Kerala High Court
Sulaikha Beevi vs Mathew on 21 December, 2000
Equivalent citations: AIR 2001 KERALA 177, (2001) 2 RENTLR 44, (2001) 1 KER LT 360, (2001) 2 RECCIVR 61, (2001) 1 KER LJ 221, (2001) 2 RENCJ 9, (2001) 1 RENCR 311, (2001) 2 ICC 732
JUDGMENT S. Sankarasubban, J.
1. Plaintiff is the appellant. Suit was filed for eviction of the defendants from the plaint schedule building and appurtenant ground and putting the plaintiff in possession thereof and for recovering an amount of Rs. 6,300/- with interest at 12% and for other reliefs.
2. Plaintiff is the daughter of late Janab Mohammed Sahib, Malika Veedu, Attakulangara, Thiruvananthapuram. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant, K.C. Mathew executed a rent deed on 1.1.1062 agreeing to take the building and the appurtenant ground as described in the plaint schedule on rent on the terms and conditions incorporated therein. As per the provisions of the rent deed, the first defendant was bound to pay a rent of Rs. 120/- per mensem upto 30.4.1962, Rs. 125/- per mensem till 30.4.1963. Rs. 130/- per mensem till 30.4.1964, Rs. 135/- per mensem till 30.4.1965 and Rs. 140/- per mensem till 30.4.1966. He had agreed that on the expiry of the terms on 30.4.1966, he will surrender the building and the appurtenant ground.
3. On the expiry of the period limited in the rent deed, the first defendant continued his possession of the building and appurtenant ground with the assent of the lessor, viz., the late Janab Mohammed Sahib, thereby giving rise to a renewal of the lease from month to month from May, 1966 the plaintiff's father and the first defendant agreed to have the rent fixed at Rs. 175/- per mensem and thereafter, the first defendant was paying the rent at that rate. The plaintiff's father died on 20th July, 1974. There was a suit for partition, as O.S. No. 177 of 1973 filed by the legal heirs of Janab Mohammed Sahib. As per the decree in that suit, the plaintiff was given absolute right over the plaint schedule property. After the decree, the plaintiff has been demanding the defendants to pay the rent to her from 1.5.1974. The rent for May, 1974 was payable before 10th June, 1974. The rent from 1.5.1974 at the rate of Rs. 175/- per mensem and interest due were recoverable by the plaintiff from the first defendant and his assets.
4. The plaintiffs son, Iqbal Ahmuned has graduated in Medicine with M.B.B.S. degree and desires to start a dispensary in the plaint schedule building. He does not own any suitable building in Trivandrum or elsewhere and is dependent on the plaintiff for making accommodation for the said purpose. The plaintiff herself has no possession of any other building suitable to help her son. As the first defendant was continuing in the premises as a lessee from month to month since 30.4.1966 a notice to quit as required under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued to the first defendant terminating the lease with effect from 31.5.1976. Notwithstanding the same termination, as the first defendant did not vacate the premises and surrender possession of the building and appurtenant ground to the plaintiff, he moved an application before the Rent Control Court as O.P. (B.R.C.) No. 176 of 1976 for obtaining possession of the building and the premises. The application was filed under Ss. 11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act.
5. Before the Rent Control Court, the defendants raised the contention that they are entitled to the benefit of S. 306 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The Rent Control Court found that this contention to be bonafide. Since it could not decide the question, the application was rejected giving liberty to the plaintiff to file suit. According to the first defendant, he is conducting limber business in the property. According to him, he has constructed a building therein. As the property was given on rent in 1120 M.E., the plaintiff submits that there is no fixity of tenure for the defendant. It is further submitted that the building was sub-let to the second defendant- Firm and the plaintiff needs the building bonafide for the purpose of her son to start a Nursing Home. Further, it was started that the first defendant has got property of his own at Karamana, Killippalam and hence, the plaintiff is also entitled to get eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act.
