Madras High Court
Navaneetham Ammal vs Baby Ammal on 4 December, 2012
Author: P.R.Shivakumar
Bench: P.R.Shivakumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 04.12.2012 CORAM THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE P.R.SHIVAKUMAR.J S.A.No.516 of 2010 and M.P.No.1 of 2010 1.Navaneetham Ammal Wife of Late gopal 2.Saravanan 3.Ravi 4.Janaki 5.Amudha ... Appellants Vs. 1.Baby Ammal Wife of Late Gopal 2.Devadass 3.Rajendran 4.Padma 5.Anand ... Respondents Second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Tambaram dated 30.01.2010 made in A.S.No.35 of 2008 (CPT SC AS 78/2007) confirming the Judgment and Decree of the District Munsif, Tambaram dated 28.04.2006 made in O.S.No.40 of 2005. For Appellant : Mr.S.Nandivarman for Mr.V.Raghavachari For Respondents : Mr.T.Velumani for R1 and R2 Mr.N.Suresh Kumar for R3 to R5 ------- JUDGMENT
The defendants 1 to 5 in the original suit are the appellants in the second appeal. The plaintiffs in the original suit are the respondents 1 and 2 in the second appeal. Defendants 6 to 8 in the original suit are the respondents 3 to 5 in the second appeal.
2. The first respondent Baby Ammal and the second respondent Devadass as plaintiffs, filed the suit O.S.No.40/2005 on the file of the District Munsif, Tambaram for the relief of partition claiming 1/9th share in the suit property to each one of them. The claim of the plaintiffs was based on their contention that the suit property was the absolute property of one Gopal to whom, Baby Ammal was legally wedded and he died intestate. It is the further case of the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs that, Devadass (2nd respondent), Rajendran (3rd respondent), Padma (4th respondent) and Anand (5th respondent) were the legitimate children born to Gopal and Baby Ammal; that Navaneedam Ammal, the first appellant, due to her cohabitation with Late Gopal, gave birth to Saravanan, Ravi, Janaki and Amudha, the appellants 2 to 5 herein. As such, Baby Ammal, being the legally wedded wife of Gopal, Devadass, Rajendran, Padma and Anand were being the legitimate children of Gopal born out of lawful wedlock and Saravanan, Ravi, Janaki and Amudha, being the children born to Late Gopal due to the cohabitation of Navaneedam Ammal, which might give rise to a presumption that they were living as husband and wife, all the above said 10 persons, namely all the parties to the appeal, excepting the first appellant Navaneedam Ammal, are entitled to succeed to the properties of Late Gopal, as he died intestate. Thus the plaintiffs had prayed for a decree for partition directing division of the suit property into nine equal shares and allotment of two consecutive shares, out of the nine shares, to the plaintiffs.
3. The suit was resisted by the appellants herein/defendants 1 to 5 contending that Baby Ammal was not the legally wedded wife of Gopal and on the other hand, Navaneedam Ammal was the legally wedded wife of Gopal with a consequence that Saravanan, Ravi, Janaki and Amudha alone were the legitimate children of Gopal. The further contention of the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 is that the said Gopal, during his life time, gifted the suit property to Navaneedam Ammal, Saravanan and Ravi, namely the appellants 1 to 3 herein/defendants 1 to 3, by executing a registered Settlement Deed dated 10.12.2003 and hence the defendants prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
4. In the light of the said pleadings, the trial court initially framed 12 issues and ultimately identified only three issues as the issues involved in the suit and recast the same, which are as follows:-
i) Whether the first plaintiff is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Mr.Gopal?
ii) Whether the settlement deed dt.10.12.2003 is proved?
iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the partition of 1/9th share each and for separate possession of shares?
Based on the identification of those issues, the parties went for trial and in the trial, three witnesses were examined as PWs.1 to 3 and eight documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A8 on the side of the plaintiffs, whereas two witnesses were examined as DWs.1 and 2 and two documents were marked as Ex.B1 and B2 on the side of the defendants (appellants herein).
5. The learned trial judge, at the conclusion of trial, after hearing the arguments advanced on both sides, considered the pleadings and evidence and upon such consideration, the trial court held that Baby Ammal, the first plaintiff was the legally wedded wife of Gopal; that the settlement deed dated 10.12.2003 produced as Ex.B1 was not proved in accordance with law and that Baby Ammal and Devadass were entitled to 1/9th share each. Accordingly a preliminary decree was passed. As against the same, the appellants herein/defendants 1 to 5 preferred an appeal on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Tambaram (lower appellate judge). The learned lower appellate judge, after hearing both sides and on re-appreciation of evidence, concurred with the said findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal confirming the preliminary decree passed by the trial court in all respects. Hence the appellants herein/defendants 1 to 5 have knocked at the doors of this court by filing the present second appeal questioning the correctness of the decree passed by the lower appellate court confirming the preliminary decree passed by the trial court on various grounds set out in the memorandum of grounds of second appeal.
6. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the following question was identified and formulated as the substantial question of law involved in the second appeal.
" When the execution and recital of settlement deed under Ex.B1 is not denied by the plaintiffs or the Courts below justified in ignoring the same?"
