Karnataka High Court
Deepak A vs State By on 22 September, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 1343 OF 2024 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
BETWEEN:
1. DEEPAK A,
S/O ANNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
NO. 1251, 34-G CROSS,
26TH MAIN, 4TH T BLOCK,
JAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 041.
2. VINAY GOWDA A,
S/O ANNAPPA,
AGED 36 YEARS,
R/AT NO.153, 4TH T BLOCK,
Digitally signed OPP SANJAYANDHI HOSPITAL,
by SAMREEN
AYUB THILAKANAGAR,
DESHNUR BANGALORE SOUTH,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF JAYANAGAR,
KARNATAKA BENGALURU - 560 041.
DHARWAD
BENCH
3. SRI ANNAPPA,
S/O LATE NANJAPPA,
AGED 66 YEARS,
NO. 1251, 32-G CROSS,
26TH MAIN, 4TH T BLOCK,
JAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 041.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. D.R. RAVI SHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI K.RAVISHANKAR,ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1. STATE
BY THILAKANAGAR POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. MISS KAYALA KATHLEEN KUMAR,
D/O. LATE DR. S. KRISHNA KUMAR,
AGED 35 YEARS,
R/AT NO 1107,
LAURENT STREET
SANTA CRUZ, CALIFRONIA,
USA - 950 060
PRESENTLY AT
NO. 3, 3RD FLOOR,
CISRS BUILDING,
MILLERS ROAD,
BENSON TOWN,
BENGALURU - 560 046.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K.NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R1
SMT. VANI H., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRL.P. IS FILED U/S.482 CRPC PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR
AND COMPLAINANT LODGED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IN
CR.NO.13/2024 REGISTERED BY THILAKNAGAR POLICE WHICH IS
PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 37TH ADDL.C.M.M COURT NRUPATUNGAR
RAOD, BENGALURU AGAINST THE PETITIONERS FOR THE OFFENCE
P/U/S 34,420,467,468,470,471 OF IPC.
THIS PETITION IS BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 11.07.2025
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CAV ORDER
In this petition, petitioners - accused Nos. 1 to 3 seek
quashing of the impugned complaint and FIR registered as Crime
No.13/2024 dated 30.01.2024 before the 1st respondent - police
authorities and for other reliefs.
2. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that on
18.01.2024, the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant filed the
impugned complaint against the petitioners - accused 1 to 3,
Arokiadas - accused No.4, Dhiraj Jain - accused No.5 and Ashok
- accused No.6 interalia alleging that she was the daughter and
beneficiary under a Will dated 21.08.2014 executed by her father
Dr.S.Krishna Kumar in her favour in relation to various properties
including House No.1251, 32nd 'G' cross, 4th 'T' block, Jayanagar,
Bangalore - 41, comprising of 1 unit in the ground floor and 3 units
in the first floor. It was alleged that all the accused persons
colluded with each other and fraudulently, forged and created an
alleged power of attorney dated 31.05.2022 alleged to have been
executed by the aforesaid Dr.S.Krishna Kumar in favour of accused
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No.4 - Arokiadas, which was a forged and fabricated document
and that on the basis of the said illegal and invalid GPA, the
accused persons fraudulently colluded with each other and
concocted / created an alleged lease deed dated 25.11.2022 in
favour of petitioners - accused Nos. 1 to 3 which was also a got
up, illegal and invalid document. It was therefore requested by the
2nd respondent - complainant to the 1st respondent - police
authorities to take necessary action against the petitioners and
other accused persons.
3. In pursuance of the aforesaid complaint, the 1st
respondent - police authorities registered the impugned FIR in
Crime No.13/2024 against the petitioners - accused 1 to 3 as well
as accused Nos.4 to 6 for alleged offences punishable under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 470 and 471 of IPC, aggrieved by which,
petitioners - accused Nos.1 to 3 are before this Court by way of the
present petition.
4. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioners and
learned HCGP for 1st respondent - State as well as learned counsel
for 2nd respondent and perused the material on record.
