The plaintiffs proclaimed that the suit was within limitation as per Article 113 of the Indian Limitation Act. Article 113 of the Limitation Act was residuary and could be invoked only if no other Article applies. The plaintiffs could not circumvent Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act by employing clever drafting by avoiding mentioning those circumstances by which the suit was barred by the law of limitation. In the present case, residuary Article 113 could not be invoked because of the availability of specific Articles 58 and

59. Thus, the plaint would not disclose that it was filed within the limitation period. Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC makes it clear that if the plaint did not 10 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 disclose the necessary averments relating to limitation, the same was liable to be rejected as such, the plaint relief (b) was barred by limitation.

4.2. The defendant further contended that the plaintiffs could not claim the benefit of mistake or fraud concerning the contents of document No.9528/2019 as the said document was a registered document and the plaintiffs could have discovered it with reasonable diligence. The said registered lease deed was signed on 5.9.2019. Therefore, the time limit would start on 05.09.2019 and end on 04.09.2022 under Articles 58 and 59. Therefore, the suit was barred by limitation and was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The Court could not take into cognizance the assertions in the plaint which were contrary to statutory law and judicial dicta for deciding the case in rejecting the plaint. The word 'shall' in Order VII Rule 11 implied that it would obligate the court to reject the plaint if it fell under any of the conditions specified in the four clauses of Rule 11 of CPC even without the defendants involvement and prayed to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.

5. The respondents-plaintiffs filed their counter contending that the petitioner-defendant No.1 had not disputed about the agreement of lease entered between them on 20.09.2018. As per the agreement of lease and also the disputed registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019 under Clause-3, 11 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 the lessor and lessee had the option of terminating the lease after serving a six months notice in advance on either side which was a condition agreed by the parties and was binding on both the parties. As such, the respondents-plaintiffs had got every legal right to terminate the lease by issuing legal notice. Under Clause 14 of the agreement of lease dated 20.09.2018, the registration charge for getting lease deed registered for all purposes should be borne by the lessor. The lessor on the request of the lessee agreed to register a separate lease deed to get permission to run the educational institution on the expenses to be borne by the lessee. As such the disputed registered lease was executed keeping the plaintiffs in dark about its contents. There was no consensus ad-idem between the parties for the terms of the disputed registered lease deed. The respondents-plaintiffs came to know about the fraud played by the petitioner-defendant No.1 only when the plaintiffs filed the suit against the defendants vide O.S. No.241 of 2023 wherein the defendants filed their counter contending that they had not defaulted on rent payments as per the registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019. The said registered lease deed was obtained by playing fraud upon them as well as on the government with wrong recitals in the documents to evade stamp duty and registration charges. Though the respondents-plaintiffs were parties to the registered lease deed, having come to know about the fraud played by the petitioner-defendant No.1 after 12 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 filing the counter in I.A No.603 of 2023 in O.S. No.241 of 2023, filed the present suit for eviction and for cancellation of registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019 and to declare the same as null and void. It was clearly stated in the plaint averments under which circumstances the said document was brought into existence. Till date, the petitioner-defendant No.1 was making payment of rents as per the lease agreement dated 20.09.2018 as such, the said unregistered agreement of lease was binding on the petitioner and it was acted upon. The cause of action was categorically pleaded in the plaint. The cancellation of lease deed dated 05.09.2019 was sought by the plaintiffs within the limitation from the date of knowledge of the contents of the document and prayed to dismiss the petition.

6. The trial court i.e. the learned Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad, on hearing both the counsel representing the parties, dismissed the petition, observing that whether which lease deed would prevail, registered or unregistered could be decided by the court during the course of trial. The fact of fraud must be proved before the court through oral or documentary evidence and could not be presumed from the pleadings itself. As the suit was filed seeking the relief of eviction of the defendants from the suit schedule property and there was no provision of limitation for eviction, the respondents-plaintiffs had rightly invoked Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and further opined that the issue of 13 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 limitation was a mixed question of fact and law, which requires evidence and the same could not be decided at the threshold.

7. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad, the defendant No.1 preferred this revision.

8. Heard Sri P. Balaji Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner- defendant No.1 and Sri Shaik Madar, learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs.

9. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the plaintiffs' suit for eviction, cancellation of lease deed and damages was fundamentally fraud as it lacks valid cause of action. Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 unequivocally established the supremacy of registered document over unregistered document pertaining to the same property. The plaintiffs acknowledged that the eviction notice referred to in the plaint relates only to the unregistered lease deed and that no notice of eviction was issued concerning the registered lease deed. No lease existed under the unregistered lease deed. The unregistered lease deed would disclose that the lease would commence on 01.06.2019, while the subsequent registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019 would indicate that the lease would begin on 01.08.2019 and lease payments were made only after 14 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 01.08.2019. Thus, only the registered lease deed was acted upon. He contended that when there was no lease under the unregistered lease, eviction could not be pursued basing on the unregistered lease deed. He further contended that the plaintiff incorrectly invoked Article 113 of the Limitation Act, a residuary Article. Article 59 prescribes a three year limitation period for cancellation of a document running from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to seek cancellation became known. The plaintiffs being a signatory to the registered lease deed could not claim ignorance of its contents or allege delayed discovery of the document contents. The plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of the non-est factum as it would apply only to those who were incapacitated from understanding the contents of the document without the assistance of others, which was not the present case. Section 17 of the Limitation Act would stipulate that the limitation period would begin when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. The plaintiffs failure to exercise due diligence at the time of executing the registered lease deed could not extend the limitation period. Since there was no cause of action for eviction based on either the registered lease or unregistered lease and the eviction relief sought in the present suit was a consequential remedy linked to the cancellation of the lease deed, therefore, the limitation applicable to the cancellation of the documents only applies to the case. 15

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 The suit was barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was three years limitation period specified under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, which would begin from the date of execution of the lease deed. The attempt at creative drafting was an effort to circumvent the specific provisions of the Limitation Act by improperly invoking a residuary article. The plaintiffs' allegations of fraud, deception or cheating were vague and unsubstantiated. The difference in rents specified in the registered lease compared to the unregistered lease deed would not indicate fraud, particularly since the defendant had consistently paid Rs.1,81,828/- per month with enhancement as outlined in the unregistered lease deed. Furthermore, it was not the case that the petitioner-defendant No.1 had gained any undue advantage or benefit as a result of the alleged fraud. Therefore, the unsubstantiated fraud allegations would not provide a valid basis for the suit. The trial court incorrectly stated that the precedence between the registered and unregistered lease deeds would be determined after reviewing evidence. Section 50 of the Registration Act was a clear provision that could be applied at the stage of Order VII Rule 11. The court could not consider assertions in the complaint that would contradict statutory law. The trial court failed to recognize that eviction relief was based on notices sent from unregistered lease deed which was legally untenable. The observation of the trial court that limitation was a mixed 16 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 question of fact and law was also contrary to the established legal principles and relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and another 1 and Ramathal and others v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. and another2.

10. Learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner was a corporate body running several schools in various places and have a separate legal department. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 were represented by their GPA holder and father Ganta Satyanarayana. They had entered into an unregistered lease deed with the petitioner on 20.09.2018 which was a comprehensive one. As per clause No.14 of the said lease deed, the land ladies agreed to execute a nominal registered lease deed in favour of the petitioner herein, since it was required to get permission to run the school. Accordingly, the petitioner herein obtained a nominal registered lease deed on 05.09.2019 from the respondents - plaintiffs for the purpose of getting permissions to run the school. The stamp paper was purchased by the petitioner and it was drafted by their legal department. The land ladies were under the impression that the registered lease deed would not be used against them. At that time, 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844 2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1022 17 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 they could not understand the nefarious and clandestine design of the petitioner. In the registered lease deed, the lease amount was shown as Rs.10,000/- per month only instead of Rs.1,80,000/- and odd per month as stipulated in the original unregistered lease deed. The building was constructed by obtaining a bank loan by the land ladies. As per the requirement of the petitioner herein to run the school, its possession was handed over to the petitioner as stipulated in the registered lease deed. The land ladies would not have executed the registered lease deed, if it was not required for obtaining permissions to run the school by the petitioner. It was fraud played by a Corporate body. Since the petitioner committed default in paying the lease amount regularly, the respondents got issued legal notices dated 17.01.2023, 06.10.2023 and 02.05.2024 demanding the petitioner for payment of arrears of lease amount and also to vacate the premises if they failed to pay the lease amount regularly, under the lease agreement. The petitioner received the same, but did not give any reply and intentionally kept quiet. As such, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit vide O.S. No.241 of 2023 and filed I.A. No.603 of 2023 seeking temporary injunction. The same was allowed on merits, but challenging the same, the petitioner preferred a CMA and the same was pending. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 for the first time came to know about the fraud played by the petitioner on 23.12.2023 when the defendant filed their 18 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 counter in I.A. No.603 of 2023, wherein they stated that the rent was Rs.10,000/- per month only. As such, after issuing the third legal notice, the land ladies had filed the present suit O.S.No.142 of 2024 for eviction, for cancellation of the registered lease deed on the ground of fraud and also claiming damages @ Rs.5,00,000/- per month for the unauthorized use and occupation of the premises of the plaintiffs.

