Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramesh Rawat And Anr. vs State Of M.P. And Anr. on 23 April, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004CRILJ412, 2003(4)MPHT288, 2004 CRI. L. J. 412, 2003 (2) FAC 235, (2003) 4 MPHT 288, (2003) 2 EFR 261, (2003) 3 MPLJ 495, (2003) 2 FAC 235, (2003) 9 ALLINDCAS 205 (MP)
ORDER S.L. Kochar, J.
1. Petitioners have filed this petition for quashing the case pending against them before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore, in Criminal Case No. 7060/86 for the alleged offence punishable under Section 7(1)/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short "the Act").
2. The learned Counsel for petitioners have submitted that on 29-4-1986, the Food Inspector purchased sample of Dalda Refined Groundnut Oil from the petitioners. The Food Inspector, after completing the formalities, affixed a slip on the sample bearing Sl. No. IND/88/86 and also mentioned number on the slip which is 026199. Thereafter one part of the sample was sent for analysis and other two parts were kept with Local Health Authority.
The Public Analyst report issued by the Local Health Authority is also bearing the number on the sample as mentioned above. The report disclosed that the sample was not in accordance with the prescribed standard. Therefore, the same was adulterated.
3. The learned Counsel further submitted that after receiving intimation about the prosecution the petitioners appeared before the Court on 25-7-1986 and filed an application under Section 13(2) of the Act for sending sample which was kept with the Local Health Authority for analysis by Central Food Laboratory. The learned Magistrate was pleased to send the sample to Central Food Laboratory. This report by Central Food Laboratory has been received by the Trial Court (Annexure H), is disclosing different number of the sample than the aforesaid number mentioned by the Food Inspector on the slip of the sample and in this report in the sample castor oil was also found which was not found in the Public Analyst Report. Therefore, the sample which was sent to Central Food Laboratory is different than the sample which was lifted from the godown of the petitioners.
4. The learned Counsel has also sought quashing of proceeding challenging the consent given by Local Health Authority on the ground that on the consent letter, signature of Dy. Director, Local Health Authority are mentioned at two places and it can be seen by naked eye that both are different. The consent has also been challenged on the ground of non-application of mind and granting the same mechanically. It was given in a printed proforma after filling the blank. The learned Counsel has vehemently argued that in view of the aforesaid two grounds, prosecution will not succeed. Therefore, it would be an abuse of process of Court of law to continue the same.
5. The learned Counsel has relied on a series of judgments to bolster his submissions.
6. In oppugnation, the learned Dy. AG Shri Desai has submitted that as per Rule 4 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1986, it is for the Court to call the sample kept with the Local Health Authority and sent the same on the prayer of accused to Central Food Laboratory. Therefore, for this purpose different number can be given by the Court because the whole procedure is required to be done by the Court. In support thereof he has relied on a judgment State of Gujarat v. Bhupendra M. Mehta, reported in 1999 Cr.LJ 1373 . For the second point, he has submitted that there is difference between consent and sanction and the question of difference in signature can not be considered at this stage. He further submitted that both the points raised by the petitioners may not be considered by this Court at this stage because both will require explanation from the prosecution and without giving opportunity to prosecution in the trial to explain the ambiguity, the final conclusion in petition under Section 482, Cr.PC should not be arrived by this Court. He has also submitted that all the judgments relied by the Counsel for petitioners are the judgments in which the points have considered after completion of trial in appeal/revision by the different High Courts.
7. Having heard the learned Counsel for parties and after perusing the entire record, this Court is of the opinion that this is really a premature stage to consider the ambiguity in the code number given by the Food Inspector on the sample which is mentioned on the slip affixed on the sample and Public Analyst Report as well as the difference in Code number of the sample mentioned in the Central Food Laboratory report, without giving proper and appropriate opportunity to the prosecution to explain the same. The same is the situation about difference of signature of Dy. Director, Local Health Authority on consent letter. The case is pending for recording evidence before the charge. The applicant will get sufficient opportunity in cross-examination to put all these questions to Food Inspector and if he will not be able to explain the same, it would be for the Trial Court to decide the same on the basis of fact and law at an appropriate stage. Number of judgments have been cited by the learned Counsel for petitioners in support of their point but this Court does not feel it necessary to burden this order by mentioning each and every judgment but reference of one judgment would suffice the issue, i.e., Jaiprakash v. State of Haryana (Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases, 1997 Vol. 2-176 Punjab & Haryana High Court). In this judgment, the learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court, has considered the difference of number in the Public Analyst Report and held that:--
"It is entirely for the prosecution to explain the said contradiction. No attempt seemingly had been made during the course of trial to explain the same. When the prosecution failed to tally the two, the petitioner is right in urging that it is not shown that the sample seized in fact was tested by the Public Analyst."
8. This judgment clearly shows that the point urged by the petitioner was considered at the time of final delivery of judgment.
9. The power under Section 482, Cr.PC of this Court are very restricted. The Apex Court time and again has discussed about the use of power under Section 482, Cr.PC by High Court. See Vishwa Mitter of Vijay Bharat Cigarette Stores, Dalhousie Road, Pathankot v. O.P. Poddar and Ors., 1983 Vol. 4 SCC 701 equallent in 1984 SCC 29 (Cr.), Associated Cement Co.
Ltd. v. Keshavanand, 1998 Vol. 1 SCC 687 equallant in 1998 SCC (Cr.) 475 and M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 234.
10. In case of M.M.T.C. Ltd. and another (supra), the Apex Court has held that :--
"The law is well settled that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very stringently and with circumspection. It is settled law that at this stage the Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice."
11. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal analysis, this Court is of the opinion that the petition for quashing the proceedings pending against the petitioners before the Court below is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, same is dismissed.