Karnataka High Court
Sri N L Jahagirdar vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 5 January, 2015
Equivalent citations: 2015 (4) AKR 296
Author: Anand Byrareddy
Bench: Anand Byrareddy
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT
BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2015
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION No.129 OF 2010
BETWEEN:
Sri. N.L. Jahagirdar,
Aged 47 years, Manager,
Bank of India,
25/1, Bangalore CBB,
Museum Road,
Bangalore-560 025. ...PETITIONER.
(By Smt. Anuparna, Advocate for Smt. Latha Shetty, Advocate)
AND:
Central Bureau of
Investigation, ACB,
Bangalore. ...RESPONDENT.
(By Shri P.M. Nawaz, Advocate)
*****
This Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section
397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying to set
aside the order dated 29.8.2009 wherein the application filed by
the petitioner for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in Spl.C.C.No.150/2005, pending on the
2
file of the XXI Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge and
Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore.
This petition having been heard and reserved on
14/11/2014 and coming on for pronouncement of orders this
day, the Court delivered the following:-
ORDER
The petitioner has sought to question the correctness of the order dated 29.8.2009 passed by the Court of the Special Judge for CBI Cases, at Bangalore on an application by the petitioner in Spl.CC.no.150/2005, under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Cr.P.C.', for brevity).
2. It is stated that in the criminal proceedings initiated before the above said court, the petitioner is arrayed as accused no.9, by way of a supplementary charge sheet. The allegations in the complaint are to the effect that M/s Manx Auto Ltd. had produced fake documents purported to be that of a guarantor, to secure a loan from the Bank of India, when the petitioner was serving as Credit Officer, Corporate Banking Branch, 3 Bangalore, during the period May 2001 to August 2001. He was said to have been transferred to the Richmond Town Branch on 26.8.2001 as Officer, Administration Department.
And that on 18.10.2001 he was said to have been designated as Deputy Manager, Credit, at the said branch.
The above said fake documents are said to have been furnished by one Srinivas Jagirdar, Accused no.3, in collusion with a valuator, Accused no.5 and the Bank Manager, Accused no.1, along with another. The petitioner is also alleged to have colluded with the accused in this regard. It was alleged that the said Accused no.3 had offered certain immovable property as security, in his capacity as the guarantor in respect of a loan provided by the Richmond Town branch of the bank, in favour of M/s Manx Auto Ltd. A major portion of the said property however, was already said to have been mortgaged to M/s Karnataka State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the KSFC', for brevity) in respect of a loan created by the 4 brother and sister of Accused no.3, and the said property already had been sold to a third party by the KSFC. Further, on the very same forged documents pertaining to the property, the said Accused no.3 is said to have availed of another loan from a Co-operative bank in a sum of Rs.5 lakh. It is thereafter that the self same property had been offered as security to the petitioner's bank.
3. It is seen that even though the present petitioner was not one of the accused when the criminal proceedings were first initiated, the investigating officer had filed an application before the court below seeking the arraignment of the petitioner on the following contentions:
'The investigation of the case disclosed that Sri. N.L. Jagirdar, was Dy. Manager (Advances), Bank of India, Richmond Town Branch, Bangalore, when the bank had advanced credit facilities to M/s. Manx Auto Ltd. It was Shri N.L. Jagirdar who had conducted the Credit Process Audit (CPA-I) on 28/12/01, and had made observations regarding the non-compliance of certain conditions of the sanction, which was accorded 5 by Bank of India, Zonal Office, Bangalore, for financing M/s. Manx Auto Ltd. However, even after knowing fully well that many of the sanction conditions had not been complied with, Shri N.L. Jagirdar (A-7) had no hesitation in permitting excess drawals from the CC Account of the company. The culpability of Shri N.L. Jagirdar has become all the more pronounced as he had permitted overdrawings on 36 such occasions. He had passed 20 of those cheques on occasions when Shri B.V. Islur (A-1), Branch Manager, was also present in the branch, and when he had no financial powers, to permit such overdrawals.
Of the overdrawals permitted by him, on 13 occasions the cheques were not passed by any authority of the bank, and on 18 occasions, he himself had permitted the overdrawals the documents, especially the Encumbrance Certificate, and the Sale-deed. It is further seen that on three occasions, subsequent to the Zonal Office rejecting the proposal sent by the branch for allowing Adhoc Cash Credit limits of Rs.50 lakhs to the company, Shri N.L. Jagirdar (A-7) had continued to extend overdrawings in the account, without any regard to the intimation received from the Zonal Office.
It is further established during investigation that Sri. N.L. Jagirdar, is also responsible for not ensuring 6 the enforceability of the security offered by the borrower firm after verifying."