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5. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior
counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the impugned
complaint and FIR in order to point out that necessary ingredients
constituting the alleged offences have not been made out by the
petitioner. It was submitted that during the lifetime of late
Dr.S.Krishna Kumar, father of 2nd respondent - complainant, he had
executed a special power of attorney dated 31.05.2002 in favour of
accused No.4 - Arokiadas, pursuant to which, the said accused
No.4 executed a lease agreement dated 25.11.2022 in favour of
petitioner No.1 - accused No.1 in respect of the ground floor and 2
units in first floor, since the petitioners were already occupying the
ground floor as tenants under the said Dr.S.Krishna Kumar. It was
submitted that the said Dr.S.Krishna Kumar not only had full
knowledge of these transactions but had voluntarily executed the
said power of attorney and received a sum of Rs.10 lakhs from the
petitioners towards the lease of the property in their favour and as
such, the impugned complaint being false and nullitious filed after
the life time of Dr.S.Krishna Kumar, deserves to be quashed. It was
further submitted that the 2nd respondent is attempting to give a
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criminal colour to a civil dispute and the complaint and the FIR
deserves to be quashed.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for 2nd respondent and
learned HCGP for 1st respondent submit that the complaint clearly
makes out and discloses not only the commission of the offences
by the petitioners - accused Nos.1 to 3 but also contains the
necessary ingredients constituting the offences and the various
contentions urged by the petitioners and the 2nd respondent would
necessarily have to be examined by the 1st respondent - police
authorities during investigation and as such, there is no merit in the
petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
8. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is
an undisputed fact that late Dr.S.Krishna Kumar, father of 2nd
respondent was the owner of the aforesaid residential house
comprising of 1 unit in the ground floor and 3 units in the 1st floor; it
is also not in dispute that vide lease deed dated 01.09.2019, the
said Dr.S.Krishna Kumar leased out the ground floor portion / unit
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in favour of petitioner No.1, while 2 units in the first floor were
leased out in favour of other tenants and the 3rd unit was retained
by late Dr.S.Krishna Kumar; subsequently, during the Covid-19
pandemic period, the tenants of the 1st floor vacated and all the 3
units on the first floor remained vacant during that time. According
to the petitioners, late Dr.S.Krishna Kumar who expired on
24.10.2023 had not executed any document or alleged power of
attorney in favour of accused No.4 - Arokiadas and the alleged
lease deed dated 25.11.2022 alleged to have been executed by
Arokiadas in favour of petitioner No.1 and the power of attorney
dated 31.05.2022 alleged to have been executed by Dr.S.Krishna
Kumar in favour of accused No.4 - Arokiadas were fabricated,
bogus, fake, fraudulent, concocted, got up and illegal documents,
the petitioners have relied upon these documents in support of their
claim. In this context, it would be necessary to extract the
complaint averments, which are as under:-
From:- Date:-18/01/2024
Miss. Kayla Kathleen Kumar,
D/o. late Dr. S Krishna Kumar,
Aged about 35 years,
Permanent resident of
No. 1107, Laurent Street,
Santa Cruz, California, USA-95060
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Presently residing at No. 73, 3rd Floor,
CISRS Building, Millers Road,
Benson Town, Bengalore-560046
To,
The Commissioner of Police
Bangalore City,
No. 1, Infantry Road
Bangalore-560001.
Respected sir,
Sub:- Complaint against (1) Sri. Vinay Gowda, (2)
Sri. Annappa, (3) Sri. Deepak Gowda, (4)
Mr.Arokia Dass & others for creating and
forging General Power of Attorney referredto
in the registered lease deed dated
25.11.2022 and on the basis of the
forged/created Power of Attorney getting
lease deed dated 25/11/2022 executed
showing fictitious consideration in respect of
property bearing house No. 1251, having PID
No. 58-183-31, situated at 32nd 'G' Cross, 4th
'T' Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore-560
004which was owned and possessed by Dr.
S. Krishna Kumar, S/o. Sri G Sarangan.
I would bring to the kind notice of the Hon'ble
Commissioner the following facts for immediate and
appropriate action under the Indian Laws;
I am the third child of Dr. S Krishna Kumar, S/o.
Sri. G Sarangan, and I am the beneficiary under the Will
dated 21/08/2014 registered as Document No. HLS-3-
00087/2014-15, Book-3, Stored in CD No. HSD 104, in
the office of the Sub-Registrar, Shivajinagar (Ulsoor),
Bangalore, executed by my father.
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My father Dr.S. Krishna Kumar, S/o. Sri. G.
Sarangan was the absolute owner in possession and
enjoyment of the immovable property bearing house No.
1251, having PID No. 58-183-31, situated at 32nd 'G'
Cross, 4th 'T' Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore-560041, and
my father had constructed a house consisting of 4 units
one in the ground floor and three in the first floor.
That my father by retaining one small unit for
himself had let out the ground floor to Sri. Vinay Gowda,
S/o. Sri Annappa whose cell number is 73497 77779 and
his father Sri Annappas' cell number is 9342883209vide
Lease deed dated 01/09/2016 for a period of 11 months
and the term of the said lease was being extended from
time to time as per the request of Sri. Vinay Gowda, who
was residing in the said ground floor premises along with
his wife, children, his parents and younger brother Sri.
Deepak. A.
That the remaining two portions in the first floor
were let out favouring other two tenants, who later
vacated the premises just before the onset of Covid-19
pandemic and thereafter the two portions were lying
vacant.
