Delhi District Court
Sunil Niranjan Shah vs Laxmi Chand Ahuja on 25 November, 2025
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja,
Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
IN THE COURT OF VINOD YADAV: DISTRICT JUDGE:
(COMMERCIAL COURT)-02: NORTH-WEST DISTRICT:
ROHINI DISTRICT COURTS: DELHI
CNR No.DLNW01-008173-2024
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024
In the matter of:-
Sunil Niranjan Shah,
Trading as: M/s Shabroc India
At: 15/72- D, Civil Lines, Kanpur,
Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh - 208001.
.....Plaintiff
Versus
Laxmi Chand Ahuja,
Trading as M/s S.B. Chemicals
At: B-10, Bajrangbali Estate,
Saraimita Panki Site-4,
Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh - 208020.
.....Defendant
25.11.2025
Present: Shri Anil Kumar Sahu and Shri Roshan Kumar, Ld. Counsels
for the plaintiff alongwith plaintiff in person.
Shri Amit Kumar Tiwari and Shri Sanchit Bhushan,
Ld. Counsels for the defendant.
ORDER
1. By this order, I shall dispose off the following applications:
(a) Application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC filed on behalf of plaintiff;Digitally signed
VINOD by VINOD YADAV Page 1 of 76 YADAV Date: 2025.11.25 17:51:35 +0530 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(b) Application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC filed on behalf of plaintiff;
(c) Application under Order XI Rule 1 (5) CPC, filed on behalf of plaintiff;
(d) Application against the defendant's counsel for Conflict of Interest and Violation of Bar Council of India Rules on Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, filed on behalf of plaintiff; and
(e) Application under Order XIII-A CPC, filed by the plaintiff.
2. The arguments on aforesaid applications from both the sides have been heard in detail.
3. The instant suit was filed by plaintiff on 27.08.2024 and the same came up for hearing on 31.08.2024, on which date summons in the suit and notice of application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC was issued. The application under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC was also disposed off with certain directions.
4. The facts of the case in brief required for the disposal of aforesaid applications are that plaintiff is the sole proprietor of firm namely M/s Shabroc India, having office at 15/72- D Civil Lines, Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh -208001. It has been averred that M/s Shabroc India was founded by the father of plaintiff namely Shri Niranjan Kumar Shah, which is stated to be engaged in the business of manufacturing, marketing and exporting of detergent soap, detergent cake, detergent washing powder Page 2 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 etc. along with other allied and cognate goods.
5. (i) It has been further stated that in the year 1975, plaintiff's predecessor coined, invented, adopted and conceived the trademark/label "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ / " in relation to the goods detergent soap, detergent cake, detergent washing powder etc. and started doing business of manufacturing, marketing and trading of the said goods under in the open market.
(ii) On 23.04.1975, the predecessor of the plaintiff firm applied for registration of the trademark/label "COW BRAND" in Class 03 in relation to Detergent (Not for use in Industrial or manufacturing processes) on proposed to be used basis and the said application vide No. 304873 got registered in the name of plaintiff's predecessor before the concerned Trademark registry. Later on 03.05.1983, plaintiff's father and one Mr.Ramnik Lal Maganlal Desai entered into a partnership agreement for doing business and continued their business under the name and style of M/s Shabroc India. Subsequently, on 02.11.2001, some amendment was carried out in the name of the partners of the firm, whereby the name of one of the partners i.e., Mr. Ramnik Lal Maganlal Desai was deleted and two new partners i.e., Mr. Sunil N. Shah and Ms. Malini N. Shah were inducted in the said partnership firm. Thereafter, the said partnership firm i.e, M/s Shabroc India was dissolved on 31.03.2014 and plaintiff became Page 3 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 the sole proprietor of the firm M/s Shabroc India without any change in the business activity of the firm. Thereafter, vide Transfer deed dated 05.05.2023, the plaintiff's predecessor transferred all the rights and title of the Brand name under the Trademark/label "COW BRAND" (Trademark application No. 304873) to Sunil Niranjan Shah trading as M/s Shabroc India for the consideration of Rs 1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only). Further, on 17.05.2023 plaintiff filed a TM-P before the Trademark Registry with respect to the Application No.304873 for recording his name as Subsequent Proprietor by way of Assignment or transfer of Mark and vide order dated 02.04.2024, passed by the Trademark Registry, plaintiff was brought on record as subsequent proprietor in respect of the said registered trade mark.
6. (i) It has been further stated that on 06.03.2023, the plaintiff applied for registration of the trademark/label "GAAY CHAAP / " in Class 03 vide Application No.5837680 and GAAY CHAAP (COW BRAND)/ vide Application No.5837681 in Class 03 for soap, detergent cake and detergent powder in respect of soap, detergent cake and detergent powder respectively with a user claim of 23/04/1975 with unique artistic features, getup, colour scheme and combination, layout Page 4 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 and trade dress in its good and business to look more impressive and modern in the market equipped with the same entrusted quality in relation to said goods and business. The trademark application bearing No.5837680 has been published in the journal no. 2167-0 dated 29.07.2024, however, due to some miscommunication between the plaintiff and its previous attorney, reply to the examination report under the trademark application bearing no. 5837681 was not filed and it is claimed that plaintiff is taking necessary steps to rectify the same.
(ii) It has been claimed that on 09.10.2023, plaintiff firm had further applied for registration of the trademark/label "GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ " bearing application No.6140474 in Class 35 for retail, wholesale, marketing, and advertising services in relation to soap, detergent cake, and detergent powder and GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ , bearing application No.6140473 in Class 03 for soap, detergent cake, and detergent powder respectively with a user claim of 23/04/1975. It is stated that although the trademark application bearing no. 6140474 has been registered but the trademark application bearing no. 6140473 is pending registration.
Page 5 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
7. It has been contended that in the month of December, 2013, plaintiff further adopted, conceived and started using, soliciting, displaying, marketing another label under the trademark/label GAAY CHHAP/ / in relation to the goods of soap, detergent cake, and detergent powder. As such, plaintiff claims himself to be owner and proprietor of trademark/label/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ / / / " on account of its honest, bonafide and prior adoption and continuous and commercial use thereof. For ready reference, a representation of said trademark/Label is being given hereunder:
Page 6 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 Page 7 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
8. (i) It has been next contended that in order to secure the statutory right in the said Trademark/Label/trade dress, plaintiff had also applied for and obtained the Trade Mark registrations pertaining to some of its said Trade Mark/label/trade dress/packaging, details whereof are given hereunder:
APPLICATION CLASS DATE OF USER STATUS DISCLAIMER NO. APPLICATION CLAIM 304873 03 23.04.1975 Proposed to Registered (Not for use in COW BRAND/ be used industrial or manufacturing Processes) For Sale in the States of Uttar Pradesh Page 8 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 And Bihar Only 5837680 03 06.03.2023 23.04.1975 Accepted & N/A GAAY CHAAP/ Advertised 5837681 35 06.03.2023 23.04.1975 Objected N/A GAAY CHAAP (COW BRAND) / 6140474 35 09.10.2023 23.04.1975 Registered N/A GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ 6140473 03 09.10.2023 23.04.1975 Opposed N/A GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ Page 9 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 6305411 03 16/02/2024 23/04/1975 Objected Registration of SHABROC INDIA this trademark (WORD) shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word "
india "
6305412 03 16/02/2024 23/04/1975 Objected Registration of
SHABROC this trademark
INDIA/ shall give no
right to the
exclusive use of
the word "
india "
(ii) It has been stated that Legal Proceeding Certificates (LPC) in
respect of some of the aforesaid trade mark applications have been duly applied before the concerned Registry of Trademark.
9. It has been averred that with the advent of e-commerce and increasing popularity of the internet and digitization, plaintiff has also been advertising and promoting its business under the said trademark/label along with its trademark/label/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND" through different means and modes including visual, audio, print and social media along with advertisement in leading newspapers, magazines, advertisement in trade literature(s), trade Page 10 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 hoardings and boards etc. Plaintiff has also been advertising and promoting its business under the said trademark through its own website www.shabrocindia.com. It has been claimed that the plaintiff also solicits, displays, promotes its goods through various e-commerce cum interactive websites namely www.indiamart.com, www.amazon.com, etc. The screen shot of the plaintiff's website as well as e-commerce interactive websites displaying and selling the goods of the plaintiff under the said trademark/label are being depicted in paragraph No.19 of the plaint.
10. It has been emphasized that by reason of extensive advertisement and promotional activities coupled with excellent quality and the high standards of the plaintiff's business and goods, the trade level of the plaintiff enjoys solid, enduring and first-class reputation in the market. The business and goods under the said trademark/label are distinctive indicium of the plaintiff and has acquired secondary significance. It is claimed that the plaintiff's said Trademark/Label has strong goodwill and reputation in India within the meaning of Section 29 (4) of the Trade Marks Act 1999.
11. (i) Defendant Laxmi Chand Ahuja is stated to be proprietor of M/s S.B. Chemicals and is engaged in the identical trade and business of manufacturing and marketing of soap, washing powder, detergent powder and detergent cake.
(ii) It has been claimed that defendant with a mala-fide intention and to pass on its products, as those of the plaintiff, has malafidely and Page 11 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 deliberately adopted the identical Trademark/label/trade-dress/packaging/color combination/artistic work "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / / " in relation to the impugned goods and business, being identical and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's well recognized trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/colour combination/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ / / ".