6. A written statement was filed by the defendants. In the written statement, it was contended that the first defendant was given on lease the land in Survey Nos. 275 1/A & B/B2/2746/3 by the original owner in the year 1120 M.E. for the commercial and industrial purposes of carrying the timber business of the defendant and the buildings bearing T.C. Nos. 653 and 654 were constructed by the first defendant. In addition to those buildings, a pucca shed also was constructed by the first defendant for installing a Saw Mill. The lease deed of 1.1.1962 is only a renewal of the prior lease of 1956, which itself is only a renewal of the prior lease of 1956, which itself was a renewal of the first lease of 1120 M.E. There was no agreement between the parties for the surrender of the building or land on the expiry of the term of the lease. What had been agreed to between the parties was that in the event of the first defendant not requiring the land for the commercial and industrial purposes for which it was taken, the owner would pay the defendant a reasonable value for the buildings and the shed constructed by the first defendant. The plaintiff has also not demanded the rent in respect of the land from the defendant. The first defendant has been and is always ready and willing to pay rent due. The rent under the contract of tenancy was not paid by the first defendant from May, 1974 onwards, because nobody demanded for the same. The averment that the building is required for the plaintiff's son is denied. The defendant had obtained fixity of tenure under S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The land and the building described in the schedule are situate in a commercial centre. This locality is not at all suitable for starting a private hospital. The land owned by the first defendant at Karamana is not suitable or sufficient enough for the defendants' commercial and industrial purposes. There is no assignment or subletting as alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no cause of action.
7. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial court, viz., the Sub Court, Trivandrum raised as many as 8 issues. Issue Nos. 1 to 3 relate to the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession and whether the defendants are entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and also whether any building was constructed by the first defendant. Since these there issues relate to the claim made by the defendants for the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, those issues were referred to the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal found that the first defendant is entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Regarding the arrears of rent, the court found that there was arrears of rent. It accepted the finding of the Tribunal as it was bound to and the suit was decreed for realisation of Rs.6,300/-.
8. As already stated, the issues regarding the tenancy were referred to the Land Tribunal. Before the Land Tribunal, proceedings were numbered as O.A. No. 1175 of 1978. Before the Land Tribunal, the tenant produced Exts. B1 to B9 and the plaintiff-landlord produced Exts. A1 to A5. Before the Land Tribunal, the plaintiff's witness was examined as DW1 and the tenant's witness was examined as PW1. The Land Tribunal took the view that even though Ext. Al rent deed was executed by the first defendant, he had not actually vacated the premises before executing Ext. A1 and he was continuing possession. It took into account the recitals in Ext. B9 and held that the buildings were constructed by the tenant for the purpose of conducting timber business. Hence, it held that the defendants are entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
9. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, two appeals were filed before the District Court as A.S. No. 420 of 1082 and A.S. No. 431 of 1982, As 420 of 1982 was filed by the defendants against the decree for rent, while A.S. No. 431 of 1982 was filed by the plaintiff Both the appeals were dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. Against the above judgment and decree, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal as S.A. No. 88 of 1985.
10. The main ground taken in the appeal is that a fresh lease was executed under which the defendant expressly surrendered the property and hence, according to the appellant, as soon as Ext. A1 was executed, there was surrender of the previous lease from the date of Ext. A1. Three substantial questions were raised by the appellant in the memorandum of appeal. The Second Appeal was referred to a Division Bench and was heard by the Division Bench consisting of P.A. Mohammed and K.A. Mohammed Shafi, JJ. By judgment dated 9th December, 1996, the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. Against that judgment, the respondents preferred Civil Appeal No. 5616 of 1997 before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by order dated 19.1.2000, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of this Court and remanded the Second Appeal to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations. In the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court took the view that the judgment passed by this Court has not referred to any substantial questions of law. Hence, the case was remanded to this Court with the following observations:
'Though learned counsel on both sides suggested certain questions of law we are not inclined to set those questions, for, it is open 10 the Division Bench to formulate such substantial questions of law which would arise and which requires to be answered in the Second Appeal. If no such substantial question of law is actually involved in the appeal there is no scope for entertaining the Second Appeal."
