Delhi District Court
Parhlad Rai (Dar) vs Shankar Yadav (243/19Kk) on 4 June, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHELLY ARORA
DISTRICT JUDGE AND ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE
PO MACT (SE), SAKET COURTS : NEW DELHI
MACT No.: 771/2019
FIR no. 243/2019
PS Kalindi Kunj
U/s 279/338 IPC
CNR No.: DLSE01 -007363-2019
Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors.
Prahalad Rai
S/o Radha Mohan Ray
R/o H. No. 65, Subhash Market
Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi.
.....Petitioner
Versus
1. Shankar Yadav
S/o Ram Daresh Yadav
R/o H. No. Vill. Bhitta Dharampura
PS Anchal, Pupuri Distt. Sitamarhi, Bihar.
.....R-1/ Driver
2. M/s Triveni Road Car Pvt Ltd
R/o 8GF Transport Center, Rohtak Road
Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi.
.....R-2/ Owner
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 1 of 53
3. M/s United India Insurance Company Ltd
8th Floor, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi.
....R-3/ Insurance Co.
Date of accident : 09.07.2019
Date of filing of DAR : 30.10.2019
Date of Decision : 04.06.2025
AWARD
1. DAR
1(a). Detailed Accident Report (hereinafter referred as DAR)
was filed by IO ASI Onkar in terms of provisions of Motor
Vehicle Act, which is treated as Claim Petition under Section 166
(1) read with Section 166 (4) MV Act. It pertains to alleged
accident of injured Sh. Prahalad Rai (hereinafter referred as
claimant) by vehicle bearing Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666 (hereinafter
referred as offending vehicle), which was driven by Sh. Shankar
Yadav (hereinafter referred as R-1), owned by M/s Triveni Road
Car Pvt Ltd (hereinafter referred as R-2) and insured with M/s
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred as R-3).
2. Brief Facts:
2(a). Preliminary information about the accident was received
on 09.07.2019 recorded vide DD no.23A, at PS Kalindi Kunj in
respect of accident on Pusta Road Cut Loop Road near Kalindi
Kunj New Delhi, upon receipt of which, ASI Dharam Prakash
along with Ct. Nitin proceeded to the spot where Truck bearing
Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666 and a scooty bearing Reg. No.DL 9SBA
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 2 of 53
2995 (black colour) were found in accidental condition and they
learnt that injured has already been rushed to hospital in a PCR
van. ASI Dharam Prakash then proceeded to AIIMS Trauma
Center where he found injured Prahalad Rai to be hospitalized
with MLC no. 500180770/19. Statement of Prahalad Rai was
recorded who informed that he was commuting by his scooty
from Kalindi Kunj to Madanpur Khadar, crossing Loop Road Cut
on Pusta Road when a truck bearing Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666,
being driven speedily, rashly and dangerously impacted his
scooty, severely injuring him in the process. He stated that
someone from the public informed the police and he was rushed
to AIIMS Trauma Center in a PCR vehicle. He informed the
name of Truck driver as Shankar Yadav and asserted that the
accident is attributed to his speedy and rash driving. FIR was
registered on the basis of statement of injured Prahalad Rai. The
accidental vehicles were seized and taken into police possession.
Notice u/s 133 MV Act was served upon Sh. Ram Singh, the
truck operator working for M/s Triveni Road Carrier Pvt Ltd who
informed that he was responsible for supervising and managing
the offending vehicle and that Shankar Yadav was at wheels at
the time of accident. He also produced the document pertaining
to offending vehicle as well as the driving license of Shankar
Yadav. Driver Shankar Yadav was also interrogated and arrested.
The Mechanical Inspection of the accident vehicle was got done.
The documents pertaining to offending vehicle as well as the
driving license were found to be genuine. Driver Shankar Yadav
was charge sheeted for injuring the claimant on account of
speedy and rash driving of offending vehicle on a public way.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 3 of 53
DAR was also filed by Investigating Officer.
3. Reply:
3(a) Reply to DAR was not filed by R-1 as well as by R-2.
3(b) Reply was filed by Insurance Company wherein the
validity and the genuineness of the Insurance Policy was
conceded, however, it was asserted that neither the Refresher
Course Certificate to drive Transport Vehicle carrying hazardous
goods was filed nor any endorsement was made on the license for
the relevant period, thus driver/ R-1 was not authorised to drive
vehicle transporting hazardous goods which constitutes violation
of the terms and conditions of the insurance company, therefore,
insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured and to
pay compensation to victim.
4. Issues:
4(a) From the pleadings of parties, following issues were
framed vide order dated 30.10.2019:
i). Whether the injured suffered injuries in a road traffic accident on
09.07.2019 due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle bearing no.
DL 1GC 2666 being driven by R-1, owned by R-2 and insured with
R-3? OPP.
ii). Whether the injured is entitled to any compensation, if so, to what
extent and from whom?OPP
iii). Relief.
5. Evidence:
5(a) Matter was then listed for Petitioner Evidence. PW-1 Sh.
Prahalad Rai tendered his evidentiary affidavit as Ex.PW1/A. He
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 4 of 53
relied upon following documents:
Ex.PW1/1 - Copy of MLC
Ex.PW1/2- Copy of the medical records.
Ex.PW1/3 to Ex.PW1/7- Copy of the discharge certificates
Ex.PW1/8- Copy of medical Prescription
Ex.PW1/9- Copy of bills
Ex.PW1/10 & Ex.PW1/11- Copies of Salary Certificates
Ex.PW1/12- Copy of his Aadhar Card
Ex.PW1/13- Copy of Driving License
Ex.PW1/14- Copy of the PAN Card
5(a) PW-1 was cross examined by counsel for Insurance
Company.
5(b) Sh. Anil Harsh was examined as PW-2 who appeared on
behalf of employer of claimant namely Harsh Specialty Coating
Pvt Ltd. He was cross examined by counsel for insurance
company.
5(c) Petitioner Evidence was closed. Matter was then listed for
RE.
5(d). R3W1 Ms. Pooja, Administrative Officer, M/s United
India Insurance Co. Ltd examined on behalf of Insurance
Company. She tendered her evidentiary affidavit as Ex.R3W1/A.
She relied upon copy of insurance policy as Ex.R3W1/1, Report
of Licensing Authority filed by the Investigating Officer as
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 5 of 53
Ex.R3W1/2, copy of notice dated 05.04.2024 in terms of Order
12 Rule 8 CPC as Ex.R3W1/3, copy of the postal receipts as
Ex.R3W1/4 & Ex.PW1/5. She was cross examined by counsel
for claimant.
5(e) Respondent Evidence was accordingly closed. Matter was
then listed for Final Arguments.
6. Final Arguments:
6(a) Final Arguments were advanced by the contesting
counsels. Counsel for the claimant filed Written Submissions
arguing that R-1 & 2 chose not to cross examine PW-1 on the
aspect of rash and negligent driving and also did not produce any
evidence to revert the same and therefore, negligence on their
part can be inferred against them. It is further argued that the
petitioner suffered with open traumatic grade -III fracture of both
bones of his left leg and underwent surgeries, and prolonged
medical treatment which has also rendered him 63% permanent
disabled, leading to substantial loss of income, having adversely
affected his earning capacity. He also argued that the claimant is
entitled to compensation for loss of future earning. It is also
asserted that R-3 is liable to indemnify R-1 & 2 and pay
compensation to the claimant. He has relied upon following case
laws:
-Bimla Devi & Ors. Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation
& Ors. (2009) 13 SCC 530.
-Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Meena Variyal & Ors.