Thereafter, the petitioner having been named as Accused no.9, before the court below, the petitioner had filed an application seeking his discharge on several grounds. The said application has been considered by the court below in the following terms :
"16. Accused No.9 who was working as Deputy Manager (Credit) from August 2001 to January 2003 in the Bank of India, Richmond Town Branch, Bangalore has sought for his discharge. He has urged among other grounds that he was designated as Deputy Manager with effect from 16/9/2001 and worked in that capacity till 18/10/2002. He has further averred in his application that although he was in credit section from 16/9/2001, he was not aware of the proposal for credit facilities to M/s. Manx Auto Ltd. The proposal was not signed by him. Inspection of M/s. Manx Auto Ltd., and property mortgaged to Bank was conducted by Mr. Islur (A1) who submitted Report [D- 6(c)] in this regard. One U.L. Somappa a panel Advocate verified the documents pertaining to the property and submitted his report dated 26/12/2001 (D-15) wherein he has clearly mentioned at Item No.20 that he had verified Encumbrance Certificate dated 22/12/2001 [D-20(b)] for the period from 1/4/1999 to 20/12/2001. He has further averred about change in terms of sanction order accorded by the Zonal Office on 27/12/2001. It was sent to the branch on the same day. He was told by the Manager (A1) to complete Credit Process Audit-I (CPA-I) (D-68) on the same day and Credit Process Audit-II (CPA-II) (D-69) also would be completed by K. Sridharan (CW-17) on that day 7 itself. Sridharan further confirmed in his statement that EC (D-20) was verified by Mr. U.L. Somappa (CW-51) who gave his legal opinion (D-15) that M/s. Shyam Industrial Complex represented by Proprietor Srinivas Jahagirdar has got clear and marketable title. It is further averred that the Applicant (A-9) took the legal opinion as the basis as was the usual practice of the bank. The said EC has also been verified at the time of wetting the documents by the panel advocate Mr. H.R. Katti [CW-25] vide his letter No.303/02 (D-36) dt: 12/11/2002 and he also certified that the securities created by the company are enforceable in the court of law. The further charge against this accused is that he failed to obtain collateral security of J.M. Prabhakar (A2) and D. Chauhan (A3), tax paid receipt and khatha of M/s. Shyam Industrial Complex and extended credit facilities / TOL without complying with the conditions of sanction, the obtention of collateral security was one of the post disbursement conditions as per Page No.9 of Zonal Office (ZO) sanction note dated 26/11/2011 (D-76). Although a month's time was allowed as per the sanction, the security was not offered to the bank before disbursement. Such fact was brought to the light in CPA-I (D-68). As far as the tax paid receipts are concerned, the borrowers requested the Manager (A1) to allow a month's time for production of the receipt for the period 1/4/2002 to 31/3/2002. However, the tax paid receipts (D-26) dated 21/10/1999 and 26/12/2001 were duly verified by panel advocate (CW-51) and request by the company was considered favourably by Manager (A1) who approved for disbursement as evidenced in CPA-I (D-68). As regards transfer of khatha in the name of Shyam Industrial Complex, a Proprietorship concern, the revenue authorities had not received the records from BDA and the delay on that account is reflected in the report of CW-51 (D-15). However Items 15 and 17 of the report of the Advocate (D-
15) evidences acceptance of tax up to 31/3/2000. The Manager acceded to the request of borrowers and extended accommodation for completion of such formality. CPA-I (D-68) and CPA-II (D-69) were submitted to Zonal Office on 28/12/2001 as mentioned by K.S. Sridharan (CW-17).
