Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Punjab vs Harnek Singh & Others on 17 July, 2012
Author: Paramjeet Singh
Bench: Paramjeet Singh
CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRANo. 1530-SBA of 2003
Date of Decision: July 17, 2012
State of Punjab ... Petitioner
Versus
Harnek Singh & Others .. Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH
1) Whether Reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment ?.
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not ?.
3) Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ?
Present: Mr. K.S. Aulakh, AAG, Punjab.
for the Appellant.
Mr.Vivek Goyal , Advocate
for respondents no 1 to 3.
Mr. PPS Duggal, Advocate
for respondent No 4
Paramjeet Singh, J.
This is an appeal against judgment and order dated 14.12.2002 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala whereby, respondents no 1 to 3 have been acquitted.
A FIR No. 175 dated 20.11.1997 was registered at Police Station Kotwali Kapurthala for the offences under Sections 223 and 224 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC for short) against respondents. The respondents were charged for the offence under Section 223/224 IPC on the allegation that while they were posted on guard duty to guard under trial Bikramjit Singh who had been brought to Civil Hospital , Kapaurthala for urinary problem treatment, they conducted CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 2 themeselves in a negligent manner and allowed undertrial Bikramjit Singh, who was facing trial U/S 302/34 IPC, to escape from custody while undertreatment in Civil Hospital. The said Bikramjit Singh was charged under Section 224 IPC on the allegation that while he was admitted in hospital as undertrial, he escaped from the lawful custody after which the matter was reported to the police by Superintendent District Jail.
The prosecution in order to prove its case examined Roop Ram (PW1), the then Deputy Superintendent Jail, Mohinder Singh, Head Warder (PW2), Baljinder Singh Assistant Suprintendent Jail, (PW3) Kartar Chand,Assistant Suprintendent Jail, (PW4), Jarnail Singh (PW5), Parveen Kumar (PW6), ASI, Partap Singh (PW7), Dr. Gurcharan Singh (PW8), HC Baldev Dutt(PW9). ASI Gulzar Singh (PW10), Parvez Masih, Criminal Ahlamd (PW11), Gulshan Kumar (PW12) and Kavita Rani (PW13). The respondents in their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C. for short) denied the prosecution version and stated that they have been falsely implicated in the case .
The learned trial Court after considering the evidence and material on record acquitted respondents no 1 to 3 of the offences and convicted Paramjeet Singh under Section 223 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment.
The appellant-State has assailed the said order of acquittal of respondent no 1 to 3 dated 14.12.2002 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala.
Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the order of acquittal of respondents no 1 to 3 is not sustainable. There CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 3 is sufficient evidence against them. They are liable to be convicted. He has contended that once the evidence has been believed while convicting Const. Paramjeet Singh, the same evidence cannot be disbelieved qua respondent nos. 1 to 3. All of them were on guard duty. None of them was present at the place of occurence . All the accused in conspiracy with the under trial and acting negligently allowed to escape the undertrial accused Bikramjit Singh when he was sent to the Hospital for treatment.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contended that in fact there is no evidence that accused was sent to hospital under the tight security of police officials in question. As per the jail record, custody of the undertrial was given to HC Kashmir Singh and C. Paramjeet Singh to produce in court. When the custody was for production in court, how he was sent to civil hospital. Dr. Gurcharan Singh, during the morning around at 8 am on 20.11.1997 noticed that patient / accused Bikramjit Singh was not in his bed and policemen were also missing. No sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C was taken from competent authority. So they cannot be prosecuted. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no evidence from which conpiracy can be proved. Apart from the above, learned counsel for the respondents contended that every guard / official is not required to perform his duties round the clock. The duty roster was prepared by the guard incharge CII Harnek Singh for active duty of the guards. It has come on record that at the relevant time, Const. Paramjeet Singh was on active duty. ASI Guljar Singh PW10 has admitted that Paramjeet Singh was on active duty. It came to his notice that Paramjeet took Bikramjit Singh with him and CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 4 thereafter, they did not come back. In this way, if any offence is committed that is committed by Paramjeet Singh who was on active duty, not the other guards. The guard perform their duties in turns.