Kerala High Court
Bismi Sainudheen vs P.K.Nabeesa Beevi on 2 November, 2010
Author: V.K.Mohanan
Bench: V.K.Mohanan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.K.MOHANAN
WEDNESDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF AUGUST 2013/16TH SRAVANA, 1935
Crl.MC.No. 136 of 2013
--------------------------
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CMP.NO.4687/2010 AND
CMP.NO.301/2012 IN MC.NO.76/2009 OF ADDL.CHIEF JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
.......
Crl.MC 4389/2010 of HIGH COURT OF KERALA DATED 02-11-2010
......
PETITIONER(S):
--------------------------
BISMI SAINUDHEEN,
W/O. SHAHUL HAMEED,
T.C.NO.13/705. SHAHINA MANZIL, KUNNUKUZHI,
VANCHIYOOR P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADV. SRI.K.ABDUL JAWAD
RESPONDENT(S):
------------------------------
1. P.K.NABEESA BEEVI,
D/O.FATHIMA BEEVI, T.C.6/193(4),
NETHAJI ROAD, VATTIYOORKAVU,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - PIN-695 009.
2. SHAHUL HAMEED,
S/O. M.IBRAHIMKUTTY, T.C.13/705,
SHAHINA MANZIL, KUNNUKUZHI, VANCHIYOOR P.O.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-35.
3. STATE OF KERALA,
REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
R1 BY ADVS. SMT.SREEDEVI KYLASANATH
SRI.ACHUTH KYLAS
SRI.P.VISHNU SANKAR
SRI.R.SARATHKRISHNAN
R2 BY ADV. SRI.S.MOHAMMED AL RAFI
R3 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.RAJESH VIJAYAN
THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 17/07/2013, THE COURT ON 07/08/2013 PASSED THE
FOLLOWING:
Kss
Crl.M.C.No.136/2013
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S ANNEXURES:
ANNEX.A: COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND PETITION FILED BY THE
1ST RESPONDENT IN CMP NO.3689/10.
ANNEX,B: COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
ANNEX.C: COPY OF THE ORDER DTD. 15/10/2010 IN CMP NO.3689/10
IN M.C.76/09 ON THE FILE OF ADDL.CHIEF JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
ANNEX.D: COPY OF THE ORDER DTD. 2/11/2010 IN CRL.M.C.NO.4389/2010
ON THE FILE OF THIS HON'BLE COURT.
ANNEX.E: COPY OF THE ORDER DTD. 15/12/2012 IN CMP NO.4687/10
ON THE FILE OF ADDL.CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE COURT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
RESPONDENT'S ANNEXURES:
ANNEX.R1(A): COPY OF THE SALE DEED DTD. 29/03/1985.
ANNEX.R1(B): COPY OF ORDER DTD. 21/08/2009 OF THE HON'BLE
SESSIONS COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM IN
CRL.APPEAL NO.517/2009.
ANNEX.R1(C): COPY OF THE ORDER DTD. 15/02/2010 IN CRL.M.C.3829/09.
ANNEX.R1(D): COPY OF THE ORDER DTD. 24/02/2011 IN CRL.M.C.3829/09.
ANNEX.R1(E): COPY OF JUDGMENTS OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA DTD. 18/07/2011.
ANNEX.R1(F): COPY OF ORDER DTD. 9/01/2012 OF THE HON'BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA IS PRODUCED HEREWITH
AND MARKED.
ANNEX.R1(G): COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN TP(CRL.)12/2011 OF THE
HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA.
ANNEX.R1(H): COPY OF THE COMMON COMPLAINT DTD. 12/03/2012
SUBMITTED BEFORE THE POLICE AUTHORITIES.
ANNEX.R1(I): COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT SWORN BY MY ELDEST
DAUGHTER ON 23/06/13.
/TRUE COPY/
P.A.TO JUDGE
Kss
"CR"
V.K.MOHANAN, J.
-------------------------------
Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013
-------------------------------
Dated this the 7th day of August, 2013.
