Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Dr. (Mrs). Usha Mehta vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue ... on 27 August, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(6)ALT382
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court dated 21-6-2001 in W.P.No. 1947 of 1992 which was filed by the appellant challenging the validity of G.O.Ms.No. 130 dated 31-1-1992 whereby and whereunder the lease granted to the petitioner-appellant was cancelled by the Government.
2. According to the petitioner-appellant, a lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioner - Mrs. Usha B. Pershad for certain land situate at Sardar Patel road, Secunderabad. Subsequently, the Collector ordered that allotment of the land in question shall be made over to the Mandal Revenue Officer for construction of an Office building. After obtaining reports from the Commissioner of Land Revenue, the Government issued a Memo dated 16-11-1988 cancelling the allotment. In the proceedings before this Court, the claim of the petitioner was negatived. The Government issued final orders in the said G.O. dated 31-1-1992 allotting the land in question to A.P. Women's Co-operative Finance Corporation. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition found that the lease granted to the petitioner itself is irregular and invalid in the eye of law. Hence, this writ appeal.
3. Sri J.V. Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant inter alia submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the deed in question is a forged one and thus erred in passing the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel has drawn our attention to the deed of lease and submitted on the basis thereof that the same was permitted in evidence in the suit.
4. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that this appeal can be disposed of on a short question. The lease of indenture dated 10-1-1972 was purported to have been executed by the Secretary in the Revenue Department. The said indenture was executed by the Estate Officer of the Secunderabad on behalf of the Revenue Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh. In terms of Article 299 of the Constitution of India, all the deeds, documents and indentures must be drawn in the name of the Governor and they should be executed by persons authorized thereof.
5. The learned Government Pleader for Revenue on the other hand would submit that the grant of lease in favour of the petitioner-appellant is unauthorized and the entire transaction is the result of fraud and collusion between the petitioner-appellant and one Mr. Venkat Rao, the then Inspector in the Office of the Estate Officer, Secunderabad. The said indenture does not fulfill the aforementioned criteria. In that view of the matter, the said indenture must be held to be illegal.
6. Reference may be made to Article 299 of the Constitution of India which reads as under:
(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by President, or by the Governor of the State as the case may, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorize.
(2) Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the Government of India heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of them be personally liable in respect thereof.
7. In New Marine Coal Co. v. Union of India, it was held:
... As a result of this decision, there can be no doubt that the contract on which the suit is based is void and unenforceable, and this part of the decision is against the appellant. It is also clear under this decision that if in pursuance of the said void contract, the appellant has performed his part and the respondent has received the benefit of the performance of the contract by the appellant, Section 70 would justify the claim made by the appellant against the respondent. This part of the decision is in favour of the appellant. It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with this aspect of the matter at length.
8. The transfer of property by way of lease is a contract within the meaning of the aforementioned provisions.
9. In State of U.P. v. Murari, it is held Section 235 provides that a person untruly representing himself to be the authorized agent of another, and thereby inducing a third person to deal with him as such agent, is liable, if this alleged employer does not ratify his acts, to make compensation to the other in respect of any loss or damage which he has incurred by so dealing. The High Court did not base its decision on the above section. But it seems that Section 235 also can become applicable only if there is a valid contract in existence. This appears to follow from the words 'if his alleged employer does not ratify his acts'. The contract should thus be such that it is capable of ratification. In the present case, where the contract was entered into without complying with the requirements of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution, the question of ratification could not arise because on the view which has already been followed such a contract is void and is not capable of ratification.
10. It is now well settled principle of law that in order to comply with the requirements of the Article 299, a contract
(a) must be executed by a person duly authorized by the President or Governor, as the case may be;
(b) must be executed by such person 'on behalf of the President (or Governor)' as the case may be,
(c) must be expressed to be made by the President (or Governor) as the case may be, i.e., in the name of the President (or Governor).
11. The matter has been considered in Bihar Eastern Gangatic Fishermen Cooperative Society Limited v. Sipahi Singh, wherein it has been clearly held:
It is now well settled that the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution which are mandatory in character require that a contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State must satisfy three conditions viz., (i) it must be expressed to be made by the President or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be; (ii) it must be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor as the case may be; and (iii) its execution must be by such person and in such manner as the President or Governor may direct or authorize. Failure to comply with these conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable.
12. However it is also well-known that such contracts are not void for collateral purposes and if by reason of any agreement, the appellant herein may be held to be entitled by way of reliefs or consequences which are independent of the formality of the contract subject of course to the Government ratifying it.
13. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to go into the other questions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. No costs.