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. It is appropriate to note that the learned Trial Magistrate after giving due consideration to the evidence on record has recorded a firm finding that Const. Paramjeet Singh was negligent in the performance of his duties, inasmuch as he allowed the undertrial, who was confined in Jail, to escape from his lawful custody. The prosecution has examined witnesses to substantiate the charge against him. There is no evidence on record if any criminal conspiracy was hatched by all the accused for helping Bikramjit Singh undertrial to escape from judicial custody from civil hospital. The learned Court has recorded a finding that Bikramjit Singh undertrial was suffering from urinary problem. On that account, he was sent to hospital for emergency treatment and the custody was handed over to HC Kashmir Singh and Const. Paramjeet Singh. There is categorical evidence on record in this regard to the effect that C. Paramjeet Singh had taken him in car No. PB02A-6866. During this period, no doubt CII Harnek Singh, Const. Rajesh Kumar, Const. Major Singh and Const. Paramjeet Singh were deputed on guard duty during his treatment in hospital. But on the fateful date, Const. Paramjeet Singh was on active duty so due to the negligency of C. Paramjeet Singh undertrial accued fled from the hospital. The finding has been recorded by the Court that respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are not responsible nor there is evidence of hatching the conspiracy in their connivance. The learned counsel for the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 5 respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghurey Lal Versus State of U P (2008) 10 SCC, 450 wherein the Apex Court has considered various judgments and has laid guidlines on which the judgment of acquittal can be reversed. Relevant portion from the judgement is as under:
"46. We deem it appropriate to deal with some of the important cases which have been dealt with under the 1898 Code by the Privy Council and by this Court. We would like to crystallize the legal position in the hope that the appellate courts do not commit similar lapses upon dealing with future judgments of acquittal.
47. The earliest case that dealt with the controversy in issue was Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 Privy Council 227. In this case, the ambit and scope of the powers of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal has been aptly elucidated by the Privy Council. Lord Russell writing the judgment has observed as under: (at p. 230):
"..the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 6 Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.."
The law succinctly crystallized in this case has been consistently followed by this Court. On proper analysis of the ratio and findings of this case, it is revealed that the findings of the trial court are based on the fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence. Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused further gets reinforced and strengthened by the acquittal of the trial court. The appellate court undoubtedly has wide powers of re- appreciating and re- evaluating the entire evidence but it would be justified in interfering with the judgment of acquittal only when the judgment of the trial court is palpably wrong, totally ill- founded or wholly misconceived, based on erroneous analysis of evidence and non-existent material, demonstrably unsustainable or perverse.
48. This Court again in the case of Surajpal Singh & Others v. State, AIR 1952 SC 52, has spelt out the powers of the High Court. The Court has also cautioned the Appellate Courts to follow well established norms while dealing with appeals from acquittal by the trial court. The Court observed as under:
"It is well established that in an appeal under Section 417 Criminal P.C., the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well- CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 7 settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons."
49. This Court reiterated the principles and observed that presumption of innocence of accused is reinforced by an order of the acquittal. The appellate court could have interfered only for very substantial and compelling reasons.
50. In Tulsiram Kanu v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1, this Court explicated that the appellate court would be justified in reversing the acquittal only when very substantial question and compelling reasons are present. In this case, the Court used a different phrase to describe the approach of an appellate court against an order of acquittal. There, the Sessions Court expressed that there was clearly reasonable doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence put before it. Kania, C.J., observed that it required good and sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt before the appellate court came to a different conclusion.
51. In the same year, this Court had an occasion to deal withMadan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 637, wherein it said that the High Court had not kept the rules and principles of administration of CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 8 criminal justice clearly before it and that therefore the judgment was vitiated by non-advertence to and mis- appreciation of various material facts transpiring in evidence. The High Court failed to give due weight and consideration to the findings upon which the trial court based its decision.