O R D E R
A very crucial question that arose for consideration in the above M.C. is, whether the "wife" or "daughter in law"
would come within the definition of "Respondent"
contained in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to for short as "the Act" only). In order to answer the above question, brief facts which led to the filing of the above M.C. are inevitable, which follows as:
2. The challenge in this M.C. is against an order dated 15.12.2012 in C.M.P.No.4687/10 in M.C.No.76/09 on the file of the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-
Thiruvananthapuram, filed by the mother-in-law of the present petitioner, by which the learned Magistrate 2 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 allowed the petition, impleading the petitioner, who is the wife of the 2nd respondent in the above M.C. and the daughter in law of the petitioner therein. The petitioner herein, for convenience hereinafter referred to as, the wife/ daughter in law and the 1st respondent as, the aggrieved person, and her son, who is the husband of the petitioner, as the 2nd respondent.
3. According to the petitioner herein, the aggrieved person approached the court below by filing C.M.P.No.3689/10, after one year from the date of filing of M.C.No.76/09 under Section 12 of the Act. Thus, besides pointing out the delay in filing the petition for impleading the petitioner, it was contended before the court below that the same was filed to disturb harmonious matrimonial relationship between herself and the 2nd respondent, who is the son of the aggrieved person. According to the petitioner, her father-in-law, namely the husband of the aggrieved person, was the Managing Director of a Public Sector Undertaking and thus the aggrieved person is 3 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 earning `10,000/- as family pension and her other daughters are well settled and the aggrieved person is residing along with one of her daughters. Thus stating all the above facts, the petitioner had filed an objection against the impleading petition. Copy of C.M.P.No.3689/10 filed by the aggrieved person for impleading the petitioner and the affidavit sworn into by her, and the objections subsequently filed therein by the petitioner are produced as Annexures A and B. Annexure C is the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, in C.M.P.No.3689/10 filed by the aggrieved person, wherein cost was ordered to be paid by the aggrieved person to the 2nd respondent, for the inordinate delay in filing the petition. It is the further case of the petitioner that, against Annexure C order, by filing Crl.M.C.No.4389/10, she approached this Court, but the same was disposed by this Court, granting liberty to the petitioner to appear before the court below raising the contention that she will not come under the purview of "respondent" as defined under the Act, and Annexure D is 4 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 the said order of this Court. It is the specific case of the petitioner that in terms of Annexure D, the wife/daughter-in- law, who is the petitioner herein, has filed C.M.P.No.4687/10 in the court below, challenging the maintainability of the complaint filed by the 1st respondent against the wife/daughter-in-law and the said petition was heard by the predecessor Magistrate, who issued summons to the wife/daughter-in-law on two occasions for being examined as witness from the side of the 2nd respondent. According to the petitioner, the wife/daughter-in-law, after the assumption of charge by the present Magistrate, the said petition was dismissed without hearing the petitioner or her counsel, which order is produced here as Annexure E.
4. The case of the aggrieved person is that, she is a senior citizen and a widow, residing in an orphanage. Her husband Ibrahim Kutty had expired on 21.4.2004. Besides the 2nd respondent, she has two daughters and another son, as her children. According to her, she was residing along with her husband and children in Shahina Manzil, 5 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 T.C.No.13/705, for more than 13 years and the said house and property having an extent of about 6 cents stands in the name of her deceased husband, which was purchased by him through a valid sale deed. Her daughters and the other son are residing separately. According to the aggrieved person, her son - the 2nd respondent, in collusion with his wife, harassed, humiliated and threatened her and has finally driven her out of her own house with the ulterior motive of grabbing the property. According to the aggrieved person, she being a widow who was residing in Shahina Manzil, the house and the property which were in the name of her deceased husband, proposed to spend rest of her life in the said house, as she has got sentiments with such house where she lived along with her deceased husband. According to the aggrieved person, the above property is in the name of her deceased husband and he had not executed any Will giving the right over it to anybody including her son, who is the 2nd respondent herein.
