Delhi District Court
Ms Adarsh Tea And Foodproducts vs State on 13 August, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-013449-2023
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 517/2023
1. M/s. ADARSH TEA AND FOOD PRODUCTS,
Sharma Market Dhurwa,
Near Hanuman Mandir Bus Stand,
Sector-9, Dhurwa, Ranchi,
Jharkhand-834004.
2. SHRI. AWADESH UPADHYAY,
S/o. Shri. Raghunath Upadhyay,
Sharma Market Dhurwa,
Near Hanuman Mandir Bus Stand,
Sector-9, Dhurwa, Ranchi,
Jharkhand-834004. ... REVISIONISTS/
PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1. STATE,
Through SHO, PS. Rajinder Nagar,
New Delhi.
2. M/s. CREAMY COUNTY,
Through, its Authorized Representative,
Mr. Gagandeep Singh Marwah,
Having its registered office at;
N-118, Sector-1,
Bawana Industrial Area,
New Delhi-110039. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 21.09.2023
Date of institution : 23.09.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 03.06.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 13.08.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been preferred in terms of the provisions under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code') against the order dated 24.05.2023 (hereinafter CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 1 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:19 +0530 referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06/Ld. MM-06 (NI Act), Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM'), in case bearing; 'Creamy County v. Adarsh Tea and Food Products, CC No. 4296/2020', arising out of a complaint under Sections 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'NI Act'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court allowed the application filed by/on behalf of respondent no. 2, in terms of the provisions under Section 143A of NI Act and the revisionists/petitioners were directed to jointly and severally, pay/deposit, a sum of Rs. 2,64,504.30/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Sixty Four Thousand Five Hundred and Four only and Thirty paise only), being 10% (ten percent) of the amount under the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque as interim compensation to respondent no. 2, within a period of 60 (sixty) days of the said order.
2. Succinctly, the genesis of the present proceedings before this Court is a complaint, filed by/on behalf of respondent no. 2 in terms of the provisions under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read with Sections 138/142 of the NI Act, inter alia asserting that respondent no. 2 was a partnership firm, engaged in the business of trading dairy products. As per respondent no. 2, one Shri. Sanjiv Sharma (accused no. 3 before the Ld. Trial Court, hereinafter also referred to as 'accused no. 3/Sanjiv Sharma'), being the authorized representative of revisionist no. 1, approached respondent no. 2 for the supply of skimmed milk powder (hereinafter referred to as the 'product/good'), in bulk quantity(ies), owing to the good reputation of respondent no. 2.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 2 of 38
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:17:27 +0530
Consequently, revisionist no. 2, being the proprietor of revisionist no. 1, placed order of skimmed milk powder with respondent no. 2, to be supplied at the official address of revisionist no. 1. The complaint further chronicles that pursuant to the said understanding/agreement, respondent no. 2 supplied goods/products worth Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty Five Thousand and Thirty Four only) to the revisionists against invoice no. 133, dated 01.03.2020 for the said amount of Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty Five Thousand and Thirty Four only) along with E-Way bill no. 731122758066, dated 01.03.2020. Correspondingly, as per respondent no. 2, as per the books of account, maintained by respondent no. 2 a sum of Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty Five Thousand and Thirty Four only) was shown as debit balance against the revisionists. Correspondingly, respondent no. 2 asserted under its complaint that the aforesaid products were duly delivered to revisionist no. 1 on 07.03.2020 and subsequently, against the discharge of aforesaid liability, the revisionists, acting through their authorized representative, Shri. Sanjiv Sharma, issued a post-dated cheque bearing no. 225315, dated 04.05.2020 for a sum of Rs. 26,45,034/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs Forty Five Thousand and Thirty Four only), drawn on State Bank of India, Hatia branch, Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Bihar-834004 (hereinafter referred to as the 'dishonoured cheque/cheque in question') to respondent no. 2 and requested respondent no. 2 to present the said cheque for encashment upon expiry of a period of 02 (two) months, with an assurance that the same would be honored on its presentation. However, when the said cheque was presented for encashment by respondent no. 2 on 04.05.2020 CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 3 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:31 +0530 with its banker, i.e., HDFC Bank, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi-110060, same was returned unpaid/dishonoured on 13.05.2020 vide cheque return memo of the same date, with the remark(s), 'Payment Stopped By The Drawer'. Thereafter, respondent no. 2 is asserted to have contacted the revisionists and apprised them of the fate of the cheque in question, requesting them to pay the outstanding amount. However, the revisionists are asserted to have avoided the persistent requests of respondent no. 2 on one or the other pretext. Consequently, considering the blatant act on the part of the revisionists, respondent no. 2 is asserted to have got issued a legal notice/legal demand notice dated 18.06.2020 (hereinafter referred to as the 'legal demand notice/legal notice') to the revisionists and accused no. 3 inter alia seeking payment of the amount of aforesaid cheque/dishonoured cheque. However, since the revisionists neither replied to the said notice nor made payment of the aforesaid amount against the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque, respondent no. 2 filed a complaint before the Ld. Trial Court, in terms of the provisions under Sections 138/142 NI Act. 2.1. Relevantly, upon such complaints being filed and on consideration of the affidavit of evidence and other documents filed by respondent no. 2, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 24.03.2021, took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 NI Act and issued summons against the revisionists and accused no.