(2007) 5 SCC 428
-NKV Bros Pvt Ltd Vs.M Karumai Ammal & Ors. (1980) 3 SCC
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 6 of 53
457
-United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shila Datta & Ors. (2011)
10 SCC 509
-Minu B Mehta & Anr. Vs. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan &
Anr (1977) 2 SCC 441
-Jagadish Vs. Mohan & Ors. (2018) 4 SCC 571
-Mohan Soni Vs. Ram Avtar Tomar & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 267
6(b) Written Submissions filed on behalf of R-2 wherein
counsel for R-1 & 2 contended that R-1 was holding a valid
driving license with authorisation to drive transport vehicle
carrying hazardous goods under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act. It is also stated that R-1 had already passed the the
certifying test on 19.02.2019, required for driving the hazardous
vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Act much prior to the date of
accident and therefore, R-1 was authorised to drive the hazardous
goods transport vehicle at the time of accident. It is also stated
that the driving license of R-1 was valid throughout the country
as per Rule 9 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989. It is stated
that the owner has no responsibility to grant compensation to the
petitioner and as the insurance policy has been conceded by
Insurance Company to be valid as on the date of accident thus the
entire liability be falls upon the insurance company. It is also
argued that the insurance company is under an obligation to
prove willful breach on the part of vehicle owner and as such if
the driver has produced driving license which looks genuine on
the face of it then the employer is not expected to investigate into
the authenticity of the said license and same would not occasion
any breach of Sec. 149 (2) (a) (ii) and therefore, the insurance
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 7 of 53
company would be solely liable to pay compensation. Counsel
for R-1 & R-2 relied upon judgments in the case of Iffco Tokio
General Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Geeta Devi & Ors SLP (C)
no. 19992 of 2023, Ram Shabad Yadav Vs. Harilal First Appeal
No. 217/2018.
6(c) Counsel for R-3 also filed written submissions asserting
that the driver of the offending vehicle was not authorised to
drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature,
relying upon report of Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicle
Department, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, as per which, the license
was valid from 24.02.2018 till 19.02.2019 whereas the accident
took place in July 2019. it is pointed out that there is no requisite
endorsement in the driving license which amounts to violation of
the conditions laid down in Sec. 14 (2) (a) of the MV Act. It is
asserted that the owner of the offending vehicle / insured
deliberately / knowingly permitted the driver without requisite
endorsement and authorisation to drive the offending vehicle,
which amounts to violation of the terms and conditions of the
insurance policy. Validity and effectiveness of the insurance
policy is however conceded. Therefore, the Insurance Company
seeks recovery rights against owner / insured. Counsel for R-3/
Insurance Company has relied upon judgments in the case of
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Ramesh
Chand Sharma, MAC APP 447/2013, Laxmi Narain Vs.
Tirlochan Singh & Ors. FAO No. 289/2019, Reliance General
Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Kiran Sharma & Ors. MAC Appeal
No.610/2015.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 8 of 53
7. Discussion:
On the basis of material on record, evidence adduced and
arguments addressed, issue wise findings are as under :
Issue No.1
i). i). Whether the injured suffered injuries in a road traffic accident
on 20.12.2022 due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle bearing no.
DL 3SET 4197 being driven by R-1, owned by R-2 and insured with
R-3? OPP.
7(a). PW-1 / injured affirmed by way of evidentiary affidavit
Ex.PW1/A that he was enroute Madanpur Khadar from Kalindi
Kunj via Pusta Road by his scooty at about 01.00 PM on
09.07.2019 when a truck bearing Reg. No. DL 1GC 2666, driven
by R-1 in a speedy and rash manner came from the side of loop
road and struck his scooty forcefully on account of which, he
sustained serious injury on his left leg. He stated that police
officials rushed him to the hospital after the accident. None
appeared on behalf of R-1 & 2 to cross examine him. During
cross examination by counsel for insurance company, he
reaffirmed the specifics of the accident. He was not cross
examined in respect of mode and manner of the accident. He
declined the suggestion that the accident took place due to his
negligence. He also stated that his driving license was valid at the
time of accident.
7(b). PW-1 has practically not been cross examined on the
aspect of mode and manner of the accident. The rashness on the
part of R-1 was also not questioned by the insurance company in
its reply. FIR was registered on the basis of statement of injured
on the date of accident itself. Injured was rushed to hospital by
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 9 of 53
police officials. The accidental vehicles were found and seized
from spot itself. The specification about the offending vehicle as
well as about R-1 as driver of the offending vehicle were
mentioned in the first complaint leading to the registration of
FIR. In response to notice u/s 133 MV Act, the truck operator
accepted that R-1 was driving the offending vehicle at the time of
accident. Mechanical Inspection Report also reflects fresh
accidental damages on both the accidental vehicles corroborating
the deposition made by PW-1. Therefore, there is absolutely no
dispute in respect of the identification or the involvement of the
offending vehicle as well as R-1 as its driver, causing the
accident.
7(c). R-1 has been charge sheeted for causing injury to victim
due to speedy and rash driving of the offending vehicle. Perusal
of record reflects that no reply has been filed by owner or driver
contesting or barely denying the allegations/ averments in the
petition. R-1, being the driver was the best person to divulge
crucial details leading to the accident, however, he has chosen
not to testify about the contextual circumstances of the accident.
R-3/ Insurance Company could also have called upon R-1 as
driver of the offending vehicle to testify about the facts and
circumstances of the accident, however, same was not resorted
to. It is settled that filing of charge sheet itself is a significant
step towards the inference of negligence on the part of driver of
the offending vehicle. (Support drawn from the Judgment in the
case of National Insurance Company Vs. Pushpa Rana 2009 ACJ
287 Delhi as referred and relied by Hon'ble Supreme Court of
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 10 of 53
India in case of Ranjeet & Anr. Vs. Abdul Kayam Neb & Anr
SLP (C) No. 10351/2019). It is also settled that adverse inference
can be drawn against the driver of the offending vehicle in case
he does not appear as a witness to depose and clarify about his
stance in respect of the accident. (support drawn from the
judgment in the case of Cholamandlam insurance company Ltd.
Vs. Kamlesh 2009 (3) AD Delhi 310.)
7(d). It is a well-established legal principle that negligence in
motor accident cases should be determined based on the
preponderance of probabilities, not on proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The facts and circumstances must be considered in a broad
and practical manner. It is also settled that proceedings under the
Motor Vehicles Act are different from regular civil suits and are
not strictly governed by the technical rules of the Indian
Evidence Act. This view has been supported in the judgments of
Bimla Devi & Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation &
Ors., (2009) 13 SCC 530; Kaushnumma Begum & Ors. v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001 ACJ 421 (SC); and National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana, 2009 ACJ 287.
7(e). All material on record, including GD entries, FIR, charge-
sheet, mechanical inspection reports, findings, also as no attempt
has been made by the contesting respondents to set up any
defence support the necessary inference that the accident
occurred on account of speedy and rash driving of offending
vehicle. Issue No.1 is decided in favour of claimant and against
the respondents.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 11 of 53
ISSUE NO. 2
"Whether the injured is entitled to any
compensation, if so, to what extent and from whom?
OPP"
"The determination of quantum must be liberal, not
niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free
country in generous scales"
{as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Concord of India Insurance Company Limited Vs.