It is in the above circumstances that the Second Appeal has come before us.
11. Shri. P. Sukumaran Nair, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that in the light of the execution of Ext. A1 lease, there is express surrender of the previous lease and the parties are governed by the terms of Ext. A1. According to him, Ext. A1 definitely shows that it is only a lease of building and land and if that be so, the provisions of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not come into play. According to him, even if the original lease was granted for the purpose of construction of the buildings and sheds, when that lease had expired, and a fresh lease has been executed, there is surrender of the previous lease and hence, the right of the party has to be adjudged on the basis of the new lease. The sum and substance of the argument of the counsel for the appellant is that the terms of Ext. A1 should be looked into and if it is looked into, it can be seen that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It was further contended that in Ext. B9 lease, it has been stated that if the tenant had constructed the building with the materials supplied by the landlord agreeing to take the building as the landlord's building and to pay rent on that footing, can he contend that the building is his own? Since no building was constructed pursuant to Ext. A1 lease, is he entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
12. Sri. Balakrishna Iyer appearing for the respondents submitted that in spite of Ext. A1, the first defendant continues as tenant and the previous lease is not extinguished and hence, he is entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. He further contended that both Exts. A1 and B9 are for five years. But they were not registered. Hence, those leases are void. With the result, the original lease of 1120 M.E. continues and hence, the first defendant is entitled to the benefit of fixity of tenure.
13. After hearing both parties, we are of the view that the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration:
(1) In so far as Exts. A1 and B9 leases are not registered, can the term of those documents beaded upon? Is not the lease created in 1120 M.E. continuing in so far as the lease created under Exts. A1 and B9 are void?
(2) Whether on the creation of Ext.A1 lease, there has been a surrender, expressor implied of the previous lease and the first defendant is estopped from contending that the buildings and the sheds constructed by him belonged to him?
(3) Whether the first defendant is entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
14. Before we discuss the above questions of law, we have to state that on the evidence of this case, it has come out that the first defendant took out the premises in 1120 M.E. from the original owner. He constructed the shed for installing a Saw Mill and was conducting business there. This is stated in Ext. B9, which is a lease executed by the plaintiff's predecessor in favour of the defendant. It is also for five years, but was not registered. The recitals contained in the document would show that the defendant was continuing in possession and he had constructed an office room using the materials belonging to the plaintiff. From Ext. B9, it is seen that the subject matter of the. lease is the office room and the land where a shed was constructed by the lessee for doing timber business. It is seen from Ext. B9 that the lessee has agreed to construct the existing sheds and other sheds on the expiry of the lease. The next document we find is Ext. A1. It is of the year 1962. It is stated in Ext. A1 document that the suit property viz., the building and the land are in the possession and enjoyment of the lessor. It is further stated in the last portion of the deed that the first defendant had surrendered the land which he had taken on lease after the expiry of the term. It is further stated that since he wanted to continue the business in that premises, he had requested the lessor to grant the building and premises on rental basis. It was pursuant to his request that the lease was granted to him and therefore he had executed Ext. A1. It was also agreed that at the end of the above period, he would vacate the land and the building without raising any dispute. It is also seen that by Ext. B9, the first defendant had given up the building itself in favour of the lessor. It is also seen that after the execution of Ext. A1, the tenant has been paying rent as stated in Ext. A1. The Land Tribunal and the lower Appellate Court took the view that the position in 1120 M.E. had not changed and since the lessee had taken the land for commercial purpose and constructed buildings therein, he is entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
15. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that by Exts. A1 and B9, the lessee had surrendered his right and a new lease has come up as per Exts. A1 and B9 and hence, the first defendant is not entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. As per Ext. A1, the appellant's predecessor had leased the office room and the sheds and the first defendant has agreed to pay rent for that. And the first defendant admits that the lease had been surrendered earlier. In this context, now a question has come up whether Exts. A1 and B9 can be looked into, since there documents were not registered.