52. The same principle has been followed in Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 (at pp. 809-10 para 5), wherein the Court said:
"It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 9 opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal."
53. The question was again raised prominently in Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1956 SC 217. Bose, J. expressing the majority view observed (at p.220):
"It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong; Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 76, at pp.77-78); and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under Section 417 is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for reversing that view. Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 at 54."
54. In Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216, this Court again had an occasion to examine the same proposition of law. The Court (at page 222) observed as under:
"It is now well settled that though the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused person is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court and the views of the trial Judge as CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 10 to the credibility of the witnesses must be given proper weight and consideration; and the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses must also be kept in mind, and there must be substantial and compelling reasons for the appellate Court to come to a conclusion different from that of the trial Judge."
55. A Constitution Bench of this Court in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, observed as under:
"There is no doubt that the power conferred by clause (a) which deals with an appeal against an order of acquittal is as wide as the power conferred by clause (b) which deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, and so, it is obvious that the High Court's powers in dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the appeal in question is one against acquittal or against conviction. That is one aspect of the question. The other aspect of the question centres round the approach which the High Court adopts in dealing with appeals against orders of acquittal. In dealing with such appeals, the High Court naturally bears in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact that the said presumption is strengthened by the order of CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 11 acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court and so, the fact that the accused person is entitled for the benefit of a reasonable doubt will always be present in the mind of the High Court when it deals with the merits of the case. As an appellate Court the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. Thus, though the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those which it has in dealing with an appeal against conviction, in dealing with the former class of appeals, its approach is governed by the overriding consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence. ........
The test suggested by the expression "substantial and compelling reasons" should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case, and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterize the findings recorded therein as perverse.
The question which the Supreme Court has to ask itself, in appeals against conviction by the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 12 High Court in such a case, is whether on the material produced by the prosecution, the High Court was justified in reaching the conclusion that the prosecution case against the appellants had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the contrary view taken by the trial Court was erroneous. In answering this question, the Supreme Court would, no doubt, consider the salient and broad features of the evidence in order to appreciate the grievance made by the appellants against the conclusions of the High Court."
56. In Noor Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 286, this Court relied on the principles of law enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup (supra) and observed thus:
"Sections 417, 418 and 423 give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption not weakened by the fact CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 13 that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."
57. In Khedu Mohton & Others v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450, this Court gave the appellate court broad guidelines as to when it could properly disturb an acquittal. The Court observed as under:
"3. It is true that the powers of the High Court in considering the evidence on record in appeals under Section 417, Cr. P.C. are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but that court at the same time should bear in mind the presumption of- innocence of accused persons which presumption is not weakened by their acquittal. It must also bear in mind the fact that the appellate judge had found them not guilty. Unless the conclusions reached by him are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or that his decision is likely to result in grave injustice, the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with his conclusions. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record then the view in support of the acquittal of the accused should be preferred. The fact that the High Court is inclined to take a different view of the evidence on record is not sufficient to CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 14 interfere with the order of acquittal." (emphasis supplied)
58. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Another v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, the Court observed thus:
"An appellant aggrieved by the overturning of his acquittal deserves the final court's deeper concern on fundamental principles of criminal justice...... But we hasten to add even here that, although the learned judges of the High Court have not expressly stated so, they have been at pains to dwell at length on all the points relied on by the trial court as favourable to the prisoners for the good reason that they wanted to be satisfied in their conscience whether there was credible testimony warranting, on a fair consideration, a reversal of the acquittal registered by the court below. In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the Appellate Court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 15 consideration, In our view the High Court's judgment survives this exacting standard."
59. In Lekha Yadav v. State of Bihar (1973) 2 SCC 424, the Court following the case of Sheo Swarup (supra) again reiterated the legal position as under:
"The different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court such as-
(a) substantial and compelling reasons:
(b) good and sufficiently cogent reasons;
(c) strong reasons. are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal but should express the reasons in its judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified."
