Gujarat High Court
Amrutlal Laljibhai Thakkar vs State Of Gujarat & on 25 March, 2013
Author: R.M.Chhaya
Bench: R.M.Chhaya
AMRUTLAL LALJIBHAI THAKKARV/SSTATE OF GUJARAT R/CR.MA/14447/2012 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 14447 of 2012 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.M.CHHAYA Sd/- ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? NO 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? NO 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? NO 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? NO 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? NO ================================================================ AMRUTLAL LALJIBHAI THAKKAR & 2....Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR JAL SOLI UNWALA, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 3 MR HITESH S PADHYA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MS MOXA THAKKAR, APP. for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.M.CHHAYA Date : 25/03/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr. Jal Soli Unwala, learned Advocate for the applicants, Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned APP. for respondent State and Mr. Hitesh Padhya, learned Advocate for respondent no.2 the first informant.
2. By way of this application u/S 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code for the sake of brevity), the applicants have prayed for quashing the FIR registered with Dariapur Police Station, District Ahmedabad being CR No. I-45 of 2010 for the alleged offences u/Ss. 476, 420 and 114 of IPC. Mr. Unwala, learned Counsel appearing for the applicants has submitted that applicants and respondent no.2 - the first informant have amicably settled their dispute. Mr. Unwala further submitted that as the parties have amicably settled the dispute the impugned FIR would amount to harassment to the applicants. Mr. Unwala further submitted that in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties the trial would be futile and hence, this is a fit case and this Court would be pleased to exercise its inherent power u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned APP. has candidly submitted that as the parties have amicably settled the dispute this Court may pass appropriate order.
Mr. Hitesh Padhya, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 the first informant has tendered an affidavit of respondent no.2 the first informant and the same is taken on record. Mr. Padhya has submitted that as averred in the affidavit, the parties have amicably settled the dispute and reiterated the contentions raised by Mr. Unwala, learned Advocate for the applicants.
5. This Court (Coram : Hon ble Mr. Justice K.M. Thaker) on 7.3.2013 while admitting the matter has passed the following order :
Heard learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties.
2. In present petition, the petitioners have prayed that:-
6(b) To quash the impugned FIR at Annexure A being I CR No.45 of 2010 filed before the Dariapur Police Station, Dist. Ahmedabad by invoking the powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 1973.
2.1 In present petition, the impugned FIR is for the alleged offence under Sections 476, 420 and 114 of the IPC.
3. Mr. Unwala, learned advocate for the petitioners, has submitted that the alleged offence is purely a dispute of personal nature. He also submitted that subsequently, the petitioners and private respondent complainant have arrived at settlement and in view of the said settlement between the parties, the respondent No.2 complainant, now, does not want to prosecute the impugned FIR further and is satisfied with the said settlement.
Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent No.2, has confirmed the said statement and also tendered affidavit dated 2.3.2013 said to have been made by the respondent No.2 complainant Sunilbhai Mohanbhai Patel. Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent No.2, in light of the said affidavit dated 2.3.2013, submitted that the respondent No.2 complainant now does not want to prosecute the complaint further.
The affidavit dated 2.3.2013 is taken on record.
5. In view of aforesaid submission and statement by learned counsel for the parties, below mentioned order is passed.
5.1 Rule returnable on 25.3.2013. Mr. H.L.Jani, learned APP, and Mr. Padhya, learned advocate, waive service of rule for the respondent No.1 and 2 respectively.
5.2 In the meanwhile and until the returnable date, ad-interim relief in terms of para 6(c) is granted, in view of the joint submission by learned advocates for the petitioner and respondent No.2 that the matter is settled.
5.3 On the returnable date, it would be open to the parties to request the Court (where final hearing of petitions under Section 482 of the Code is assigned as per present roster) to take up the matter for early or final hearing.
6. Considering the aforesaid, therefore, it transpires from the record of the application that the parties have amicably settled the dispute.
7. The Hon ble Apex Court in case of Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.
reported in 2013(1) GLR 65 wherein the Hon ble Apex Court has observed thus :
7. The only question for consideration before this Court at this stage is that inasmuch as all those offences are not compoundable offences under Sec. 320 of the Code, (except Sec. 420 of I.P.C. that too with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending), whether it would be possible to quash the F.I.R. by the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Code or by this Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India ?
8) The above question was recently considered by this Court in Shiji @ Pappu & Ors. vs. Radhika & Anr. (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (AIR 2012 SC 499). The question posed in that case was "Whether the criminal proceedings in question could be quashed in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the settlement that the parties had arrived at." After adverting to Section 482 of the Code and various decisions, this Court concluded as under:
"17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Sec. 320 Cr.P.C. is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand, and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Sec. 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Sec. 320 Cr.P.C.
18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Sec. 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked."
9) On going through the factual details, earlier decision, various offences under Sec. 320 of the Code and invocation of Sec. 482 of the Code, we fully concur with the said conclusion. In the case on hand, irrespective of the earlier dispute between Respondent No.2-the complainant and the appellant being accused No.3 as well as accused Nos.1 and 2 subsequently and after getting all the materials, relevant details etc., the present appellant (accused No. 3) sworn an affidavit with bona fide intention securing the right, title and interest in favour of Respondent No.2-herein the Complainant. In such bona fide circumstances, the power under Sec. 482 may be exercised. Further, in view of the settlement arrived at between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the appellant (accused No. 3), there is no chance of recording a conviction insofar as the present appellant is concerned and the entire exercise of trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. Inasmuch as the matter has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view that the High Court, by exercising the inherent power under Sec. 482 of the Code even in offences which are not compoundable under Sec. 320, may quash the prosecution. However, as observed in Shiji [2011(10)SCC 705 : AIR 2012 SC 499], the power under Sec. 482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing, but an abuse of the process of law. In other words, the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.
8. It would also be advantageous at this stage to refer to the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State (2012) 10 SCC 303 wherein it has been observed thus :
56.
It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.
57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx 61. The
position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
9. Having heard the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties, considering the facts and circumstances arising out of the present application as well as considering the decisions rendered in the cases of Shiji Alias Pappu & Ors. Vs. Radhika & Anr. (2011) 10 SCC 705, Jagdish Chanana & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr., 2008(2) GLH 53, Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., reported in 2009(1) GLH 31, Manoj Sharma Vs. State & Ors., 2009(1) GLH 190, Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.,(supra), Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, 2008(4) SCC 582 it appears that further continuation of criminal proceedings in relation to the impugned FIR against the applicants-original accused would be unnecessary harassment to the applicants and the trial would be futile and would also amount to abuse of process of law and Court and hence, to secure the ends of justice, the impugned FIR is required to be quashed in exercise of power u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the present application is allowed. The impugned FIR registered with Dariapur Police Station, District Ahmedabad being CR No. I-45 of 2010 for the alleged offences u/Ss. 476, 420 and 114 of IPC as well as other consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR are hereby quashed.
11. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
Sd/-
(R.M.CHHAYA, J.) M.M.BHATT Page 13 of 13