Point No. 116. Exts. A1 and B9 are two leases. While Ext. B9 appears to be executed by the predecessor in interest of the appellant in favour of the first defendant, Ext. A1 was executed by the first defendant in favour of the predecessor of the appellant. Both the leases are for a period of five years. Hence, going by S.107 of the Transfer of Properly Act, since the leases are not registered, the leases are void. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that since the leases are void, it cannot be looked into and hence, it should be presumed that the lease of 1120 M.E. continues.
17. Many decisions were cited at the bar regarding this proposition by both sides. But we think, it is not necessary to go into those decisions cited, since recently, the Supreme Court has spoken about this in Anthony v. KC Ittoop & Sons & Ors. (2000) 5 Supreme 172. In the above case. Thomas, J. speaking for the Bench held as follows:
"The lease deed relied on by the plaintiff was intended to be operative for the period of five years. It is an unregistered instrument. Hence such an instrument cannot create a lease on account of three pronged statutory inhibitions. The first interdict is contained in the first paragraph of S. 107 of the T.P. Act. The second inhibition can be discerned from S. 17(l) of the Registration Act. The third interdict is contained in S. 49 of the Registration Act which speaks about the fatal consequence of non-complaince of S. 17 thereof. The resultant position is insurmountable that so far as the instrument of lease is concerned there is no scope for holding that appellant is lessee by virtue of the said instrument. The court is disabled from using the instrument as evidence and hence it goes out of consideration in this case, hool, line and sinker".
Thus, in the present case, Exts. A1 and B9 cannot be looked into for the purpose of showing that the leases are created by those documents.
18. The next question is whether the recitals in those documents can be looked into for the purpose of showing legal relationship between the parties. In fact, in the same judgment, the Supreme Court observed thus:
"But the above finding does not exhaust the scope of the issue whether appellant is a lessee of the building. A lease of immovable property is defined in S. 105 of the T.P. Act. A transfer of a right to enjoy a property in consideration of a price paid or promised to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions is the basic fabric for a valid lease. The provision says that such a transfer can be made expressly or by implication. Once there is such a transfer of right to enjoy the properly a lease stands created..... Thus dehors the instrument parties can create a lease as envisaged in the second paragraph of S. 107 of the T.P. Act. When lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property and such transfer can be made expressly or by implication, the mere fact that an unregistered instrument came into existence would not stand in the way of the court to determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise than through such deed."
The Court further observed as follows:
"When it is admitted that legal possession of the building has been transferred to the appellant there is no scope for countenancing even a case of licence. A transfer or right in the building for enjoyment, of which the consideration of payment of monthly rent has been fixed, can reasonably be presumed..... Taking a different view would be contrary to the reality when parties clearly intended to create a lease through the document which they executed had not gone into the processes of registration. That lacuna had affected the validity of the document, but what had happened between the parties in respect of the prorate became a reality. Non registration of the document had caused only two consequences. One is that no lease exceeding one year was created. Second is that the instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is concerned. Nonetheless the presumption that lease not exceeding one year stood created by conduct of parties remains un-rebutted."
In the written statement filed by the defendants, it is stated thus: "The lease deed of 1.1.1962 is only a renewal of the prior lease of 1956 which itself was a renewal of the first lease of 1120 M.E." In paragraph 2, it is admitted that the rent was enhanced to Rs. 175/- from May, 1966 by mutual agreement between the late owner and the first defendant.
