Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 12.03.2026 vs Of on 27 April, 2026
2026:HHC:13586
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 369 of 2014
.
Reserved on: 12.03.2026
Date of Decision: 27.4.2026.
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
of
Yudhvir Singh ...Respondent
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the respondent : Mr Naresh Kaul, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 03.03.2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 22026:HHC:13586 punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It .
was asserted that the informant Devinder Singh (PW1) was going to his home on 09.12.2008 on his motorcycle bearing registration No. PB-35K-4329. He reached near Sunny Slipper Factory at 5:45 PM, when a Mahindra Bolero bearing of registration No. HP-38A-8856 came from the opposite side at high speed and hit the motorcycle. The informant fell off the rt motorcycle and sustained injuries. The accused was driving the Mahindra Bolero at the time of the accident, and the accident occurred due to his negligence. The accused ran away from the spot after the accident. The informant was taken to the hospital.
An intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext.PW8/B) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Karan Jeet Singh, HC Chain Singh (PW8), Constable Joginder Singh and Constable Munish Kumar had already left for traffic checking vide entry (Ext.PW8/A). They were asked to verify the correctness of the information. HC Chain Singh (PW8) went to the hospital for verification. He filed an application (Ext.PW8/C) for conducting the medical examination of the injured and certifying the fitness of the injured to make the statement. The Medical Officer ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:13586 certified that the injured was fit to make the statement. HC Chain Singh (PW8) recorded the statement of Devinder Singh .
(PW1) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW6/A) was registered. HC Chain Singh (PW8) investigated the matter.
He obtained the treatment summary (Ext.P1) and other documents (Ext.P2 to Ext.P6). He visited the spot and prepared of the site plan (Ext.PW8/D). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP -38A-8856 and PB-35K-4329 vide memos rt (Ext.PW3/B and Ext. PW3/A). Sandeep Sharma (PW4) took the photographs (Ext.PW4/A1 to Ext.PW4/A3) whose negatives are Ext.PW4/A4 to Ext.PW4/A6. Narinder Sood (PW2) examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B). HC Chain Singh (PW8) recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 4 2026:HHC:13586 Section 184 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
.
4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Devinder Singh (PW1) is the injured/informant.
Narinder Sood (PW2) examined the vehicles. Pawan Kumar of (PW3) is an eyewitness. Sandeep Sharma (PW4) and Vinay Kumar (PW5) witnessed various recoveries. Chatter Singh (PW6) rt signed the FIR. Ajay Singh (PW7) proved that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. Chain Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. Ashok Kumar (PW9) proved the entries in the daily diary.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., admitted that he was employed as a driver by Ajay Kumar in the vehicle bearing registration number HP-38A-
8856. He claimed that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the informant because he was not looking forward while riding his motorcycle. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant's statement was contradictory and could not be relied upon. The ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:13586 informant was interested in the success of his case, and he wanted to save himself from criminal liability. Statement of .
Pawan Kumar (PW3) showed that the accident occurred due to the informant's negligence because he was looking towards the factory, and hit the Mahindra Bolero. Ram Swaroop was present on the spot but was not examined by the prosecution without of any reason. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the rt accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 184 of the MV Act.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence properly. The learned Trial Court discarded the statements of prosecution witnesses without any cogent reasons. The informant and Pawan Kumar (PW3) supported the prosecution's case. The minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
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8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Naresh Kaul, .
learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred of in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the site plan, and the photographs rt that the accused was driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Learned Trial Court relied upon minor contradictions in the statement of the informant and Pawan Kumar, which were bound to come with the passage of time and could not have been used for discarding the prosecution's case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. Pawan Kumar (PW3) admitted in his cross-examination that the informant was looking towards the factory, which led to the ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:13586 accident. This admission shows the informant's negligence, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution had .
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions of made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment rt of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438:
"24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:13586 consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.
13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v.
.
Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:
21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view rt based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471.
14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
15. The informant Devinder Singh (PW1) stated that he was going to his home on his motorcycle bearing registration No. PB-35K-4329 on 09.12.2008. He reached the Sunny Slipper factory at about 5:45 PM, when a vehicle bearing registration ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:13586 No. HP-38A-8856 came from the opposite side at high speed and hit the motorcycle on the wrong side. The motorcycle fell.