Nirmala Devi (1979 )4SCC 365}
8. Sec. 168 MV Act enjoins the Claim Tribunals to hold an
inquiry into the claim to determine the compensation payable and
pass an award. Relevant portion of Section 168 MV Act is
reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
"(1) Award of the Claims Tribunal.--On receipt of an
application for compensation made under section 166, the
Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to
the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as
the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the
provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the
amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and
specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be
paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify
the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver
of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them,
as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes
a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the
death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and
any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise)
for compensation in respect of such death or permanent
disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter X.
.
.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 12 of 53 .
9. "....Money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered." {as observed in the case of H. West and Son Limited Vs. Shephard 1958 -65 ACJ 504 (HL, England)}. It recognizes that the physical damage caused once cannot be fully undone. Something which remains as an indelible permanent signs of an unfortunate incident cannot be balanced merely by paying some monetary compensation. The process of damage and the ugly scars left on physical body and mental self, navigating through the entire process post accident and the unintended but compulsory turns that it brings in the course of life is indeed painful and traumatic. It is also required to be underlined that the damage is not restricted to the tangible injuries visible on the body of the injured rather catapults the lives of his family members also.
10. The assessment or grant of compensation is a small attempt to render assistance to the injured to navigate through the hairpin unanticipated sudden and traumatic turn in order to bring some elbow space for him to move towards stability and normalcy to the extent possible. The underlying principle remains thus to make good the damage so far as possible as equivalent in money.
11. Section 168 MV Act puts an obligation over Tribunal to assess 'just' compensation with the object of putting the sufferer in the same position as nearly as possible as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong. It is worthwhile to reproduce MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 13 of 53 certain observations made by Karnataka High Court in the case of K. Narasimha Murthy v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd ILR 2004 KAR 2471 as referred and relied in the case of Rekha Jain Vs. National Insurance Company Limited Civil Appeal No. 5370- 5372 of 2013 which enumerates the milestones to be kept in mind by the Tribunal in an endevour to assess just compensation, at the same time acknowledging that any amount of money cannot compensate fully an injured man or completely renew a shattered human physical frame as under:
"16. The Courts and Tribunals, in bodily injury cases, while assessing compensation, should take into account all relevant circumstances, evidence, legal principles governing quantification of compensation. Further, they have to approach the issue of awarding compensation on the larger perspectives of justice, equity and good conscience and eschew technicalities in the decision-making. There should be realisation on the part of the Tribunals and Courts that the possession of one's own body is the first and most valuable of all human rights, and that all possessions and ownership are extensions of this primary right, while awarding compensation for bodily injuries. Bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles a claimant to damages. The amount of damages varies according to gravity of injuries."
12. It is also settled that the monetary assessment is a methodology known to law as social and legal security to a victim even though the nature of injuries and the individual ramifications might vary in different cases, therefore, it is understandable that one remedy cannot heal all. Further, the loss is in the nature of deprivation and it is unlike a personal asset with a price tag which can be simply awarded and therefore, complete accuracy in making such assessment is not humanly possible. The endevour is thus to make an assessment as best and as fair as possible under the given circumstance. The uncertainty of bringing justness to an assessment has been recognized, still MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 14 of 53 holding that substantial damages must be awarded. The observations made by Lord Halsbury in the case of Mediana In re 1900 AC 113 (HL) give valuable insights into the aspect and reproduced as under:
"......Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless it is remitted to the jury or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case: how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in money counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident....... But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given"
13. The uncertainty involved has also been recognized by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rekha Jain (supra) where observations of Lord Blacburn in the case of Livingstone Vs. Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 APP CAS 25 were referred as under:
".......where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given... you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured.. in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong...."
14. It is further observed by their Lordship in the case of Rekha Jain (supra) as follows:
"41.....Besides, the Court is well advised to remember that the measures of damages in all these cases 'should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure'. The observation of Lord Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to 'hold up MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 15 of 53 his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing' is quite opposite to be kept in mind by the Court in assessing compensation in personal injury cases."
15. It is also settled that the compensation is not granted only for the physical injury but for the entire loss which results from the injury in an endevour to place the victim in a position as close as possible as prior to the accident (support drawn from National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors (2017) 16 SCC 680 also in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343). It is also settled as held in catena of judgments that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the object of the Tribunal ought to be to assist the injured persons, (support drawn from Helen C Rebello (Mrs) & Ors. v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr (1999) 1 SCC 90).
16. It is settled that an injured is required to be compensated for his inability to lead full life, his inability to enjoy those natural amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned (support drawn from C. K. Subramonia Iyer vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair - AIR 1970 SC 376 as further referred and relied in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and then in a recent pronouncement of Sidram Vs Divisonal Manager United India Insurance Company & Anr SLP (Civil) No.19277 of 2018).
17. What is required of the Tribunal is to attempt objective assessment of damages as nearly as possible without fanciful or whimsical speculation even though, some conjecture specially in MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 16 of 53 reference of the nature of disability and it consequence would be inevitable. {support drawn from Raj Kumar (supra) as referred and relied in Sidram (supra)}.
18. Observing that a measure of damages cannot be arrived with precise mathematical calculations and that much depends upon peculiar facts and circumstances of any matter, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India elaborated upon the expression "which appears to it to be just" in the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Another, (2003) 7 SCC 197.
19. The observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Suresh Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited (2012) 12 SCC 274 provide valuable insights into the factors to be weighed by the Tribunal for determination of quantum of compensation. The relevant extract of which is reproduced as under:
"10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority, while determining the quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the sufferings of the injured person which would include his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the Tribunal or a court has to be broad- based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation the fundamental criterion of "just compensation"
should be inhered."
20. The compensation has been broadly delineated as pecuniary and non pecuniary in the case of R. D. Hattangadi Vs. Pest Control India Pvt Ltd. 1995 AIR 755, it is worthwhile to reproduce certain observations made therein:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 17 of 53 "9....while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages.
Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial;
(iii) other material loss. So far non- pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life."
21. The issue of determination of compensation in a personal injury matter was extensively deliberated by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) Relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder for further discussion:
6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 18 of 53 consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)
(b),
(iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.
7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under Item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses-- Item (iii)--depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non- pecuniary damages--Items (iv), (v) and (vi)--involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decisions of this Court and the High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability--Item (ii)
(a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case.
22. PECUNIARY DAMAGES Damages under pecuniary heads primarily involves reimbursement of actual amount spent on account of injury suffered in an accident to undo the monetary loss, suffered by the claimant, as ascertainable from the evidence on record. Given hereunder are various heads under which compensation for pecuniary damages is assessed:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 19 of 53 A. Expenditure on Medical Treatment: Claimant has filed medical treatment bills as Ex.PW1/10 (colly) & Ex.PW1/15 colly. As per computation filed by claimant, the total sum of such bills was calculated to be Rs. 57,314/-. Sundry / miscellaneous expenses cannot be ruled out during the admission in the hospital and subsequently also. Accordingly, injured is awarded Rs.67,314/- (Rs.57,314/- + Rs. 10,000/-) towards expenditure on medical treatment.