12. (i) It has been contended that defendant had filed three trademark applications; one for the impugned trademark/label "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ " bearing application No.5826228, dated 27.02.2023 with a user claim of 13.01.2016 on all India basis and the other for the Page 12 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 impugned trademark/label "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ , bearing application No. 6286085, dated 03.02.2024 with a user claim of 06.04.2011 in Class 03 on all India basis in relation to the impugned goods. It is stated that defendant's trademark application bearing No. 5826228 filed on 27.02.2023 was opposed by the plaintiff on 25.01.2024 for the reason that the it/plaintiff is the prior, bonafide, senior user of the Trademark/label "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND".
(ii) It has been further contended that defendant had also filed another application, dated 13.01.2016 for registration of the Trademark/label "SANTARI WASHING POWDER/ " in Class 03 for washing powder on all India Basis claiming user since 10.04.2015 and the said trademark application No.3158496 got registration in the name of defendant by the concerned Trademark Registry. The details of the impugned trademark applications of the defendant are mentioned hereunder:
APPLICATION CLASS DATE OF USER STATUS
NO. APPLICATION CLAIM
5826228 03 27.02.2023 13.01.2016 Opposed
6286085 03 03.02.2024 06.04.2011 Pending
3158496 03 13.01.2016 10.04.2015 Registered
Page 13 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(iii) It has been further contended that defendant has also played fraud with the Trademark Registry in Trademark Application No.6286085 by claiming alleged user of the impugned Trademark/label by filing forged and fabricated Invoices by replacing the impugned Trademark "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP" from the original invoice issued for sale of goods under the mark "ARB Washing Powder". The plaintiff in support of said contention has placed reliance upon copy of Invoice No.30, dated 29.05.2018 showing the impugned Trademark "ARB Washing Powder"
which for ready reference is annexed with this order as Annexure-I.
13. (i) It has been alleged that during the third week of January' 2024, plaintiff came to know about the impugned Trademark application bearing No.5826228 of the defendant and immediately filed a notice of opposition in the impugned trademark application of the defendant on 25.01.2024. Further, in the month of August' 2024, plaintiff came to know about the indulgence of the defendant in the impugned activity under the impugned trademark/label/packaging/trade dress and made a complaint to the concerned police station pursuant whereto police visited the premise of the defendant however, no action thereupon was taken.
(ii) It has been further contended that defendant has been making clandestine and surreptitious sales and has been supplying, soliciting and displaying its impugned trade mark/label/trade dress/packaging/ artistic work to the dealers and distributors in the markets of Delhi, including North-west District areas i.e., Keshav Puram, Rani Bagh, Subhash Palace, Bharat Nagar, Ashok Vihar, Aman Vihar, Rohini, etc. besides other parts of Page 14 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 the country. The defendant has further been displaying, marketing, promoting, soliciting its business through various e-commerce cum interactive websites including www.indiamart.com all over the territory of India including North-West District of Delhi.
14. It has been averred that defendant is not the proprietor of the impugned Trademark/label and artistic feature/label/packaging/trade dress and by commercially using the same, it is not only damaging the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff by passing off their substandard products as that of the plaintiff, but are also causing financial loss to the plaintiff by reaping unfair advantage of the repute and distinctive character of the trademark of the plaintiff.
15. On these grounds, by way of application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC, the plaintiff thus sought ex-parte ad-interim injunction, thereby restraining the defendant by himself as also through its/their individual proprietors/partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for and on their behalf from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trade mark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / Page 15 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 / " or any other trade mark/label which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark/label/trade dress "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND / " in relation to their impugned goods and business of all kinds of washing powder, detergent powder, detergent cake, soap etc., and other allied/cognate/related goods or from doing any other acts or deeds, thereby infringing plaintiff's registered trademarks and passing off their products as that of plaintiff.
16. By way of detailed order dated 31.08.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the "first interim order"), ex-parte ad-interim injunction was passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants and application under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC was disposed off with certain directions; the operative part whereof is re-produced hereunder:
xxxxx
25. Therefore, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, considering the submission made at Bar and perusal of record clearly shows that appointment of Local Commissioner is indispensable in this case. Further, as regards handing over of seized goods to plaintiff, Page 16 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 keeping in view that it is not merely a case of infringement but also of counterfeiting and the cited judgment of Hon'ble High Court, the request is allowed. Consequently, Shri Naveen Tayal, Advocate, Enrolment No.D-718/97 (R), having mobile number 9350509371 is appointed as "Local Commissioner" to visit premises of defendant, i.e Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading as M/s S.B. Chemicals, At: B-10, Bajrangbali Estate, Saraimita Panki Site-4, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh - 208020, with the following directions:-
.(i)The Local Commissioner shall make an inventory and take into custody all the impugned goods, including other incriminatory material like stationery, packing material, pouches, cartons, display boards, sign boards, advertising material, unfinished packed, unpacked impugned goods or any other documents, wrapper etc. bearing the impugned trade mark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / " or any other trade mark/label which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark/label/trade dress "GAAY CHAAP/ GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND / Page 17 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 / " in relation to their impugned goods/services. However, he shall return the seized/infringed goods to the representative(s) of the plaintiff on superdari, after clicking photographs/video footage thereof and taking an undertaking from the representative of plaintiff that plaintiff will produce the goods so seized as and when called upon to do so by this Court.
.(ii) The Local Commissioner shall also seize and sign all books of accounts, ledgers, and cash registers, stock registers, invoices, day book etc of defendant and seal them after signing them. .(iii) Local Commissioner shall visit other premises at the identification of the plaintiff where the alleged activities are being carried on by or on behalf of the defendant or where the impugned goods and/ or materials being the impugned trademark are expected to be found.
.(iv)The concerned SP/Addl. DSP/SHO/Officer-In- Charge of the Police Station(s) having the local jurisdiction over the place where the premises of defendant is situated are directed to render all necessary assistance as well as security to the Local commissioner in carrying out the above directions. The learned counsel for the plaintiff as well as the representative of plaintiff are also permitted to accompany the learned Local Commissioner while visiting the premises of defendant for execution of the commission. .(v) The Local Commissioner shall also take photographs of the premises of the defendant as Page 18 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 aforesaid, as well as of the infringed material found at the site.
.(vi) If on the date of visit, the premises are found locked, Local Commissioner shall break open the same in the presence of police officials of the concerned Police Station(s) after taking the photographs thereof and shall proceed to execute the commission after affixing the copy of summons and complete set of papers on the main gate of the premises and shall also maintain decency while breaking open the locks to recover the infringing material.
.(vii) The fee of the Local Commissioner is tentatively fixed at Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand Only) apart from all other out-of-pocket expenses.
.(viii) The Local Commissioner shall visit the premises of the defendant within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order by her and shall file the report before this Court within one week of the visit to the place thereafter.
26. Accordingly application U/o XXVI rule 9 CPC stands disposed off.
xxxxx
17. The learned Local Commissioner visited the premises of defendant on 06.09.2024 and filed his report in Court on 12.09.2024 (hereinafter referred to as "first LC report").
18. The defendant was duly served in the matter and he appeared in Court through his counsel Shri Amit Tiwari, Advocate on 16.10.2024 Page 19 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 and filed written statement in the matter. Thereafter, on 14.11.2024 the plaintiff filed an application under Order XIII-A CPC on which notice was issued to the defendant for 15.01.2025.
19. In the meantime, plaintiff filed two more applications, one under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC read with Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, inter alia alleging therein that after passing of the first interim order dated 31.08.2024, the defendant adopted an ingenious method to flout the same by started selling his product in the name of "SANTARI JI KA BAIL CHAAP/ / " detergent powder with the same trade dress. The said application was taken up for hearing on 20.11.2024 (hereinafter referred to as "second interim order") and again the same learned Local Commissioner was appointed to visit the premises of defendant. The learned Local Commissioner accordingly visited the spot/premises of defendant again on 25.11.2024 and filed his report on 02.12.2024 (hereinafter referred to as "second LC report").
20. It appears that the defendant challenged the "second interim order" dated 20.11.2024 before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by filing "FAO No.244/2024", titled as "Laxmi Chand Ahuja V/s Sunil Niranjan Shah", inter alai seeking stay of "second interim order" dated 20.11.2024. The said FAO was disposed by the Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court Page 20 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 of Delhi on 19.12.2024 with the observation that this Court shall consider the application of defendant and the defendant shall be at liberty to raise all the arguments available to him in accordance with law. Thereafter, on 15.01.2025, time was granted to the defendant to file reply to application under Order XIII-A CPC and application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC and the matter was notified for further consideration on 17.02.2025. The matter, however, came up for hearing before this Court on 03.03.2025, on which date an application under Order 379 r/w Section 215 of BNSS, 2023 was filed by plaintiff, inter alia levelling allegations of professional misconduct against Shri Sanchit Bhushan, Advocate, learned counsel for the defendant. Copy of the said application was supplied to learned counsel(s) for the defendant and they were asked to file reply to the said application.
21. Thereafter, the matter came up before this Court on 19.04.2025, on which date, again no reply was filed to any applications, except the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC. The learned counsels for the defendant insisted for hearing arguments on application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC and other applications.
22. In the written statement filed in the matter, the defendant has admitted using the mark "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP" detergent powder with the same trade dress as that of plaintiff, however, it was contended that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.