3. Subsequently, on the revisionists' and accused no. 3's entering appearance before the Ld. Trial Court, notice in terms of the provisions under Section 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence under Section 138 NI Act was framed against the revisionists and accused no. 3 on 13.09.2022, to which the said accused persons CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 4 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:35 +0530 (including the revisionists) pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Correspondingly, statement of the revisionists and accused no. 3 in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. was recorded, admitting certain documents. Markedly, during the course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, the respondent no. 2 moved an application under Section 143A NI Act, upon which, notice was issued and the Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 24.05.2023/impugned order, allowed the respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A of NI Act, inter alia under the following observations;
"...2. Reply was not filed on behalf of the Accused persons since last few dates and the Ld. Counsel stated that the matter may be decided on the basis of pleadings and material on record. Ld. Proxy Counsel for the Accused has submitted that Accused is not liable to pay the cheque amount as the Accused has categorically disputed his liability in the notice of accusation and the matter is to be seen at the trial. It is also stated that considering the defense of the accused, this Court was please to dispense with the filing of the application u/s 145(2) of the NI Act. The Accused claims that no case for interim relief is made out without a trial as the merits of the defence of the Accused has not yet been examined.
3. I have heard the submissions of both sides and I have also perused the record.
4. On the basis of submissions made and arguments advanced, this Court finds itself in agreement with the view taken in a recent judgement of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in JSB Cargo & Freight Forwarders Vs. State which had affirmed the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in LGR Enterprises & Ors. Vs. P Anbazhagan that the power u/s 143A is not mandatory but is directory in nature. Further, the discretion to award interim compensation u/s 143A is to be exercised judicially and not mechanically or capriciously and the Court is to examine, on a case-to-case basis whether sufficient grounds to award interim compensation are made out or not.
*** *** ***
8. The statement of objects and reasons of the NI (Amendment) Bill, which came to be enacted and CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 5 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:41 +0530 inserted the provision of s.143A would serve as a starting point for consideration. The same reads:
*** *** ***
9. The phrases 'delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers' & 'discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation' are quite ominous when considered in context. The legislature has, in its wisdom, delineated the problem and propounded the solution. Its interpretation and application to the facts of the case has been left to the Courts of law. The provisions inserted by the Amendment Act of 2018 have received interpretation by the various Hon'ble High Courts as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court. The vesting of discretion to award compensation in fit cases, to further advance the object of the Act must embrace its corollary, i.e., the Court must also see that frivolous or undeserving complainants do not get unduly enriched at the cost of a luckless victim.
*** *** ***
14. The upshot of the above discussion is that the defence of the Accused would constitute one of the factors in deciding an application u/s 143A. The aforesaid conclusion has been alluded to in the judgement of LGR Enterprises in Para 8 thereof wherein it is observed that "(the application u/s 143A could be allowed where) the enforceable debt or liability in a case, is borne out by overwhelming materials which the Accused person could not on the face of it deny or where the Accused person accepts the debt or liability partly". (emphasis supplied). As a corollary to the above proposition elucidated in LGR Enterprises, a strong, prima facie plausible plea of defence entered by the Accused may very well constitute a sufficient ground to reject the application u/s 143A. The judgement in JSB Cargo & Freight Forwarders Vs. State goes one step further and envisions consideration and admission/denial of documents (u/s 294 Cr.P.C:) brought forth by the Accused at the stage of deciding the application u/s 143A of the NI Act.
15. Perusal of the record reveals that a fit case for exercise of discretionary power to grant interim compensation to the Complainant is made out at this stage for the following reasons:
(a) The Accused No. 1 & 2 have taken the defence in the notice of accusation that the cheque in question was issued in blank to one Titan Nutrition pursuant to transaction in milk products with that concern and the Accused persons do not know as to how the cheque came CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 6 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:17:45 +0530 into the hands of the complainant. It is also stated that the liability qua Titan Nutrition was already discharged but no document/proof is forthcoming within the meaning of s. 294 Cr.P.C. as adverted to in the previous paragraphs. It is pertinent to note herein that the signature on the cheque was admitted by Accused No. 2.
(b) It is settled law that even a blank signed/inchoate instrument continues to be 'negotiable' and can be presented by any lawful payee for value after filling up the blanks and it is the defence which is to establish the absence of consideration/ liability. The statutory provisions of s.20, 118 and 139 of the Act will apply to the defence in full force and as such the defence plea appears to be prima facie considerably faint at this stage.
(c) If it was the case of the Accused persons that the complainant has misused the cheque in question, they did not even care to reply to the legal demand notice. It is also seen that despite due service of summons, the Accused persons did not enter appearance on the date fixed for hearing and have appeared only after non-bailable process was issued, which has caused a delay of almost 1 year and 4 months since the date of passing of the summoning order.
16. Accordingly, the present application hereby allowed in favour of the Complainant. The Accused No. 1, 2 are directed:
(a) Jointly and severally to pay a sum of Rs.
2,64,504.30/- being 10% of the amount under the cheques in question as interim compensation to the Complainant within 60 days from today. The quantum of 10% is being awarded keeping in mind the fact that the cheque in question is of a relatively large amount of Rs. 26 lakh and award of higher proportion may likely have an effect on the capacity of Accused persons to defend themselves in the proceedings.
(b) The said amount shall be refunded by the Complainant to the Accused in case the Accused is ultimately acquitted.