5. According to the aggrieved person, as the 6 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 misbehavior and ill-treatment towards her was so cruel, she initially approached the State Women's Commission and on getting notice from the Commission, the wife/daughter in law has filed M.C.No.54/09 before the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvananthapuram and obtained an ex parte protection order, but later the M.C. was dismissed. According to the aggrieved person, as the mental and physical harassment continued against her, she preferred a petition under section 12 of the Act and thus M.C.No.76/09 was instituted in the court below and the court below passed an interim order, and dissatisfied with the order of the learned CJM, she preferred an appeal before the Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, which resulted in the order dated 21.8.2009 in Crl.A.No.517/09. As the 2nd respondent - the son of the aggrieved person, had failed to comply with the interim order, cognizance was taken for the offence punishable under Section 31 of the Act, against which, the 2nd respondent approached this Court by filing Crl.M.C.No.3829/09, which was disposed of 7 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 by this Court by order dated 15.2.2010 and subsequently, Crl.M.C.No.3829/09 was reopened suo motu by order dated 24.2.2011. It is also the case of the aggrieved person that against the order of this Court, referred above, her son preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Honourable Supreme Court, which resulted in the order dated 18.7.2011 upon the Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).2460/11 and thereafter, the 2nd respondent filed T.P.(Crl.)No.12/11 before this Court, for transfer of the case from the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and the same was dismissed by this Court by order dated 4.3.2011 and subsequently, the said order was again challenged in the Honourable Supreme Court, but by order dated 9.1.2012 in the petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 5800/2011, the same was dismissed. As the harassment continued, according to the aggrieved person, she preferred W.P.(C) No.8550/12 before this Court, seeking police protection and subsequently the same was withdrawn as this Court directed the parties to appear for mediation. 8 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013
6. According to the aggrieved person, the maltreatment and harassment done by her son - the 2nd respondent, was at the instance of his wife, since she was interested in grabbing the property and the person behind all the vexatious litigation was her daughter-in-law and in the said circumstances, she moved an application as C.M.P.No.4687/10 before the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvananthapuram, to implead the petitioner herein as additional respondent in M.C.No.76/09, which was allowed by the court below as per the impugned order.
7. According to the petitioner, who is the wife/ daughter in law, she would not come under the purview of "Respondent" as defined under Section 2(q) of the Act. Therefore, the above M.C. is filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C., with a prayer to set aside Annexure E order in C.M.P.No.4687/10.
8. I have heard Adv.Sri.K.Abdul Jawad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Adv.Sri.Achuth Kylas, learned 9 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 counsel for the 1st respondent herein, who is the aggrieved person and also Adv.Sri.Mohammed Al Rafi, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent herein. I have also heard Adv.Sri.Rajesh Vijayan, the learned Public Prosecutor.
9. Adv.Sri.K.Abdul Jawad, learned counsel for the petitioner, the wife/daughter in law, in his persuasive arguments, after taking me through the various provisions of the Act and the circumstances under which the above Act is enacted, has submitted that the petitioner being the wife of the son of the aggrieved person, at no stretch of imagination will come under the definition of Section 2(q), more particularly, even as per the proviso to Section 2(q), because of the marital status of the petitioner with the son of the aggrieved person, the wife/daughter-in-law is out of the extended definition of the term "respondent" as contemplated under the Proviso. In support of the above contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner, he relied upon the following decisions, reported in Afzalunnisa Begum and others Vs. State of A.P. and another (2009 10 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 KHC 5824) and also in, Manju A.Nair Vs. State of Kerala (2012(4) KLT 39).
10. Whereas, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ aggrieved person strenuously submitted that, the Act itself was adopted by the Parliament to give protection to women as a whole, from domestic violence and there is no meaning for a further classification, by excluding the wife or daughter-in-law from the ambit of Section 2(q) of the Act, and it will be against the object to be achieved by above enactment. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions : Kusum Lata Sharma Vs. State and another (2011 KHC 2921), Sandhya Manoj Wankhade Vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade and others [(2011) 3 Supreme Court Cases 650], an order of this Court dated 2.12.2009 in Crl.M.C.No.2225 of 2009, Kanai Lal Sur. Vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 S.C. 907 (Y 44 C 135 Dec.)], Archana Hemant Naik Vs. Urmilaben I.Naik and another (2010 KHC 7159), Chandan Singh Vs. Shyam 11 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 Sunder Agrawal (2006(4) AWC 4192) and Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another {(1994) 3 Supreme Court Cases 440}.
11. Sri.Rajesh Vijayan, the learned Public Prosecutor, after taking me through various provisions including the definition Clause under Sections 2(a), 2 (q), 3 and particularly the Section 19 of the Act, has submitted that, a harmonious interpretation of various provisions are required so as to give effect to the object to be achieved, for which the Act is enacted. The learned Public Prosecutor in support of his contentions, placed reliance on the following decisions Kanai Lal Sur. Vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 S.C. 907 (Y 44 C 135 Dec.)] and B.Shah Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Coimbatore and others (AIR 1978 SC 12).
12. I have carefully considered the submissions made by both the counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondents and also the arguments advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor. I have also perused the order 12 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 impugned and the other materials produced in the above petition that are produced from the side of the petitioner and the contesting respondents. I have carefully gone through the authorities cited at the Bar.