Page 21 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
23. It is relevant to note here that plaintiff has filed an application under Order XI Rule 1(5) CPC, seeking to file on record additional documents in terms of liberty granted to it on 31.08.2024, inter alia seeking to place on record documents like invoices, ledger account, fee schedule, whatsapp chats to show communication between plaintiff and learned counsel for the defendant prior to institution of the present suit. The learned counsel for the defendant was confronted with the aforesaid documents. The learned counsel for the defendant did not prefer to file any reply to the said application and insisted for deciding the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC. The documents being relevant for consideration on application filed by the plaintiff in person alleging conflict of interest on part of Shri Sanchit Bhushan, Advocate, learned counsel for the defendant. The copies of said documents having been duly supplied to learned counsel for the defendant are taken on record.
24. There is no specific denial of the averments of plaintiff that the product of the plaintiff is a registered trademark since a long time, atleast prior to the defendant having adopted the same in its product. It is, however, contended that the product(s) of defendant is entirely different from the one adopted by defendant for selling his product as "SANTARI JI KA BAIL CHAAP/ / ". With the aforesaid factual matrix, I have heard arguments on all the pending applications. My findings thereupon are as under.
Page 22 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 Application under Order XI Rule 1(5) CPC:
25. By way of this application, the plaintiff has sought permission of this Court to place on record additional documents, which are in the nature of Invoices, showing the presence of plaintiff in Delhi. Since no reply to this application has been filed and the fact that the documents sought to be placed on record are relevant towards establishing the jurisdiction of this Court, the application is allowed. The additional documents are taken on record.
Applications under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC and under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC:
26. In application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC, plaintiff has sought following reliefs:
xxxxx
(a) Issue an ad-interim ex-parte injunction restraining the Defendant himself as also through their individual proprietors/partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for and on their behalf from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trade mark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / Page 23 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 / "or any other trade mark/label which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark/label/trade dress "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ " in relation to their impugned goods and business of all kinds of washing powder, detergent powder, detergent cake, soap etc., and other allied/cognate/related goods or from doing any other acts or deeds amounting to or likely to:
(i) Infringement and enabling others to infringe plaintiff's said trade mark/label "GAAY CHAAP/ GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ COW BRAND";
(ii) Passing off and violation of the plaintiff's common law right in the said trade mark/label "GAAY CHAAP/ GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ COW BRAND" ;
(iii) Infringement of copyright in the artistic work involved in the Plaintiff's artistic features/label/logo/colour combination "GAAY CHAAP/ GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ COW BRAND";Page 24 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(iv) Diluting the plaintiff's goodwill and reputation to registered trade mark/label "GAAY CHAAP/ GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)/ COW BRAND";
(v) Not only that the defendant is further guilty of falsification and unfair and unethical trade practices.
(b) Restraining the Defendant from disposing off or dealing with his assets including their premises at the addresses mentioned in the Memo of Parties and his stocks- in-trade or any other assets as may be brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Court during the course of the proceedings and on the Defendant's disclosure thereof and which the Defendant are called upon to disclose and/or on its ascertainment by the plaintiff as the plaintiff is not aware of the same as per Section 135(2)(c) of the Trade Marks Act,1999 as it could adversely affect the plaintiff's ability to recover the costs and pecuniary reliefs thereon.
(c) For an order for delivery up of all the impugned finished and unfinished materials bearing the impugned and violative mark/label or any other word/mark which may be identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's said trade mark/label including its blocks, labels, display boards, sign boards, trade literatures and goods etc. to the plaintiff on superdari for the purposes of showing and/or presenting them before this Hon'ble Court whenever the need arises for the adjudication of the present matter.
xxxxx Page 25 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
27. Vide "first interim order" dated 31.08.2024, defendant by himself as also through its/their individual proprietors/partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for and on their behalf were restrained from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trade mark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / / " or any other trade mark/label which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark/label/trade dress "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND / " in relation to their impugned goods and business of all kinds of washing powder, detergent powder, detergent cake, soap etc., and other allied/cognate/related goods or from doing any other acts or deeds, thereby infringing plaintiff's registered trademarks and passing off their products as that of plaintiff.
Page 26 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
28. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has very vehemently argued that plaintiff has been using the trademark/label/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND" for a fairly long period in Class 2 as well as Class 35 since the year 1975; whereas, the defendant got his trademark in respect of detergent powders by the name of "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / / " washing powder having entirely different trade dress, but considering the popularity of the product of plaintiff, it started using trademark with a view to encash upon the popularity of the product(s) of plaintiff. The defendant started piggy bagging it sometimes in the year 2023 and passing its goods as that of plaintiff by adopting the same trade dress with a view to deceive the unwary customers to make them believe that they had been purchasing the product(s) of plaintiff only. The malafide conduct of the defendant has been deprecated by pointing out two LC reports, particularly second LC report dated 02.12.2024, wherein in the same premises which was earlier visited learned Local Commissioner, the defendant was found using the same trade dress, but this time in the nature Page 27 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 of "SANTARI JI KA BAIL CHAAP/ / " detergent powder for the logo similar to that of GAAY CHHAP. It is argued that this ingenuous method was adopted by the defendant to by-pass the rigours of the violation of "first interim order", dated 31.08.2024 and as such violated the same. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has very vehemently argued that defendant has deliberately tried to over-reach the authority of this Court by showing contumacious conduct in flagrant violation of the first and second interim orders passed in the matter. It has been prayed that a reference of committing criminal contempt of this Court be made to Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
29. It is next contended that the balance of convenience is in favour of plaintiff, as its registered trademark is being violated with impunity by the defendant despite there being two injunction orders in this matter in its favour. It is further argued that it is the plaintiff, who is going to suffer irreparable loss and injury and has non recompass in law, in case ad-interim injunction, as prayed for is not granted in favour of plaintiff(s) and against the defendant(s).
30. Per contra, learned counsels for the defendant have very vehemently argued that both the plaintiff and defendant have been operating from District Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh and the defendant does not Page 28 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 have any business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and as such, this Court does not have any territorial jurisdiction to enteterain the present suit. It has been pointed out that a suit has already been filed by the defendant against the plaintiff in the open Court at Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh which is pending disposal there. In support of their aforesaid contentions, learned counsels for the defendant has referred the following three decisions/judgments:
(i) Case reported as, "Civil Appeal No.10643-10644/2010", titled as, "Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. V/s Sanjay Dalia & Anr.". (DOD: 01.07.2015);
(ii) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.323/2023", titled as, "New Life Laboratories Private Limited V/s Dr.Ilyas New Life Homeo And Herbals Private Limited & Anr." (DOD: 21.07.2023); and
(iii) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.828/2022", titled as, "M/s Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Limited V/s M/s Veda Seed Sciences Private Limited" (DOD: 16.04.2025).
31. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Case reported as, "FAO (OS) No.506/2013", titled as, "World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. V/s Reshma Collection" (DOD:
15.10.2014);
(ii) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.309/2021", titled as, "Cable News Network Inc. V/s CVTN Calcutta Television Network Private Limited" (DOD: 28.04.2023);
Page 29 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(iii) Case reported as, "RFA-IPD No.7/2022", titled as, "Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. V/s UMAC Pharmaceuticals & Ors." (DOD:
10.08.2023);
(iv) Case reported as, "FAO (Comm.) No.125/2023", titled as, "Rajendra Vardichand Jagetia & Anr. V/s Modern Mold Plast Private Limited: (DOD: 31.05.2024);
(v) Case reported as, "2018 SCC Online Del 10881", titled as, "Burger King Corporation V/s Techchand Shewakramani & Ors."; and
(vi) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.669/2025", titled as, "Sunil Niranjan Shah V/s Vijay Bahadur" (DOD: 24.11.2025).
32. I have considered the aforesaid judgments. It is a matter of record that plaintiff has an "interactive website" of its own. The product(s) of the plaintiff is also available on e-commerce websites. Several invoices have been placed on record to show that the plaintiff has been selling its product(s) through e-commerce websites to all parts of India, including Delhi.
33. In case of "World Wrestling Entertainment Inc." (supra), the Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
23. Let us now apply these principles to the type of transaction over the internet, which we have explained above. The website of the appellant/plaintiff refers to various goods and services. It is not an offer but an invitation to an Page 30 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 offer, just as a menu in a restaurant. The invitation, if accepted by a customer in Delhi, becomes an offer made by the customer in Delhi for purchasing the goods ―advertised‖ on the website of the appellant/ plaintiff. When, through the mode of the software and the browser, the transaction is confirmed and payment is made to the appellant/ plaintiff through its website, the appellant / plaintiff accepts the offer of the customer at Delhi. Since the transaction between the two takes place instantaneously, the acceptance by the appellant/ plaintiff is instantaneously communicated to its customer through the internet at Delhi. Therefore, in such a case, part of the cause of action would arise in Delhi.
21.But, we are not concerned with the question of cause of action between the appellant/ plaintiff and its customers in Delhi because the defendants are not such customers and they are, in any event, all residents of Mumbai. What we are examining is whether the third condition specified in Dhodha House (supra) is satisfied or not. In other words, if the contracts and/ or transactions entered into between the appellant/ plaintiff on the one hand and its customers are being concluded in Delhi, can it not be said that the essential part of the business of the appellant/ plaintiff, insofar as its transactions with customers in Delhi are concerned, takes place in Delhi? The offers are made by customers at Delhi.