19. In this context, we also refer to a decision of this Court in Neelakantan Sreedharan v. Subba Bhakthan Narayana Bhakthan, 1975 KLT 128. In the above case, Viswanatha Iyer, J. observed as follows:
"The rent deed is executed by the lessee alone. It is also not registered and therefore, if is inadmissible to prove the creation of a lease by an instrument. But, it is admissible to prove the creation of a lease by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession as mentioned in S. 107 of the T.P. Act. The rent deed can be relied on to establish the rural relationship between the parties. It contains an admission or an acknowledgement by the defendant who is sought to be made liable that he is a tenant and that is the best evidence that one can possibly have as to the oral agreement of a lease. It is well known that documents relating to sales, leases and mortgages come into existence only after agreements arrived at between the parties to these transactions. The lessor and lessee generally agree to the terms of the tenancy before hand and then reduce to writing what has been agreed upon. In such cases oral agreement of lease can be spelt out of the rent deed executed by the lessee and there can be no bar that would prevent a court from looking into such a document for this purpose".
Thus, on the basis of the above decisions, we are of the view that even though Exts. A1 and B9 are not registered, those documents can be looked into for the purpose of finding out the nature of the agreement executed between the parties and we reject the contention of the respondents that the documents cannot be looked into.
Point No. 2:
20. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the lease between the parties is one created by Ext. A1 dated 1.1.1962. In other words, the contention is that the lease of 1120 M.E. as well as the lease created under Ext. B9 were surrendered and a fresh arrangement had been arrived at under Ext. A1. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that since the leases are void, the earlier lease subsists and hence, there is no surrender. The respondents further contended that there was no physical handing over of the property in favour of the appellant and hence it cannot be said that there was surrender of the property. In this connection, we refer to S. 111(e) and (f) of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as follows:
"111. A lease of immovable property determines:
(a) .....
(b) .....
(c) .....
(d) .....
(e) by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease, to the lessor by mutual agreement between them.
(f) by implied surrender."
Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, Seventh Edition at page 741, it is stated thus: "A surrender is an yielding up of the term of the lessee's interest to him who has the immediate reversion or the lessor's interest. It takes effect therefore like a contract by mutual consent, on the lessor's acceptance of the act of the lessee". The surrender is either express or implied. The Author further states as follows: "Express surrenders are in England required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. No such formality is necessary in India. A deed of surrender need not be registered, if there are facts de hors. No particular form of words is essential to make a good surrender." At page 742, the Author describes regarding the implied surrender which reads thus: "Implied surrender or surrender by operation of law occurs (1) by the creation of a new relationship, or (2) by relinquishment of possession..... If the lessee accepts a new lease, that in itself is a surrender of the old lease, for the new lease could not be granted unless the old was surrendered".
21. In Smt. Kamlabai & Ors. v. Mangilal Dulichand Mantri, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 375, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"It is thus clear that when the parties surrendered the tenancy and substituted it by a fresh arrangement merely because physically the possession was not handed over is of not much consequence. Apparently in the present case also by mutual agreement, the tenancy came to an end and by arbitration what was sought was an arrangement for time on payment of damages for use and occupation. Admittedly, it did not either continue the old tenancy or started any new one. This substitution of new arrangement and the determination of the old by mutual agreement clearly indicates that the tenant surrendered his tenancy rights and the court below was not right in coming to the conclusion that the surrender is not there as possession was not handed over".
To the same effect is the decision in Konijeti Venkayya & Anr. v. Thammana Pada Venkata Subbarao, AIR 1957 SC 619. Thus, it can be seen that an implied surrender can be inferred from the conduct of the parties. If we look into the recitals in Ext. A1, it can be seen that the respondent has agreed that the properly leased belongs to the appellant's father and that he has taken it on rent from 1.1.1962. According to us, the recitals in that document are that he has surrendered the building and premises to the landlord and he is taking the building and premises again for carrying on his business and that he will be vacating the building premises at the end of the term. Thus, according to us, a new relationship was created between the parties. Thus, we infer that the old lease has been surrendered. Thus we are of the view that the lease exists between the parties. It can be seen that the relationship has come to an end.