10.1. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the suit was filed for eviction, which was the main relief and since there was no specific provision in the Limitation Act for eviction, the respondents-plaintiffs pleaded that the suit was filed within the limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Even if it was presumed for the sake of argument that Article 59 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the facts of the case, the suit was filed within the limitation period of three years, when the plaintiffs first came to know about the fraud played by the petitioner on 23.12.2023 when a counter was filed in I.A. No.603 of 2023 in O.S. No.241 of 2023. It was well established that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law and it had to be decided only after completion of trial. The plaint could not be rejected on the said ground. The order passed by the trial court was in accordance with the well established principles of law. As per Clause 3 of the unregistered lease deed as well as the registered lease deed, there was no need to plead about violation of any 19 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 rights or infringement for filing a suit for eviction. Either of the parties could terminate the lease by issuing a six months notice in advance. The petitioner was paying rents as per the unregistered lease deed only. The petitioner did not deny the claim of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the three legal notices. As such, there was a valid cause of action for them to file the present suit. The plea of non-est factum was a triable issue and it could not be decided in a petition filed for rejection of the plaint. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramathal and others v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. and another (2 supra) relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner was supporting the case of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein. The plaint could not be rejected on the ground of inconsistent pleadings or that one of the relief was barred by law, because it was well established that the plaint would not be rejected in part. Since the respondent Nos.1 and 2 had also prayed for the relief of eviction and for damages, apart from the relief of cancellation of registered lease deed and relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in G. Nagaraj and others v. B.P. Mruthunjayanna and others 3 , on the principles to be followed while dealing with the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC; and in Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants Pvt. Ltd. 4 and Central Bank of India 3 MANU SC/0828/2023 4 2017 (6) ALD 137 (SC) 20 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 and another v. Prabha Jain & Others 5 , on the aspect that the plaint cannot be rejected in part and Gujarat Composite Limited v. A Infrastructure Limited & Others6 on the aspect whether the parties were required to be referred to arbitration when there is a clause of arbitration mentioned in the agreement.

11. Now the point for consideration in this revision petition is:

Whether the order passed by the court below is within its jurisdiction and mandate under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC or whether the same is liable to be set aside?

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) 7 outlined the principles for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC as follows:

"The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.

The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

2025 LawSuit (SC) 102 6 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 384 7 2020 (7) SCC 366 21 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 Supp SCC 366], this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to continue to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words:

"12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without any point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the Court should readily exercise the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action."

The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.

Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit.

Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as part of the plaint.

In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on merits, 22 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.

The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success which reads as:

"139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed."

In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.[(2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.

D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman [(1999) 3 SCC 267]. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra14. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).

The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that 23 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.

"Cause of action" means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, this Court held :

"24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded"

(emphasis supplied) In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1997) 4 SCC 467] this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words:

"5. ...The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing ..." (emphasis supplied) Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal [(1998) 2 SCC 70] this Court held that law cannot 24 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint.

If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [(2017 13 SCC 174] held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.

The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article.

Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under :

Description of Period of Limitation Time from which suit limitation begins to run

58. To obtain Three years When the right to sue any other first accrues declaration

59. To cancel Three years When the facts or set aside an entitling the plaintiff instrument or to have the decree or for instrument or decree the rescission cancelled or set aside of a contract or the contract rescinded first become known to him.

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues.

In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [(2011) 9 SCC 126] this Court held that the use of the word 'first' between the words 'sue' and 'accrued', would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued.