The offers are subject to confirmation/ acceptance of the appellant/ plaintiff through its website. The money would emanate or be paid from Delhi. Can it not then be considered that the appellant/ plaintiff is, to a certain extent, carrying on business at Delhi? In our view, it would be so. Because of the advancements in technology and the rapid growth of Page 31 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 new models of conducting business over the internet, it is possible for an entity to have a virtual presence in a place which is located at a distance from the place where it has a physical presence. The availability of transactions through the website at a particular place is virtually the same thing as a seller having shops in that place in the physical world. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the appellant/ plaintiff had a shop in Delhi from where it sold its various goods and services. In that case, it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi. This is apart from the fact that the appellant/ plaintiff may also have been regarded as having voluntarily resided in Delhi. When the shop in the "physical sense" is replaced by the "virtual" shop because of the advancement of technology, in our view, it cannot be said that the appellant/ plaintiff would not carry on business in Delhi.
xxxxx
34. In case of "Cable News Network Inc." (supra), after considering the law on the subject, the Hon'ble High Court has been pleased to pass an authoritative pronouncement with regard to availability of a product on e-commerce sites. The relevant extracts of the judgment are re-produced hereunder:
xxxxx
29. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt Ltd v.
Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, in para 14, clearly holds that "in addition to the places where suits could be filed under Section 20 of the Code, the plaintiff can also institute a suit under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957, as the case may be, by taking advantage of the provisions Page 32 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 of section 134(2)12 or section 62(2), respectively. Section 134, therefore, provides an additional recourse, to a plaintiff, over and above the recourse available under Section 20 of the CPC.
30. Mr. Chaitanya stressed on the fact that the invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be justified, in para 49 of the plaint, only on the anvil of Section 20 of the CPC. Citing Karans Gurukul Classes8, Mr. Chaitanya sought to submit that the issue of territorial jurisdiction had, therefore, to live, or die, with Section 20. Impliedly, therefore, what was sought to be contended was that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act was not open for invocation by the plaintiff.
31. I cannot agree.
32. Pleadings bind parties on facts. Statutory provisions constitute the extant law, and it is open to every citizen to take advantage of, or invoke, a statutory provision which, according to him, is in his favour. The factual foundation for invocation of the provision has, however, necessarily to find place in the plaint. No party can be permitted to argue facts which are not pleaded. However, where the factual foundation is present, the omission, in the plaint, to specifically cite a statutory provision cannot operate as estoppel against the plaintiff seeking its benefit. In the present case, in fact, it is specifically pleaded, in para 49 of the plaint, that the plaintiff carries on business in Delhi, and offers services, through its website, in Delhi, targeted at viewers in Delhi. These averments are sufficient, on facts, to merit examination of the aspect of territorial jurisdiction not only from the point of view of Section 20 of the CPC, but also from the point of view of Section 134 Page 33 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 of the Trade Marks Act.
xxxxx xxxxx 36.3 WWE contended, before this Court, that it "carries on business" in Delhi because "its programs are broadcast in Delhi; its merchandise and books are available for sale in Delhi; and its goods and services are sold to customers in Delhi through its website which can be accessed in Delhi over the Internet". The Division Bench identified the issue arising before it to be whether, in these circumstances, WWE could be treated as "carrying on business" within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. xxxxx
35. In case of "Corona Remedies Pvt. Limited" (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
18. Moreover, in para 17 of the plaint, the plaintiff has also averred that the products of the plaintiff are available for sale on e-commerce websites which could be accessed, and across which transactions could be concluded, within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Saket District Court. The said paragraph reads thus:
17.The Plaintiff's products under the trademark are also available on leading e-commerce portal such www.1mg.com, www.apollopharmacy.in, www.indiamart.com etc. Further, the search on www.google.in for the term MAC-RD reflect the products of the Plaintiff only and also leads to the Page 34 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 Plaintiff's website www.coronaremedies.com which indicates that the goods of Plaintiff under the trade mark MAC-RD are extremely popular in India. Moreover, the Plaintiff has its presence in all the metro cities of India.
19. Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act permits an infringing suit to be instituted within the territorial jurisdiction of any court within which the plaintiff carries on business. Section 202 of the CPC permits a plaint to be instituted before any court within whose territorial jurisdiction, the defendant carries on business or the whole, or part, of the cause of action arises.
20. In Ultra Homes Construction Pvt. Ltd. v.
Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, the Division Bench of this Court, speaking through S. Ravindra Bhat, J. as he then was, has clearly held that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act provides an additional forum before which infringing suit could be instituted, apart from the court which would have territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Section 20 of the CPC. As such, an infringing suit could be instituted before any court which would have territorial jurisdiction either under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act or under Section 20 of the CPC.
21. In the present case, the averments contained in paras 43 and 44 of the plaint conferred territorial jurisdiction on the learned Saket District Court to entertain a decide the plaintiff's suit both under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act as well as under
Section 20 of the CPC. The impugned judgment of Page 35 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 the learned ADJ indicates that, in fact, the learned ADJ has not even addressed the issue of jurisdiction vis-à-vis Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and has merely restricted his discussion to Section 20 of the CPC, with respect to which, too, the findings in the impugned judgment are not sustainable in law or on facts.
xxxxx
36. In case of "Rajendra Vardichand Jagetia & Anr." (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
10. The other contention raised by the Appellants is that the Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Plaint. The Respondent had in its plaint clearly set out that the Appellants are permitting advertising, soliciting and sale of their goods through an interactive website:
<https://maharajamouldedfurniture.com> in several parts of New Delhi. The Respondent has also placed on record screenshots of the website of the Appellants from which the infringing products are being sold.
10.1 The issue in relation to purchase of goods from interactive websites is no longer res integra. This Court in Shree Girirajji v. Gagan Pagrani Proprietor of Plastica Industries while relying on World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. M/s. Reshma Collection & Ors., has held that if customers can place orders for purchase of goods from Delhi through an interactive website, then the Courts in Delhi will have jurisdiction for the infringement and passing off. The relevant extract of Shree Girirajji case is s below:Page 36 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 "14. Undisputedly, if a person carries on his business through an interactive site and, sells and markets its goods through such sites, the courts exercising jurisdiction in respect of places where the goods are made available would have the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for infringement of the trademarks. Indisputably, customers in Delhi can place orders and purchase goods online through the interactive website. Thus, the courts in Delhi would have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for infringement of trademarks and passing off (Reference: World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v.
Reshma Collection, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031])." [Emphasis is ours] 10.2 The plea of jurisdiction has to be taken on a demurrer. The Appellants website:
<https://maharajamouldedfurniture.com> is an interactive website. The learned Commercial Court has found that the infringing products can be bought and delivery of such products is also available in South Delhi. Thus, the contention of the Appellants that the learned Commercial Court had no jurisdiction to try the Suit is misconceived.
xxxxx
37. In case of "Burger King Corporation" (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
21. Thus, jurisdiction of a court in a trade mark action, could be invoked where there is use upon or in relation to goods. The phrase "in relation to" has been interpreted to include advertising, promotion, publicity, etc. Thus, in addition to actual sale of goods and providing services, if a person advertises his or her business under the mark in a territory, Page 37 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 promotes his or her business under the mark in a territory or for example invites franchisee queries from a particular territory, sources goods from a particular territory, manufactures goods in a particular territory, assembles goods in a particular territory, undertakes printing of packaging in a particular territory, exports goods from a particular territory, it would constitute "use of a mark".
22. This scheme of the TM Act is amply clear from a reading of Sections 28 and 29 as also Section 56.
Under Section 28, the rights conferred are the exclusive right to use of a mark. Under Section 29, use of a mark could be any form of use, including-- • as part of a trade name or a corporate name or name of a business concern [Section 29(5)];
• use by affixing it to products/services [Section 29(6)(b)];
• use by affixing it to packaging [Section 29(6)(b)]; • use by offering goods/services for sale;
• use for the purpose of import or export[Section 29(6)(c)];
• use on business papers [Section 29(6)(d)];
• use in comparative advertising which is detrimental to distinctive character or repute of the mark [Section 29(4)];
• use in advertising [Section 29(7)]; • Applying a mark in a territory for purposes of export of goods/services [Section 56(1)]; and • Use by which a trade connection is created between the user and the proprietor [Section 56(2)].
23. Thus, when Section 20 CPC provides that a suit could be filed in any place where the cause of action arises, in a suit involving rights in a trade mark, cause of action arises in each and every place where there is any form of use of the said mark. Principles which apply to infringement, actions to determine Page 38 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 "use" would equally apply to passing off actions.
xxxxx
38. Recently, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of "Sunil Niranjan Shah V/s Vijay Bahadur" (supra) has been pleased to consider the facts and circumstances in a similar case involving the trademark of plaintiff and has been pleased to hold as under:
xxxxx
11. A Trade Mark indicates the source of the goods or services, in respect of which it is used. A Trade Mark is an indicator of origin, distinguishing the goods and services of a party from those of its competitors. Thus, a Trade Mark is said to possess a distinctive character, when it serves to identify and distinguish the goods or services of a party from those of others. In the present case, the Plaintiff's Marks serves as a source indicator for the products provided by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff's Marks have attained a distinctive character and have become identifiers and distinguish the goods of the Plaintiff from those of other parties, including, from those of the Defendant. By extensive, continuous, and prolonged usage, the public at large commonly associates the Mark 'GAAY CHHAP', with the Plaintiff. The Impugned Marks are deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Marks.
12. The test of confusion is to be seen from the perspective of an average person with imperfect recollection getting confused and in view of the Plaintiff's Marks and the Impugned Marks being almost identical, any ordinary person would get confused and would not be able to distinguish between the Plaintiff's Marks and the Impugned Marks.Page 39 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
13. The Parties have between them a history of disputes with respect to the use of the Marks identical or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Marks and the Plaintiff has already initiated various Suits against the Defendant's son and known associate of the Defendant, Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav with respect to use of Marks identical or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Marks. The conduct of the Defendant, his son and his associate is prima facie dishonest and with an intent to ride upon the goodwill of the Plaintiff's Marks. All of them have continuously used and applied for various Marks which are deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Marks.