That Sri. Vinay Gowda was paying rentals
regularly up to the pandemic and thereafter, started
delaying the payments for about 10 months and did not
make any attempt to pay the rentals or to renew the lease
deed. Hence, my father Dr. S. Krishna Kumar, got issued
a legal notice dated 16/10/2021 to Sri VinayGowda
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demanding payment of arrears of rentals and to vacate
the schedule premises immediately. However, due the ill
health of my father and his immobility, he could not file a
case before the jurisdictional court.
Please be informed that my father Dr.S Krishna
Kumar, had moved out of the house during 2021 and was
living at an organization providing assisted living facilities.
Neither Sri. Vinay Gowda nor any of his family members
knew about my father's stay at an Assisted Living.
My father Dr. S Krishna Kumarexpired on
24/10/2023 at Manipal Hospitals on account of ill health,
leaving behind the aforesaid registered will bequeathing
the aforesaid property in my favour and as such I have
succeeded to the estate of my father in terms of the
aforesaid will.
Please note that in terms of the registered will
executed by my father, I came to Bangalore to get the
khatha transferred and complete the other legal
formalities. I had applied for the encumbrance certificate
in respect of said property and verification of the same to
my shock and surprise, I noticed that one Mr. Arokia
Dass, S/o. JemesDass, claiming to be the Power of
Attorney holder of my father has executed and registered
the Lease Deed dated 25/11/2022 favouring Sri. Deepak.
A, S/o. Sri. Annappa, in respect of above said property
bearing house No.1251, which is registered as Document
No.BMH-1-08268/2022-23 stored in CD No. BMHD 1794
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of Volume 1 at the office of the Sub-Registrar,
Bommanahalli, Bangalore.
Please be informed that my father had appointed
Smt. Vani.H as his Attorney holder as per Power of
Attorney dated 02.11.2017 for the purposes specified
therein and there were no other Power of Attorneys
executed by my father in favour of anyone else.
Please be informed that on further verification, I
learnt that the said Mr. ArokiaDasswas neither known to
my father Dr. S Krishna Kumar or to his power of attorney
holder Smt. Vani. H. The power of attorney referred to in
the Lease Deed is forged and created by and for the
benefit of Sri. Vinay Gowda, Sri. Annappa and Sri.
Deepak. A jointly by playing fraud for the purpose of
getting registration of lease deed dated 25/11/2022
executed favouring Sri. Deepak A, S/o. Sri. Annappa, in
respect of above said property bearing house No. 1251,
showing fictitious consideration only with a view to knock
off the aforesaid property and for making illegal gains. I
strongly believe that the alleged General Power of
Attorney favouring Mr.ArokiaDass, S/o. JemesDass is
also created by the aforesaid tenant and his family
members with an ulterior motive.
Please be informed that, I have verified the
documents and the bank account statements left by my
father and found that neither the rentals nor the security
deposit specified in the alleged lease deed have been
deposited to my father's account. Please also note that
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the rentals agreed to be paid by Sri. Vinay Gowda in
respect of ground floor premises were itself much more
than the rentals specified in the forged lease deed dated
25/11/2022 for the entire residential premises consisting
of 3 units and when I visited the residential premises on
11.01.2023in the forenoon, I was not permitted to inspect
the house.
The aforesaid persons have forged my father's
signature and created a fake Power of Attorney and on
the basis of said created Power of Attorney have got the
Lease deed dated 25/11/2022 executed showing fictitious
consideration only with a view to knock off the aforesaid
property and make illegal gains. Rentals have not been
paid since three years either by Sri Vinay Gowda or Sri
Deepak A which shows their conspiracy to knock of the
valuable immovable property. I have been informed that
these acts of the said persons are punishable under
Section 120B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 India Penal Code.
The aforesaid persons are guilty of creating
documents pertaining to immovable property with a view
of make illegal gains. The act of creating the said Power
of Attorney amounts to fraud as my father has not
executed any kind of document much less the alleged
Power of Attorney in favour of said Mr. ArokiaDass.
The witnesses to the said forged General Power of
Attorney have also joined hands with Mr. ArokiaDassand
others and further the witnesses to the alleged Lease
deed dated 25/11/2022 are also not known to my father
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or m family. These witnesses are also hand in glow with
Mr. ArokiaDassand Sri Deepak A, all of them with
common intention to deceive my father and myself and to
knock of the property by creating forged documents.
The alleged Lease deed dated 25/11/2022 is
created and executed on the basis of forged General
Power of Attorney and consideration stated therein is
fictitious, fraudulently executed to deprive my father of his
valuable rights. The aforesaid persons have acted with
common intention and have joined together hatched
conspiracy to make wrongful gain at the cost of my father
and myself and deprive us of our valuable property to
cheat us.