B. Expenditure on Conveyance: Claimant has deposed that he has visited hospital about 500 times and incurred more than Rs. 30,000/- on conveyance. Any conveyance bill, however, has not been filed on record. It is evident from the medical records that injured suffered grievous injuries which is why he was not in a state of free unrestricted mobility that he could undertake hospital visits on his own without appropriate vehicular arrangements. Injured underwent prolonged medical treatment for about two years as per record with recurrent hospitalization and numerous OPD visits. The family members of the injured would also necessarily have made hospital visits to attend the injured during hospitalization/ OPD visits. As such, an amount of Rs. 30,000/- is awarded towards the head of conveyance. C. Expenditure on Special Diet: Claimant has deposed that he has spent more than Rs. 1,00,000/- on his special diet. However, apart from medical bills any other bills related to special diet has not been filed. Injured suffered severe crush injury on his left leg with exposed bone and remained hospitalized for about 2 months post accident. As per record, he underwent surgical procedures MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 20 of 53 several times during his treatment extending to more than two years. He was prescribed high protein diet vide Discharge Summary dated 07.09.2019 Ex.PW1/4 (colly) and later in Discharge Summary dated 09.02.2021 Ex.PW1/5 as well. Given the nature of injuries and the prolonged treatment including certain operative procedures, as also prescribed in the Discharge Summary, injured would have required to consume healthy protein diet for prompt and effective recovery. Compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded to injured towards expenditure on special diet.
D. Expenditure for Attendant: PW-1 deposed that his movements were restricted on account of injuries sustained in the accident. Thus his entire family used to render assistance for 24 hours a day as he could not avail the services of attendant due to his poor financial condition as hiring of attendant would have costed him about Rs. 15,000/- per month. As per the medical records, he was hospitalized for two months post accident wherein he underwent two surgical procedures on 10.08.2019 & 31.08.2019 and later again in February 2021, he remained hospitalized for transposition of flap in left leg. Again, he underwent surgical procedure in September 2021 and then in November 2021. His bone grafting was done in March 2022. Considering the nature of injuries sustained by injured, it cannot be stated that he was on his own and did not need any assistance. During treatment, he suffered recurrent hospitalization for about more than 2 years as well as several operative procedures. It can be inferred that he would have required the presence as well as service of his family MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 21 of 53 members during prolonged treatment. It is settled that the services provided by family members are also required to be compensated. An amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- is thus awarded awarded towards expenditure for attendant charges.
E. Loss of earning during the period of treatment: PW-1 further deposed that he served with Harsh Specialty Coating Pvt Ltd with salary of Rs. 15,000/- per month. He also stated that he was doing part time job and earning about Rs. 7000/- per month. In support thereof, PW-1 produced Salary Certificate issued by an Authorised Representative on behalf of Harsh Specialty Coating Pvt Ltd. Ex.PW1/11 certifying his earning / salary as a delivery boy to be Rs. 15,000/- per month. PW-1 also produced a certificate issued by Proprietor, Malhotra Pvt Ltd that he worked as a delivery boy in a Mother Dairy from the year 2014-2019 on a monthly salary of Rs. 7,000/-.
E(i) PW-2 Sh. Anil Harsh, Director of Harsh Specialty Coating Pvt Ltd was examined who deposed that Prahalad Rai joined their company in year 2013 as a delivery boy and worked till the date of accident, however, he could not join back due to injuries sustained in the accident. He also stated that injured was getting a salary of Rs. 15,000/- per month. During cross examination, he stated that any appointment letter was not issued to the claimant and that he used to be paid salary sometimes in cash and sometime by cheque. He also clarified that the operations of the company has been closed since the year 2020 and therefore, cash vouchers cannot be produced. Insurance Company in its Written Submissions has applied minimum wages for an unskilled MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 22 of 53 workman in the State of NCT of Delhi as the monthly earnings of injured which is Rs. 14,806/-. Considering that the injured has produced salary certificate duly supported by testimony of PW-2, which also commensurate with the minimum wages relied by the insurance company, the monthly income of injured is accepted to be Rs. 15,000/- per month. Since the proprietor for Malhotra Enterprises has not been examined therefore, the certification dated 28.10.2022 is not taken as proved and hence not counted as part of monthly income.
E(ii) Injured deposed that he was admitted at AIIMS Trauma Center on 09.07.2019 right after the accident, however, was later transferred to Safdarjung Hospital on the same day where he remained admitted all the while for about two months and underwent surgical procedures on 10.08.2019 and 31.08.2019 and later discharged on 07.09.2019. Again he was admitted in the month of February 2021 and underwent surgical procedures involving Transposition of Superiorly based Fascio Cutaneous Flap Left Leg + SSG, having been diagnosed with left leg upper one third bone Fascio cutaneous flap delay. He was advised limb elevation and weekly dressing as per the Discharge Summary. Again in September 2021, he was readmitted in Safdarjung Hospital with the complaint of pain and swelling of left lower limb and underwent surgical procedures. He was again advised limb elevation and active toe movement. In Nov. 2021, he remained admitted for about a week in Safdarjung Hospital, underwent a surgical procedure and advised limb elevation and active toe movements. Subsequently, in March 2022, he MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 23 of 53 remained admitted for about 10 days when he presented with complaint of deformity at injury site and underwent bone grafting. He was again advised limb elevation, active toe movements, partial weight bearing and walker assisted mobilization in the Discharge Summary dated 14.03.2022. He was also advised weekly dressing till December 2019. Considering the medical history placed on record, it is evident that injured was constrained to remain under active medical treatment including several surgical procedures, post accident for the injuries sustained by him for about more than two years post accident. It is also on record that injured could never joined back his duty as a Delivery Boy on account of injuries sustained in the accident. It can thus be inferred that injured would not have been in a position to work for gain for at least 2 years (24 months) post accident.
E(iii) Amount towards loss of income during period of treatment is thus calculated to be Rs. 15,000/- x 24 = Rs. 3,60,000/-.
F. Loss of future earning: It is settled that a person is required to be compensated not just for the physical injury but also for the loss he has suffered as well as the loss which he might entail for the rest of his life on account of those injuries which he sustained in the accident. This necessarily means that he is required to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy normal amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the injury, his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. (Support drawn from the judgment titled as C. K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair (1969) 3 SCC 64.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 24 of 53 F(i) Claimant was assessed with 63% permanent physical impairment in relation to left lower limb.
F(ii) Before proceeding further, it is important to understand as to what disability means and also types thereof. This aspect has been delved into by Hon'ble SC in Raj Kumar (supra):
"8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accident injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 ("the Disabilities Act", for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation."
F(iii) The term 'disability' means the decrements to the functional efficacy of body of injured whereas 'functioning' encompass all the body functions and activities for an independent life. Functional disability is to determine the extent of loss or extent of restrictive functionality considering the nature of activities required to be necessarily performed in efficient discharge of duties and the limb effected. This computes the MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 25 of 53 extent of adverse effect of physical disability upon the functional efficacy of an injured person, in turn adversely impacting his earning capacity. The process entails understanding and enumerating the skill set required for performing specific activities. To sum up, functional disability basically measures the extent of ability having been compromised to carry out basic everyday tasks or even more complex tasks required for and independent living. The limitations may occur on account of disability in the personal sphere, in the social sphere and in the occupational sphere. In the personal sphere it may encompass the daily activities of a person, his body function and his involvement in basis life situations. At the societal level, it could mean difficulty in involvement and participation in social and community activities interfering the interpersonal interaction and relationship adversely impacting the civic life. When disability restricts the vocation or employment avenues to make earning for his living, it falls in the category of disability in the occupational sphere. The disability might occur on account of age or any illness and in the case at hand by way of an accident. A person living a normal life in particular set of circumstance and making his living by engaging in any work has suffered disability which might impead his daily life activities, both on a personal and social scale and might also impact his ability to continue earning as much as before and his future employment avenues.
F(iv) What is thus required to be assessed is the effect and impact of disability upon the working efficiency of injured and whether it would adversely impact his earning capabilities in MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 26 of 53 future. It is settled that the Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity.