A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [(1991) 4 SCC 1] held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words "right to sue" means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings.

The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected."

13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and another8 held that:

"12. As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane. The averments in the application can be taken into account only to consider whether the case falls within any of the sub-rules of Order VII Rule 11 by considering 8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844 26 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 the averments in the plaint. The Court cannot look into the written statement or the documents filed by the defendants. The Civil Courts including this Court cannot go into the rival contentions at that stage."

In para-14, it was also held that:

"14....There is also a presumption in law that a registered document is validly executed and is valid until it is declared as illegal."

13.1. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was also extracted in para No.15 of the said judgment to consider when a person is said to have notice of a fact.

"15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to relevant portion of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as under:

"3. Interpretation clause...... ...... "a person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.

Explanation I.--Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub- Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 Provided that--(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.

Explanation II.--Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.

Explanation III.--A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:

Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud."

13.2. Thus, it was held that there was a constructive notice from the date of registration and the presumption under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into operation from the said date.

13.3. Even with regard to the plea of limitation, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court therein that:

"18. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have held that the question of the suit being barred by limitation can be decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. Though the question of limitation generally is a mixed question of law and fact, when upon meaningful reading of the plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the given circumstances, after 28 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11."

13.4. While also considering the aspect whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act was applicable, while referring to the case of Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa [(1996) 7 SCC 767], which was extracted as follows:

"21. ...

6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays 29 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be clear that the word 'person' in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him."

13.5. While considering the scope of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Hon'ble Apex Court also extracted its earlier judgment in Prem Singh v. Birbal 9 and held that:

"22. It will also be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal, where the scope of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Article 59 was discussed and held as under:

"11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

12. An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal 9 (2006) 5 SCC 353 30 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 preferred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed.

13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.

14. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:

"31. When cancellation may be ordered.--(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.

(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation."

15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief.

16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.

17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article

59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be.

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025

18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid.

22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956] this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation as regards character of a document is void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating:

"The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable."

13.6. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering whether limitation was a mixed question of fact and law and could be decided only after weighing the evidence on record, held that:

"26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of 32 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC. The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold."

14. In the light of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above case, whether the trial court has decided the petition by considering all these principles or not, need to be looked into.

15. Admittedly, there were two lease deeds executed between the parties; one registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019 vide document No.9528 of 2019 and the other unregistered lease deed dated 20.09.2018. Under Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, registration of a lease deed for a term exceeding 11 months is mandatory. An unregistered lease deed cannot be used to prove the terms of lease or cannot be the basis to file an eviction suit unless it falls under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 i.e. for collateral purpose to prove possession. Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 gives priority to registered documents over oral or un-registered documents. It emphasizes that registered documents take precedence over un-registered documents relating to the same property, if 33 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 executed in good faith and without notice of the earlier claims. Thus, whenever there was conflict between the registered document and an unregistered document, (which was required to be registered), the registered document prevails. Thus, the registered lease deed would prevail over an unregistered lease deed under Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908, even if it does not reflect the true terms. The object of enacting Section 50 is to discourage secret or fraudulent deals hidden through unregistered agreements. As both the registered and unregistered lease deeds exists for the same property, as per Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908, the registered document prevails over unregistered one in conflicting claims as per the rule of priority prescribed under it and the trial court cannot ignore the statutory law while deciding a petition under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and cannot say that it could be decided by the Court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties in the course of trial. The evidence adduced by the parties would be having no bearing on this principle.

16. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs that the respondents had executed the registered lease deed without understanding its legal complications and that it was a nominal deed executed only for the purpose obtaining permission from the 34 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 authorities and the same was not legally valid and binding upon them on the principle of non-est factum, cannot be accepted, as the respondents- plaintiffs are well educated persons and can read the contents of the documents and can understand its meaning and had executed the document with full knowledge, they cannot take the plea of fraud.