(c) Neither party shall take recovery of compensation as a ground to protract the trial..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Here it is further pertinent to reproduce the relevant CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 7 of 38 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:49 +0530 extracts of the separate order passed by the Ld. Trial Court on the aforesaid date, whereby while acquitting accused no. 3/Sh. Sanjiv Sharma, Ld. Trial Court noted as under;
"... Exemption application filed on behalf of the accused no. 2. Accepted for today.
At this stage, it is stated that under instruction from the complainant, the present matter is required to be withdrawn against accused no. 3 Sh. Sanjiv Sharma. Separate statement recorded. The said accused is hereby acquitted.
At this stage, the Ld. Counsel for the complainant has pressed his application under section 143 A of NI Act.
Considering that reply has not been filed by the accused no. 1 and despite due opportunity and the accused no. 3 is acquitted today, the Ld. Proxy counsel appearing for accused no. 1 and 2 was asked if the said application can be decided on the basis of pleadings. She is amenable to the proposition and the Ld. Counsel for the complainant also agrees to the same..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court in a mechanical manner and utter haste, without considering the material placed on record as well as without appreciating the correct facts and circumstances brought forth on record. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not even hear the arguments addressed on behalf CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 8 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:53 +0530 of the revisionists and passed the order in an extreme hurry, to the prejudice of the revisionists. In this regard, Ld. Counsel submitted that on 24.05.2023, the arguing counsel for the revisionists was engaged in a proceeding before the Hon'ble High Court, leading to the appearance on behalf of the revisionists having been made by 'proxy counsel' for the arguing counsel. Correspondingly, request for exemption was moved on behalf of revisionist no. 2, which was allowed by the Ld. Trial Court. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, despite the fact that neither the petitioners were present nor represented before the Ld. Trial Court on the said date, the Ld. Trial Court proceeded to decide respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A NI Act, without affording an opportunity of filing reply or without hearing the arguments by/on behalf of the revisionists. As per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court further erred in deciding respondent no. 2's application in the absence of the revisionists or their counsel, despite being fully aware that the Ld. Proxy counsel, who had entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court on the said date was not aware about anything of the merits of the present case. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, even the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the Ld. Proxy counsel for the revisionists was amenable to the proposition of the Ld. Trial Court deciding the matter on the basis of pleadings/records of the Ld. Trial Court is grossly erroneous and violative of the principles of natural justice. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Proxy counsel was not aware of the case and did not understand anything of the merits of the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court and was, as such, unauthorized to tender any concession on behalf of the revisionists. However, Ld. Counsel asserted that the said facts CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 9 of 38 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:17:57 +0530 were not considered by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, presuming for the sake of argument that the Ld. Proxy counsel, had in fact rightly entered appearance on behalf of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court, same in itself would not be sufficient to waive the right of the revisionists to contest an adverse financial directions passed by the Ld. Trial Court, which has serious civil and financial repercussions on the revisionists. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court was obligated to pass a reasoned order, which the Ld. Trial Court failed to deliver in the instant case.
3.1. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case put forth by respondent no. 2 and the revisionists' defence and pass the order in contravention of the factual scenario of the present case as well as settled law. As per the Ld. Counsel, had there been any real evaluation by the Ld. Trial Court to the said effect, the findings recorded under the impugned order would have been contrastingly different. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court, while recording its reasons for passing the impugned order, failed to appreciate that even at the time of framing of notice, the revisionists had specifically asserted that they have no dealing with respondent no. 2 and that the milk product was taken from one Titan Nutrition and not from respondent no. 2. Correspondingly, the revisionists asserted that the project in question was also issued to Titan Nutrition as blank cheque and that the revisionists were not aware as to how the cheque in question/dishonored cheque came into the possession of respondent no. 2. Ergo, Ld. Counsel asserted that the revisionists CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 10 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:18:00 +0530 had duly discharged their burden under law and were not liable towards respondent no. 2 in any manner, despite which as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court erroneously passed the order to the prejudice of the revisionists. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel asserted that the Ld. Trial Court passed impugned order in a mechanical manner, without considering the serious factual disputes raised by the revisionists, which go to the root of the present case. Further, no discussion or finding on the objections raised by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists were specified under the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that even for the sake of argument, presuming that Ld. Proxy counsel was competent to tender no objection on behalf of the revisionists, the impugned order ought to have been based on assessment of correct factual scenario and judicial dictate, which has not been carried out in the instant case. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further asserted that the perversity in the impugned order is so writ large that despite there being a clear parameter and settled law that presumption under Section 139 NI Act cannot by, in itself, be a sole ground to direct the payment of interim compensation and the question of applying the presumption will arise only at the trial, yet, the Ld. Trial Court has presumed the same to be of significance, which appear to have overweighed the Ld. Trial Court, in passing the impugned order. It is further submitted that the pleadings in the complaint and the material placed on record, demonstrate no prima facie case against the revisionists, the complainant itself, being not maintainable against the revisionists herein. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the said facts under the impugned order, while allowing the respondent no. 2's CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 11 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:04 +0530 application under Section 143A of the NI Act. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order is liable to set aside on this sole ground.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further contended that impugned order is bad in law and liable to be set aside. In this regard, Ld. Counsel emphatically argued that not only respondent no. 2 failed to place on record, any cogent evidence in support of his assertions in the complaint, rather, also in the light of the glaring contradictions, inconsistencies, concealment of facts and falsehood, the assertion of respondent no. 2 to bring home the point of commission of offence under Section 138 NI Act by the revisionists is far-fetched and totally inconceivable.