I am returning to USA on 24.01.2024 on account of
official commitments. Therefore I am executing a power
of attorney favouring Sri. Srinivasa B.C, a resident of
Bangalore and a known person to my family. Sri
Srinivasa B.C is aware of all the facts and he would
appear before the jurisdictional authorities and the court
as the case may be, in this regard and participate in
further adjudication including giving statements, filing
papers, site inspection etc. as required in law. Copy of
the power of attorney would be furnished by him.
Hence I request your goodself to take necessary
action against said persons and punish them under
Section 120B, 424, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.
Thanking you
Sd/-
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Yours truly
Miss. Kayla Kathleen Kumar
Please note I have annexed photocopies of documents
and also the address of sons for your convenience.
1. Sri Vinay Gowda,
S/o. Sri. Annappa,
Aged about 37 years,
(Cell No. 73497 77779)
2. Sri. Annappa,
S/o. not known
Aged about 63years,
(Cell No. 9342883209)
3. Sri. Deepak A,
S/o. Sri. Annappa,
Aged about 34 years,
1 to 3 are Residing at No.1251,
32nd 'G' Cross, 4th 'T' Block,
Jayanagar, Bangalore-560 041.
4. Mr.ArokiaDass
S/o. JemesDass
Aged about 56years,
R/at No. M Chiambe Village,
Nidaramangala, Malur Taluk,
Kolar District-563137
-alleged GPA Holder
5. Sri. Dhiraj Jain,
Residing at No. 20, 11th Main,
Hanumanthangar, Bangalore-560019
-witness to Lease Deed
6. Sri. Ashok,
Residing at No. 25, 25th Main,
II Block, Banashankari, Bangalore-560050
-witness to Lease Deed
7. Photocopy of the Lease Deed dated 25.11.2022
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¢£ÁAPÀ 20.01.2024 gÀAzÀÄ 17:45 UÀAmÉUÉ ¦AiÀiÁðzÀÄzÁgÀjAzÀ
oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è zÀÆgÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ. oÁuÁ ªÉÆ. ¸ÀASÁå 13/2024 u/s 468,
420, 467, 470, 471 R/w 34 IPC ¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR®Ä ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÉÛ.
9. A perusal of the allegations made in the complaint will
prima facie indicate that the same disclose the commission of the
offences by the petitioners in collusion with accused Nos. 4 to 6
and all necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences
including allegations relating to the power of attorney, lease deed
etc., referred to supra are present and forthcoming in the
complaint; it follows therefrom that in the light of specific and
detailed allegations contained in the impugned complaint, the same
would warrant investigation by the 1st respondent - police
authorities and at this stage, the question of interfering with the
impugned complaint and FIR would not arise in the facts and
circumstances of the instant case.
10. A perusal of the rival contentions will indicate that there
are complicated and disputed questions of fact involving allegations
and counter allegations made by both parties against one another,
which are incapable of being considered, examined or adjudicated
upon by this Court without investigation being conducted by the 1st
respondent - Police and on this score also, I am of the considered
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opinion that the instant case does not warrant invocation of the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and consequently, the present petition is
liable to be dismissed.
11. Insofar as the contention urged by the petitioners that
they had already instituted a civil suit in O.S.No.1240/2023 against
the said Dr.S.Krishna Kumar and accused No.4 - Arokiadas, a
perusal of the judgment and decree 08.04.2025 passed in the said
suit will indicate that while the suit as against Dr.S.Krishna Kumar
was dismissed on the ground that he had expired, the suit was
decreed ex-parte against the said Arokiadas; the said judgment
which does not contain or render any finding on the legality, validity,
authenticity, genuineness or correctness of the GPA or the lease
deed, also cannot be relied upon by the petitioners, especially
when the suit was dismissed against Dr.S.Krishna Kumar and the
2nd respondent was not a party to the said suit. Under these
circumstances, the said suit in O.S.No.1240/2023 and the
judgment and decree passed therein cannot be relied upon by the
petitioners to seek quashment of the impugned complaint and FIR
and their contention in this regard is liable to be rejected.
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12. Insofar as the contention urged by the petitioners that
since the 2nd respondent is entitled to pursue civil remedies and
that the civil court is a proper forum to adjudicate upon the dispute
between the petitioners and 2nd respondent, which is essentially of
a civil nature, it is well settled that mere availability of civil remedies
or pendency of criminal proceedings would not operate as a bar /
embargo for the aggrieved person to initiate criminal proceedings
by making necessary and suitable allegations in this regard.
13. In the case of P.Swaroopa Rani vs. M.Hari Narayana -
(2008) 5 SCC 765, the Apex court held as under:-
"11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case. (See M.S. Sheriff v. State of
Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397], Iqbal Singh
Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1101] and Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India v. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants [(2005) 12
SCC 226 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 544] .)