There is also charge that this accused allowed TOL with 8 effect from 27/3/2002 on 18 occasions and failed to indicate to the Zonal Office until 28/6/2002 violating the Zonal Office instructions. The plea of this accused is that there were no instructions from the Zonal Office not to allow TOL, in this account. The Branch Manager (A1) had sanctioned TOL of Rs.50 lakhs and it was reported to Zonal Office on 4/4/2002 (D-75) as per proforma for reporting temporary over limits. As there was no communication from the Zonal office there was a deemed sanction for the TOL of Rs.50 lakhs for 90 days. In the absence of Manager (A1), this accused as Deputy Manager (Credit) used to initial the cheque as he was aware of the sanctioning of TOL. It cannot therefore be inferred that this accused had allowed / sanction TOL. The Zonal Office was not kept in the dark, in fact the Manager (A1) and the Customers (A1, A3 and A7) were constant touch with Zonal Office. The customers requested directly the Zonal Office for their TOL requirement vide their letter dated 11/6/2002. The outstanding cash credit in the account was mentioned as Rs.138 lakhs. The letter was forwarded by the Zonal Office vide their Inter Office Memorandum No.KZO/SSI/SRP/2002-03/64 dated 21.06.2002 to the branch requesting to scrutinize and asking the branch for their comments and recommendations to consider the company's request. TOL was also reported vide Branch Memorandum (D-76) dated 28.6.2002. There was no communication for the above reporting from the ZO (D-76) till 19/8/2002. Thus, there was deemed sanction. As regards the allegation that TOL was allowed on three occasions even after the Zonal Office refused to accord approval to the proposal dated 20/8/2006, Accused No.9 would aver that the memorandum was rejected after lapse of 50 days. It was received by the Incharge Manager (EP Paul CW-30) who had marked it to him in his own handwriting. After receipt of the letter the borrowers were informed about the rejection and the Manager (A1) was on leave during that period. The borrowers were also informed that they were required to repay the TOL allowed in the account. They discussed with Manager (A1) and assured repayment of TOL gradually and further suggested to Manager that they shall deposit the cheques in their 9 accounts and out of the proceeds part amount could be recovered towards repayment of TOL and the remaining portion could be allowed for their working capital requirement. Manager (A1) agreed to such proposal and instructed the branch to recover part of the amount from the proceeds of the cheque which the borrowers deposited in their account. It was subsequently confirmed by him in writing vide (D-108) and it was also conveyed by the Regular Manager (A1) to the incharge Manager (CW-30) who happens to be the delegated authority in the branch during the absence of the regular Manager. It is further averred that the three cheques alleged to be passed after decline of approval from the Zonal office have been cancelled by the in-charge Manager E.P. Pal (CW-30). The three cheques were for the purpose of purchasing the DD favouring Fiat India Ltd. These cheques were passed against credit of Rs.22.5 lakhs on 21/8/2002 and Rs.3.89 lakhs on 28/8/2002 as evidenced in the statement of account. As for passing 13 cheques without Manager's signature as Second Cancellation Officer, it is stated by the petitioner (A9) that the 2nd cancellation is done for the correctness of the cheques i.e., apparent tenor of the instrument and verification of the signature of the drawer of the cheques and not for having passed the cheques.
17. The passing of 20 cheques by A9 even whom Bank Manager was present is sought to be explained by A9 by stating that A1 used to go out frequently for business development. As for the failure to obtain the second officer's passing signature, it is averred that after passing the cheque it would be sent through sub-staff for getting the second officer's signature. In almost all the cases, the cancellation by the second officer is done. But the cheques in question might have been taken by the sub-staff directly for stitching without getting second officer's cancellation. As per the allegation TOL was allowed with effect from 27/3/2002, Zonal Office was informed about it after lapse of about 5 months and it was only on 28/6/2002, Zonal Office was informed about it for the first time. A9 would submit that TOL was sanctioned by Manager (A1) and it 10 was reported to Zonal Office (D-75) on 4/4/2002 within a matter of one week from the date it was allowed. It is further averred that Manager (A1) and the customers (A2, A3, A7) were in constant touch with Zonal Office. The customers in their letter dated 11/6/2002, mentioned about the outstanding in CC Account as Rs.138 lakhs against sanctioned limit of Rs.100 lakhs. This letter was forwarded by Zonal Office vide their Office Memorandum (IOM) No. KZO/SSI/SRP/2002-03/64 dated 21.06.2002 to the branch requesting to scrutinize and asking the branch for their comments and recommendations to consider the company's request by them. TOL was also reported vide Branch Memorandum dated 28/6/2002 and there was no communication for above reporting even after lapse of 50 days from the Zonal Office till 19/8/2002 (D-76). As for the failure to maintain TOL Register, Accused No.9 submits that he has no role to play.
18. The prosecution has resisted the application of A9 for discharge contending interalia that the material fraudulent acts and consequent damage to the bank took place when A9 was working in the bank between September 2001 and 18/10/2002. The Bank suspended A9 on 10/2/2003. The prosecution has contended in its counter that the petitioner (Accused No.9) failed to verify Encumbrance Certificate (EC) D-20 dated 22/12/2002 prior to disposal of credit facility. It is also the specific allegation of the prosecution that accused No.9 was hand in glove with Accused No.1 in ignoring the non-compliance of the relevant condition of sanction by the Directors of M/s. Manx Auto Ltd., and extended credit facility and TOL. Thus, A9 together with A1 violated the sanctioned limits of Rs.100 lakhs cash credit and allowed TOL with effect from 4/2/2002 till 31/3/2002 upto 1156.5 lakhs to M/s. Manx Auto Ltd., by conspiring with other accused TOL was allowed to the company / Directors jeopardizing the interest of the bank.