13. From the facts stated above, it can be seen that the aggrieved person approached the court below during the year 2009 seeking various reliefs under the Act. In spite of the mandate that is contained in Sub Section (5) of Section 12 of the Act, by which it is stipulated that, "The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub- section (1) of section 12, within a period of 60 days from the date of its first hearing", the matter is still pending in the court below without any substantial progress. Several proceedings that are initiated, both at the instance of the aggrieved person as well as the other respondents, and also the present petitioner - the wife/ daughter in law, would show the several rounds of litigation, including the petitions filed before the Honourable Supreme Court on two occasions.
13 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013
14. This Court is fully aware of the fact that several petitions are being filed before this Court on similar ground by the wife or daughter-in-law, contending that no action would lie against them under the above Act, as they will not come under the definition of "Respondent". Hence, according to me, the question involved in the present case, is a serious question of law bearing general importance and involving public interest.
15. The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the above Act says that, "1. Short title, extent and commencement. -- (1) This Act may be called the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force on such date* as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint."
The above Act is adopted by the Parliament to achieve the following objects :
" (i) It covers those women who are or have been in a relationship with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a shared household 14 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 and are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption. In addition, relationships with family members living together as a joint family are also included. Even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers, single women, or living with the abuser are entitled to legal protection under the proposed legislation. However, whereas the Bill enables the wife or the female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage to file a complaint under the proposed enactment against any relative of the husband or the male partner, it does not enable any female relative of the husband or the male partner to file a complaint against the wife or the female partner.
(ii) It defines the expression "domestic violence"
to include actual abuse or threat or abuse that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic. Harassment by way of unlawful dowry demands to the woman or her relatives would also be covered under this definition.
(iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. It also provides for the right of a woman to reside in her matrimonial home or shared household, whether or not she has any title or rights in such home or household. This right is secured by a residence order, which is passed by the Magistrate.
(iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in favour of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from aiding or committing an act of domestic violence or any other specified act, entering a workplace or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person, attempting to communicate with her, isolating any assets used by both the parties and causing violence to the aggrieved person, her relatives or 15 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 others who provide her assistance from the domestic violence.
(v) It provides for appointment of Protection Officers and registration of non-governmental organisations as service providers for providing assistance to the aggrieved person with respect to her medical examination, obtaining legal aid, safe shelter, etc." (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, on a consideration of the circumstances under which the Act promulgated and the objects sought to be achieved, it is crystal clear that the main object is to protect the women as a whole and according to me, that is why the Act itself named and projected as "The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act". It is relevant to note that, Section 2(a) of the Act defines an "aggrieved person", which reads as follows :
"aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent."
A plain reading of the section indicates, particularly in view of the emphasised portion of the object, that any woman in a domestic relationship with the respondent can invoke the 16 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 provisions of the Act, provided, the other conditions are satisfied. It is relevant to note that the definition "aggrieved person" is not confined to a lady, or woman, based upon her marital status alone. So, the definition of "aggrieved person" cannot be interpreted by giving a narrow meaning as 'wife' only.
16. It is true, in Section 2(q), where the term "respondent" defines, states as, "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner;"
But, by incorporating the proviso, the said definition is extended against the relative of the husband or the male partner. So, according to me, the proviso given under Section 2(q), is not only extending the class of persons coming under the term "respondent", but the same is also extending the definition of "aggrieved person" contained in 17 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 Section 2(a). In the proviso, what stated and provided are that, an aggrieved wife or female, living in a domestic relationship in the nature of marriage, can file complaint against a relative of the husband or against the male partner.
17. According to me, the definition "aggrieved person" that is contained in section 2(a), unless the same is exclusively meant for wife/daughter-in-law alone and until excludes other women who are relatives of the husband, it is incorrect to hold that the wife/daughter-in-law will not come under the definition of "respondent" as defined in Section 2
(q). In this juncture, it is relevant to note that the Honourable Apex Court has held in the decision reported in Sandhya Manoj Wankhade Vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade and others [(2011) 3 SCC 650] that, "legislature never intended to exclude female relatives from ambit of complaint that could be made under 2005 Act."
