Mohommad Baks vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 26 May, 2026

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Chattisgarh High Court

Mohommad Baks vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 26 May, 2026

1. Petitioner has invoked inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 2 for short 'BNSS') seeking quashment of charge sheet No.25/2025 filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1 st Class Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj in connection with FIR No.3/2025 registered against the petitioner at Police Station Ramchandrapur for the offence punishable under Sections 331 (3), 296, 132, 174 of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNS') Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984 and Section 7 () of the Chhattisgarh Local Authorities (Electoral Offences) Act, 1964. Petitioner has also prayed for setting aside of the order dated 13.10.2025 by which learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on the final report submitted by the police.

2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that on 5.3.2025 respondent No.2-complainant submitted a written complaint before the concerned police station alleging that when the complainant was engaged in the duty of panchayat election at Booth No.115, village Ramchandrapur, 100-150 people including petitioner herein reached there, entered the polling booth centre while abusing them filthily, broke open two locks of booth centre and tried to snatch election materials and thereby they have caused obstruction in discharge of official duty by the complainant and other government officials who were on election duty. Based on aforesaid complaint, FIR 3 bearing No.03/2025 was registered against petitioner and 100-150 others for the offence under Sections 331 (3), 296, 132, 174 of the BNS; Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984 and Section 7 ([k) of the Chhattisgarh Local Authorities (Electoral Offences) Act, 1964. In the course of investigation, police recorded statement of witnesses under Section 180 of BNSS (Section 161 CrPC) as also supplementary statement and on completion of investigation, the police submitted charge sheet on which the concerned Court has taken cognizance on 13.10.2025 against the petitioner for the offence as aforementioned.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that petitioner has been falsely implicated in instant crime due to political rivalry as he is elected as a Member of Janpad Panchayat Ramchandrapur in two consecutive terms. He submits that in the panchayat election of 2025 petitioner has defeated the candidate of ruling party in the State, due to which they were annoyed with the petitioner and therefore, they colluded with the Presiding Officer and got lodged a false complaint against the petitioner. He submits that FIR against the petitioner is registered with inordinate delay i.e. after 10 days from the date of alleged incident, and despite due knowledge, delay of 10 days has not been explained by the complainant. Delay of 10 days in reporting of alleged incident, particularly when 4 police station is at a distance of just 500 meter from the place of alleged incident, clearly indicates that FIR is not a spontaneous document but it is the result of deliberations and afterthought.

4. He further submits that the order taking cognizance against the petitioner is wholly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles in this regard, inasmuch as the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material available on record and has mechanically taken cognizance on the report submitted by police without there being sufficient ground for proceeding. He further submits that while taking cognizance, learned trial Court has not applied its judicial mind and failed to consider whether there exists a prima facie case against the petitioner. Hence, the order is cryptic and non-speaking, and does not reflect any reasoning as to how the ingredients of the alleged offences are made out.

5. He next contended that the entire prosecution case, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, does not disclose the commission of any offence much less the offences for which final report is submitted. Hence, it is prayed that the charge sheet No.25/2025 submitted against the petitioner and all subsequent proceedings initiated thereon be quashed.

6. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing submissions of learned counsel for petitioner, would submit that present petition seeking quashment of FIR, charge-sheet and the order taking cognizance on final report, is wholly misconceived and not maintainable in law. FIR against the petitioner is registered based on written complaint lodged by the Presiding Officer engaged in panchayat election duty. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court and learned trial Court has rightly taken cognizance after due consideration of material available before it and after due application of mind. He also submits that factual controversy cannot be considered at this moment. FIR and the outcome of investigation, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences. At this stage, meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudication on disputed facts is impermissible. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents filed along with petition.

8. Upon a perusal of the FIR and material placed on record, this Court finds that there are clear and specific allegations attributable to petitioner about causing hindrance in performance of official duty by the complainant and others, who were on election duty. It is specifically mentioned in the complaint that petitioner along with 100-150 persons broke 6 open locks, entered Polling Booth No.115 of village Ramchandrapur, hurled filthy abuses at the government officials, who were on election duty and also tried to snatch election materials. Statement of witnesses is also recorded by police under Section 180 of BNSS and thereafter police submitted final report before learned Magistrate. Thus, there is prima facie material against the petitioner that he had tried to obstruct the complainant from doing his official duty.

9. This Court while hearing the matter under Section 528 BNSS at the initial stage of proceedings, cannot examine genuineness of statement, allegations made in FIR in question. In case of Teeja Devi vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :

"5. It has been rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that ordinarily power under Section 482 CrPC should not be used to quash an FIR because that amounts to interfering with the statutory power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with the provisions of CrPC. As per law settled by a catena of judgments, if the allegations made in the FIR prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, interference with the investigation is not proper and it can be done only in the rarest of rare cases where the court is satisfied that the prosecution is malicious and vexatious."