.
The driver of the vehicle fled from the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that he had left the office at about 5 PM. The place of accident was located at a distance of 8-10 kms from the place of accident. There was a slight curve before the place of the of accident. Ram Swaroop was working in the Sunny factory. He denied that he was looking towards the gate of the factory and rt drove towards the wrong side of the road. He denied that the accused tried to save him, which led to the accident.
16. The cross-examination of this witness shows that the accused has not disputed the accident. It was suggested to him that he had driven the motorcycle towards the wrong side of the road, and he denied the suggestion. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof and cannot be used for discarding the prosecution's case. The site plan (Ext.PW8/D) shows the place of the accident. The width of the road is shown to be eight feet. The motorcycle was going from Indora towards Mohtli and was on the left side of the road. The pickup was coming from Mohtli towards Indora and is shown to be towards its right side.
The photographs (Ext.PW4/A-1 to Ext.PW4/A-3) also show that ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 10 2026:HHC:13586 the motorcycle is towards the left side of the road, whereas Mahindra Bolero is towards the right side of the road. Hence, the .
photographs and the site plan corroborate the informant's version that the accident had occurred towards the right side of the road for the Mahindra Bolero.
of
17. Pawan Kumar (PW3) stated that he was posted in the Sunny Slipper factory and was discharging his duty on rt 09.12.2008. A pickup vehicle came from Mohtli and hit a motorcycle coming from Indora at about 5:40- 5:45 PM. The accident occurred due to the high speed of the driver of the pickup and driving the pickup towards the wrong side of the road. He stated in his cross-examination that there was a slight curve at the place of the accident. He admitted that Ram Swaroop used to ride the motorcycle with the informant. The motorcyclist was looking towards the factory and hit the jeep.
This led to the accident, and there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the pickup.
18. Learned Trial Court was swayed by the admission made by this witness in the cross-examination that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the pickup. This ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 11 2026:HHC:13586 statement was inadmissible and could not have been used for acquitting the accused. A witness can only depose about the fact .
which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 of that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: rt "It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not."
19. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held:
"It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court."
20. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statement made by this witness that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the motorcyclist.
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21. It was submitted that the accident would not have occurred had the informant not looked towards the factory. This .
submission is only stated to be rejected. The site plan, the statements of the witnesses, and the photographs clearly show that the Mahindra Bolero was being driven towards the right side of the road. Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident of was driving the Mahindra Bolero towards the right side of the road and not the informant looking towards the factory. Had the rt Mahindra Bolero been driven towards the left side of the road, the accident would not have occurred even if the informant was looking towards the factory.
22. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic.
Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:
"The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 13 2026:HHC:13586 on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was .
coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side.
The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road."
23. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar of 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:
rt "The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road."
24. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:
"16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 14 2026:HHC:13586 always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong .
side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side."
25. In the present case, the accused was driving the of Mahindra Bolero towards the wrong side of the road in breach of the rules of the regulation framed by the Central Government, rt and he was clearly negligent.
26. The learned Trial Court held that Ram Swaroop was present, but he was not examined, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. This conclusion cannot be accepted. The question of adverse inference only arises when the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove the case of the party2. In the present case, the prosecution's case is proved by the statements of the informant and Pawan Kumar (PW3) as well as the photographs and the site plan. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution for not examining Ram Swaroop.
2Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569, and Rattan Dev v. Pasam Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 441 ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 15 2026:HHC:13586
27. Learned Trial Court held that the statement of the informant was contradictory because he had stated in the FIR .
that he was taken to the hospital by the passers-by, whereas he had stated before the Court that Ram Swaroop and other factory workers took him to the hospital. It was rightly submitted by Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the of respondent/State, that this was a minor contradiction related to the detail, which was bound to come with time due to failure of rt memory. The incident had occurred on 09.12.2008, whereas the statement was made by the informant on 26.05.2012. Therefore, the contradiction is not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: -
"32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:
"I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 16 2026:HHC:13586 that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, .