F(v) Hon'ble SC laid down certain guidelines for the Tribunal to be able to arrive at an objective figure to quantify the loss for the purpose of computing the compensation in the judgment of Raj Kumar (supra). Relevant extracts of this judgment for the purpose of further discussion are reproduced hereunder:
"Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability
9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body cannot obviously exceed 100%.
10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 27 of 53 show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation.
11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258 : (2010) 10 Scale 298] and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 341 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1285 : (2010) 8 Scale 567] )
12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence:
(i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary;
(ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement;
(iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is, the permanent disability suffered by the person.
If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity.
13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 28 of 53 of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood.
.
.
.
.
19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors."
F(vi) Further in the case of "Mohan Soni v Ram Avtar Tomar & Ors. I (2012) ACC 1 (SC), the question at hand was deliberated and following observations as relevant in the context were made:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 29 of 53 "In the context of loss of future earning, any physical disability resulting from an accident has to be judged with reference to the nature of work being performed by the person suffering the disability. This is the basic premise and once that is grasped, it clearly follows that the same injury or loss may affect two different persons in different ways. Take the case of a marginal farmer who does his cultivation work himself and ploughs his land with his own two hands; or the puller of a cycle-rickshaw, one of the main means of transport in hundreds of small towns all over the country. The loss of one of the legs either to the marginal farmer or the cycle-rickshaw-puller would be the end of the road insofar as their earning capacity is concerned. But in case of a person engaged in some kind of desk work in an office, the loss of a leg may not have the same effect. The loss of a leg (or for that matter the loss of any limb) to anyone is bound to have very traumatic effects on one's personal, family or social life but the loss of one of the legs to a person working in the office would not interfere with his work/earning capacity in the same degree as in the case of a marginal farmer or a cycle-rickshaw-puller.
F(vii) The question of assessment of impact of disability on the earning capacity has been dealt in several cases but it is understood that each case has to be evaluated on its contextual dynamics established by way of evidence at hand. It brings us to a question whether extent of permanent disability as medically determined can simply be taken to be the extent of functional disability and hence, the loss of earning capacity. It has been held in various pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and Hon'ble High Court that equating the two as a criteria would result in an inobjective and absurd compensation. There however, might be certain cases where the two would correspond to each other but it cannot be mechanically applied rather requires evaluation of applicable factors independently in each case to reach at a fair quantification of loss of earning capacity.
F(viii) Claimant has testified himself to be employed as a MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 30 of 53 delivery boy prior to the accident which requires extensive and unrestricted mobilisation. Claimant has placed on record his driving license to show that his work involved driving a two wheeler and delivering products. He underwent several surgical procedures over a duration of about 2 & ½ years post accident and had to endure substantial disability including deformity in the left lower limb. It is unlikely that injured would be able to perform the same task requiring driving of two wheeler for extended duration for making his living post accident which is bound to have an adverse impact on his earning efficiency. This impairment significantly restricts mobility, a critical requirement for his prior employment, which heavily relied on driving and physical activity. The nature of his injury directly impacts his ability to perform essential job functions, particularly those involving extensive fieldwork and continuous driving, which are indispensable for a delivery boy. Moreover, the psychological and emotional consequences of the injury further diminish his capacity to adapt to alternative employment or social settings, compounding the overall effect on his earning ability. Given the substantial impact on his ability to undertake field-oriented work, his functional disability is assessed as 50% concerning his earning capacity.
F(ix) Future Prospect: It is settled that future prospect (as laid down in the well considered judgment of National Insurance Company Vs. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680) shall be payable, not only in fatal cases but also in the case of permanent disability. (Support drawn from Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar & Ors., MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 31 of 53 AIR 2020 SC 4424).
F(x) PW-1 has filed his Aadhar Card as Ex.PW1/13 on record as per which his date of birth is 20.06.1979, therefore, his age as on the date of accident was about 40 years and 19 days. Since the injured was between the age of 40 to 50 years (at the time of accident) and purportedly earning fixed income thus the percentage towards future prospect is taken to be @ 25 % {as laid down in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra)}. Further, multiplier of 16 is applicable {as per table mentioned in para no.40 of Sarla Verma (supra)}.
F(xi) In view of the above discussion of law, the calculation under future loss of income in the present case is as under:
(a) Annual income (Rs. 15,000/- x 12) = Rs.1,80,000/-
(b) Future prospect (25% of Rs.1,80,000/-) = Rs.45,000/-
__________________
(c) Total = Rs. 2,25,000/-
(d) Thus, Multiplicand = Rs. 2,25,000/-
(e) Hence, the 'Total Loss of Future Income' shall be :-
Percentage of Functional Disability (Multiplicand X Multiplier).
50% (Rs. 2,25,000/- X 16) = Rs. 18,00,000/- MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 32 of 53 23. NON-PECUNIARY LOSS (i) Injured is entitled to both, pecuniary as well as non-
pecuniary damages. As the name suggests pecuniary damages are designed to make good the pecuniary loss which can be ascertained in terms of money whereas non pecuniary damages are general damages to compensate the injured for mental and physical shock, pain, suffering, loss of expectation of life, inconvenience, hardship, frustration, stress, dejectment and unhappiness suffered by him on account of injuries sustained in the accident. It takes into account all the aspects of a normal life which deluded injured on account of accident. Given the nature of heads covered, it is bound to involve guess work on the part of Tribunal involving some hypothetical consideration as well, primarily considering the special circumstances of the injured and the effect of those upon his future life.
(ii) Regarding non-pecuniary loss, following was stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4 th Edition, Vol. 12 (page 446):
"Non-pecuniary loss: the pattern: Damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenity constitute a conventional sum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair, fairness being interpreted by the courts in the light of previous decisions. Thus there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury will currently fall. The particular circumstances of the plaintiff, including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the award.
(As also referred in the case of Sidram.....................)
7. In Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1999) MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 33 of 53 6 SCC 667, the Supreme Court held that the object of an award of damages is to give the plaintiff compensation for damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The Court further held that the elements of damage recognized by law are divisible into two main groups: pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. While the pecuniary loss is capable of being arithmetically worked out, the non- pecuniary loss is not so calculable. Non-pecuniary loss is compensated in terms of money, not as a substitute or replacement for other money, but as a substitute, what McGregor says, is generally more important than money: it is the best that a court can do.
8. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274, the Supreme Court held that if a collection of cases on the quantum of damages is to be useful, it must necessarily be classified in such a way that comparable cases can be grouped together. No doubt, no two cases are alike but still, it is possible to make a broad classification which enables one to bring comparable awards together. Inflation should be taken into account while calculating damages.
(referred and relied in the case of A. Rupin Manohar Through Sh. S. Anandha vs Mohd. Ansari & Ors. 605/2015 passed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court)
(iii) To sum up, Compensation under non-pecuniary heads involves objective assessment of the damages in a bid to undo the loss, the injured would incur on account of his inability to a normal life and earn as much as he would, but for the injuries sustained. The whole idea behind assessment for damages for compensation is to put the claimant in the same position in so far as money can. The very nature of these damages, compulsorily involves some guesswork and hypothetical considerations, however, efforts should be made to adjudicate these on the basis of objective parameters rather than guided by subjective sympathy. The nature and severity of injury, the age, nature of disability are some of those parameters. Given hereunder are various heads under which compensation for non-pecuniary loss (general damages) is assessed:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 34 of 53
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma on account of injuries: The mental and physical loss cannot always be arithmetically computed in terms of money. These form the intangible losses suffered by injured for no fault of his. Although any form of human suffering cannot be equated in money, however, the object remains to compensate in so far as the money can compensate. Certain observations made by the Supreme Court of India in R. D. Hattangadi are relevant in the context:
"10. It cannot be disputed that because of the accident the appellant who was an active practising lawyer has become paraplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It is really difficult in this background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the appellant and for having become a lifelong handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. That is why it has been said by courts that whenever any amount is determined as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate such injury "so far as money can compensate" because it is impossible to equate the money with the human sufferings or personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame."