Ld. Counsel further vehemently asserted/reiterated that the provisions under Section 143A NI Act are discretionary and not mandatory in nature and the Ld. Trial Court was required to assess the defense of the revisionists, existence of a prima facie case as well as the relationship between the parties, while adjudicating on the said application. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, no such assessment was conducted by the Ld. Trial Court as notable under the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that, even otherwise, the complaint filed before the Ld. Trial Court is not maintainable as no notice as prescribed under law was served upon the revisionists and that the revisionists had duly raised their defence at the stage of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. that no such notice was received by them, which has not been considered by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further asserted that the fact that the revisionists had not filed documents evidencing that discharge of liability towards Titan Nutrition does not disentitle CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 12 of 38 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:18:08 +0530 them from bringing such evidence on record at an appropriate stage of trial. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order preempts the adjudication on the fact of non-issuance of any cheque by the revisionists to respondent no. 2, during the trial, besides the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order grossly prejudices the revisionists' defence. As per the Ld. Counsel, it is a settled law that mere non filing of the documents at an early stage does not preclude a party from relying on it at a later stage, especially in criminal proceedings where the right to fair trial is paramount. Ergo, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court not only in violation of the settled principles of law, besides the same is also not in tandem with the factual circumstances brought forth. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel prayed that the present revision petition may be allowed, and the impugned order may be set aside. In support of the said contentions, reliance has been placed upon the decision(s) in; M/s. JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v. State & Anr. Crl.MC 2663/2021, dated 20.12.2021 (DHC).
4. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that all the relevant facts and circumstances were duly considered by the Ld. Trial Court, besides the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, wary of the settled judicial precedents and the material brought forth on record. Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 further CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 13 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:12 +0530 submitted that no illegality/infirmity can be attributed to the impugned order, so as to subject the same to any interference by this Court under this Court's exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 further submitted that the entire case of the revisionists is premised on the fact that the revisionists were not afforded opportunity to present the case, however, the records of the Ld. Trial Court demonstrate otherwise. As per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists were well aware of the fact that respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A NI Act was pending adjudication before the Ld. Trial Court on 24.05.2023 and that the same was scheduled to be taken up for arguments as already five dates had lapsed whereby the revisionists had not filed/ submitted a reply to the said application. In particular, as per the Ld. Counsel, the records of the Ld. Trial Court clearly demonstrate that the said application was moved on behalf of respondent no. 2 on 02.08.2022, whereby notice of the said application was issued to the revisionists, followed by an opportunity to the revisionists to file the reply again on 13.09.2022. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel submitted that again the Ld. Trial Court had provided several opportunities to the revisionists vide its orders dated 11.01.2023 and 01.03.2023 to file reply to the said application, however, the revisionists deliberately failed to either file reply to the said application or to address their arguments. In this regard, it was further submitted that the revisionists on 24.05.2023, deliberately appeared through proxy counsel solely to delay and frustrate the process of law and in order to usurp the hard-earned money of respondent no. 2. Ergo, under such circumstances, the Ld. Trial Court was left with no option than to proceed with the CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 14 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:16 +0530 adjudication on the said application on the basis of material placed on record.
4.1. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was rightly passed by the Ld. Trial Court being cognizant of the settled law as well as legal provisions. In this regard, it was submitted by the Ld. Trial Court took a preliminary view of the criminal complaint, while applying its judicial discretion and determining on the respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A NI Act while passing the impugned order.
Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel asserted that the revisionists are trying to frustrate the essence of provisions under Section 143A NI Act, which is meant to deter/avoid undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonor cases. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists are trying to take advantage of their own wrong, besides, have provided no justification for their sheer negligence, disentitling them from claiming any relief or indulgence from this Court. It was further asserted that by means of the present revision petition, the revisionists are trying to endeavor to bring new facts as well as present new documents before this Court which can neither be permitted nor adjudicated by this Court at the present stage of revision. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists are trying to make contradictory stand in the present revision petition, in utter variance to their assertion at the time of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. In this regard, Ld. Counsel asserted that though revisionists had asserted before the Ld. Trial Court that they had no dealing with respondent no. 2 and that respondent no. 2 had misused the cheque in question, however, at the time of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. the revisionists CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 15 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:20 +0530 specifically asserted that the cheque was signed by revisionist no. 2 though the other particulars were not filled in by the said revisionist. Under such circumstances, Ld. Counsel submitted that the revisionists are precluded from denying their liability under Section 138 NI Act, especially when the law is settled that even a blank signed instrument continues to be negotiable and can be presented by any lawful payee for value after filling up the blanks and it is the defence which is to establish the absence of consideration/liability qua such cheque. 4.2. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the records of the Ld. Trial Court would clearly demonstrate that the revisionists, despite receipt of legal notice through the medium of courier as well as WhatsApp did not care to even reply to the said notice and even despite due service of summons, the revisionists deliberately omitted to appear before the Ld. Trial Court leading to issuance of non bailable warrants against them. As per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists have been protracting the trial proceeding on one or the other pretext disentitling them from claiming any indulgence from this Court. Ergo, Ld. Counsel reiterated that no interference is called for under the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court being cognizant of the facts of the present case, legal provisions and judicial precedents. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; LGR Enterprises & Ors. v. P. Anbazhagan, Crl. O.P. No. 15440/2019, dated 12.07.2019 (Mad.
HC) and Rajesh Aggarwal v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. Crl. Rev. P. No. 478/2011, (DHC).