14. The Plaintiff has been able to establish use of the Mark 'GAAY CHHAP' since 1975, whereas the Defendant has not been able to substantiate their claim of use of the Impugned Marks since 1973. The Defendant has been unable to provide any independent evidence substantiating the use of the Impugned Marks since 1973. The Defendant has relied on invoice dated 26.12.1972, which is even prior to the user claim of the Defendant. The Defendant in another invoice has mentioned date in Hindi and English (hybrid) i.e., २२/ ५/2007. There is certainly a doubt about the legitimacy of the invoices of the Defendant. There are no public documents to substantiate the user claim of the Defendant either.
15. There is no cavil that the rights of the prior user of the Mark are superior to the rights of the prior registrant of the Mark, as held in Century Traders (supra) relied upon by the Plaintiff. Once the Defendant himself has sought registration over the Impugned Marks, the Defendant cannot take the Page 40 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 defence that the Plaintiff's Marks are descriptive and not entitled to protection as has been held by this Court in Automatic Electric Limited (supra) and Indian Hotels Company (supra). The Defendant cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate.
16. The Defendant has not been able to establish that the Plaintiff has suppressed material facts from this Court and accordingly, the judgments in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) and A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra), do not help the case of the Defendant either.
17. Having considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Parties, the pleadings and the documents on record it is clear that the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the Mark 'GAAY CHHAP'. The Plaintiff has been able to establish long and continuous use of the Mark 'GAAY CHHAP' with respect to detergent soap, detergent cake, detergent washing powder, etc. in Class 3. The Plaintiff has demonstrated the goodwill and reputation acquired by the use of the Plaintiff's Marks. The Plaintiff's turnover for the FY 2024-25 was ₹39,66,43,930/-. The Defendant's use of the Impugned Marks is prima facie dishonest and nothing but an attempt to ride the goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiff so as to cause confusion in the market.
18. Injunction is a relief in equity, and in view of the aforesaid discussion, the same is in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. Further, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and grave prejudice is likely to be caused to the Plaintiff if interim injunction as prayed for is not granted in Page 41 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. A strong prima facie case has been made out on behalf of the Plaintiff for grant of interim injunction. The Plaintiff has established its prior user as well as goodwill and reputation, on the basis of the documents on record.
19. This is a case of triple identity where the Mark is identical, the product category is identical and the trade channel as also the consumer base is identical. The Plaintiff being the prior user, adopter and the registered owner of the Mark 'GAAY CHHAP' is entitled to protection.
20. Accordingly, the Defendant, its partners, associates, assigns or assignees in interest, heirs, successors or successors in interest, permitted assigns, sister concerns or group companies, distributors, dealers, wholesalers, retailers, stockiest, agents and all others acting for and on the Defendant's behalf are restrained from using, soliciting, providing services and advertising in any manner including on the internet and e-commerce platform, directly or indirectly dealing in detergent soap, detergent cake and detergent washing powder in Class 3 under the Impugned Marks, 'GOPAL GAI CHHAP', ' ' and 'COW BRAND', or any other Mark which is identical or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Marks, 'COW BRAND', 'GAAY CHHAP', Page 42 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 'GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)', ' ', ' ', ' ', so as to cause infringement or passing off of the Plaintiff's Marks and from using the Impugned Label, ' ' or any another label so as to cause infringement of the Plaintiff's Artistic Works, ' ', ' ', ' ' and ' '.
xxxxx Page 43 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
39. (i) In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, this Court has territorial jurisdiction to try the present suit and as such, the only defence taken by the defendant is of no consequences to him, therefore, the plaintiff has been able to satisfy trinity of test for grant of injunction in the matter. The application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC is hereby allowed.
(ii) Consequently, the defendant by himself as also through its/their individual proprietors/partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for and on their behalf are hereby restrained from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trade mark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / / "
or any other trade mark/label which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark/label/trade dress "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND / " in relation to their impugned goods and business of all kinds of washing powder, detergent powder, detergent cake, soap etc., and other allied/cognate/related goods or from doing any other acts or deeds, thereby infringing plaintiff's registered Page 44 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 trademarks and passing off their products as that of plaintiff.
Application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC:
40. As regards the application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC, a bare perusal of both the reports of learned Local Commissioner go on to establish that the defendant has not only violated the "first interim order"
dated 31.08.2024, but has also obstinately and malafidely tried to over reach the authority of this Court by using the same trade dress with a slightly changed name in order to create misrepresentation in the minds of general public that the product(s) being sold was in fact the product of plaintiff.
41. (i) A Local Commissioner appointed by the Court is an extended arm and agent of the Court. The Local Commissioner is appointed by the Court because a Judge, normally, cannot personally step out of the precincts of his Court to see for himself the situation prevailing at the relevant site. In case reported as, "CCP No.49/2011 in CS (OS) No.947/2011", titled as, "Autodesk Inc. & Anr. V/s Arup Das & Ors." (DOD: 22.10.2023), the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
26. A Local Commissioner appointed by the Court is an extended arm and agent of the Court. The Local Commissioner is appointed by the Court because a Judge, normally, cannot personally step out of the precincts of his Court to see for himself the situation prevailing at the relevant site. Therefore, a Local Page 45 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 Commissioner is appointed to act as the eyes and ears of the Court so that local investigation could be carried out for the purpose of elucidating the matters in dispute. In matters involving allegations of infringement of intellectual property rights, the execution of the local commission and the report furnished by the Local Commissioner assumes great significance, as the breach of copyright in softwares-
which resides in electronic form, may go undetected unless computer systems of the defendant are examined and investigated before the defendant gets a chance to destroy the evidence of use of such software by deleting the software from the computer system.
xxxxx xxxxx
28. "Civil Contempt" is defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to mean "willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court". The respondents have willfully disobeyed the orders of this Court by not permitting the Local Commissioner to execute her Commission at the address in question. The present is not a case where the Local Commissioner desired to carry out the Commission/investigation at a wholly unrelated premises. Firstly, the premises itself was named in the order of the Court, authorizing the Local Commissioner to inspect the same. Secondly, the premises was the premises of the defendant company, inasmuch, as it was their Corporate Office and the Design and Development Centre for the check valves, butterfly valves and balancing valves manufactured by the defendant company - as is evidenced from the ISO certificate. The refusal of the respondents to allow the execution of the Local Commission is Page 46 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 clearly deliberate, willful and mala fide.
xxxxx
(ii) Further, in case reported as, "CCP(O) 10/2018 in CS (Comm.) No.291/2018", titled as, "Louis Vuitton Malletier V/s Mr.Omi & Anr." (DOD: 07.08.2018), the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold as under:
xxxxx A LOCAL COMMISSIONER APPOINTED BY THE COURT IS EFFECTIVELY THE EYES AND EARS OF THE COURT AND THE REPORT IS PART OF THE COURT RECORD. THE DEFENCE THAT A LOCAL COMMISSIONER‟S REPORT IS NOT MENTIONED IN ANY REPORTED JUDGMENT, AS THE BASIS OF CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT IS AN UNTENABLE ARGUMENT AS THE INSTANCES OF CONTEMPT MENTIONED IN THE JUDGMENTS, ARE NOT EXHAUSTIVE BUT ILLUSTRATIVE.
19. A Local Commissioner is a person appointed by the Court in pursuance of its powers vested under Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure and is normally authorised to examine witnesses, conduct local and scientific investigations and/or sale of property, perform a ministerial act, examine accounts, partition of property and execute any other order as directed by the Court.
20. While conducting an investigation, a Local Commissioner is given wide powers as he is in effect a ground level representative of the judiciary. This view was favoured by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Mahant Narayana Dossjee Varu vs. The Board of Trustees, the Tirumalai Tirupati Devasthanamas, Tirupathi, 1957 SCC OnLine AP 116. The Madras Page 47 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 High Court in Pormusamy Pandaram v. The Salem Vaiyapamalai Jangamar Sangam, 1984 SCC OnLine Mad 190 has held as under:-
"5........Its object is to collect evidence at the instance of the party who relies on the same and which evidence cannot be taken in court but could be taken only from its peculiar nature, on the spot. This evidence will elucidate a point which may otherwise be left in doubt or ambiguity on record. The Commissioner, in effect, is a projection of the court, appointed for a particular purpose........"
21. The Supreme Court in Misrilal Ramratan & Ors. Mansukhlal & Os. V. A.S. Shaik Fathimal (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. 1995 Supp.(4) SCC 600 has held that even a specious plea of non-examination of a Local Commissioner at the stage of trial cannot lead to the Commissioner's report being overlooked or rejected by the Court. The above view of the Supreme Court was also relied upon by the Delhi High Court in Levi Strauss and Co. v. Rajesh Agarwal, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6421, wherein it has been held as under:-
"9. The Local Commissioner is in fact a representative of the Court itself and it is for this reason that Order 26 Rule 10(2) of CPC clearly provides that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report the same shall be treated as evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record."
22. In the opinion of this Court, a Local Commissioner appointed by the Court is an extended arm and agent of the Court. The Local Commissioner is appointed by the Court because a Judge, normally, cannot personally step out of the precincts of his Court to see for himself the situation prevailing at the relevant site. [See: Autodesk Inc. & Anr. v. Arup Das Page 48 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 & Ors, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4225 and Anil K. Aggarwal V. Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2292].