(v) Certain factors were also laid down for consideration in the case of The Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs Mahadeva Shetty And Anr Appeal (Civil) 5453 of 2003 further relied in the case of Sidram (supra) for awarding compensation for pain and suffering. The observations made in the aforesaid case as relevant to the context are reproduced hereunder:
"113. Before we close this matter, it needs to be underlined, as observed in Pappu Deo Yadav (supra) that Courts should be mindful that a serious injury not only permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but too often inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim. The attendant trauma of the victim's having to live in a world entirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid, and with MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 35 of 53 degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete personal choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge's mind, whenever tasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severe limitations inflicted due to such injuries undermine the dignity (which is now recognized as an intrinsic component of the right to life under Article 21) of the individual, thus depriving the person of the essence of the right to a wholesome life which she or he had lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied, the victim is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfiting and unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amounts oblivious of these circumstances, there is resultant affront to the injured victim. [See: Pappu Deo Yadav (supra)]
(vi) Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Suresh (supra) observed as follows:
"2. ... There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity "the Act") stipulates that there should be grant of "just compensation". Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine "just compensation" which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance."
But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity. (as relied in the case of Jagdish Vs. Mohan AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 1347, by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India).
(vii) Injured suffered grievous injuries which led to 63% permanent physical impairment in relation to his left lower limb. He must have suffered immense physical, mental and emotional trauma for what he was compelled to undergo on account of MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 36 of 53 injuries sustained in the accident. He was compelled to endure prolonged medical treatment and several surgical procedures. There is no measure with the court to quantify the pain and suffering of the injured, however, an attempt is being made to compensate in terms of money for the agony he must have suffered. Therefore, an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- is awarded to the injured against pain, suffering and and trauma sustained in the accident.
(viii) Loss of amenities of life: It compensates the victim on account of his inability to enjoy the basic amenities of life as any other normal person can, taking into account the age and the deprivation he would have to undergo and suffer due to injuries. Considering the nature of injuries suffered by claimant, an amount of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded towards loss of amenities.
24. The compensation awarded against pecuniary and non- pecuniary damages under various heads is being sequentially put in a tabulated form hereunder for ease of reference to all concerned:
Sl. no. Pecuniary loss : - Quantum
1. (i) Expenditure on treatment : As Rs. 67,314/-
discussed above.
(ii) Expenditure on Conveyance : As Rs. 30,000/-
discussed above.
(iii) Expenditure on special diet : As Rs.50,000/-
discussed above.
(iv) Cost of nursing / attendant : Rs.1,50,000/-
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 37 of 53
(v) Loss of earning during the period of Rs.3,60,000/-
treatment:
(vi) Loss of Future Income Rs.18,00,000/-
2. Non-Pecuniary Loss :
(i) Damages for pain, suffering and Rs. 2,00,000/-
trauma on account of injuries:
(ii) Loss of amenities of life Rs. 50,000/-
3 Total Compensation Rs.27,07,314/-
Deduction, if any, Nil
Total Compensation after deduction Rs.27,07,314/-
Interest As directed
below
25. Interest:
25(a). It is settled that any fixed rate of interest cannot be
prescribed for all cases at all times and would largely depend upon the prevailing rate of interest as per the applicable guidelines. As such, interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum is deemed fit and accordingly granted in the present case. (Reliance placed upon National Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Yad Ram MAC APP 526/2018 also referred and relied in case of The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Sohan Lal & Ors. MAC APP 70/2024 of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court).
26. Liability:-
26(a). Ld. counsel for Insurance Company has contended that the driver of the offending vehicle, though had a valid license to drive transport vehicle, however, had no endorsement of the transport MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 38 of 53 authority authorizing him to drive the hazardous goods carrying vehicle, which constitute breach of the terms and conditions of the policy and therefore, insurance company has prayed for complete exoneration to pay compensation to the claimants. Having said that, Ld. Counsel for insurance company has conceded the validity and effectiveness of the insurance policy as on the date of accident. Per contra, respondent no.2/owner of the offending vehicle has contended that driver has the valid driving license of the category of hazardous vehicle and had already passed the test on 19.02.2019, as required for driving the hazardous goods carrying vehicle as listed in the category of hazardous vehicle under the motor Vehicle Act and thus there is no reason to doubt the eligibility of R-1 to drive the hazardous goods vehicle at the time of accident. R-2 also contended that the owner duly performed its part of liability and thus not liable to pay any amount of compensation to the petitioner. It is also stated that the burden is upon the insurance company to prove that the vehicle owner has failed to exercise due diligence to verify the driving license before employing him as a driver. It is also stated that the driver has been able to produce driving license which is genuine on the face of it thus insured is under no liability to make enquiries with RTOs to ascertain the veracity of the driving license.
26(b). Insurance company has examined its Administrative Officer who deposed that a notice dated 05.04.2024 was issued in terms of Order XII Rule 8 CPC addressed to R-1 & R-2 to MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 39 of 53 produce valid license to drive offending vehicle, covering the date of accident, however same was not replied to. She deposed that driver of the offending vehicle was not holding valid license to drive vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature. She relied upon report of Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicles Department, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh which certifies that the license was valid from 24.02.2018 to 19.02.2019 for driving vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature whereas accident took place on 09.07.2019 and thus said license was not valid on the date of accident for driving Transport vehicle carrying goods of dangerous and hazardous nature. She also deposed that the license did not have requisite endorsement by the Licensing Authority in terms of Section 14 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. She also deposed that the driver filed 3 days refresher course certificate, however, his license did not carry any endorsement by the Licensing Authority authorising him to drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of dangerous and hazardous nature, effective for a period of one year. She relied upon report of Licensing Authority as Ex.R3W1/A. She however, stated that the insurance policy is valid as on the date of accident. During cross examination by counsel for claimant, she stated that she had no knowledge whether the vehicle was indeed carrying any dangerous goods at the time of accident. She also specified that the truck was moving towards Indian Gas Plant as mentioned in the charge sheet. His cross examination was adopted by counsel for R-2/ owner of the offending vehicle.
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 40 of 53 26(c). The MV Act doesn't explicitly define "hazardous goods", however it does recognize the need for safe transportation of these goods. The MV Act, along with other regulations, outlines requirements for the transportation of dangerous goods, including vehicle design, operator requirements, and driver training. Table 2 of Rule 137 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 defines the indicative criteria for categorization of a material as dangerous or hazardous which includes flammable gas. Before proceeding ahead with the discussion, it is imperative to advert to Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 which lays down the educational qualifications for driver of goods carriages carrying dangerous or hazardous goods. It mandates that any such person shall additionally be required to possess the ability to read and write atleast one Indian Language and English and shall also possess a Certificate of Training as per the syllabus prescribed therein. Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference :
"[9. Educational qualifications for drivers of goods carriages carrying dangerous or hazardous goods.--24[(1) One year from the date of commencement of Central Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Rules, 1993, any person driving a goods carriage carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature to human life shall, in addition to being the holder of a driving licence to drive a transport vehicle, also has the ability to read and write at least one Indian language out of those 25[specified in the VIII Schedule of the Constitution] and English and also possess a certificate of having successfully passed a course consisting of following syllabus and periodicity connected with the transport of such goods."
