Patna High Court
Ram Prasad Singh vs Subodh Prasad Singh And Ors. on 3 May, 1983
Equivalent citations: AIR1983PAT278, AIR 1983 PATNA 278, (1983) PAT LJR 554, 1983 BBCJ 548, (1983) BLJ 403
ORDER Hari Lal Agrawal, J.
1. This application in revision has been filed against the orders of the Courts below punishing the petitioner for disobedience of the Court's order passed in an injunction matter.
2. The principal question involved in this case is as to whether the petitioner is liable to be proceeded against under Order 39, Rule 2 (31. Civil P. C. when he was not personally a party to the suit
3. The relevant facts leading to the passing of the order, are as follows. The plaintiff Subodh Prasad Singh instituted Title Suit No. 29 of 1976 in the trial court praying to declare him as the legally appointed Headmaster of Rai Kumar and Lalji High School. Barhonia, impleading the Board of Secondary Education. Bihar, through its Secretary as defendant first party, the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School as defendani second party and Shri Vivekanand Mishra (for short 'Shri Mishra') as defendant third party. The plaintiff and Shri Mishra were appointed as Assistant Teachers in the school with effect from 27-7-1960 and 25-7-1958 respectively. At that time one Jogendra Prasad Singh was the Headmaster who left the school and Shri Mishra being the seniormost, Assistant Teacher was appointed the Incharge Headmaster with effect from 1-1-1971. The petitioner had joined as District Education Officer. Monghyr. on 18-2-1976. The Board of Secondary Education by its order dated 12-3-1976 had already confirmed the order of the petitioner's; predecessor appointing Shri Mishra as the Headmaster of the school (Annexurr 8).
4. In Title Suit No. 29 of 1976 filed by the plaintiff-opposite party on 14-4-1576 in the court of the Second Munsif. Monghyr. to establish his claim over the office of the Headmaster, he inter alia prayed for injunction restraining Shri Mishra from working as the Headmaster of the school. On 15-4-76 while issuing the notice in the injunction matter the trial court ordered "to maintain status quo until the final disposal of the injunction matter". The Board communicated this order of the court to the petitioner also. On 7-12-1976 the plaintiff filed an application in the trial court against all the three defendants complaining that the order of status quo was violated by the defendants and that this petitioner was the person concerned liable for the contempt of court. This was registered as Misc. Case No. 61 of 1976. Notice was accordingly issued to the petitioner and cause was shown defending the action of the petitioner as the District Education Officer. One of the points taken was that the petitioner being not a party, could not be proceeded against in this proceeding.
5. The trial court held that before and after 15-4-1976 it was the plaintiff who was working as the Headmaster of the school and that the petitioner (District Education Officer) had disobeyed the order of status quo by treating Shri Mishra as the Headmaster of the school. It accordingly ordered for attachment of 2 months' salary of the petitioner as a measure of punishment for the aforesaid disobedience. An appeal was filed by the petitioner and the Additional District Judge by his long order dismissed the same. While dismissing the appeal the learned Additional District Judge held that the petitioner was "the agent of the Board and the Board had directed the then D.E.O., Monghyr to scrupulousty obey the order of the court, i.e., to maintain status quo, but the..... appellant did not respect the order of the court....."
6. Although in revision the findings were not challenged and in fact could not be challenged, just for the sake of completing the facts. I would state, that the case of the plaintiff was that he had been promoter! as Acting Headmaster of the school on 26-10-1974 by the Managing Committee and that Sri Mishra never took charge of the office of the Headmaster in pursuance of the letter of the Board dated 12-3-1970 and, therefore, it was the plaintiff who was working as the Headmaster UP to 8-11-1976.
7. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner being not a defendant in the suit, in any view of the matter he could not be held guilty for the alleged breach of the order of the court. It is no doubt, true that the opening words of Rule 2 of Order 39 speaks that "In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind..... the plaintiff may apply to the court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant....."
8. Some decisions were also cited on behalf of the petitioner in support of the proposition, although the principle as such is well settled. In the Special Bench case of Pratap Udai Nath Shahi De0 v. Sara Lal Durga Prasad Nath Shahi Deo (AIR 1949 Pat 39) it was laid down that equity acts in personam and an injunction is a personal matter. The ordinary rule is that it can only be disobeyed in contempt by persons named in the writ. Persons who were not defendants in the suit in which injunction was granted nor were named in the decree, cannot be proceeded against in contempt for disobeying the injunction. Reference was also made to the case of S. N. Bannerjee v. Kuchwar Lime & Stone Co, Ltd. (AIR 1938 PC 295) and to the case of Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 Pat 443).
9. The facts of the aforesaid cases are entirely distinguishable. In my opinion, the above authorities are of no assistance to the petitioner as. apart from the fact that the nature of the protective order that was passed by the Munsif which had a wider import and operation, the case should be governed by the princi-ples laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Rani Spna-bati Kumari (AIR 1961 SC 2211. In that case an order of temporary iniunction was issued against the State of Bihar "not to issue any notification for taking possession of the lands under the Bihar Land Reforms Act". In spite of this prohibitory order, a breach was committed and an application for disobedience under the old provision. i.e., Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 39, was filed and one of the points taken on behalf of the State of Bihar was that the State could not be proceeded against for a tort or wrong doing as the law provides the punishment or compensation which could not be meted to a State as such. Referring to the expression "person" occurring in Sub-rule (3). corresponding to Rule 2A of the amended Code, it was observed that this expression was employed merely compendiously to designate everyone in a group, defendant, his agent, servants and workmen and not for excluding any defendant against whom the order of injunction has primarily been pressed. Hence in cases where the State is the defendant against which an order of injunction has been issued, it is "expressly" named in the clause and not even by necessary implication. Otherwise the order of injunction would be frustrated and the power rendered ineffective and unmeaning if the machinery for enforcement specially enacted did not extend to everyone against whom the order of injunction is directed.
Reference was also made to Form 8 of Appendix F of the Code which reads :
"The Court, doeth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendant CD, his servants, agents and workmen from....."
In this connection reference may also be made to a single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Brijendra Prasad Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1963 Pat 449). In this case also an order of interim injunction was obtained by the plaintiff against the State of Bihar and a petition for action under Order 39. Rule 2 (3) of the Code was made against certain officers of the Government for having violated the order. On a similar plea being taken by those officers relying upon the Supreme Court case (supra) it was held that for proceeding against the officers under Order 39, Rule 2 (3) it is not necessary that they should have been impleaded as defendants, Proceedings can be taken against them even if they are shown to have been agents and servants of the State and to have violated the order of injunction in spite of knowledge that there was such an order.
I do not see any reason why the same principle should not apply mutatis mutandis to the facts of the present case when the Board of Secondary Education. Bihar, was impleaded as defendant first party in the suit and the petitioner was the District Education Officer under the control of the Board and posted at Monghyr, and was informed by the Board by its letter dated 11-5-1976 for maintaining the status quo. Since the petitioner was an agent of the defendant Board of Secondary Education, although he was not personally impleaded as a defendant he must be held to be bound by the said order of injunction, and as the findings have been recorded by both the courts below, by allowing Shri Mishra to act as the Headmaster of the school in question in place of the plaintiff, the petitioner has obviously committed an apparent breach of the order of status quo. He, therefore, has been rightly punished for his said action and I do not find any error of jurisdiction having been committed by either of the courts below.
10. The application, therefore, has no substance and must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with, costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 55 only.