23. Consequently, the Local Commissioner is effectively the eyes and ears of the Court. Moreover, as the reports of the two Local Commissioners have now been admitted, the facts therein must be taken to be true and correct.
24. The contemnors' only defence that a Local Commissioner's report is not mentioned in any reported judgment, as an instance of contempt in the face of the Court, is an untenable argument as the instances of contempt mentioned in the judgments are not exhaustive but illustrative.
25. Accordingly, this Court holds that the reports of the Local Commissioner form a part of the Court record and what is recorded therein, especially as it has not been disputed, shall be deemed to have been recorded/seen by this Court and the said reports can form the basis of an action under Section 14 of the Act 1971.
26. In fact, in the present case, the statements made by respondent no.2/ defendant no.2 under oath, contrary to the two Local Commissioners' reports, prejudice and/or interfere and/or tend to interfere with, the due course of the judicial proceeding and/or obstruct and/or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice.
THE PRESENT CASE IS A CASE OF CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT AND THEREFORE, THE PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 14 OF ACT, 1971 APPLIES. FOR ALL OTHER CASES OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT SECTION 15 IS APPLICABLE.
Page 49 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
27. Criminal Contempt is defined under Section 2(c) of the Act, 1971. Section 14 deals with contempt in the face of the Court. Under the said section, the Judge in whose face the contempt is committed can himself/herself forthwith take notice and issue orders of contempt against the contemnor. Lord Denning has held "contempt in the face of the Court was never confined to conduct which a judge saw with his own eyes. It covered all contempts for which a judge of his own motion could punish a man on the spot. So contempt in the face of the court is the same thing as contempt which the court can punish of its own motion. It really means contempt in the cognisance of the court." [73 Balogh vs. St. Albans Crown Court (supra)].
28. Contempt in the face of the Court may be criminal or civil contempt. However, in both cases of contempt in the face of the Court, the procedure under Section 14 of the Act, 1971 is attracted. For all other cases of criminal contempt Section 15 is applicable.
29. Further, this Court is of the opinion that a contemnor is not in a position of an accused and contempt proceedings are separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. In a criminal trial where a person is accused of an offence, there is a Public Prosecutor who prosecutes the case on behalf of the prosecution against the accused, but in contempt proceedings the Court is both the accuser as well as the Judge of the accusation as observed by the Supreme Court in Debarata Bandopadhyay Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 189. In fact, contempt proceeding is sui generis. It has peculiar features which are not found in criminal proceedings. In this view the contemnors do not stand in the position of a Page 50 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 person accused of an offence and the Court is free to evolve its own procedure consistent with principles of fair play and natural justice. The Supreme Court in Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 406 has held so. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
" 12. .............A criminal contempt is punishable by the superior courts by fine or imprisonment, but it has many characteristics which distinguishes it from ordinary offence. An offence under the criminal jurisdiction is trial by a Magistrate or a Judge and the procedure of trial is regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which provides an elaborate procedure for framing of charges, recording of evidence, cross-examination, argument and the judgment. But charge of contempt is tried on summary process without any fixed procedure as the court is free to evolve its own procedure consistent with fair play and natural justice. In contempt proceedings unlike the trial for a criminal offence no oral evidence is ordinarily recorded and the usual practice is to give evidence by affidavits......"
30. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in State of U.P. Vs. Deg Raj Singh & Ors., 1983 Crl.LJ 866 has similarly held as under:-
" 27. A contempt is not an offence within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor is the contemnor an accused within the meaning of Section 5 of the Oath's Act, or within the meaning of Article 20, Sub-Clause (3) of the Constitution of India. Contempt is an offence to the Court and not to the person who sits as a Judge. Ergo, an insult to the Court if not punished will create a general dissatisfaction in the minds of the public as to the dignity, solemnity and Page 51 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 efficacy of the Courts of Justice.
xxxxx
42. The application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC is accordingly allowed and following directions are hereby issued:
(a) The factory premises of the defendant at B-10, Bajrangbali Estate, Saraimata Panki Site-4, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh-208020 is hereby ordered to be attached.
(b) Separately, Show Cause Notice be issued to the defendant as to why he may not be detained in civil imprisonment for committing disobedience of "first interim order", dated 31.08.2024, passed by this Court.
Application against the defendant's counsel for Conflict of Interest and Violation of Bar Council of India Rules on Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette
43. It is argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff that defendant's counsel namely Shri Sanchit Bhushan, Advocate and his firm namely M/s S. Singh & Associates was previously appointed by the plaintiff at or around the year 2016-17 for prosecuting its trademark infringement cases. It is contended that in the course of their service for legal counsel, plaintiff shared proprietary information about him as well as its predecessors in relation to its business model, pending litigations etc. The said counsel was also holding Power of Attorney as Trademark Attorney for representation of the plaintiff in the trademark and copyright matters. The learned counsel for the plaintiff made a strong pitch that the Page 52 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 counsel(s) appearing on behalf of defendant are in direct conflict of interest of plaintiff in the present matter, as the counsel representing the defendant with malafide intent, deliberately misrepresented and concealed from this Court that in a separate copyright criminal proceedings, they had represented the plaintiff.
44. Keeping in view the principle of natural justice ( Audi Alteram Partem), this Court gave an opportunity to the learned counsel for the defendant (Shri Sanchit Bhushan, Advocate) to present his case in writing, however, the learned counsel neither chose to file reply to the aforesaid application nor conceded or denied the allegations levied against him. Rather, the learned counsel categorically admitted at Bar that he was part of the firm namely M/s S. Singh & Associates, who represented the plaintiff earlier and now he being a counsel for the defendant.
45. I have the learned counsels for the parties on this application. I am of the considered opinion that the Advocates in India are expected to adhere to specific standards of professional conduct and etiquettes, preliminary outlined by the Bar Council of India. These standards cover duty towards clients, the Court, and the fellow Advocates, emphasizing diginity, respect and ethical behaviour. The Advocates must act with integrity, uphold client's interests and avoid of conflicts of interest while maintaining confidentiality.
46. Upon the very same lines, the Preamble of Chapter-II (Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, Bar Council of India Rules), specifically Rule 23 categorically stipulates that an Advocate who Page 53 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 has advised a party in connection with the institution of a suit, appeal or other matter or has drawn pleadings, or acted for party, shall not act, appear or plead for the opposite party in the same matter.
47. The issue of conflict of interest has been explored vide the following judicial pronouncements.
(i) The Privy Council in case of "Mary Lilian Hira Devi V/s Digbijai Singh", has been pleased to hold that "on the impropriety of a legal practitioner who has acted for one party in a dispute......acting for the other party in subsequent litigation between them relating to or arising out of that dispute. Such conduct is, to say the least of it, open to misconception and is likely to raise suspicion in the mind of the original client and to embitter the subsequent litigation. This is a matter which concerns the honour of the profession".
(ii) Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in case of "Advocate Cuddalore, Collector of South Arcot V/s An Advocate" has been pleased to observe as under:
xxxxx It is improper for an advocate to accept an engagement for the defence in a case in which at an earlier stage he advised or gave an opinion to the prosecution or appeared on behalf of prosecution.
xxxxx
(iii) Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in case of "Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh V/s Kothakapu Etreddy Venkata Reddi And Ors.", has been pleased to observe down as under:Page 54 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 xxxxx To maintain the highest traditions of the Bar and the profession, precludes Advocates from appearing for the opposite party if that is likely to embarrass the advocate or raise a suspicion in the mind of the client with respect to the conduct of his erstwhile advocate or that it is not gentlemanly conduct or that is improper to do so, or the circumstances are such from which an inference of imparting confidential nature of information can be raised.
xxxxx
(iv) Even the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case reported as, "AIR 1983 SC 1012", titled as, "Chandra Shekhar Soni V/s Bar Council of Rajasthan & Ors." (DOD: 20.07.1983) has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx It is not in accordance with professional etiquette for an advocate while retained by one party to accept the brief of the other. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except by express consent given by all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. The appellant would not have appeared for the other side except with the permission of the learned Magistrate. Counsel's paramount duty is to the client, and where he finds that there is conflict of interests, he should refrain from doing anything which would harm any interests of his client. A lawyer when entrusted with a brief is expected to follow the norms of professional ethics and try to protect the interests of his client in relation to whom he occupies a position of trust.
xxxxx Page 55 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
48. Thus, it is noted that the legal profession, like any other, is governed by a set of ethical principles and duties that guide the conduct of its practitioners. Lawyers, as officers of the court, are bound by a stringent code of ethics that requires them to balance their duties towards their clients, the courts, their opponents and society at large. A conflict of interest is, therefore, a compromising influence that is likely to negatively affect the advice which a lawyer would otherwise give to a particular client or the way in which he/she will pursue the matter of his/her client. It is likely to affect adversely either the lawyer's judgment concerning a client or prospective client, or the lawyer's loyalty in respect of client or prospective client, or the lawyer's safeguarding of interests of a client or prospective client. A lawyer who finds himself in a position of conflict must inform the client of his conflicting duties, and either obtain from that client an agreement that he should not perform his full duties of disclosure or he may recuse himself from the case.
Application under Order XIII-A CPC:
49. The learned counsel for the plaintiff instead of leading PE has preferred an application under Order XIII-A CPC, inter alia praying for passing of summary judgment in the matter. Despite service, no reply to the said application has been filed by the defendant. It has been very vehemently argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff that there is no need to record evidence in the matter. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the following judgments:
Page 56 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(a) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.1203/2018", titled as, "AKTIEBOLAGET VOLVO & Ors. V/s Gyan Singh & Anr."