12. It is furthermore trite that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted where a
forged document has been filed. It was so held by a
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Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh
Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] stating :
(SCC pp. 387-88, paras 25-26)
"25. An enlarged interpretation to Section
195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said
provision would also operate where after commission
of an act of forgery the document is subsequently
produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As
pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand
Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 660] after preparing a forged document or
committing an act of forgery, a person may manage
to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or
revenue court, either by himself or through someone
set up by him and simply file the document in the said
proceeding. He would thus be protected from
prosecution, either at the instance of a private party
or the police until the court, where the document has
been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The
litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the
actual trial of such a person may be delayed
indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly
detrimental to the interest of the society at large.
26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the
courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a
criminal complaint and such a course is rarely
adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an
interpretation which leads to a situation where a
person alleged to have committed an offence of the
type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is either not placed
for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a
complaint is filed, the same does not come to its
logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in
consonance with the principle that an unworkable or
impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory
Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), Para
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313, the principle has been stated in the following
manner:
'The court seeks to avoid a construction of an
enactment that produces an unworkable or
impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have
been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however,
there are overriding reasons for applying such a
construction, for example, where it appears that
Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is
too strong.' "
In regard to the possible conflict of findings between
civil and criminal court, however, it was opined :
(SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
should be made to avoid conflict of findings between
the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point
out that the standard of proof required in the two
proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are
decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence
while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the
prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has
to be given. There is neither any statutory provision
nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in
one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in
the other, as both the cases have to be decided on
the basis of the evidence adduced therein."
It was concluded : (SCC p. 390, para 33)
"33. In view of the discussion made above, we are
of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida
Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 :
1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly decided and
the view taken therein is the correct view. Section
195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the
offences enumerated in the said provision have been
committed with respect to a document after it has
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been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in any court i.e. during the time when the document
was in custodia legis."
13. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding,
although initiated in terms of some observations made by the
civil court, is not barred under any statute."
14. In the case of Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy -
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1428, the Apex Court held as under:-
7. It is clear from the facts that a prima facie case for
criminal conspiracy and cheating exists against respondent
Nos. 1 and 2. It appears that they, along with their uncles
Guruva Reddy and Umedha Reddy, have attempted to
defraud their aunts by creating a forged family tree and
partition deed with a motive to gain all the monetary award
for land in question bypassing the appellant and her sisters.
They succeeded in their plan until Sudhanva Reddy
revealed it to the authorities by a letter. The High Court has
erroneously relied upon the statement of Sub-Registrar
who stated that partition deed dated 24.03.2005 was
presented for registration on 26.03.2005 and due to health
reasons concerning K.G. Yellappa Reddy, his thumb
impressions were secured at his house in presence of the
Sub-Registrar. However, we must note this statement of
the Sub-Registrar has not been put to cross examination. It
would be unwise to rely on unverified testimony of a Sub-
Registrar to ascertain the genuineness of Partition deed.
The High Court erred in heavily relying on his statement to
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conclude that the Partition deed was genuine and thus no
offence is made out against the respondents under
Sections 463 and 464 IPC.
18. Further, the High Court could not find any
justification to deny that respondents misrepresented the
family tree. The Court itself has acknowledged that
respondents were bound to disclose the names of
daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy and Jayalakshmi in the
family tree. Considering the fact that both the partition deed
and the family tree were used in gaining the monetary
compensation awarded for the land, it is necessary that
genuineness of both the documents is put to trial.
19. We now come to the issue of bar against
prosecution during the pendency of a civil suit. We hereby
hold that no such bar exists against prosecution if the
offences punishable under criminal law are made out
against the parties to the civil suit. Learned senior counsel
Dr.Menaka Guruswamy has rightly placed the relevant
judicial precedents to support the above submission. In the
case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. - (2020) 14 SCC
552, this Court has reviewed its precedents which clarify
the position. The relevant paragraph from the above
judgment is extracted below:
"8. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the
very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as
well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is
availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in
motion the proceedings in criminal law."
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20. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar - (1985) 2 SCC
370, this Court summed up the distinction between the two
remedies as under:
"21. ... There are a large number of cases where
criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two
remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive
and essentially differ in their content and consequence.
The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who
commits an offence against a person, property or the State
for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived
of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not,
however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the
wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an
anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available,
a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types
of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It
is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the
husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property
of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar
prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the
ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say
that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the
custody of her husband, no action against him can be
taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort
the real intent of the law."
21. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamaladevi
Agarwal v. State of W.B. - (2002) 1 SCC 555,
"17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to
the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not
justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the
appellant against the respondents. We are also not
impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was
pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified
to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the
basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded
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with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil
action in a different court even though higher in status and
authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the
proceedings."