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionists and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondents have been heard as CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 16 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:18:24 +0530 well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court record, written submissions filed by the parties and the case laws, relied, thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, as under;
"3971. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub- section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Significantly, from a perusal of the above, it is quite discernable that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a 1 Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; "438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation--All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 439.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding ...." (Emphasis supplied).
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case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied) CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 18 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:33 +0530
8. Analogously, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law2 that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality , "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312 , wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded the law, as under;
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings 2 Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP
958.
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of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence..."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, however, before proceeding with the assessment of the rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondent, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/NI Act, for the purpose(s) of the present discourse, as under;
"143A. Power to direct interim compensation-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under Section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant-
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of the cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 20 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:41 +0530 Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.
(5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Apropos the present discourse, this Court outrightly notes that the provision under Section 143A was inserted under the statute book/NI Act pursuant to the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2018, w.e.f. 01.09.2018. Relevantly, the objective behind the introduction of the said provision, was to reduce undue delay in disposal of cheque dishonour cases as well as to provide for temporary relief in the form of interim compensation to the complainant, in the interregnum. Reference in this regard is made to the relevant extract from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, as enumerated under the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017, as under;
"...2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The proposed amendments will strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce in general by allowing lending institutions, including banks, to continue to extend financing to the productive sectors of the economy.
3. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to provide, inter alia, for the following, namely:-
(i) to insert a new section 143A in the said Act to provide that the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 21 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:18:44 +0530 summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint, and in any other case, upon framing of charge. The interim compensation so payable shall be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque; ..."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. However, at this stage, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that notwithstanding the salutary object of Section 143A NI Act, i.e., an aid to ensure speedy disposal of the proceeding pending under Section 138 NI Act, the said provision has been persistently held by the superior courts3 to be 'directory' and 'not mandatory' in nature. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Ashwin Ashokrao Karokar v. Laxmikant Govind Joshi, WP (Crl.) No. 48/2022, dated 07.07.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while expressing similar sentimentalities, remarked as under;
"...9.4. Section 143-A of the N.I. Act, though enacted with an intent to ensure speedy disposal of the proceeding pending under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the said intent, insofar as Section143-A of the N.I. Act is concerned, does not make the provision mandatory, as what is conferred upon the Court by virtue of the said provision is a discretion to direct interim compensation and no right is created in the complainant under it, to demand the entitlement to compensation. Grant of interim compensation, would be at the discretion of the Court, based upon consideration of various factors, such as (a) whether the requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, were fulfilled (b) whether the pleadings disclose the drawing of the presumption (c) whether the proceedings were within limitation and (d) whether prima facie a legal debt or liability was disclosed from the complaint or the notice of demand preceding it, and factors as such [see: B.R. Upadhya and Anant H. Ulahalkar (supra)]..."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Clearly, it is seen from above that the discretion 3 JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder (P) Ltd. v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5425.
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under Section 143A of NI Act entails a judicial exercise, which the courts may exercise only upon consideration of various facts and circumstances. As a corollary, it is quite understandable that Ld. Magistrates/Ld. MMs/Ld. JMFCs, while exercising such discretion are bound to provide reasons/record brief reasons, indicating consideration of all relevant factors while granting or denying such interim compensation. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in L.G.R. Enterprises v. P. Anbazhagan, AIR Online 2019 Mad. 801: (2019) 3 Mad. LJ(Cri.) 423, wherein the Hon'ble Court accentuated the importance of a reasoned order under such cases, in the following terms;
"8. Therefore, whenever the trial Court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, it shall record reasons as to why it directs the accused person (drawer of the cheque) to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. The reasons may be varied. For instance, the accused person would have absconded for a longtime and thereby would have protracted the proceedings or the accused person would have intentionally evaded service for a long time and only after repeated attempts, appears before the Court, or the enforceable debt or liability in a case, is borne out by overwhelming materials which the accused person could not on the face of it deny or where the accused person accepts the debt or liability partly or where the accused person does not cross examine the witnesses and keeps on dragging with the proceedings by filing one petition after another or the accused person absconds and by virtue of a non-bailable warrant he is secured and brought before the Court after a long time or he files a recall non-bailable warrant petition after a long time and the Court while considering his petition for recalling the non-bailable warrant can invoke Section 143A(1) of the Act. This list is not exhaustive and it is more illustrative as to the various circumstances under which the trial Court will be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, by directing the accused person to pay the interim compensation of 20% to the complainant.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 23 of 38
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:18:56 +0530
9. The other reason why the order of the trial Court under Section 143A(1) of the Act, should contain reasons, is because it will always be subjected to challenge before this Court. This Court while considering the petition will only look for the reasons given by the Court below while passing the order under Section 143A(1) of the Act. An order that is subjected to appeal or revision, should always be supported by reasons. A discretionary order without reasons is, on the face of it, illegal and it will be set aside on that ground alone..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Significantly, this Court deems it further germane to refer to a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., Crl. Appeal No. 741/2024, dated 15.03.2024 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the contours, scope and ambit of the provisions under Section 143A of NI Act, observed as under;
"19. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows:
a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall."
b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors.
c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:
i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.
ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.
iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:00 +0530
iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive..."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, legal provisions and judicial dictates, when the facts of the present case are seen in conjunction with the arguments addressed by/on behalf of the revisionists and that of respondent(s)/respondent no. 2, this Court concurs with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order. In fact, this Court is also in agreement with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court that once the revisionist admitted his signatures on the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque, presumption4 under Section 118/139 of the NI Act came into play. Needless to mention that it is trite law the presumption envisioned under Section 139 NI Act not only pertains to the fact that the cheque in question was drawn in discharge of debt or liability, rather, also includes5 a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability at the time of such drawing. Indisputably 6, the burden to rebut the presumption lies on the revisionists herein, by establishing probable defence, which can be only done during the trial by the revisionists' either leading evidence/defence evidence or from the material placed on record by the 4 Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148; and Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.
5S. Natarajan v. Sama Dharman, (2021) 6 SCC 413.
6Rajaram v. Maruthachalam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 48.
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:04 +0530
complainant/respondent no. 2. Correspondingly, it is seen from a conscientious perusal of the impugned order that while allowing respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A of NI Act, the Ld. Trial Court not only considered the facts and circumstances brought forth on record by respondent no. 2 and the revisionists, rather, also of the objective behind the introduction of the said provision under the statute books and awarded a compensation to a tune of 10% (ten percent) of the cheque amount/dishonoured cheque amount. As aforenoted, the objective behind the introduction of the provisions under Section 143A NI Act under the statute books was premised/aimed to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases, "so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money." Ergo, in said context, in the considered opinion of this Court, Ld. Trial Court was well within its right to note the conduct of the revisionists as well as the delay occasioned in the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, wherein the appearance of the revisionists could only be ensured once bailable warrants were issued against the revisionists by the Ld. Trial Court. In fact, in this regard, even this Court records that from a conscientious perusal of the records it is noted that the summons qua the revisionists were issued by the Ld. Trial Court on 24.03.2021. However, subsequently, under the order dated 18.10.2021, Ld. Trial Court duly noted that the tracking report filed by/on behalf of the complainant, reflected that the summons were duly served on the revisionists, despite which, the revisionists failed to enter appearance before the Ld. Trial Court, leading to the issuance of bailable warrants against them.
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2025.08.13 16:19:08 +0530 Needless to further mention that since the revisionists/accused continued to absent themselves before the Ld. Trail Court, non- bailable warrants were issued against them on 08.04.2022 and it was only subsequent thereto, the revisionists entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court on 12.07.2022. Clearly, in light of the foregoing, no error/irregularity in the observation of the Ld. Trial Court can be attributed by this Court, recording the conduct of the revisionists under the impugned order, considering the objective behind the introduction of provisions under Section 143A NI Act it to provide temporary respite to the payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation. On the other hand, even in the considered opinion of this Court, the conduct of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court suggests adoption of delaying tactics on the part of the revisionists, which is one of the determining factors, while dealing with an application under Section 143A of NI Act.
16. Congruently, it is seen from a scrupulous analysis of the impugned order that the Ld. Trial Court, while directing the revisionist to deposit/pay the interim compensation amount, duly reflected on the defence(s) raised by the revisionist , i.e., to the effect that the dishonoured cheque/cheque in question was issued in blank to one, Titan Nutrition pursuant to transaction in milk products with the said concern and that the revisionists were no aware as to how the said cheque landed in the hand of respondent no. 2. In this regard, this Court deems it further pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the relevant extracts of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. framed against the revisionists, wherein the revisionists inter alia proclaimed as under;
"...Q. Do you plead guilty or have any defence to make?
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2025.08.13 16:19:12 +0530 A. (Accused no. 2) I do not plead guilty. I claim trial...
*** *** *** Q. Do you admit your signature on the cheques in question?
A. (Accused no. 2) Yes. The cheques in question had been signed by me...
Q. Did you fill the other particulars on the cheques in question including date, name of payee and amount?
A. (Accused no. 2) No...
*** *** *** Q. Do you have anything else to say? A. (Accused no. 2) My plea of defence is that I have no dealing with the complainant. I had taken milk products from Titan Nutrition and not the complainant. The cheque in question was issued as undated and blank signed in favour of Titan Nutrition. I do not know how the cheque in question has come into the possession of the complainant. I am not liable under the cheque in question. I have already discharged my liability towards the cheque in question..."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Clearly, it is seen from above that revisionist no. 2, at the time of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. duly admitted the issuance of cheque in question/dishonoured cheque from his bank account, besides, revisionist no. 2 also admitted, his signatures on the cheque in question. However, the defence raised by/on behalf of the revisionists was that the cheque in question was issued in favour of one Titan Nutrition as blank signed cheques, with whom, the revisionists had dealing. Correspondingly, the revisionists asserted that they had already cleared their liability towards Titan Nutrition and that they were not aware as to how the cheque in question, landed in the hand of respondent no. 2. Needless to mention, the revisionists/revisionist no. 2 further proclaimed that they/he owed nothing towards respondent no. 2. In this regard, it is apposite to note that the onus of proving the defence that the cheque was issued as blank CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 28 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:19:16 +0530 signed cheque/security and that too in favour of one Titan Nutrition was on the revisionists. Clearly, no material to the said effect/in support of the said defence has been brought on record of the Ld. Trial Court at the said stage and that the same could be determined only during the course of trial. Correspondingly, in the considered opinion of this Court, further plea/defence of the revisionists that the cheque in question was issued as blank signed cheque, entailing no liability on the revisionist fails to impress even this Court, especially when the law is settled that filling of particulars of cheque by any person, other than the drawer does not invalidate the cheque and the liability under Section 138 NI Act/presumption under Section 139 NI Act would still be attracted under such situation(s), when the signatures on the cheque in question is duly admitted by the drawer/accused. Reference in this regard is made to decision in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under;
"33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.