(DOD: 25.04.2023);
(b) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.478/2019", titled as, "Sandisk LLC V/s Amit & Ors." (DOD: 01.03.2023);
(c) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.564/2020", titled as, "Imagine Marketing Private Ltd. V/s M/s Green Accessories Through Its Proprietor & Anr." (DOD: 21.03.2022);
(d) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.675/2019", titled as, "Dhani Loans And Services Limited & Anr. V/s WWW.Dhanifinance.Com & Ors." (DOD: 12.10.2022);
(e) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.929/2018", titled as, "Sanofi & Anr. V/s Faisal Mushtaq & Ors." (DOD: 16.11.2018);
(f) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.413/2021", titled as, "LT Foods Limited V/s Saraswati Trading Company" (DOD:
11.11.2022);
(g) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.1219/2018", titled as, "Shri Ved Prakash Garg Trading As M/s Parul Food Products V/s M/s Gurudev Industries" (DOD: 20.12.2018);
(h) Case reported as, "CS (OS) No.3466/2012", titled as, "Disney Enterprises Inc. & Anr. V/s Balraj Muttneja & Ors." (DOD:
20.02.2014); and
(i) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.564/2020" titled as, "Imagine Marketing Private Limited V/s M/s Green Accessories Through: Its Proprietor & Anr." (DOD: 21.03.2022).Page 57 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
50. The judgment in case of LT Foods (supra) and Shri Ved Prakash Garg (supra) has been referred to establish the point that the report of Local Commissioner in itself can be treated as evidence.
51. The learned counsel has further very vehemently argued that in the teeth of material available on record in the form of plaint, documents and the report of leaned Local Commissioner, no useful purpose would be served asking the plaintiff to lead evidence with regard to the grant of prayer qua damages and cost.
52. In case reported as, "AKTIEBOLAGET VOLVO" (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to observe as under:
xxxxx
10. At the hearing on 19thApril, 2023, the counsels for the defendants on instructions submitted that the defendants were agreeable to a decree of permanent injunction being passed against the defendants.
Counsel for the plaintiffs also pressed for costs and damages of Rs.10,00,000/- to be apportioned between the defendants.
xxxxx xxxxx
17. I am of the opinion that no purpose would be served by directing the plaintiffs to lead evidence by filing examination-in-chief by way of affidavit. The defendants have no reasonable prospect of succeeding in the present suit. Therefore, in my opinion, this is a fit case where a Summary Judgment in terms of Order XIII-A of the CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes of a specified value, read with Rule 27 of the Page 58 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 IPD Rules, deserves to be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
xxxxx
53. The Hon' ble High Court, thereafter in paragraphs No.22 and 23 of the aforesaid judgment has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
22. Clearly, the customers are being misled by the defendants and the entire effort is deliberate and dishonest. This amounts to dilution of the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiffs' marks and causing loss to the plaintiffs in business and reputation. The members of the public are bound to confuse bicycles manufactured and sold by the defendants under the mark VOLVO as emanating from the plaintiffs. The defendants have been making unlawful gains at the expense of the plaintiffs. I am convinced that this is nota case of innocent adoption by the defendants. The Court cannot ignore such flagrant misuse of the plaintiffs' marks by the defendants. Even though the claim of the plaintiffs for damages, based on the recoveries made at the premises of the defendant no.2 and the invoices placed on record, is close to Rs.20,00,000/-, I deem it appropriate to award a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-towards damages and costs to the plaintiffs.
23. Taking into account that the defendants no. 3 and 4 are the manufacturers and suppliers of the aforesaid goods and the defendants no.1and 2 were selling the goods supplied by the defendants no.3 and 4, out of the aforesaid amount, the defendants no.3 and 4 shall be liable to pay Rs.6,50,000/- in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 shall be liable to pay Rs.3,50,000/- in favour of the plaintiffs.
xxxxx Page 59 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
54. The other judgment(s) sought to be relied upon by learned counsel for the plaintiff also lays down the same law.
55. Amended Order XIIIA of CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, enables the Court to decide a claim or part thereof without recording oral evidence. Order XIIIA of CPC seeks to avoid the long drawn process of leading oral evidence in certain eventualities. Consequently, the said provision enables disposal of commercial disputes in a time bound manner and promotes the object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
56. Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of CPC empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against a defendant where on an application filed in that regard, the Court considers that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending a claim and there is no other compelling reason as to why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence. Order XIIIA (3) of CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, is reproduced herein below:-
xxxxx "3. Grounds for summary judgment.--The Court may give a summary judgment against a plaintiff or defendant on a claim if it considers that-
(a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, as the case may be; and
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence."
xxxxx Page 60 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
57. (i) Now, coming back to the facts of instant case. From the material placed on record, it is categorically apparent that trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/colour combination/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ / / " are valid and subsisting in favour of plaintiff till date. The plaintiff has been able to successfully establish its proprietary rights in the said Trademark as it has secured registration in the mark "COWBRAND"/ bearing application number 304873 in class 03 and "GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND)"/ registered in Class 35 bearing A pplication N .6140474 for soap, detergent cake and detergent powder respectively with a user claim dating back to 23.04.1975. The plaintiff has in the year 2024 has also obtained a Copyright Certificate for the artistic work under the title of work GAAY Page 61 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 CHHAP (COW BRAND) bearing Registration No. A- 153025/2024.
(ii) A perusal of the registered trademark of the plaintiff and the impugned trademark used by the defendant, as placed on record, shows that defendant has adopted the impugned trademark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / / ", which is/are visually, structurally, deceptively and confusingly similar to plaintiff's registered trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/colour combination/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ / / " in respect of identical goods which creates the same commercial impression.
(iii) The defendant has even explicitly acknowledged in the written statement being involved in the production of goods bearing the impugned trademark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP". For ready reference, a comparison chart displaying the plaintiff's and defendants' product under their respective trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/artistic work are being provided herein below:-
Page 62 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 PLAINTIFF'S TRADEMARK/ DEFENDANT'S IMPUGNED LABEL/ TRADE DRESS/ARTISTIC TRADEMARK/LABEL/TRADE WORK DRESS/ARTISTIC WORK Page 63 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(iv) The defendant has failed to explain the plausible reason of its adoption of the impugned Trademark/label "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP" when the defendant has already adopted a trademark/label "SANTARI WASHING POWDER". Further, the dishonest and unlawful intention of the defendant can be gathered from the fact that despite adopting a unique trademark/label "SANTARI WASHING POWDER", the defendant has been using, displaying, soliciting the impugned Trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/ colour combination/ artistic work "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP" which is identical and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's well recognised trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/colour combination/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHAAP/COW BRAND in order to associate/ to show relationship with the plaintiff and sell their inferior quality goods in the market.Page 64 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
58. The defendant cannot be allowed to piggy bag upon the reputation of plaintiff. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a case involving somewhat similar facts, i.e in case reported as, "1992 SCC Online Del 122", titled as, "The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. V/s Mahavir Steels & Ors." (DOD: 25.02.1992), has been pleased to hold as under:
xxxxx
14. .........An imitation remains an imitation whether it is done by one or by many. It acquires no legitimacy. A wrong is not righted by the following it musters. Infringement of trade mark by a trader cannot be justified on the ground that there are others like him who are doing the same. There is a growing tendency to copy the trade marks to cash upon some one else's business reputation . The pirates of trade marks are like parasites clinging to others for their growth. Imitators of trade marks have the sole object of diverting the business of others. This tendency must be curbed in the interest of the trade and the consumers.
xxxxx
59. Further, in case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.126/2022", titled as, "M.L Brother LLP V/s Mahesh Kumar Bhuralal Tanna" (DOD:
12.05.2022), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down that Local Commissioner's report can be read in evidence in terms of Order XXVI Rule 10(2) CPC. For ready reference, the said observations are re-produced as under:
xxxxx
10. Order 26 Rule 10 (2) CPC stipulates that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken Page 65 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 by the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. The said provision reads as under:
10. Procedure of Commissioner.-- (1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him, to the Court.
(2) Report and depositions to be evidence in suit. Commissioner may be examined in person.--The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record;
but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation."
11. In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Rajesh Agarwal 2018 IAD (Delhi) 622, this Court examined the said provision and held that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report, it becomes evidence in the suit itself. Under Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC it is not mandatory to examine the Commissioner to admit the report of the Commissioner as evidence in the suit. The relevant observations are as under:
Page 66 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
8. The Local Commissioner is in fact a representative of the Court itself and it is for this reason that Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC clearly provides that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report the same shall be treated as evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record.
xxx xxx xxxx
10. The rationale behind Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC is clear i.e. the Commissioner is appointed as a representative of the Court and evidence collected by the Commissioner along with the report of the Commissioner would be evidence in the suit, subject to any objection raised by any party. If any party has any objection to Commissioner's report or to the evidence, such party has an option to examine the Commissioner personally in open Court. Such examination is however, neither compulsory nor required especially in cases where the party does not challenge the report. In the present case, a perusal of the written statement filed by the Defendant clearly reveals that the Defendant does not challenge the Commissioner's report. Para of the written statement is set out below..."
12. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Vinod Goel v. Mahesh Yadav [RFA 598/2016 decided on 23rd May, 2018] wherein the Court observed as under:
"7. It is the settled proposition in law that when a Commissioner is appointed, he acts as the officer of the Court and it is not necessary for the Commissioner to be examined. This is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Page 67 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 Misrilal Ramratan & Ors. Mansukhlal & Ors. v. A.S. Shaik Fathimal & Ors., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 600, wherein the Court held as under:
"It is now settled law that the report of the Commissioner is part of the record and that therefore the report cannot be overlooked or rejected on spacious plea of non-examination of the Commissioner as a witness since it is part of the record of the case."