18. In the present case, it is relevant to note that there is no challenge against the institution of the petition, at the 18 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 instance of the aggrieved person, who is the mother of the 2nd respondent and the mother-in-law of the petitioner herein, under Section 12(1) of the Act. At this juncture, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, Section 19(1)(c) of the Act is relevant. Section 19, with the caption "Residence orders" reads as follows :
"While disposing of an application under Sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order--
(a) xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx
(b) xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides ; "
According to the learned counsel, if wife or daughter-in-law is not impleaded as respondent, she can prevent the aggrieved person from enjoying an order under section 19 (1)(c) of the Act. Hence, if a domestic violence is committed by the wife/daughter-in-law, she being a female person would also come within the ambit of the definition "respondent". Otherwise, as in the present case, if an order 19 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 is passed under Section 19(1)(c) against the original respondent alone, who is the son of the aggrieved person, the son's wife, ie., the daughter-in-law of the aggrieved person, who is the petitioner herein, can very well defeat the order of the court under section 19(1)(c). It is not out of context to refer to the facts agitated by the aggrieved person in support of her claim and the alleged domestic violence committed against her and the various litigations said to have initiated against her, at the instance of the petitioner herein. So, one of the objectives aimed by the Act can be defeated, if a narrow interpretation to Section 2(q) is given, excluding the wife/daughter in law from the definition of "respondent". It is to be noted that, the Act never contemplates to give any privilege or protection to a lady, whatever may be her family status, to commit any domestic violence against another female, who is in domestic relationship with the respondent. Except the male, all victims, against whom domestic violence is meted out can be included in the definition of "aggrieved person", vice 20 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 versa all persons irrespective of their marital status, who meted out the domestic violence against any female member of the family, can be included in the term "respondent" and the exclusion of any woman for the sole reason that she is the wife or daughter-in-law, is against the very object and purpose of the Act. Suppose the victim is a major female or her "step mother" or "a woman living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage", such victim can file a complaint against those persons, who meted out domestic violence. The concept of the society about "Mother" is being subjected to change and incidents are being reported that even the "Mother" is presenting her own daughter for flesh trade. Thus, while giving protection to women, a check measure has to be adopted to prevent such women from subjecting the female members of the same family to domestic violence. Hence, under the guise of being 'wife' or 'daughter-in-law', they cannot be given privilege or be allowed to escape from the liability under the provisions of the above Act, if she has committed any "domestic 21 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 violence". Thus, if the second wife or wife, who being the step mother or even if a real mother, meted out domestic violence against a major daughter, they along with her father has to be arrayed as respondent, in an action under the provisions of the above Act.
19. In this juncture it is relevant to note that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, heavily relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in (2012(4) KLT 39) cited supra, wherein it is held that, "An adult female person could be made a respondent only if the complaint is filed either by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage". In the said decision, it is relevant to note that the question referred by a learned Single Judge of this Court was whether a mother could proceed against her daughter under the provisions of the Act, taking note of the the two decisions of this Court reported in Remadevi Vs. State of Kerala (2008(4) KLT 105) and Vijayalekshmi Amma Vs. Bindu (2010(1) KLT 79). So, according to me, the factual 22 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 inputs in the present case are entirely different from the facts involved in the decisions of the Division Bench referred to above and hence the same are not relevant and applicable in the present case.
20. It is relevant to note that a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the decision reported in (2011 KHC 2921) cited supra, in a similar situation and answering a similar question of law, has held that, "A mother who is being maltreated and harassed by her son would be an "aggrieved person". If the said harassment is caused through the female relative of the son, ie., his wife, the said family relative will fall within the ambit of the "respondent" , and it is further held that, "this phenomenon of the daughters-in-law harassing their mothers-in-law especially who are dependant is not uncommon in the Indian society". The facts involved in the case on hand are identical to the facts involved in the above decision.
21. As rightly observed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, it is beyond dispute that, with respect 23 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 to the matrimonial issues and domestic violence, it is a shocking factor that, 95% of such disputes are originated from simple and petty reasons, which pave way to difference of opinion among the spouses or among the members of their family, which ultimately lead to filing of petition for divorce or for maintenance, or filing of even criminal cases, irrespective of their caste, creed or religion. Absence of proper understanding about the institution of marriage, social realities and poor economic background etc. are some of the basic reasons for such disputes. However, as I indicated earlier, irrespective of the religion, caste or creed, the victims are always the women. The discrimination or hostility against women starts from the womb of her mother and it is very shocking to hear that there is tendency to abort a female foetus in the womb itself. After birth, the females are discriminated from males and the same continues through out her life cycle, notwithstanding the fact whether she is a daughter, daughter-in-law, wife or mother. A society wherein the status of a woman is not 24 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 recognized in par with that of man, or where man and woman are not recognized equally, such litigation are likely to continue and the same cannot be prevented or reduced, unless the mind set of people is brought to comprehensive and drastic change and progress through the social, educational, economic changes in the society as a whole. Since, harassment, maltreatment and cruelty against the women are being increased day by day, the legislature thought of, adopting a new legislation to give protection to the women as a class in their domestic affairs as necessary and the said object is spelled out from the objects contained in the Bill, which I referred earlier. So, at no stretch of imagination it can be concluded that, various measures and protection contemplated in various provisions of the Act, are only for wife or female living in marital relationship with the male partner. In the decision reported in (2011) 3 SCC 650 cited supra, the Apex Court has held that, "no restrictive meaning can be given to expression "relative" nor has said expression been defined to make it specific to 25 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 males only" and further held that, "Legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or the male partner from the ambit of complaint that could be made under the provisions of the Act".