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the of general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty rt and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.
VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 17 2026:HHC:13586 details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is .
overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one of person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a rt conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.
XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 18 2026:HHC:13586 foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.
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XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness." [See Bharwada of Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC rt 1012)"
28. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: -
"38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) "24. ... The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 19 2026:HHC:13586 for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence .
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the of matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness."
39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of rt Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies.
40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) "30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 20 2026:HHC:13586 essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material .
particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram rt Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457:
2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100:
2002 SCC (Cri) 961].
31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].
32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-
by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 21 2026:HHC:13586 aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements .
being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, of (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777]."
41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v.
rt State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) "46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. ... Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution.
***
49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 22 2026:HHC:13586 these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused."
42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar .
v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) "24. ... The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, of drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the rt witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness."
29. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: -
"17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 23 2026:HHC:13586 evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses.
.
The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under:
"42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness of unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not rt otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness."
30. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration alone. It was observed:
"24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact of making something larger, more important, better or worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term "exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth".::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 24
2026:HHC:13586 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an .
'exaggerated statement' lies in a fact, to which fictitious additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is of "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth rt and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their separation, no real evidence survives that the whole evidence can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643, 18.]
25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 held that:
"24. ...So far as this contention is concerned, it must be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case of eyewitnesses, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply, and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is said to have ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 25 2026:HHC:13586 exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not found acceptable .
the remaining part of the evidence has to be scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied upon..."
26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot of be left to judicium dei. The Court, in their quest to reach the truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its rt best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of the doubt is extended.
27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their statements. The trial Court fell in grave error and overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version."
31. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan, 2022 Cri. L.J. 374, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply to India. It was observed: -
::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 262026:HHC:13586 "48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in .
our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff from the grain has to be applied. However, when the evidence is inseparable and such an attempt would either be impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable, the natural consequence would be one of avoidance. The said principle has not assumed the status of law but continues only as a rule of caution. One has to see the of nature of the discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies are very material, shaking the very credibility of the witness, leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that it is neither possible to separate it rt nor to rely upon, it is for the said court to either accept or reject."
32. In the present case, the accused never disputed the injury sustained by the informant, and the medical record was tendered based on the statement made by the accused before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, even if there are some contradictions regarding taking the informant to the hospital, the same does not affect the injury sustained by him and is not sufficient to discard his testimony.
33. Further, the attention of the informant was not drawn to the previous statement recorded by the Police, which is an essential requirement under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Binay Kumar Singh Versus State of Bihar, 1997 (1) SCC 283, that if a ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 27 2026:HHC:13586 witness is to be contradicted with his previous statement, his attention must be drawn towards it. It was observed: -
.
"11. The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his evidence in Court. This principle is delineated in S. 155 (3) of the Evidence Act, and it must be borne in mind when reading S. 145, which consists of two limbs. It is provided in the first limb of S.145 that a witness may be cross-
of examined as to the previous statement made by him without such writing being shown to him but the second limb provides that "if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must before the writing can be rt provided, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him." There is thus a distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it may be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the credit of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite party to cross-examine the witness with reference to the previous statements made by him. He may at that stage succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through such cross-examination, even without resorting to the procedure laid down in the second limb. But if the witness disowns having made any statement which is inconsistent with his present stand, his testimony in Court on that score would not be vitiated until the cross-
examiner proceeds to comply with the procedure prescribed in the second limb of S. 145.
12. In Bhagwan Singh's case (AIR 1952 SC 214), Vivian Bose, J., pointed out in paragraph 25 that during the cross- examination of the witnesses concerned, the formalities prescribed by S. 145 are complied with. The cross- examination, in that case, indicated that every circumstance intended to be used as a contradiction was put to him point by point and passage by passage. Learned Judges were called upon to deal with an argument that witnesses' attention should have been ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 28 2026:HHC:13586 specifically drawn to that passage in addition thereto. Their Lordships were, however, satisfied in that case that the procedure adopted was in substantial compliance .
with S. 145, and hence held that all that is required is that the witness must be treated fairly and must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to them in a fair and reasonable manner. On the facts of that case, there is no dispute with the proposition laid therein.