26(d). Against the backdrop of the qualification laid under Rule 9, Respondent no.2/owner of the offending vehicle has not MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 41 of 53 adduced any evidence to show that the driver had complied with the qualifications as laid under Rule 9 Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989. Written Submissions, however, were filed by counsel for R-2 wherein no submissions was made that the truck was not carrying hazardous goods rather it was submitted that the driver had a valid driving license as required under Rule 9 MVR and that he had attended the training programme for safe transportation of hazardous goods conducted from 17.02.2019 to 19.02.2019 which was valid upto 18.02.2020, thus there is no violation of Sec. 14 (2) (a) of MV Act.
26(e). The contention on behalf of R-2 emphasises on the certification of training imparted upon respondent no.1 to drive the goods carriage carrying the hazardous goods. Against this backdrop, it is relevant to enlist the duties or responsibilities saddled upon owner of any such vehicle transporting the hazardous goods. It is noted that Rule No. 132 of CMVR, 1989, saddles duty upon owner to ensure that driver of the goods carriage carrying such dangerous or hazardous goods hold a driving license as per provisions of Rule 9 of CMVR, 1989. Section 132 in The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 has been reproduced hereunder for ready reference :
"132. [ Responsibility of the transporter or owner of goods carriage. [Rule132 substituted by GSR 338(E), dated 26.3.1993 (w.e.f. 26.3.1993).] (1) It shall be the Responsibility of the owner of the goods carriage transporting any dangerous or hazardous goods to ensure the following, namely:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 42 of 53
(a) that the goods carriage has a valid registration to carry the said goods and the said carriage is safe for the transport of the said goods; and
(b) the vehicle is equipped with necessary first-aid, safety equipment, tool box and antidotes as may be necessary to contain any accident.
(2) Every owner of a goods carriage shall, before undertaking the transportation of dangerous or hazardous goods in his goods carriage,satisfy himself that the information given by the consignor is full and accurate in all respects and correspond to the classification of such goods specified in rule 137.
(3) The owner of a goods carriage shall ensure that the driver of such carriage is given all the relevant information in writing as given in Annexure V of these rules in relation to the dangerous or hazardous goods entrusted to him for transport and satisfy himself that such driver has sufficient understanding of the nature of such goods and the nature of the risks involved in the transport of such goods and is capable of taking appropriate action in case of an emergency.
(4) The owner of the goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods, and the consignor of such goods shall lay down the route for each trip which the driver shall be bound to take unless directed or permitted otherwise by the Police Authorities. They shall also fix a time table for each trip to the destination and back with reference to the route so laid down.
(5) It shall be the duty of the owner to ensure that the driver of the goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods holds a driving license as per provisions of rule 9 of these rules.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 131 and 132,it shall be sufficient compliance of the provisions of these rules if the consignor transporting dangerous or hazardous goods and the owner of the goods carriage or the transporter, abides by these conditions within six months after the date of coming into force of the Central Motor Object 1 Vehicles (Amendment) Rules,1993.]"
26(f). Possessing Certificate of successful completion of the requisite training as per the syllabus prescribed in Rule No.9, MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 43 of 53 is only one of the qualifications laid down for any driver of goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods. Mere certification cannot be equated with necessary compliance of Rule 9 of CMVR, 1989. There is no evidence led that the driver had the ability to read and write atleast one Indian language and English, although it has not been disputed that he was holding a valid driving license to drive the transport vehicle. At this stage it is relevant to advert to Sec. 14 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act which lays down the requirement of license to drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of hazardous nature that such a license shall be effective only for a period of one year and its renewal would require one day refresher course of the prescribed syllabus by the driver. Sec. 14 (2) (a) is reproduced hereunder for further reference:
"(2)A driving license issued or renewed under this Act shall,
(a) in the case of a license to drive a transport vehicle, be effective for a period of [five years]: [*] [Provided that in the case of license to drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature be effective for a period of [three years and renewal thereof shall be subject to such conditions as the Central Government may prescribe; and] ]"
26(g). In a similar situation deliberated in the case of Ramesh Chand Sharma (supra), Hon'ble Delhi High Court did not consider the driving license to be valid in the absence of required endorsement to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods. Following observations as relevant to the issue at hand are reproduced as under:
MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 44 of 53 "7. It emerges from the pleadings before the Tribunal, and the evidence adduced during inquiry into the claim petition before it, that the offending vehicle was one which would fall in the category of a transport vehicle meant to carry dangerous or hazardous substances. In these circumstances, the driving licence of the driver deputed to drive such vehicle could not be the one ordinarily issued for purposes of a heavy transport vehicle, as appears to be the case pleaded by the driver and owner of the offending vehicle in the matter at hand. Noticeably, the accident information report (page 46 of the paper book) shows that the driving license issued in favour of the driver (the second respondent) in this case was claimed to be one valid for the period 18.06.2004 to 17.06.2007. There is no material made available to show that the driver had secured the authorisation necessary in terms of Section 14(2) of MV Act, read with rule 9 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989.
The rules as noted above, do not permit such validity in case the driver is to be on duty on a vehicle carrying dangerous or hazardous substances."
26(h). In another case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Salimuddin decided on 23.09.2019, in similar facts where driver had a valid driving license and also possessed the certificate of prescribed training, however, bereft of the necessary endorsement of compliance of Rule 9 and authorization by the Transport Authority to drive goods carriages carrying hazardous goods, was held to be a case without valid and proper driving license to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods, observing that mere possession of a certificate from a MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 45 of 53 training school cannot substitute the statutory requirement of driving license to be issued by a relevant authority, as the driver had neither been tested nor approved by the licensing authority to drive the hazardous carrying vehicle. Absence of the necessary endorsement was also seen as a fundamental breach of policy condition in view of the obligation upon owner to ensure that the vehicle is driven by a person holding valid driving license in terms of Rule 9 of CMVR 1989. Relevant extracts of case of Salimuddin (supra) are reproduced hereunder :
"5. What emanates from the above is that the owner was able to establish that the driver possessed the requisite driving skills as certified by the aforementioned Government- licenced Motor Driving Training School. However, it is nobody's case that mere possession of the certificate will necessarily result in the Transport Authority certifying and/or licencing the person as having the requisite skills to drive a hazardous-goods carrying vehicle. As the name itself suggests, a motor driving training school is a school/institute which trains candidates to drive motor vehicles. It purports to impart a trainee the requisite skills as well as teach them the basic road signs and rules related to driving of motor vehicles on roads.
6. Nevertheless, at the end of any such training, whenever a candidate appears before the Transport Authority, his motor driving skills and knowledge of the applicable rules are tested by the Authority. It is only when the candidate passes the tests that he is issued a driving licence. Mere possession of a certificate from a training school cannot substitute the statutory requirement of a Driving Licence to be issued by the relevant authority. For driving of hazardous-goods carrying vehicles, a further endorsement is required on the Driving Licence.
7. In the present case, for indemnification against insurance claims under the said policy, the insurer had proceeded in good faith, that the driver of the hazardous-goods carrying motor vehicle would have been duly licenced by the relevant Licencing Authority, to drive the said vehicle. But on the driving licence, there was no such endorsement. In other words, the driver had neither been tested nor approved by the MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 46 of 53 Licencing Authority to drive the hazardous-goods carrying vehicle. There is a breach of policy condition, therefore, the owner of the vehicle would be liable to indemnify the loss."