*** *** *** CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 29 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:19:19 +0530
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act , in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, mere blatant assertion of the revisionists that the cheque in question was issued as a blank signed instrument, dodging any criminal liability against the revisionist, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not come to the aid of the revisionist at this stage. On the contrary, this Court is in agreement with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order that statutory presumptions under Sections 118 NI Act and Section 139 NI Act would apply with full force and the defence plea of the revisionists appears to be prima facie bleak at this stage.
19. At this stage, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that the revisionists have zealously contested the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, in violation of principles of natural justice. In particular, Ld. Counsel for the revisionists contended that neither an opportunity was granted to the revisionists to file a reply to respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A NI Act nor the revisionists afforded opportunity to address arguments, leading to violation of ' audi alteram partem7' rule. However, upon a conscientious perusal of the material placed on record, this Court finds itself difficult to concede with the submissions made by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to observe that it is seen from the records of the Ld. Trial Court that the instant application under Section 143A NI Act was moved by/on behalf 7 Latin phrase meaning, 'let the other side be heard as well'.
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13
16:19:23 +0530
of respondent no. 2 on 02.08.2022. Thereafter on 13.09.2022, the Ld. Trial Court, while inter alia framing notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. against the revisionists and accused no. 3, adjourned the matter to 11.01.2023, for reply and arguments on the said application. Subsequently, on 11.01.2023, request for exemption was moved on behalf of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court and the matter for the date was again adjourned to 01.03.2023 on the inability of Ld. Counsel for accused no. 3 to await a Passover. However, even on 11.01.2023, the Ld. Trial Court, adjourned the matter to 01.03.2023 for reply and arguments on the said application. Thereafter, again on 01.03.2023, matter was adjourned to 24.05.2023 for the said purpose. Needless to mention that despite aforesaid adjournments, no reply to respondent no. 2's instant application was filed by/on behalf of the revisionist. In fact, it is seen from the records of the Ld. Trial Court that even on 01.03.2023, appearance was entered by revisionist no. 2 before the Ld. Trial Court only during the post lunch session, when the matter had already been adjourned for 24.05.2023. Significantly, despite being aware of the purpose for which the matter was listed for 24.05.2023, revisionist no. 2, again requested for an exemption, which was permitted by the Ld. Trial Court. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, opted to enter appearance before the Ld. Trial Court through Ld. Proxy Counsel and the said counsel conceded that respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A NI Act, may be determined on the basis of material placed on record.
20. Relevantly, as aforenoted, Ld. Counsel for the revisionists asserted that due to his engagement before the CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 31 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:19:27 +0530 Hon'ble High Court he could not appear before the Ld. Trial Court on 24.05.2023, when the impugned order came to be passed. However, notwithstanding such absence of the Ld. Counsel, it is observed from a scrupulous analysis of the impugned order that the Ld. Trial Court considered all the submissions, assertions, averments, defence and plea, while determining respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A NI Act and passed a reasoned order only after considered all the said contentions. Needless to mention that even under the instant revision petition, no fresh averments/contentions have been raised by/on behalf of the revisionists, which have not already been dealt with the Ld. Trial Court, under the impugned order. Ergo, under such circumstances, this Court reiterates that it is not convinced with the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice, in particular, that of 'audi alteram partem' rule. On the contrary, in this regard, this Court deems it apposite here to make a reference to the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in M/s. Brahma Maintenance Private Limited v. The Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum & Ors. CWP-34815- 2024, dated 13.01.2025: 2025:PHHC:010259, wherein the Hon'ble Court, whilst being confronted with an akin situation, noted as under;
"10. The doctrine of audi alteram partem, cannot be used to cure the self-suffered wound, specifically, by those persons who are sitting on the fence. From the facts above, it is vividly postulated, that the petitioner-firm was very much aware about the proceedings pending before respondent no.1-Forum, as the principal of the petitioner-firm had already responded to the pendency proceedings. Therefore, this Court can safely conclude that the petitioner-firm was very well aware about the pendency of the instant proceedings. However, with an oblique CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 32 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.08.13 16:19:32 +0530 motive to create a defence at the appellate stage, immediately after culmination of proceedings before the authority concerned, he approached this Court and raised hue and cry about violation of the principle of natural justice."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Unmistakably, it is seen from above that the Hon'ble High Court in the aforenoted dictate unambiguously noted that the doctrine of audi alteram partem, cannot be used to cure the self-suffered wound, akin as the one, confronted before this Court, disentitling the revisionists to agitate any plea of violation of natural justice at this stage. Needless to reiterate that considering the objective of insertion of provisions under Section 143A NI Act under the statute books; persistently dilatory conduct of the revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court, as demonstrable from the records of Ld. Trial Court; as well as being wary that all the contentions of the revisionists were duly considered under the impugned order by the Ld. Trial Court and that the revisionists have not raised any plea before this Court in the instant revision petition, other than that already considered under the impugned order, in the considered opinion of this Court, the revisionists' plea of violation of principles of natural justice, does not appeal to the senses of this Court.
22. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists as well as by Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2, this Court unambiguously reaches a conclusion that all the considerations for exercising the discretion under Section 143A of the NI Act were duly dealt with by the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order. Needless to mention that all the points and CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 33 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:19:36 +0530 contentions of the revisionists and that of respondent no. 2 were duly dealt with by the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned order and no new grounds/contentions, other than those which have not already been considered under the impugned order, have been raised by the revisionists in the instant petition. In fact, there is nothing to show that the Ld. Trial Court committed any illegality and/or impropriety while passing the impugned order or that the Ld. Trial Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously and perversely. Needless to reiterate that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order duly considered the objective behind the said provision, establishment of a prima facie case by respondent no. 2 in the instant case, besides duly considered the material placed on record by respondent no. 2 and the revisionists as well as analyzed the plausibility of the defence raised by the revisionists before the Ld. Trial Court. At the same time, upon determination of/conclusion of case in favour of respondent no. 2 for the grant of interim compensation, Ld. Trial Court also applied its mind to the quantum of interim compensation awarded, i.e., 10% (ten percent) of the cheque amount/dishonoured cheque amount, in the instant case.
23. As a concluding remark, this Court deems it apposite to note that against the order dated 24.05.2023/impugned order, passed by the Ld. Trial Court, the instant criminal revision petition was preferred only on 21.09.2023, with a delay of 30 (thirty) days. Apposite to outrightly note that as per Article 131 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Limitation Act'), limitation of 90 (ninety) days from the date of the order, sought to be challenged has been prescribed as the statutory CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 34 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:19:40 +0530 period of limitation. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia provides for condonation of delay/extension of prescribed period in certain cases on demonstration of ' sufficient cause'. Pertinently, under application seeking condonation of delay, accompanying the instant petition, the revisionists, inter alia asserted as under;
"...2. That on 24.05.2023, the counsel for the accused was appearing before High Court so the poxy counsel attend the matter before the Ld. MM but the proxy counsel could not understand the order and she only convey the next date of hearing to the main counsel and initially the fact could not come in the knowledge of the main counsel that the Ld. MM had allowed the application of the respondent no. 2 and directed the petitioner to pau the amount of Rs. 2,64,504.30/- 10% of the cheque amount to the respondent no. 2.
3. That on 24.08.2023 when an application was filed by the counsel for the respondent no. 2 for issuance of warrant of attachment against the accused/petitioner herein then only on first time the fact came in the knowledge of the counsel for accused/petitioner that an order was passed on the application u/s. 143A NI Act in favour of the complainant.
4. That due to the above said reason he could not file the criminal revision petition in time and there is delay of 27 days..."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Significantly, it is noted from the records, the statutory prescribed period of limitation, i.e., 90 days period of preferring criminal revision petition against the impugned order dated 24.05.2023, expired on 22.08.2023. However, as aforenoted, the instant revision petition was e-filed only on 21.09.2023. As per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionists came to know of the passing of the impugned order only on 24.08.2023, whereupon delay of 27 days occurred. However, even upon conscientious perusal of the said application, seeking CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 35 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:19:44 +0530 condonation of delay, this Court unmistakably records that the said application has not only been drafted in an extremely casual manner, rather, the correct period of delay, sought to be condoned or the reasons leading to delay in filing only on 21.09.2023, presuming that the revisionists came to be aware of the impugned order only on 24.08.2023, are not forthcoming with precision. Undoubtedly, this Court is conscious of the repeated avowals of the superior courts that there is no presumption under law8 that the delay in approaching courts was deliberate on the part of the litigant and that the courts are advised to adopt a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented approach, in variance to, technical interpretation while considering an entreaty for condonation of delay. However, the superior courts have also persistently avowed9 that an application for condonation of delay, "should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system." As a corollary, application for condonation of delay, which is drafted in an extremely casual manner so as to even be bereft of material particulars, besides failing to disclose sufficient cause such as a bald statement of a party's taking of opinion from some counsel, cannot, in the considered opinion of this Court be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Needless to reiterate that the correct period of delay, sought to be condoned or the reasons leading to delay in filing only on 21.09.2023, presuming that the revisionists came to be aware of the impugned order only on 24.08.2023, are not 8 J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1082.9
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649.
CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 36 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.08.13 16:19:48 +0530
forthcoming with precision in the said application, so as to convince this Court to grant any indulgence in favour of the revisionists even on this count.
25. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unswervingly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial Court did not commit any illegality and/or impropriety under the impugned order, while allowing respondent no. 2's application under Section 143A of NI Act, in light of the facts and circumstances, arguments addressed, documents and the material placed on record, as well as judicial dictates, directing the revisionists to pay/deposit 10% (ten percent) of the amount of the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque to respondent no. 2 as interim compensation. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court the present revision petition deserves to be dismissed as devoid of merits as well as on limitation and is hereby dismissed. As a corollary, the order dated 24.05.2023, passed by Ld. MM-06 (NI Act), Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case bearing; 'Creamy County v. Adarsh Tea and Food Products, CC No. 4296/2020', arising out of a complaint under Section 138/142 of NI Act is hereby upheld/affirmed. Apposite at this stage to further note that, though, this Court holds highest regard for the decision(s) relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, however, the same would not, in the considered opinion of this Court come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth by the revisionists in the manner as prayed, as the facts and circumstances of the present case are clearly, distinguishable.
26. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court, with directions to proceed as per law. Needless to mention, nothing stated herein CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 37 of 38 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13 16:19:52 +0530 shall tantamount to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
27. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.08.13
16:19:57
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 13.08.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR No. 517/2023 M/s. Adarsh Tea & Food Products & Anr. v. State & Anr. Page No. 38 of 38