17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramathal and others v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. and another 10 held that:

"19. The ingredients of the plea of non est factum as laid down not only in the case of Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad [(1990) 1 SCC 207] are existing in the present case, but also the three parameters as can be deduced from Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [(1970) 3 ALL ER 961] were in existence in the present case as well. The aforementioned test for a successful plea of non est factum requires that:

A. The person pleading non est factum must belong to "class of persons, who through no fault of their own, are unable to have any understanding of the purpose of the particular document because of blindness, illiteracy or some other disability". The disability must be one requiring the reliance on others for advice as to what they are signing. As Lord Pearson had aptly put:

"In my opinion, the plea of non est factum ought to be available in a proper case for the relief of a person who for permanent or temporary reasons (not limited to blindness or illiteracy) is not capable of both reading and sufficiently understanding the deed or other document to be signed. By "sufficiently understanding" I mean understanding at least to the point of detecting a fundamental difference between the actual document and the document as the signer had believed it to be."

B. "The "signatory must have made a fundamental mistake as to the nature of the contents of the document being 10 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1022 35 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 signed", including its practical effects. Lord Wilberfore has succinctly put this aspect:

"In my opinion, a document should be held to be void (as opposed to voidable) only when the element of consent to it is totally lacking, that is, more concretely, when the transaction which the document purports to effect is essentially different in substance or in kind from the transaction intended"

C. The document must have been radically different from one intended to be signed. As Lord Reid remarked in the judgment:

"There must, I think, be a radical difference between what he signed and what he thought he was signing

-- or one could use the words "fundamental" or "serious" or "very substantial." But what amounts to a radical difference will depend on all the circumstances."

18. Thus, to prove the plea of non-est factum, the plaintiffs must be persons who were unable to understand the contents or nature of the document due to some disability like blindness, illiteracy or unable to detect the fundamental difference between the actual factual document and document they believed it to be. These aspects are absent in the present case. The respondents-plaintiffs are party to the said document and party to the fraud played by the petitioner-defendant No.1 in cheating the government authorities and executed it with full knowledge. Only when the said document was used against them, the respondents-plaintiffs are raising the plea of fraud. They are also ready to conceal the rent payable under the said document with an intention to deceive the authorities 36 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 knowing fully-well that it was a fraudulent document. As such, the plea of fraud is also applicable to them and no evidence was required to be proved such fraud as the facts averred in the plaint itself would make it clear. The starting point of limitation is the date of the knowledge of the alleged fraud and as they were parties to the said fraudulent document, they were aware of the fraud committed by the petitioner-defendant since the date of its execution. As such, it was Article 59 of the Limitation Act which was applicable to the facts of the case and the suit has to be filed within three years from the date of execution of the registered lease deed to seek for its cancellation. As it was not the case of the respondents-plaintiffs that they came to know about the existence of the registered lease deed with terms mentioned in it with regard to rent only recently about the said fact, limitation cannot be considered as a mixed question of fact and law and that it could be decided only after evidence was adduced. As the courts could not help the persons who were also parties to the fraud, abusing the process of law for their own monetary benefit and the spirit and intention of order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC is to nip at bud any vexatious litigation which ex facie appears to be against law, the defendant need not be forced to undergo the ordeal of trial and wait till the evidence is completed. 37

Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025

19. Admittedly, the legal notices which were annexed to the list of documents to the plaint are issued with reference to the unregistered lease deed but not with reference to the registered lease deed. As such, the suit for eviction is also not maintainable basing upon the notices issued on an invalid and legally inadmissible document. The relief claimed by the respondents-plaintiffs for eviction of the defendants cannot be granted as there was no cause of action to file the suit for the respondents-plaintiffs without issuing notice in reference to the registered lease deed. The relief claimed under clause (b) to cancel the registered lease deed document is barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The relief claimed under clause (c) for damages @ Rs.5,00,000/- per month is consequential to the reliefs claimed under clauses (a) and (b). When the reliefs under clauses (a) and (b) cannot be granted, the relief under clause

20. As such, as the plaint does not disclose any cause of action to file the suit for eviction or cancellation of the registered lease deed and as the reliefs claimed by the respondents-plaintiffs are barred by the law of limitation, the plaint can be rejected. As the trial court passed the order in ignorance of the statutory provision under Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 and failed to consider that the eviction notices were issued 38 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 basing upon the unregistered lease deed and passed order contrary to the established legal principles as reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cases and on incorrect assessment of limitation, it is considered fit to set aside the impugned order.

21. In the result, the CRP is allowed setting aside the order in I.A. No.185 of 2024 in O.S. No.142 of 2024 passed by the Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad, dated 03.01.2025. No order as to costs.

Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.

____________________ Dr.G. RADHA RANI, J Date:09.06.2025 KTL

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