7. The arguments advanced by Mr.S.Nandivarman, learned counsel for the appellants and by Mr.T.Velumani, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, namely respondents 1 and 2, are heard. The materials available on record and the records sent for from the courts below are also perused and taken into consideration.
8. The admitted facts are as follows:
The first appellant Navaneedam Ammal is the own sister of the first respondent Baby Ammal. Appellants 2 to 5, namely Saravanan, Ravi, Janaki and Amudha are the children of Navaneedam Ammal. Respondents 2 to 5, namely Devadass, Rajendran, Padma and Anand are the children of Baby Ammal. Though Baby Ammal and Navaneedam Ammal are sisters in relation by full blood, each one of them contends that she alone is the legally wedded wife of deceased Gopal. Respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs contend that Baby Ammal is the legally wedded wife of Gopal and Devadas, Rajendran, Padma and Anand are the legitimate children born to them out of lawful wedlock. Even though an initial stand was sought to be taken by them that Gopal did not marry Navaneedam Ammal, subsequently they conceded that their long cohabitation would give rise to a presumption that they underwent a form of marriage and hence the children, born out of such cohabitation, would also be the legal heirs of Late Gopal as per section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs conceded the right to succeed to the properties of Gopal in equal proportion with the other children of Gopal and Baby Ammal, who is claimed to be the legally wedded wife of Gopal. Though the defendants 1 to 5 would have contended before the trial court that Navaneedam Ammal alone was the legally wedded wife of Gopal and Baby Ammal had no connection with Gopal and hence Baby Ammal and her children could not claim a right to succeed to the properties of Gopal, the learned trial judge, on an appreciation of evidence held that it was Baby Ammal, who was the legally weeded wife of Gopal and even if there was any marriage between Gopal and Navaneedam Ammal, the same was void, as it was contracted during the life time of Baby Ammal and during the subsistence of her marriage with Gopal. The said finding is supported by the admission made in the reply notice marked as Ex.A4. The relevant part of which reads as follows:-
" It is pertinent to mention for more than 35 years your client had abandoned Gopal and co-habiting with another married man and my client has been living with Gopal for the last 33 years."
The same will go to show that Baby Ammal had a conjugal relationship with Gopal and she abandoned her husband Gopal and that two years after such abandonment, Navaneedam Ammal joined with Gopal and started living with him. The said admission itself shall be enough to hold that the marriage between Late Gopal and Baby Ammal was earlier in point of time and even before Navaneedam Ammal started living with Gopal, Baby Ammal was cohabiting with Gopal under the same roof as his wife. In addition, a copy of the Voter's identity card produced by the plaintiffs as Ex.A5, also describes her to be the wife of Gopal. As such the finding regarding issue No.1 framed in the suit is based on proper appreciation of evidence. The lower appellate court has also on re-appreciation of evidence, concurred with the said finding. The said concurrent finding regarding the marital status of Baby Ammal, cannot be termed perverse to elevate it as a substantial question of law. That is the reason why no question regarding the said finding has been formulated as a substantial question of law at the time of admission of the second appeal.
9. Since the relationship of each one of the parties with the deceased Gopal is either admitted or proved, in the absence of Ex.B1-Gift settlement deed, the plaintiffs claim for 1/9th share for each one of them, is bound to be upheld. Therefore, the success or failure of the suit solely depends upon the outcome of issue No.2 framed in the suit. As it has been contended by the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 that there was no specific denial of the execution of Ex.B1-Settlement Deed and the plaintiffs had taken a plea that the said deed was obtained by coercion, the courts below ought to have held that Ex.B1-Settlement Deed was proved in the absence of any evidence in proof of the vitiating factor coercion. Based on that contention alone, the above said substantial question of law has been formulated. Now, let us consider the contention of the parties regarding the said question.
10. It is an admitted fact that the suit property was the absolute property of Late Gopal and he had absolute right of disposition over the same. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 contends that though the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs had chosen to deny the execution of Settlement Deed (Ex.B1) relied on by the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 in their plaint and in the proof affidavits of PWs.1 and 2, such a denial got diluted and nullified by the admissions made by them during cross-examination and also by the suggestion made to the witnesses examined on the side of the defendants suggesting that the said document was obtained by coercion; that the above said aspect was not considered by the courts below in proper perspective and that the same has led to an erroneous and perverse finding that Ex.B1-Settlement deed was not proved to be genuine.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondents/plaintiffs contends that, since none of the attestors to Ex.B1-Settlement Deed was examined on the side of the appellants, Ex.B1 cannot be used in evidence in support of their case. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents/plaintiffs contends further that since specific denials have been made not only in the pleadings, but also in the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2 in their chief examination, the same shall be enough to hold that the execution of the document relied on by the appellants/defendants 1 to 5, namely Ex.B1-Settlement Deed was specifically denied and that in such circumstances, unless one of the attestors of the said document, at least, has been called as a witness, if alive and subject to the process of the court and also capable of giving evidence, Ex.B1 cannot be looked into.