8. Even this Court, recently in Levis Strauss v. Rajesh Agarwal [RFA 127/2007 decision dated 3rd January, 2018], held as under
"11. The rationale behind Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC is clear i.e. the Commissioner is appointed as a representative of the Court and evidence collected by the Commissioner alongwith the report of the Commissioner would be evidence in the suit, subject to any objection raised by any party. If any party has any objection to Commissioner's report or to the evidence, such party has an option to examine the Commissioner personally in open Court. Such examination is however, neither compulsory nor required especially in cases where the party does not challenge the report."
9. Mr. Prag Chawla clearly concedes that there may be no requirement to examine the Local Commissioner once the Commissioner is appointed by a Court.
10. Under these circumstances, since the Commissioner had visited the suit property and had Page 68 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 submitted the report, it is deemed appropriate that the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after taking into consideration the report of the Local Commissioner, Mr. Y.D. Nagar dated 5th January, 2000 in Suit No.2198/1999.
13. In view of Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC and the judgments discussed above, the settled legal position that emerges is that the report of the Local Commissioner can be treated as evidence in the suit where it is not challenged by any party. Accordingly, in the present case the report of the Local Commissioner and the contents therein can be relied upon by the Court as evidence as the same is unchallenged.
xxxxx (underlining which is mine emphasized)
60. There is no opposition on the part of defendant to the report of learned Local Commissioner filed in the matter.
61. (i) After considering the facts and circumstances of the case in totality, I am of the considered opinion that there is no real prospect of defendant succeeding in proving its defence, especially in the teeth of fact that defendant himself has acknowledged in the written statement of he being involved in the production of goods bearing the impugned trademark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP".
(ii) It is an admitted fact that plaintiff is the prior adopter and user of the trademark/label/trade dress/packaging/colour combination/artistic work "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) Page 69 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND/ / / ".
(iii) Thus, no useful purpose would be served by allowing the proceedings to meander mindlessly in Court and to clog the justice delivery system. Therefore, in my opinion, present is a fit case where the Summary Judgment in terms of Order XIII-A of the CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, deserves to be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in case reported as, "2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764", titled as, "Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. V/s Kunwer Sachdev", wherein the Hon' ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to observe as under:
xxxxx "90. To reiterate, the intent behind incorporating the summary judgment procedure in the Commercial Court Act, 2015 is to ensure disposal of commercial disputes in a time-bound manner. In fact, the applicability of Order XIIIA, CPC to commercial disputes, demonstrates that the trial is no longer the default procedure/norm.
91. Rule 3 of Order XIIIA, CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against the defendant where the Court considers that the defendant has no real prospects of successfully defending the claim and Page 70 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence. The expression "real" directs the Court to examine whether there is a "realistic" as opposed to "fanciful" prospects of success. This Court is of the view that the expression "no genuine issue requiring a trial" in Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure and "no other compelling reason.....for trial" in Commercial Courts Act can be read mutatis mutandis.
Consequently, Order XIIIA, CPC would be attracted if the Court, while hearing such an application, can make the necessary finding of fact, apply the law to the facts and the same is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means of achieving a fair and just result.
92. Accordingly, unlike ordinary suits, Courts need not hold trial in commercial suits, even if there are disputed questions of fact as held by the Canadian Supreme Court in Robert Hryniak (supra), in the event, the Court comes to the conclusion that the defendant lacks a real prospect of successfully defending the claim."
xxxxx
62. (i) Considering the present case on the touchstone of the law laid down in the above referred judgments, I find that no useful purpose would be served, firstly by framing the issue with regard to grant of damages & cost and then asking the plaintiff to lead evidence in the matter. I am further of the considered opinion that there is no defence available on record on part of defendant which debars the plaintiff from claiming decree in the matter, as there is no real prospect of defendant successfully contesting their claim.
Page 71 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(ii) Further, while going through the report of learned Local Commissioner, it is evident that following counterfeit/infringed goods which were identical to the plaintiff's trademark/label were recovered:
Name of the Name and Address Quantity of Estimated Local of defendant from impugned cost of the Commission where the impugned goods seized seized er who goods were seized from the impugned seized the premises of goods goods defendant (Approx.) Naveen Laxmi Chand Ahuja 60 bags of Tayal Trading as: M/s S.B. impugned goods Rs.4,25,000/-
Chemicals and packaging
At: B-10 material
'
Bajarangbali Estate,
Saraimita , Panlci
Si te-4, Kanpur,
U.P.- 208020
(iii) Be that as it may, taking into account the documents relied
upon by the plaintiff, it is observed that plaintiff has a good case and no useful purpose would be served by going to trial in the matter. I order accordingly.
63. As regards the damages claimed for by the plaintiff, it is noted that The Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 provide guidance on the manner in which the damages could be calculated in such cases. Rule 20 of the IPD Rules, 2022 is set out below:
Page 72 of 76CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 xxxxx "20. Damages/Account of profits:A party seeking damages/account of profits, shall give a reasonable estimate of the amounts claimed and the foundational facts/account statements in respect thereof along with any evidence, documentary and/or oral led by the parties to support such a claim. In addition, the Court shall consider the following factors while determining the quantum of damages:
(i) Lost profits suffered by the injured party;
(ii) Profits earned by the infringing party;
(iii) Quantum of income which the injured party may have earned through royalties/license fees, had the use of the subject IPR been duly authorized;
(iv) The duration of the infringement;
(v) Degree of intention/neglect underlying the infringement;
(vi) Conduct of the infringing party to mitigate the damages being incurred by the injured party; In the computation of damages, the Court may take the assistance of an expert as provided for under Rule 31 of these Rules.
xxxxx
64. Further, on the aspect of damages, in case reported as, "2019:DHC:2185", tilted as, "Koninlijke Philips and Ors. V/s Amazestore & Ors.", the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down certain standards for grant of damages in following terms:
xxxxx "41. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the rule of thumb that should be followed while granting damages can be summarized in a chart as under:--Page 73 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 # Degree of malafide conduct Proportionate award
(i) First time innocent infringer Injunction
(ii) First-time knowing infringer Injunction + partial costs
(iii) Repeated knowing infringer which Injunction + costs + partial causes minor impact to the plaintiff damages
(iv) Repeated knowing infringer which Injunction + costs+ causes major impact to the plaintiff compensatory damages
(v) Infringement which was deliberate Injunction + Costs + and calculated Aggravated damages (gangster/scam/mafia) + wilfful (compensatory + additional contempt of Court damages)
42. It is clarified that the above chart is illustrative and is not to be read as a statutory provision. The Courts are free to deviate from the same for good reason."
xxxxx
65. Taking a holistic view of the matter vis-a-vis provisions as laid down under Rule 20 of the IPD Rules, 2022 and applying the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of "Koninlijke Philips" (supra), I am of the considered opinion that grant of damages @ Rs.3,00,000/- to the plaintiff would meet the ends of justice. I order accordingly.
66. Accordingly, suit of the plaintiff is decreed as under:
(i) A decree of permanent injunction is hereby passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant and the defendant by himself as also through its/their individual proprietors/partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for and on their behalf are hereby restrained from Page 74 of 76 CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025 using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trade mark/label/trade dress "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP/ / / / " or any other trade mark/label which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark/label/trade dress "COW BRAND/GAAY CHAAP/GAAY CHHAP (COW BRAND) along with Device of GAAY CHHAP/COW BRAND / " in relation to their impugned goods and business of all kinds of washing powder, detergent powder, detergent cake, soap etc., and other allied/cognate/related goods or from doing any other acts or deeds, thereby infringing plaintiff's registered trademarks and passing off their products as that of plaintiff.
(ii) A decree in the sum of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Only) on account of damages sustained by the plaintiff due to loss of sale, reputation and goodwill as well as dilution of plaintiff's trademark is passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant;Page 75 of 76
CS (Comm.) No.525/2024: Sunil Niranjan Shah, Trading As M/s Shabroc India V/s Laxmi Chand Ahuja, Trading As M/s S.B Chemicals: DOO: 25.11.2025
(iii) Plaintiff is also entitled to cost of the proceedings, which will include actual cost incurred by the plaintiff, cost incurred towards execution of Local Commission as also the counsel's fee which is quantified as Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only).
67. Decree Sheet be prepared accordingly.
68. Let a separate file be maintained for application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. The said file be listed for further proceedings on 10.03.2026.
69. (i) It is noted that plaintiff had also filed an application under Section 379 r/w Section 215 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and Section 227, 228, 229, 236, 237, 246, 336(1), 335, 336(3), 340(2) and 318(4) of Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 inter alia mentioning therein that the defendant's impugned trademark/label "SANTARI JI KI GAY CHHAP" has been filed with false Affidavit of user claim on the basis of forged Invoice No.30, dated 29.05.2018.
(ii) Let a separate file be also maintained for this application and the same be listed for consideration on 10.03.2026.
70. Remaining file be consigned to Record Room after completion of necessary formalities.
Digitally
signed by
VINOD VINOD YADAV
Date:
Dictated & Announced in the YADAV 2025.11.25
17:51:42
open Court on 25.11.2025 +0530
(Vinod Yadav)
District Judge (Commercial Court)-02
North-West/Rohini Courts/25.11.2025
Page 76 of 76