10. In case at hand, though submission is made by learned counsel for petitioner of false implication, however, upon perusal of the documents enclosed along with the petition, it is apparent that the complainant is a Presiding Officer of Polling Booth No.115. He is a government servant holding post of Lecturer. Other employees engaged in election duty along with complainant are also Teachers. Statement of Cook of Anganbadi Centre is also recorded under Section 180 of BNSS. Upon going through the entire material at this stage, we are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the report lodged against him is vexatious. It is subject-matter of evidence.

11. So far as submission of learned counsel for petitioner that incident is dated 23.2.2025 and FIR was lodged on 5.3.2025 with delay, is concerned, it cannot be overlooked that complainant is a government servant, he was deputed in election duty as Presiding Officer of Polling Booth No.115 of village Ramchandrapur. In written complaint, there is mention that due to act of petitioner and other group of persons, they became afraid and have intimated the police of Police Station Ramchandrapur and the Zonal Officer, upon which the Police and Zonal Officer came there and intervened. In the facts of the case and nature of allegation, ground of delay is to be appreciated by learend trial Court after recording of evidence 8 in a trial where petitioner will have an opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses on that point also. In the given facts of the case and nature of allegations, we do not find it appropriate to accept said ground raised on behalf of petitioner for quashment of criminal proceedings at this stage.

12. In case of State of Haryana and others vs Bhajanlal and others, reported in (1992) Supp (1) 335, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS, which are as follows:-

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety 9 do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(5)    Where the allegations made in the FIR or
       complaint      are       so   absurd   and   inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6). Where there is an express legal bar en-grafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, 10 providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

         (7)     Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
                 attended      with mala fide and/or where the
                 proceeding is         maliciously instituted with an
                 ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance          on the
                 accused and with a view to spite him due to
                 private and personal grudge.

103. We also given a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

13. In case of Madan Razak v State of Bihar and others, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 269, Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the ground raised for recording statement of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC with delay, has observed thus"-

"10. It is not necessary for us to evaluate the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The only question to be determined is, whether the statements disclosed a prima facie case, leading to an offence triable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. We are of the considered view, that it is 11 not possible for us to overlook the statements of the witnesses recorded, reference to some of which, has been indicated in the instant order. The reason for the delayed recording of statements is also disclosed in the daily diary report. The evaluation of the truth or falsity thereof, will be possible only after evidence is recorded, in the matter. At the present juncture to quash the proceedings initiated against the accused by quashing the summoning order dated 6.4.2011 in exercise of the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is clearly not made out.

12. Since prima facie, commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code, are shown to be emerging from the statements of witnesses recorded (as is apparent from the order dated 6.4.2011 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rosera), we are satisfied, that the impugned order dated 26.08.2013, passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set aside."

14. In case of Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka and another, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 129, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the High Court while exercising the powers under Section 482 of CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS), does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that when 12 no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. The High Court, under Section 482 CrPC, should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy.

15. In case of Amish Devgan Vs. Union of India, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that quashing of FIR can only be in exceptional circumstances and some of the exceptional circumstances are held to be where manifestly there is some legal bar against institution or continuation of prosecution; where allegations made even if taken at face value do not constitute any offence; allegations made do not constitute cognizable offence and allegations made are so absurd and improbable that any prudent person can ever reach to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against accused. In case at hand, apart from raising above grounds, counsel for petitioner could not able to show at this stage that allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against petitioner.

16. In case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Aryan Singh and others, reported in (2023) 18 SCC 399, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that as per cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of criminal proceedings, while exercising the inherent powers, the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. Relevant portion of the said decision is quoted herein below for ready reference:-

"6. From the impugned common judgment and order [Aryan Singh v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4158] passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned trial court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved.

This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency.

7. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge 14 and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider "whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not."

17. From the above quoted decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of criminal proceedings, it is not for the High Court to conduct mini trial and evaluate evidence. It is only for the trial Court to consider. The High Court has to only consider whether there is prima facie material or not. In the present case, the allegations made in the FIR; the material collected during investigation and submitted along with final report, do disclose prima facie commission of offences and the matter requires adjudication on evidence during trial.

18. Thus in view of facts and circumstances of present case, material available in record and in light of above decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, we do not find any good ground to quash FIR, charge sheet and order dated 13.10.2025 taking cognizance on final report submitted by police against petitioner.

19. For the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this petition, the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.

      Sd/-                                                 Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu)                                 (Bibhu Datta Guru)
      Judge                                                Judge
r/-

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Chattisgarh High Court