Point No. 3 :
22. Now we have found that it is on the basis of a new lease arrangement, which came into force on 1.1.1962 that the defendant is holding the plaint schedule property, if that be so, he is not entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. As per S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the benefit is obtained only if the land has been given to a person for commercial purposes and in that he has constructed a building before 1967. As per the lease arrangement in 1962, the tenant has admitted that the building belongs to the landlord, even though it is stated that the lease is for commercial purpose. There is no construction of a building pursuant to the lease. It may be that earlier tenant has constructed a building or shed. But that right has come up by with a new relationship on 1.1.1962. So far as this aspect is concerned, there are certain decisions of this Court, which have held that in changed circumstances, the lessee will not be entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
23. In Parameswara Panicker v. Bharathan, 1987 (2) KLT 12, it was held as follows: "It is no longer open to the first defendant to contend that he continues to be in possession of the land in view of the clear recital in Ext. B1 executed by him. The land involved is only 2 cents in extent on which the building stands. The first defendant has no possession of the land except as the occupant of the building. There is nothing in the Act preventing the lessee of a commercial site from surrendering the same to landlord nor is there anything precluding Mm from transferring the building constructed for commercial purposes." In Sathianesan Punnose v. Robenson Titus, 1993 (2) KLT 956, it is stated that when the lessee surrendered his leasehold interest and a new rent deed executed on the same date wherein the land and buildings are rented out to the tenant on rental basis, since a new tenancy is created, the tenant is not entitled to get the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. To the same effect is the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in S.A. No. 957 of 1973, which states as follows:
"The first requirement in the above clause is that the lessee, his legal representative or assignee must have constructed the building. The lessee can construct a building in the character of the lessee only after the lease. If the building was already in existence constructed by some other person it cannot be said to have been constructed by a lessee. Earlier, construction by the prior lessee of the same property under a lease which had terminated is not a construction by a lessee within the meaning of S. 106(1) of the Act. For the purpose of the Section, the construction must be pursuant to the lease and if it was already in existence it cannot be said 10 have been constructed by a lessee, though historically speaking, it might have been constructed by some former lessee at some point of time. The construction by some person prior to the creation of the lease with which we are concerned could not be satisfy the requirement of S. 106".
24. In the above view of the matter, we are of the view that the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
25. The next question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendants as per the grounds mentioned in the plaint? In the plaint, the plaintiff has prayed for eviction of the defendants under Ss. 11(3), 11(4)(i) and S. 11(4)(iii) and also prayed for recovery of arrears of rent. The trial court passed a decree for recovery of arrears of rent. Against that, an appeal was filed by the defendants, which was dismissed. No further appeal has been filed by the defendants. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court did not consider the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to eviction on the grounds mentioned in the plaint. It is because both the courts found that the defendants are entitled to the benefit under S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. After the reference was obtained from the Tribunal, PW1 was examined before the trial court. The defendants did not adduce any evidence before us. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since there is only the evidence of the plaintiff and the grounds are proved, eviction should be ordered under Ss. 11(3), 11(4)(i) and 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, The building was required for the purpose of conducting a nursing home by the plaintiff's son. Further allegation was that the building was let out to the Firm and that the first defendant has another plot in Karamana to conduct the Saw Mill. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that as a matter of fact, the defendants did not adduce any evidence because of the findings of the Land Tribunal and further both the courts below have not considered any aspect.
26. After giving an anxious consideration, we are of the view that, so far as this question is concerned, the matter should be remanded back to the trial court. It is nearly 15 years after the suit was filed. The trial Court should decide the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to eviction as per the grounds stated in the suit. Both the parties are allowed to adduce any further evidence, if necessary. The parties are directed to appear in the court below on 5.2.2001. The trial court shall dispose of the matter within a period of two months thereafter.
27. For the above said reasons, we modify the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court and hold that the defendants are not entitled to fixity of tenure under S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The case is remanded to the trial court for giving a decision on the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to eviction of the respondents, under the provisions of the Rent Control Act mentioned in the plaint. The parties shall appear in the court below on 5.2.2001.
28. Second Appeal is disposed of as above.