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[Cites 8, Cited by 3]

Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)

G. Anjaneeya Prasad And Anr. vs S. Vinod Kumar on 3 March, 2006

Equivalent citations: 2006(2)ALD662

JUDGMENT
 

V.V.S. Rao, J.
 

1. The suit being O.S No. 521 of 1997 was filed by the sole respondent (hereafter called, the plaintiff) for eviction of the appellants (hereinafter called, the defendants) from the suit schedule premises bearing Gram Panchayat Shop No. 17-86/B consisting of premises No. 17-113 situated at Kamala Nagar, Dilsukhnagar, Ranga Reddy District. The said suit was decreed by the Court of Junior Civil Judge, (East and North), Ranga Reddy District on 17.4.2000. The first appeal filed by the appellants herein being A.S. No. 57 of 2000 was also dismissed by the Court of II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy on 25.4.2002 directing the appellants to vacate the suit premises within three months from the date of the said judgment. This second appeal was filed on 15.7.2002. A question was raised before the learned Single Judge, before whom the case was listed, as to whether in spite of the suit property coming within the Municipality during the pendency of the appeal, City Civil Court can pass executable eviction decree though A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (Rent Control Act, for brevity) is applicable to the area. By order, dated 18.11.2002, the learned Single Judge, having regard to the conflicting views taken by this Court in R.K. Gupta v. Sirtaj Kara, 1989 (1) ALT 551 and R. Babu v. H.K.N. Ayyanger 1999 (4) ALD 450, directed the matter to be placed before the Division Bench. When the matter came up before the Division Bench, by order, dated 11.8.2003, having regard to the conflict in the above two decisions and also the other decisions of the Supreme Court, directed the matter to be referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench answered the reference in the positive by order, dated 6.1.2006 and thereafter the matter has set down before this Court for admission.

2. The fact of the matter is not in dispute. The plaintiff is the owner of suit premises, by reason of a family settlement, dated 23.10.1993. He filed the suit alleging that the first defendant took the suit premises on lease from the mother of the plaintiff in 1989 on a monthly rent of Rs. 400/- and the lease commenced on 1.1.1989. The lease was for a period of eleven months. The lease was extended subsequently on a monthly rent of Rs. 750/-. The plaintiff was also running STD booth in Shop No. 17-86/4. On 13.3.1997, plaintiffs mother issued a notice to the plaintiff to vacate and handover the shop, in which the plaintiff is running STD booth. Therefore, first defendant was informed about family settlement requesting to vacate the suit premises, in vain. In the meanwhile, plaintiff met with an accident, and taking advantage of the same, the first defendant did not pay the rents from 1.4.1995 amounting to Rs. 19,500/-. Further, first defendant inducted the second defendant into suit mulgi without knowledge and permission of the plaintiff. He issued quit notice asking the defendants to vacate the suit premises, which he did not do, and therefore the suit was filed for eviction of the defendants from the suit schedule premises for delivery of vacant possession, for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 19,500/- and for mesne profits @ Rs. 2,000/- per month. The defendants filed written statement opposing the suit. They denied title of the plaintiff. They also denied allegation of 'sub-lease' by first defendant to second defendant stating that the second defendant being the brother is working with the first defendant as a tailor.

3. The plaintiffs examined three witnesses and marked Exs. A1 to A18. The defendants marked B1 to B5 besides examining DW1 to DW3. On consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court held against the defendants in all the issues and decreed the suit directing the defendants to deliver vacant possession within one month from the date of the judgment and pay mesne profits @ Rs. 800/-per month from the date of termination of tenancy till the date of vacant possession and pay the costs. The defendants appealed to the Court of the II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District. Appeal was filed on 15.5.2000.