22. Considering the object sought to be achieved, as spelled out from the reason and object introduced in the Bill, it is crystal clear that the Bill was introduced, purportedly to give protection to women as a whole in the areas covered by the Act and it is unconstitutional to further classify "woman" to give rigid meaning as 'wife' and limiting various protective measures meant for women, to the wife or daughter-in-law alone, especially when the definition under Section 2(a), "an aggrieved person" does not confine to such category of woman, ie., wife or daughter-in-law alone. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the law making authority never intended to make a further classification among the women and to exclude the class of woman, namely, the wife or daughter-in-law, in fixing the liability, if the aggrieved persons are subjected to domestic violence by 26 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 such person.
23. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that, as the Act intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to woman, a beneficial interpretation is required. In the decision reported in AIR 1978 SC 12 cited supra, it has held that :
"xxxxx xxxIt has also to be borne in mind in this connection that in interpreting provisions of beneficial pieces of legislation like the one in hand which is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to women workers employed in the plantations and which squarely fall within the purview of Art. 42 of the Constitution, the beneficent rule of construction which would enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child; preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output has to be adopted by the Court".
Similarly, in another decision reported in AIR 1957 S.C. 907 (Y 44 C 135 Dec.) cited supra, in the third paragraph of para (6) it is observed that, "However, in applying these observations to the provisions of any statute, it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature 27 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction." As the real object of the Act is to give protection to the women, connected with domestic violence and related issues, the term "respondent" has to be interpreted, so as to extend the protection to all the victims of domestic violence who are females, irrespective of the fact whether such domestic violence is meted out by the wife, or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage or step mother, particularly when the definition "aggrieved person"
contained in Section 2(a) is not confined to wife or 28 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 daughter-in-law. I am of the firm view that, it is unreasonable to restrict the protection and privilege to a woman, considering her marital status alone or till she become a mother-in-law. According to me, as long as a woman satisfies with the other conditions contemplated by the Act, she is entitled to get the protection, as envisaged therein, irrespective of the fact whether she is a wife or mother-in-law and if she commits any domestic violence, she is liable to be prosecuted for such guilt of domestic violence as well, because, todays "wives" are tomorrow's "mothers-
in-law". Following the dictum laid down in the above authorities and in the light of the above discussion, any interpretation giving a restrictive meaning to the definition of "respondent" under section 2(q), that a complaint can be filed only against a relative of the husband or the male partner, excluding the wife or daughter in law, is quite unreasonable and against the Constitutional Mandates that are enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. So, the resultant conclusion is that, a wife or 29 Crl.M.C.No.136 of 2013 daughter-in-law or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage, will also come under the definition of "respondent" contained in Section 2(q).
In the result, the above M.C. is dismissed upholding Annexure-E order dated 15.12.2012 in C.M.P.No.4687/10 in M.C.No.76/09 on the file of the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-Thiruvananthapuram.
Sd/-
V.K.MOHANAN, Judge ami/ The following corrections are carried out in the final order dated 7.8.2013 in Crl.M.C.No.136/2013, vide order dated 12.9.2013 in Crl.M.A.No.6750/2013 in Crl.M.C. No.136/2013 :
The 3rd sentence occurring in paragraph 4 ie. "Besides the 2nd respondent, she has two daughters and another son, as her children" is corrected as "Besides the 2nd respondent, she has two daughters as her children".
The 5th sentence occurring in paragraph 4 at page 5 ie., "Her daughters and the other son are residing separately" is corrected as "Her daughters are residing separately".
Sd/-
Registrar (Judicial)