Karnataka High Court
Gurunathsa Madusa Khode vs Transport Commissioner on 16 October, 1985
Equivalent citations: ILR1985KAR3787, 1985(2)KARLJ527
ORDER Puttaswamy, J.
1. In these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have challenged the demand notices dated 26-11-1981 (Annexures 'E' to 'H') issued by the Regional Transport Officer, Dharwar ('RTO') calling upon them to pay the amounts specified in the respective demand notices as additional taxes.
2. The petitioners are registered owners of public carrier vehicles bearing Registration Nos. MEZ 4449, 4494, 5653 and 4896 respectively registered in the State of Karnataka and are exigible to taxes on the basis of registered laden weight ('RLW') of their respective vehicles under the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 35 of 1957) ('the Act').
3. On different dates mentioned in the respective demand notices, an Inspector of Motor Vehicles ('IMV') attached to the office of the RTO intercepted the vehicles when plying on public roads, checked them and found that they were carrying goods in excess of the RLW as set out in the respective demand notices. In other words, the IMV found that the petitioners had overloaded their vehicles as set out in the respective demand notices in contravention of the terms and conditions of the permitted carrying capacity of their respective vehicles and permits issued thereto under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. On these facts that are not disputed by the petitioners, the RTO in the impugned demand notices has called upon them to pay the respective amounts as additional taxes under the Act.
4. The petitioners have challenged the demand notices on diverse grounds that will be noticed by us in due course.
5. The respondents have resisted these petitions.
6. Sri M. Rangaswamy, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, contends that overloading or violations do not attract liability for additional taxes under the Act and the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Noorulla Khan -v.- R.T.O. holding to the contrary, which had the effect of legislating in the thin guise of interpretation contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in A.V. Fernandes -v.- The State of Kerala calls for reconsideration.
7. Sri S. Rajendra Babu, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents, contends that the ruling of this Court in Noorulla Khan's case that has considered and decided the very question against the petitioners does not call for reconsideration at all.
8. In Noorulla Khan's Case, a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (KSPJ) was a member, examining the very point or question, has rejected the same, inter alia, expressing that the same does not amount to legislation in the thin guise of interpretation. On the very principles stated in Noorulla Khan's Case, this contention of Sri Rangaswamy is liable to be rejected. We are firmly of the view that Noorulla Khan's Case does not call for reconsideration on any aspect. We, therefore, reject this contention of Sri Rangaswamy.
9. Sri Rangaswamy next contends that at the most, the petitioners are liable to pay additional taxes only for the day of overloading or violations and not for the whole quarter as demanded by the RTO.
10. Sri Rajendra Babu contends that the unit of taxation being a quarter, half-year and year under Section 4 of the Act, the demand made by the RTO for a quarter was legal and valid. In support of his contention, Sri Rajendra Babu strongly relies on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mathra Prasad and Sons -v.- State of Punjab and others.
11. Section 3 of the Act which is the charging section creates liability on 'motor vehicles' suitable for use on roads
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3. 13. S.T.C. 180 at the rates specified in the Schedule to the Act. The schedules elaborately classify vehicles and the rates of taxes payable thereto on them.
12. Section 4 regulates the payment of taxes chargeable under Section 3 of the Act. Section 4(1) of the Act that is material reads thus :
"4. Payment of tax - (1) The tax levied under Section 3 shall be paid in advance by the registered owner or person having possession or control of the motor vehicle, for a quarter, half-year and year, at his choice, within fifteen days from the commencement of such quarter, half-year or year, as the case may be."
This Section specifies the units of taxation or payment of taxes on motor vehicles. The units of taxation on motor vehicles under the Act is a quarter, half-year or year as may be chosen by the owner. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad & Sons' case, an unit of taxation is chosen for easy accounting and collection of taxes and the tax-payer is bound to conform to the same. In other words, a tax-payer cannot choose his own unit of taxation and he must make payments only in conformity with the units of taxation stipulated in the Act. From this, it follows that the demand made by the RTO which is in conformity with Section 4 of the Act is legal. We see no merit in this contention of Sri Rangaswamy either.
13. Sri Rangaswamy lastly contends that the initial liability to pay taxes for a quarter does not justify the with-holding of refund of taxes for periods for which there was no additional liability for taxes at all under the Act.
14. Sri Rajendra Babu sought to justify the demands made by the RTO for the entire periods or quarters.
15. We will examine this contention with reference to the case of the petitioner in W.P.No. 32739/81 as illustrative only.
16. The petitioner who is the owner of motor vehicle No. MEZ 4449 had overloaded his vehicle on 19 10-1981 or for one day only in the month of October 1981 and not on any day in the succeeding months of November and December 1981. In his demand notice, the RTO had called upon this petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.660/- as additional taxes for the quarter commencing from 1-10-1981 and ending on 31-12-1981. We have earlier held that the petitioner is initially bound to pay that amount as that is the unit of taxation. But the contention of Sri Rangaswamy is that for the months of November and December 1981 there was no overloading or violations and therefore the amounts proportionate to those two months for which there was no additional liability on principles analogous to Section 7 of the Act is liable to be refunded to the petitioner, which is, however, opposed by the respondents.
17. The Act and the Rules do not throw any light on this question. Section 7 of the Act and the Rules regulating refunds also in terms do not expressly deal and apply to cases of refunds staked before us. We must therefore examine and decide this question on general, legal and equitable principles only which we now proceed to do.
18. We may first notice that under the Act and the Rules when a person uses his motor vehicle even for only one day in a month, he is deemed to have used the same for the whole of that month and refunds are regulated on that basis only. We cannot depart from this scheme and requirement of the Act. We must therefore necessarily hold that though the petitioner in W.P. No.32739/81 overloaded or violated for only one day in October 1981 by reason of that only he becomes liable for taxes for the whole of that month. What then remains to be considered is the claim of the petitioner for the months of November and December, 1981 only.
19. What has been held earlier cannot and does not obviously touch on the claim of the petitioners for refund of taxes for those months there were no contraventions and consequently there were no liabilities for additional taxes at all. The units of payments do not necessarily mean that there has been a wrong user for the other months also and the refunds for those months also should be denied. When there has been no contravention for the other months and afortion there were no liabilities for additional taxes, law, justice and equity demand that proportionate amounts of taxes for those months should be refunded to the petitioners. We are of the view that this approach and solution does justice to all and is fair to all at least till the Act and the Rules expressly regulate the same.
20. We are, however, of the view that the petitioners who made initial payments should move the authorities for refunds under the Rules and the authorities should examine them and then order refunds, if they are satisfied that there were no similar contraventions for the other months and no more. We must also observe that in regulating refunds for other months or periods, the authorities cannot insist on strict compliance with the requirements of Section 7 of the Act and Rule 23 of the Rules as that is impossible of compliance on the facts of these cases.
21. On the foregoing discussion, we hold that the petitioners have to initially pay the taxes in terms of the demands made against them by the RTO and then stake their claims for refunds for those months there were no contraventions before that authority only.
22. In the light of our above discussion, we make the following orders and directions :
(i) We dismiss these Writ Petitions to the extent they challenge the demands made by the RTO. But, we, however, grant one month's time from this day to each of the petitioners to make payment of the amounts demanded from him by the RTO.
(ii) We declare that after making payments, the petitioners are entitled to make applications before the RTO for refunds for those months in which they had not overloaded their vehicles.
(iii) We direct the RTO to examine and dispose of the refund applications to be made by the petitioners in accordance with law and the observations made in this order.
23. Writ Petitions are disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.