22. After surveying the abovementioned cases, this
Court in K. Jagadish (supra) set aside the holding of High
Court to quash the criminal proceedings and held that
criminal proceedings shall continue to its logical end.
23. The above precedents set by this Court make it
crystal clear that pendency of civil proceedings on the
same subject matter, involving the same parties is no
justification to quash the criminal proceedings if a prima
facie case exists against the accused persons. In present
case certainly such prima facie case exists against the
respondents. Considering the long chain of events from
creation of family tree excluding the daughters of K.G.
Yellappa Reddy, partition deed among only the sons and
grandsons of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, distribution of
compensation award among the respondents is sufficient to
conclude that there was active effort by respondents to
reap off the benefits from the land in question. Further, the
alleged threat to appellant and her sisters on revelation of
the above chain of events further affirms the motive of
respondents. All the above factors suggest that a criminal
trial is necessary to ensure justice to the appellant.
24. Therefore, we set aside the Impugned order of
High Court dated 23.11.2023 in Writ Petition No. 23106 of
2021. Accordingly, we direct the Trial Court to continue its
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proceedings against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in
accordance to law.
15. In the case of Priti Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi) -
(2021) 16 SCC 142, the Apex Court held as under:-
31. In the instant case, on a careful reading of the
complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, in our view, it cannot be said
that the complaint does not disclose the commission of
an offence. The ingredients of the offences under
Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot be said to be absent on
the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-
sheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations
in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be
decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the
course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy
provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings
initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by
itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil
remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal
proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the
process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the
High Court under Section 482CrPC for quashing such
proceedings.
32. We have perused the pleadings of the parties,
the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and orders of the courts
below and have taken into consideration the material on
record. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we
are satisfied that the issue involved in the matter under
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consideration is not a case in which the criminal trial should
have been short-circuited. The High Court was not justified
in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has primarily adverted
on two circumstances,
(i) that it was a case of termination of agreement to
sell on account of an alleged breach of the contract and;
(ii) the fact that the arbitral proceedings have been
initiated at the instance of the appellants.
Both the alleged circumstances noticed by the High
Court, in our view, are unsustainable in law. The facts
narrated in the present complaint/FIR/charge-sheet indeed
reveal the commercial transaction but that is hardly a
reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude
from such transaction. In fact, many a times, offence of
cheating is committed in the course of commercial
transactions and the illustrations have been set out under
Sections 415, 418 and 420IPC.
33. Similar observations have been made by this
Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh
Agarwal [Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal,
(1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] : (SCC p. 690, para
9)
"9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that
the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring
the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a
criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence.
Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party
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affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator
cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an
offence albeit the same act may be connected with the
discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence,
those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down
the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating
agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole
gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its
own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified
only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] ."
16. In the case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S., -
(2020) 14 SCC 552, the Apex Court held as under:
7. One of the striking features of the matter is that on
the day when the Sale Deed was executed, not a single
paisa was actually received by way of consideration. Three
post-dated cheques were handed over to the appellant and
one of those three cheques was deposited in the bank for
encashment on the next date. It is a matter of record that
subsequent cheques were not even sought to be encashed
and the appellant showed his willingness to deposit even
the sum of Rs.15 lakhs received by encashment of first
cheque. Further, neither the conveyance deed was
preceded by any agreement of sale nor any advertisement
was issued by the appellant showing his inclination to
dispose of the property in question.
8. It is true that civil proceedings have been
subsequently initiated to get the registered Sale Deed set-
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aside but that has nothing to do with the present criminal
proceedings.
9. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the very
same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well
as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is
availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in
motion the proceedings in criminal law. 10. In Pratibha Rani
v. Suraj Kumar and another1 this Court summed up the
distinction between the two remedies as under:
"21. ............ There are a large number of cases
where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The
two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly
coextensive and essentially differ in their content and
consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an
offender who commits an offence against a person,
property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the
offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even
his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at
all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents
etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy
is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred.
The two types of actions are quite different in content,
scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the
stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the
stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody,
that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or
render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or
abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married
woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action
against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to
override and distort the real intent of the law."
11. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others
- this Court observed:
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"10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present
complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or
money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding
that the offence of cheating would elude from such a
transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in
the course of commercial and also money transactions.
One of the illustrations set out under Section 415 of the
Indian Penal Code [Illustration f] is worthy of notice now:
"(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to
repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending
to repay it. A cheats."
11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the
person who induces the victim of his representation and not
the nature of the transaction which would become decisive
in discerning whether there was commission of offence or
not. The complainant has stated in the body of the
complaint that he was induced to believe that the
respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices,
and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of
the respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that the
respondent after receiving the goods had sold them to
others and still he did not pay the money. Such averments
would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the
authorities.