12. As an answer to the above said contention of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents/plaintiffs, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 drew the attention of the court to proviso to section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which says that in case of a registered document registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, there will not be any necessity unless the execution of the document has been specifically denied. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 contends that the initial denial may not be conclusive and the pleading as a whole, which will include the evidence also, should be considered in totality to decide whether there has been any specific denial or not and that, if such a consideration is made, the court can come to the only conclusion that the plaintiffs had not denied the execution of the document Ex.B1-Settlement Deed by Late Gopal and on the other hand, they pleaded the vitiating factor, namely coercion. Upon considering the materials available on record, especially the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and also the suggestion put to DW.1, this court comes to the conclusion that the above said contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is bound to be countenanced. At the cost of repetition, it is pointed out that both PWs.1 and 2 had chosen to deny Gopal having executed any Settlement Deed in favour of the appellants 1 to 3. But the answers given by them in the cross-examination have completely diluted the denial and nullified the same. PW.2 in his evidence in cross-examination, has pleaded absence of knowledge regarding the Settlement Deed executed by Gopal. He has further admitted that even after a plea was taken in the written statement based on the Settlement Deed, he did not take any efforts to find out whether there was any such Settlement Deed or not. The same will show that there was no specific denial and if at all there was any at the earlier point of time, the same got diluted and nullified by such answer. In addition, while cross-examining DW.1, a suggestion was put to him by the counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect that the Settlement Deed was obtained by defendants 1 to 3 (appellants 1 to 3) from Gopal by causing a threat and using a coercion. From such a suggestion put to DW.1, we can infer an admission that the Settlement Deed was executed by Late Gopal. Admitting the execution of settlement deed, the contesting respondents/plaintiffs have chosen to take a stand that the said document was obtained by coercion. When the execution of the document is not specifically denied and the persons entitled to deny it, pleads coercion as a vitiating factor, then the burden shifts on the person pleading such a vitiating factor. Unfortunately, there is no evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiffs to prove alleged coercion by which Ex.B1-Settlement Deed was brought into existence. Hence this court comes to the conclusion that there was no specific denial of the fact that Ex.B1-Settlement Deed was executed by Late Gopal. Even if there was any denial at the preliminary stage of the case, the same was diluted and the denial was converted into one which cannot be termed a specific denial. Hence the non-examination of any of the attestors of Ex.B1 is not fatal to the case of the contesting respondents.
13. In this regard, learned counsel for the contesting respondents/plaintiffs made his submissions based on the observations made by this court in Seenappa Vs. R.Krishnappa and Others reported in (2009) 6 MLJ 1113. Of course, in the said case, this court has held that when there is a specific denial, the burden on the person relying on the document to examine at least one of the attestors, shall not be dispensed with and non-examination of attestors was fatal to the case of the party relying on the document. This court held that when the proof of execution was not made in accordance with law, there was no question of shifting the burden of proving the vitiating factor on the person disputing it. With due regard to the Hon'ble Judge, this case can be distinguished from the case dealt with in the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents/plaintiffs. Therein there was total absence of any kind of admission and the denial was specific. In addition to the denial, the additional plea of vitiating factor was also taken. Only in those circumstances, this court held that the burden of proof, did not stand shifted on the person against whom the document was sought to be used and the person, who disputed the document.
14. In the case on hand, as pointed out supra, there is no specific denial. The contesting respondents/plaintiffs have not come forward with a categorical denial that Ex.B1-Settlement Deed was not the document executed by Late Gopal. On the other hand, at one place PW.1 pleads ignorance and at another place a suggestion was made to a witness of the defendants as if that document was brought into existence by using coercion. That will be enough to hold that there was no specific denial of the execution of Ex.B1-Settlement Deed by Late Gopal. Both the courts below have committed a serious error in holding that there was specific denial of the execution of Ex.B1-Settlement Deed by deceased Gopal and hence the necessity to examine one of the attestors could not be dispensed with. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
15. In line with the answer given to the substantial question of law holding that there was no specific denial of the execution of Ex.B1-Settlement Deed, this court comes to the conclusion that the appellants/defendants 1 to 5 had proved by other evidence, the due execution of Ex.B1-Settlement Deed. As per Ex.B1-Settlement Deed, the appellants 1 to 3/defendants 1 to 3 have become entitled to the suit property in its entirety to the exclusion of others. Hence the claim of the contesting respondents/plaintiffs that they have got 1/9th share each in the suit property and the prayer for partition, are bound to be negatived. This court does have no hesitation in holding that the decree passed by the trial court, which was confirmed by the lower appellate court is discrepant and the same is liable to be reversed with the result that the suit shall stand dismissed.
In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court, namely Subordinate Judge, Tambaram dated 30.01.2010 made in A.S.No.35 of 2008 (CPT SC AS 78/2007) confirming the Judgment and Decree of the District Munsif, Tambaram dated 28.04.2006 made in O.S.No.40 of 2005, is set aside and consequently the suit O.S.No.40 of 2005 shall stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to cost. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
04.12.2012 Index : Yes Internet : Yes asr/ To
1. The Subordinate Judge, Tambaram
2. The District Munsif, Tambaram P.R.SHIVAKUMAR, J (asr) S.A.No.516 of 2010 04.12.2012