60. In Khem Karan & Others v. State of U.P. & Another AIR 1974 SC 1567, this Court observed:
"Neither mere possibilities nor remote possibilities nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can, without danger to the administration of justice, be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused person, if there is otherwise fairly credible testimony."CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 16
61. In Bishan Singh & Others v. The State of Punjab (1974) 3 SCC 288, Justice Khanna speaking for the Court provided the legal position:
"22. It is well settled that the High Court in appeal under Section 417 of the CrPC has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power unless is be found expressly stated be in the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusion upon fact the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;
& (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."
62. In Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. The State of Gujarat (1978) 1 SCC 228, the Court observed thus:
"In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court would not ordinarily interfere with the Trial Court's conclusion unless there are compelling reasons to CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 17 do so inter alia on account of manifest errors of law or of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice."
63. In B.N. Mutto & Another v. Dr. T.K. Nandi (1979) 1 SCC 361, the Court observed thus:
"It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable. "A reasonable doubt", it has been remarked, "does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 18 reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons. [Salmond J. in his charge to the jury in R.V. Fantle reported in 1959 Criminal Law Review 584.]" {emphasis supplied}
64. In Tota Singh & Another v. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529, the Court reiterated the same principle in the following words:
"This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 19 a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." (emphasis supplied)
65. In Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 248, this Court had another occasion to deal with a case where the court dealt with the powers of the High Court in appeal from acquittal. The Court observed as under:
".. the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal merely because another view on an appraisal of the evidence on record was possible. In this connection it may be pointed out that the powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379 (sic 386) CrPC are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the trial court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of of seeing the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 20 witness. No doubt it is settled law that if the main grounds on which the Court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal. We shall, therefore, examine the evidence and the material on record to see whether the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court in acquitting the appellant are reasonable and plausible or the same are vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Trial Court are such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously which may in other words be characterized as perverse."
66. This Court time and again has provided direction as to when the High Courts should interfere with an acquittal. In Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1997) 7 SCC 677, the Court observed as under:
"8. .that there must be "sufficient and compelling reasons" or "good and sufficiently cogent reasons"
for the appellate court to alter an order of acquittal to one of conviction."
67. In Sambasivan & Others v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, while relying on the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi (Supra), the Court observed thus:
7. The principles with regard to the scope of the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 21 powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial court. It is only when the approach of the trial court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal."
68. In Bhagwan Singh & Others v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85, the Court repeated one of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court observed as under:-
"7. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. Such CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 22 is not a jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but a Judge made guidelines for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided."
69. In Harijana Thirupala & Others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court again had an occasion to deal with the settled principles of law restated by several decisions of this Court. Despite a number of judgments, High Courts continue to fail to keep them in mind before reaching a conclusion. The Court observed thus:
"10. The principles to be kept in mind in our system of administration of criminal justice are stated and restated in several decisions of this Court. Yet, sometimes High Courts fail to keep them in mind before reaching a conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused in a given case. The case on hand is one such case. Hence it is felt necessary to remind about the well-settled principles again. It is desirable and useful to remind and keep in mind these principles in deciding a case.
11. In our administration of criminal justice an accused is presumed to be innocent unless such a presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by producing the evidence to show him to be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Further if two views are possible on the evidence produced in the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 23 case, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view favourable to the accused is to be accepted. In cases where the court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused the benefit of such doubt should go in favour of the accused. At the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution taking it as false, untrustworthy or unreliable on fanciful grounds or on the basis of conjectures and surmises. The case of the prosecution must be judged as a whole having regard to the totality of the evidence. In appreciating the evidence the approach of the court must be integrated not truncated or isolated. In other words, the impact of the evidence in totality on the prosecution case or innocence of the accused has to be kept in mind in coming to the conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In reaching a conclusion about the guilt of the accused, the court has to appreciate, analyse and assess the evidence placed before it by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the animus of witnesses. It must be added that ultimately and finally the decision in every case depends upon the facts of each case.
12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 24 of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity."