12. The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly
hypertechnical approach and sieved the complaint through
a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients under
Section 415 IPC. Such an endeavour may be justified
during trial, but certainly not during the stage of
investigation. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the
High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring
that it is a commercial transaction simpliciter wherein no
semblance of criminal offence is involved."
12. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamladevi
Agarwal v. State of West Bengal and others as under:
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"9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the
initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also
pending. After referring to judgments in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, this
Court inTrisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal held:
(SCC p. 690, paras 7-8)
"7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out
that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the
inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very
extreme exceptions (vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal4
and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi5).
8. In the last referred case this Court also pointed
out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not
sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the
following observations: (SCC p. 263, para 10) '10. It may
be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as
well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction.
But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of
cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many
a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial
and also money transactions."
After referring to various decisions it was finally concluded
as under:
"17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to
the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not
justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the
appellant against the respondents. We are also not
impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was
pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified
to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the
basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded
with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil
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action in a different court even though higher in status and
authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the
proceedings."
13. In R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and others, this
Court culled out propositions concerning interference under
Section 482 of the Code as under:
"15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said
decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal
proceeding and, in particular, a first information report
unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face
value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no
cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except
in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any
document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very
sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose
commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond
the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to
hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the
same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal
proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
14. In the light of the principles as mentioned
hereinabove, we have no hesitation in concluding that the
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High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings. We,
therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decision
rendered by the High Court and direct that criminal
proceedings shall be taken to logical conclusion in
accordance with law.
17. In the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar - (1985) 2
SCC 370, the Apex Court held as under:-
21. After all how could any reasonable person
expect a newly married woman living in the same house
and under the same roof to keep her personal property or
belongings like jewellery, clothing etc., under her own
lock and key, thus showing a spirit of distrust to the
husband at the very behest. We are surprised how could
the High Court permit the husband to cast his covetous
eyes on the absolute and personal property of his wife
merely because it is kept in his custody, thereby reducing
the custody to a legal farce. On the other hand, it seems
to us that even if the personal property of the wife is
jointly kept, it would be deemed to be expressly or
impliedly kept in the custody of the husband and if he
dishonestly misappropriates or refuses to return the
same, he is certainly guilty of criminal breach of trust, and
there can be no escape from this legal consequence. The
observations of the High Court at other places regarding
the inapplicability of Section 406 do not appeal to us and
are in fact not in consonance with the spirit and trend of
the criminal law. There are a large number of cases
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where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The
two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly
coextensive and essentially differ in their content and
consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish
an offender who commits an offence against a person,
property or the State for which the accused, on proof of
the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases
even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil
remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like
arson, accidents etc. It is an anathema to suppose that
when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is
completely barred. The two types of actions are quite
different in content, scope and import. It is not at all
intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband
dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his
wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar
prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the
ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To
say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept
in the custody of her husband, no action against him can
be taken as no offence is committed is to override and
distort the real intent of the law.
18. In the case of Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of West
Bengal - (2002) 1 SCC 555, the Apex Court held as under:-
9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the
initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also
pending. After referring to judgments in State of
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Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] and Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 401] this Court in Trisuns Chemical
Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 47] held: (SCC p. 690, paras 7-8)
"7. Time and again this Court has been pointing
out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of
the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited
to very extreme exceptions (vide State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] and Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 401] ).
8. In the last referred case this Court also
pointed out that merely because an act has a civil
profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit.
We quote the following observations: (SCC p. 263, para
10)
'10. It may be that the facts narrated in the
present complaint would as well reveal a commercial
transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a
reason for holding that the offence of cheating would
elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings
were committed in the course of commercial and also
money transactions.' "
10. In Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P)
Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 615] this Court again reiterated the position and
held: (SCC pp. 272 & 278, paras 2 & 14)
"2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent
power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have
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the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an
exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing
at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of
rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the
lodgement of first information report the ball is set to roll
and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the
investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions
of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and
restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable
nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a
perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the
allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on
the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence
as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise
up to the expectation of the people and deal with the
situation as is required under the law.
***
14. Needless to record however and it being a settled principle of law that to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. The observations in Nagawwa v. VeerannaShivalingappaKonjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] lend support to the above statement of law: (SCC p. 741, para 5) '(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the
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(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible;
and
(4) where the complaint suffers from
fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.' The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings."
11. In Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17: 2001 SCC (Cri) 275] this Court held: (SCC p. 19, para 8) "8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed."