4. While the appeal was pending, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued orders in G.O. Ms. No. 548, dated 25.11.2000, notifying the Gaddi Annaram Gram Panchayat (where suit premises was situated) as Municipality with effect from 25.11.2000. Therefore, the defendants raised a plea before the appellate Court to the effect that monthly rent of suit premises being Rs. 750/-, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appellate Court considered this point besides other points and dismissed the appeal holding that Gaddi Annaram Gram Panchayat was notified as Municipality only from 25.11.2000 and that by the date of filing of the suit, the suit premises was located in Gram Panchayat to which the Rent Control Act has no application. The learned Single Judge, before whom the matter was placed for admission, after noticing the factual background, observed as under :

The only substantial question that falls for consideration in this second appeal is as under :
Whether in spite of suit property coming within the Municipality during the pendency of the appeal, City Civil Court can pass executable eviction decree, though Rent Control Act is applicable to the area? (emphasis supplied)

5. The matter was ultimately placed before the Full Bench, which considered the question whether Section 10(1) of the Rent Control Act ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to pass a decree for eviction of any person, who is a tenant within the meaning of Rent Control Act. After referring to the decisions in R. Babu v. H.K.N. Ayyanger (supra), R.K. Gupta v. Sirtaj Karan (supra), Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak , Nand Kishore Marwah v. Sarnundri Devi and Mansoor Khan v. Motiram Harebhan Kharat , the Full Bench answered the reference in the following terms :

We are therefore of the opinion that there is nothing in the language of A.P. Rent Control Act which bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court either (original or appellate) to pass a decree for eviction.
In view of the aforesaid reasons and also the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the latter decision in the case of Mansoor Khan v. Motiram Harebhan Kharat (supra), it is now settled that the rights of the parties in a case are to be decided on the date of the suit. As long as the suit is validly instituted and any change in law would not have affect on the said proceedings. Further, even such change would not affect pending proceedings unless and until the Statute taking away such jurisdiction is specifically given with retrospective effect. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, merely because the Gram Panchayat is converted into that of Municipality and the applicability of the provisions of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 to such Municipality cannot have any affect on the proceedings which have already been initiated much prior to the date of such conversion and it will only have a prospective operation for any remedies to be availed.
Therefore, in answer to the question referred, we hold that the change of Gram Panchayat into a Municipality and the ushering in of the provisions of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 would not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed and dispose of the cases pending on its file and which have been filed much prior to the date of such conversion.

6. The Full Bench directed the Registry to place the matter before appropriate Court for necessary consequential order. In view of the decision of the Full Bench, which answered the only substantial question of law that would arise in the second appeal (as framed by the learned Single Judge in the reference order, dated 18.11.2002), nothing survives in the second appeal. The second appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed.

7. The learned Counsel for the appellants (defendants) however submits that the suit premises is more than fifteen years old and the rent is less than Rs. 2,000/- and therefore in view of Section 32(c) of the Rent Control Act as inserted by A.P. Amendment Act No. 17 of 2005, the Rent Control Act alone is applicable and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction either to pass decree or execute the same. This question is no more res Integra.

8. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Satish Chandra Makan v. Dr. S.V.S. Sastry , has held that Section 32(c) of the Rent Control Act as amended by Act No. 17 of 2005 does not apply retrospectively from the date of original Act and that it is only prospective. This Court has no strong reason to differ with the view taken in Satish Chandra Makan v. Dr. S.V.S. Sastry (supra). In this case, the trial Court passed the decree on 17.4.2000, which was confirmed by the appellate Court on 25.4.2002 much before Section 32(c) of the Rent Control Act came into force i.e., 28.5.2005. The decree passed by the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court has become final. Mere pendency of the second appeal for-admission before this Court does not in any manner affect the finality of the decree passed by the trial Court as confirmed by appellate Court. Be it noted, unless the second appeal is accepted by this Court framing a substantial question of law, it cannot be said that the decree passed by the lower Courts is at large nor can it be said that the decree passed by the trial Court is eclipsed by mere pendency of the second appeal at the stage of admission. Therefore, Section 32(c) of the Rent Control Act cannot come to the rescue of the defendants. At the relevant time, the suit was instituted, decree was passed and such decree was confirmed by the trial Court. Rent Control Act had no application to the suit premises and therefore the defendants cannot even take shelter under Section 10(1) of the Rent Control Act.

9. The second appeal is devoid of any merit and as a consequence of the decision of the Full Bench in this case, the same is dismissed at the stage of admission.