19. The main thrust of the prosecution case against Accused No.9 in the context of the indictment is that Accused No.9 was aware of the fraudulent nature of 11 transactions and the fabrication of Encumbrance Certificate and other omissions and commissions on the part of the borrowers. He conspired with Accused No.1 in allowing TOL to the borrowers. It is also spelt out by the prosecution that Accused No.9 signed the cheques and allowed the TOL without having any delegated authority and thus violated the banking norms in respect of 18 cheques. He further failed to ensure 2nd officer's signature in three cheques. Accused No.9 further failed to obtain Bank Manager's initials on 13 cheques and passed those cheques and allowed TOL without any authority. A9, a Deputy Manager (Credit) signed and passed 20 cheques without obtaining A1's signature and without having any financial powers. It is also contended by the prosecution that there was failure to maintain TOL Register.
20. I have gone through the averments made in the petition and the contentions spelt out in the counter and heard the rival submissions canvassed on both sides. The main thrust of the contention of the learned counsel for Accused No.9 is that Accused No.9 has no occasion to conspire with any of the other accused and that the borrowers would only deal with Accused No.1 (Manager) and the Zonal Office and that accused No.9 was only performing his routine duties under the instructions of the Manager and according to the banking norms.
21. Per contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor would contend that the offence of conspiracy by particular accused need not be from the date of inception of the machination engineered by the borrowers. The process of fraud perpetrated on the bank can include several conspirators who have played their respective roles at several stages. He would also submit that Accused No.9 has played his role at the relevant stage when he worked in the bank by obliging the borrowers to violate the terms of sanction and to allow TOL to the borrowers. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor would also lay considerable stress on the fact that Accused No.9 being fully aware of the conspiracy entered into by the borrowers with the Manager (A1) preferred to favour the borrowers by signing 12 the cheques even when Accused No.1 Manager was present in the branch. The several overt acts of commission and omissions in respect of Accused No.9 would per-se justify the indictment.
22. This court cannot embark upon a detailed analysis of the evidence to give countenance to any of the contentions canvassed by the learned defence counsel appearing for A9. What is relevant at this juncture is the existence of prima facie material which is sufficient to frame a charge against Accused No.9. The allegations against accused No.9 would disclose the ingredients of the offence complained of and are further supported by prima facie material. As already emphasised above, this court cannot make incisive analysis of the evidence collected by the prosecution at this juncture. Such a course is not warranted for the limited purpose of framing a charge based on prima facie material. Accordingly I negative the contentions canvassed by learned defence counsel for A9 and reach my conclusion to hold that the application is liable to be dismissed. With these observations, I pass the following:
ORDER The applications for discharge filed by A2 and A7, A3, A5, A9 are dismissed.
Charge is directed to be framed against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 120B, read with 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988."
It is the above which is sought to be questioned in the present petition.
4. The learned counsel Ms. Anuparna, appearing for the petitioner has argued at length on the grounds raised in the 13 petition, with much conviction and force, with detailed reference to material documents to demonstrate that the petitioner could not be found guilty on any count whatsoever, as every single allegation could be categorically met with reference to material documents and any scintilla of suspicion could be cleared with cogent and tenable explanations particularly with reference to the detailed reply submitted by the petitioner to the charges, in the first instance which according to the counsel has been clearly overlooked by the court below.
5. Be that as it may, before entering on the particulars of the case it would firstly be necessary to examine whether the court below has committed any error of law or jurisdiction or has acted mechanically in proceeding to reject the prayer of the petitioner, seeking discharge.14
6. As regards the exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C., the following decisions of the apex court are illuminating :
"i) State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39;
ii) P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2010) 2 SCC 398; and
(iii) Sajjan Kumar vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368.
The first decision Ramesh Singh (supra) relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment reads as under:
"4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall 15 discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which -- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie 16 whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. It the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
11) Discharge of accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered in P. Vijayan (supra) as under:
"10. ....... If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons 17 of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him."
12) While considering the very same provisions i.e., framing of charges and discharge of accused, again in Sajjan Kumar (supra), this Court held thus:
"19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.18
20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC
21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of 19 the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
7. Having regard to the above settled principles and further having regard to the details that require to be examined 20 with reference to evidence that may be tendered, it would not be prudent for this court to embark on the pros and cons of the case and to conduct an enquiry, as it were, with reference to those details. The petitioner being certain of his defence would be in a position to absolve himself honourably.
The petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE KS*