12. Again in M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] this Court held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court should be slow in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage and that merely because the nature of the dispute is primarily of a civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in cases of forgery and fraud there is always some element of civil nature. In a case where the accused alleged that the transaction between the parties is of a civil nature and the criminal court cannot proceed with the complaint because the factum of document being forged was pending in the civil court, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 647-48, para 5) "5. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in a criminal case, is not applicable in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of."
13. Referring to the judgments of this Court in Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] , Sardool Singh v. Nasib Kaur [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] and Karamchand Ganga Pershad v. Union of India [(1970) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1971 SC 1244] the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint which does not require any interference by this Court in this appeal.
14. In Manju Gupta case [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] the criminal proceedings were quashed under the peculiar circumstances of the case. After referring to para 20 of the complaint and holding (at SCC
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR p. 414, para 4) "such an averment in our view, is clearly inadequate and insufficient to bring home criminality of the appellant in the matter of the alleged offences", the Court found that simply because the accused was the Secretary of the Society, the Magistrate was not justified in presuming her connection or complicity with the offence merely on that ground. The allegations in the complaint pertinent to forgery of rent receipts were held to be vague and indefinite. Sardool Singh case [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] was also decided on its facts on the basis of law earlier settled by this Court. In Karamchand Ganga Pershad case [(1970) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1971 SC 1244] an observation was made that "it is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true" (SCC p. 695, para 4). In that case the appellants had filed a writ petition in the High Court for the issuance of appropriate directions requiring the Union of India to release and deliver to them some consignments of maize transported from the State of Haryana to Howrah. Alleging that the movement of maize had been controlled by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act read with the Northern Inter-Zonal Maize (Movement Control) Order, 1967 promulgated by the State Government, the restrictions on export imposed by the Order were removed by the State of Haryana in October 1967 which was duly published and advertised. The contention of the Union was that the State of Haryana had not lifted the ban on export and further that
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR it had no power to lift the ban. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the sole ground that in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings before some court in the State of West Bengal it was inappropriate for the High Court to pronounce on the question arising for decision in the writ petition. In that context the Court held:
(SCC p. 695, para 4) "In our opinion the High Court seriously erred in coming to this conclusion. If the appellants are able to establish their case that the ban on export of maize from the State of Haryana had been validly lifted all the proceedings taken against those who exported the maize automatically fall to the ground. Their maintainability depends on the assumption that the exports were made without the authority of law. It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true. The High Court after entertaining the writ petitions and hearing arguments on the merits of the case should not have dismissed the petitions merely because certain consequential proceedings had been taken on the basis that the exports in question were illegal."
15. We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of "beyond reasonable doubt". A Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with similar circumstances, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri LJ 1019] held that where civil and criminal cases are
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the Court held: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16) "15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.
This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
16. In the present case we have noticed that before issuance of the process, the trial Magistrate had recorded the statement of the witnesses for the complainant, perused the record including the opinion of the expert and his deposition and prima facie found that the respondents were guilty for the offences for which the process was issued against them. The High Court rightly did not refer to any of those circumstances but quashed the proceedings only on the ground:
"Consideration is and should be whether any criminal proceeding instituted before a court subordinate to this Court should be allowed to continue when the very foundation of the criminal case, namely, forgery of document is under scrutiny by this Court in a civil proceeding instituted by same person i.e. the complainant in the criminal case. In my considered view it would not be proper to allow the criminal proceeding to continue when the validity of the document (deed of dissolution) is being tested in a civil proceeding before this Court. Judicial propriety demands that the course adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manju Gupta [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] and Sardool Singh [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] should be followed. If such course of action is adopted by this Court, that would be in consonance with the expression used in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure -- 'or otherwise to secure the ends of justice'. In both the cases referred to above civil suits were pending, where the validity and genuineness of a document were challenged. It was held by the Hon'ble
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR Supreme Court that when the question regarding validity of a document is sub judice in the civil courts, criminal prosecution, on the allegation of the document being forged, cannot be instituted."
17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.
19. In the case of Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Apex Court held as under:
MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS A BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES
28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and if necessary, a trial. [See : Syed AksariHadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee KunHee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686]
20. In the instant case, as stated supra, a perusal of the impugned complaint is sufficient to show that all necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences contained in the impugned complaint and FIR which clearly make out and disclose a cognizable offence, which is sufficient to warrant investigation to be conducted by the 1st respondent - Police authorities. In fact, the complaint contains several serious allegations of forgery, fraud, etc., which would necessarily have to be investigated and it is impermissible in law to interdict or interfere with the investigation pursuant to the impugned complaint and FIR and consequently, even this contention urged by the petitioners cannot be accepted.
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NC: 2025:KHC:37984 CRL.P No. 1343 of 2024 HC-KAR
21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, I am of the considered opinion that the present petition is not a fit case for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction / power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of India and consequently, there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed.
22. Accordingly, the petition is devoid of merits and the same is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE Srl.