26(i). Above case was referred and relied by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in another case Mangla Goods Carrier Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., MACP APP 270/2021 (DOD : 14.09.2023), wherein following observations were made :
"17. In view of the above dictum, even if it is accepted that the respondent no.5 had undertaken the certificate course for driving a vehicle carrying hazardous goods, in absence of an endorsement in the driving licence authorizing him to do so, it will remain a case of the respondent no.5 not having a valid and proper driving licence to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods.
18. In that view of the matter, the respondent no.1 has rightly been granted the right to recover the compensation paid to the claimants from the appellant."
26(j). There is no evidence that the owner of the offending vehicle was led to believe that the driving license was valid and effective in terms of Rule 9 of CMVR. It is the case of respondent no.2 that the driver underwent requisite training programme which was valid upto 18.02.2020 thus covering the date of accident. There is no positive evidence to show that any application in terms of Rule 9 of CMVR was made by the driver or any steps were taken on behalf of owner to ensure such compliance. As held by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in number of cases, absence of mandated endorsement for the compliance of Section 14 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, constitutes MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 47 of 53 fundamental breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy.
26(k). The judgments relied upon by R-2 mentions that unless the license is demonstrably fake on the face of it, there is no liability of the owner,however, in the present case, absence of endorsement on the driving license was very apparent and evident on the face of driving license which did not require any verification from the concerned RTOs given the duty as cast upon the owner of the transport vehicle carrying hazardous goods about ensuring the compliance of Rule 9 of CMVR Act and the mandate of Sec. 14 (2) (a) about additional necessary endorsement.
26(l) Perusal of Ex.R3W1/2 which is an extract of driving license issued by Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicle Department, Prayagraj UP clearly shows that the license was valid for driving transport vehicle from 24.02.2018 to 24.02.2021, in distinction from its validity to drive hazardous goods carrying transport vehicle from 24.02.2018 till 19.02.2019 whereas accident took place on 09.07.2019, therefore, it is evident that the driving license of R-1 had the authorisation for driving transport vehicle carrying hazardous goods only till 19.02.2019 which did not cover the date of accident. It also mentions the last endorsement date by RTO Prayagraj as 24.02.2018 which shows that any further endorsement in respect of authorization to drive the hazardous goods vehicle was never made in respect of the driving license of R-1. It is thus held that the driving license of MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 48 of 53 R-1, although valid for driving a transport vehicle, however, was invalid for driving a transport vehicle carrying hazardous goods. There is no contention that the vehicle was indeed not carrying or was not meant to carry or transport any dangerous or hazardous goods. It is also held that R-2 knowingly allowed the transport vehicle to be driven by R-1 without valid driving license which constituted fundamental breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy.
26(m). Considering that the insurance policy was valid and effective as on the date of accident and also considering that driver had a valid driving license to drive the goods carriage as on the date of accident, in the interest of justice and in view of the statutory obligation upon the insurance company to provide coverage to the third party against the accident, it is directed that the insurance company shall pay the entire compensation to the injured along-with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing of Claim Petition till realization, however, shall be at liberty to recover the same from driver as well as owner of the offending vehicle.(If there is any order regarding exclusion of interest for specific period, same be complied at the time of calculation of award amount. Further, if any auction proceed is received, same be adjusted in the final award amount).
27. The award amount shall be deposited by the Insurance Company. Counsel for the Insurance Company is also directed to furnish the complete case details, including the MACT case number, CNR number, FIR number, name of Police Station, name of the deceased/claimant(s), date of accident, and any other MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 49 of 53 relevant particulars, to the State Bank of India, Saket Court Branch, New Delhi at the time of getting the amount deposited. The amount shall be deposited through RTGS/NEFT/IMPS in the account titled "MACT FUND PARKING", Account No. 00000042706870765, IFSC Code SBIN0014244, MICR Code 110002342, under intimation to the Nazir of this Tribunal.
28. Release of Award Amount/ Disbursement Out of total award amount, Rs.20,00,000/- along with proportionate interest shall be kept in form of monthly FDR of Rs. 15,000/- each. Remaining amount shall be released to him in his bank account.
29. In terms of the Practice Directions issued by Hon'ble High Court, vide reference no. 134/Rules/DHC, dated 14.05.2025, the claimant (s) are directed to produce their bank account details along with either a certificate of the banker giving all details of the bank account of the person or persons entitled to receive the compensation including IFS Code, or a copy of cancelled cheque of the bank account to this Tribunal with seven days of the date of Award, if not already placed on record. They are also directed to file their Aadhar Card and PAN Card if not already filed.
30. Directions to the Branch Manager, SBI, Saket Court Complex 30(a). The Manager, SBI, Saket Court Complex, is further directed to verify the documents and details submitted by the claimant pertaining to their bank account, and upon proper MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 50 of 53 verification, under certification of the Branch Manager (of the bank whose details have been provided by the claimant for release of the compensation amount) disburse the amount, directed to be released to the claimant, directly into the verified bank account of the claimant under notice to the Tribunal.
31. Directions with respect to Fixed Deposit:
31(a) As per Practice Directions, Hon'ble High Court, vide reference no. 134/Rules/DHC, dated 14.05.2025, the bank shall invest the amount to be deposited in fixed deposit with any nationalised bank and fixed deposit shall be with the standing instructions to the bank to renew the same after periodical intervals till further orders are passed by the Tribunal.
31(b) The Bank shall not permit any joint name (s) to be added in the savings bank account or fixed deposit accounts of victim i.e. the savings bank account of the claimant shall be individual savings bank account and not a joint account.
31(c) The original fixed deposit shall be retained by the bank in safe custody. However, the statement containing FDR number, FDR amount, date of maturity and maturity amount shall be furnished by bank to the claimant.
31(d) The monthly interest be credited by Electronic Clearing System (ECS) in the savings bank account of the claimant near the place of their residence.
31(e) The maturity amounts of the FDR (s) be credited by Electronic Clearing System (ECS) in the savings bank account of the claimant near the place of their residence.
31(f) No loan, advance or withdrawal or pre-mature discharge be allowed on the fixed deposits without permission of the Court.
31(g) The concerned bank shall not issue any cheque book and/ or debit card to claimant (s). However, in case the debit card and/ MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 51 of 53 or cheque book have already been issued, bank shall cancel the same before the disbursement of the award amount. The bank shall debit freeze the account of the claimant so that no debit card be issued in respect of the account of the claimant from any other branch of the bank.
31(h) The bank shall make an endorsement on the passbook of the claimant to the effect, that no cheque book and / or debit card have been issued and shall not be issued without the permission of the Court and claimant shall produce the passbook with the necessary endorsement before the Court on the next date fixed for compliance.
SUMMARY OF COMPUTATION OF AWARD AMOUNT IN INJURY CASES TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE AWARD.
1 Date of accident 09.07.2019 2 Name of injured Prahalad Rai 3 Age of the injured 40 years 4 Occupation of the Not proved injured 5 Income of the injured As per minimum wages.
6 Nature injury Grievous injury and disability 7 Medical treatment taken As per record.
by the injured:
8 Period of As per record.
Hospitalization MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 52 of 53 9 Whether any permanent Yes.
disability?
32. Copy of this award be given to the parties free of cost. The copy of award be also sent to the Ld. Secretary DLSA and concerned criminal court. Digitally signed by SHELLY SHELLY ARORA Announced in the open court ARORA Date:
2025.06.04 16:24:53 +0530 on 04.06.2025 Shelly Arora PO (MACT)-02, SE/Saket/Delhi 04.06.2025 MACT No.: 771/2019 Prahalad Rai Vs. Shankar Yadav & Ors. Page No. 53 of 53