(emphasis supplied)
70. In C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair, (2003) 1 SCC 1 had to reiterate the legal position in cases where there has been acquittal by the trial courts. This Court observed thus:
"6. This Court in a number of cases has held that though the appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded, still while exercising such an appellate power in a case of acquittal, the appellate court, should not only consider every matter on record CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 25 having a bearing on the question of fact and the reasons given by the courts below in support of its order of acquittal, it must express its reasons in the judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal is not justified. In those line of cases this Court has also held that the appellate court must also bear in mind the fact that the trial court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the order of acquittal, and in such cases if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court."
71. In State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalkrishna, (2005) 9 SCC 291, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the Court observed: "In such an appeal the Appellate Court does not lightly disturb the findings of fact recorded by the Court below. If on the basis of the same evidence, two views are reasonably possible, and the view favouring the accused is accepted by the Court below, that is sufficient for upholding the order of acquittal. However, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the findings of the Court below are wholly unreasonable or perverse and not based on the evidence on record, or suffers from serious illegality including ignorance or misreading of evidence on record, the Appellate Court will be justified in setting aside such an order of acquittal." CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 26
72. In The State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755, this Court relied on the judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 and observed as under:
"15. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. ... The principle to be followed by appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." The Court further held as follows:
"16. it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 27 be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below."
73. In Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court held:
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 28 presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
74. The following principles emerge from the cases above:
1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 29
3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that trial court was wrong.
75. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal:
1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so.
A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when:
i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong;
ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law;
iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice";
iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 30
v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable;
vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/ report of the Ballistic expert, etc.
vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.
3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.
76. Had the well settled principles been followed by the High Court, the accused would have been set free long ago. Though the appellate court's power is wide and extensive, it must be used with great care and caution.
77. We have considered the entire evidence and documents on record and the reasoning given by the trial court for acquitting the accused and also the reasoning of the High Court for reversal of the judgment of acquittal. We have also dealt with a number of cases decided by the Privy Council and this Court since 1934. In our considered opinion, the trial court carefully scrutinized the entire evidence and documents on record and arrived at the CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 31 correct conclusion. We are clearly of the opinion that the reasoning given by the High Court for overturning the judgment of the trial court is wholly unsustainable and contrary to the settled principles of law crystallized by a series of judgment.
78. On marshalling the entire evidence and the documents on record, the view taken by the trial court is certainly a possible and plausible view. The settled legal position as explained above is that if the trial court's view is possible and plausible, the High Court should not substitute the same by its own possible views. The difference in treatment of the case by two courts below is particularly noticeable in the manner in which they have dealt with the prosecution evidence. While the trial court took great pain in discussing all important material aspects and to record its opinion on every material and relevant point, the learned Judges of the High Court have reversed the judgment of the trial court without placing the very substantial reasons given by it in support of its conclusion. The trial court after marshalling the evidence on record came to the conclusion that there were serious infirmities in the prosecution's story. Following the settled principles of law, it gave the benefit of doubt to the accused. In the impugned judgment, the High Court totally ignored the settled legal position and set aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial court.
79. The trial court categorically came to the finding CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 32 that when the substratum of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was false, then the prosecution case has to be discarded. When the trial court finds so many serious infirmities in the prosecution version, then the trial court was virtually left with no choice but to give benefit of doubt to the accused according to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.
80. On careful analysis of the entire evidence on record, we are of the view that the reasons given by the High Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal is unsustainable and contrary to settled principles of law. The trial court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence, therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the trial court. An acquittal by the trial court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable."
In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the learned State counsel has failed to point out any misreading of evidence by the Trial Court from which it could be proved that there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy against the respondents and they were neligent in performing their duties as guard. It is a common knowledge that guards perform their duties on shift and hourly basis. In view of the categorical finding recorded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that at that point of time, Const. Paramjeet Singh was on guard duty. So, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be held negligent and charge for the offence under Section 223 IPC is CRA No.1530-SBA of 2003 33 untenable. Consequently, judgment of acquittal of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is upheld.
In the facts and circumstances of the case , there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
July 17, 2012 [Paramjeet Singh] vkd Judge