13. So long as the attention of PW 32 (Sukhdev Bhagat) of was not drawn to the statement attributed to him as recorded by DW-10 (Nawal Kishore Prasad), we are not persuaded to reject the evidence of PW-32 that he gave Ex. 14 statement at the venue of occurrence and that he rt had not given any other statement earlier thereto."
A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam,
34. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed:
"7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 29 2026:HHC:13586 contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination.
.
8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus:
"145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.--A witness may be cross- examined as to previous statements made by him in of writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended rt to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."
The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross- examined by asking whether his prior statement exists.
The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved can the contradictions be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 30 2026:HHC:13586 differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the .
same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross- examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If of the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness.
rt Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, in confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness.
9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus:
"155. Impeaching the credibility of the witness. -- The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him--
(1) ..............................................::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 31
2026:HHC:13586 (2) ............................................. (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence .
which is liable to be contradicted."
It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trivial omission or contradiction brought to the record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court of disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission, depending upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a rt contradiction also depends on the facts of each case.
10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus:
"13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words "in the manner provided by Section145of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872" found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradicting him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514:1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at p. 819:
Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 32 2026:HHC:13586 Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts, which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not .
arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case, all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made."
It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions of under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court, and similar decisions were not considered the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for rt contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross- examine a witness as to aprevious statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-
examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement were allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 33 2026:HHC:13586 not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more .
imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police, which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous of statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it, subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may rt be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, "Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?" and he answers, "Yes", then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies:
one is that it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually said before him. In such a case, the question ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 34 2026:HHC:13586 could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put, and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is .
contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." (emphasis added) This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned of Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination."
35.
rt It was held in Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 757 that the Courts cannot suo motu take cognisance of the contradiction and the same has to be brought on record as per the law. It was observed:
"64. The court cannot suo motu make use of statements to the police that have not been proved and ask questions with reference to them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the court. The words 'if duly proved' are used in Section 162Cr. P.C. clearly shows that the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway, nor can it be looked into, but they must be duly proved for contradiction by eliciting admission from the witness during cross- examination and also during the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer. The statement before the Investigating Officer can be used for contradiction, but only after strict compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.
65. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 35
2026:HHC:13586 "145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.-- A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced .
into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."
66. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, when it is intended of to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While rt recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The attention of the witness is drawn to that part, and this must be reflected in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands proved, and there is no need for further proof of contradiction, and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement, and it must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process, the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter, when the Investigating Officer is examined in the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked for contradiction; it will then be proved in the deposition of the Investigating Officer, who, again, by referring to the police statement, will depose about the witness having made that statement. The process again involves referring to the police statement and culling out the part with which the maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court cannot suo motu make use of ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 36 2026:HHC:13586 statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction." [See: V.K. Mishra v. State of .
Uttarakhand: (2015) 9 SCC 588]
36. In the present case, the attention of the informant was not drawn to the previous statement, and he was not allowed to explain it. Therefore, the learned Trial Court could of not have discarded the statement of the informant by looking to the previous statement and finding a contradiction between the rt previous statement and the statement before the Court.
37. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He also admitted the medical record, which shows that the informant had sustained grievous injury.
Therefore, the prosecution's case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC. Since Section 338 of IPC is an aggravated form of Section 337 of IPC, no separate conviction is required to be recorded for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of IPC as per Section 71 of IPC.
38. Section 184 of the MV Act punishes a person who is driving a Motor Vehicle dangerously. Since the accused has been ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS 37 2026:HHC:13586 found guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, which is similar to Section 184 of the MV .
Act; hence, no separate conviction is required to be recorded under Section 184 of the MV Act as per Section 71 of the IPC.
39. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had proceeded on of irrelevant consideration to acquit the accused. It failed to notice the provisions of the Rules of Road regulation, which cast a duty rt upon the driver of a motor vehicle to drive the vehicle towards the left side of the road and took a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is liable for interference.
40. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the accused is convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC.
41. Let he be produced before the Court for hearing on the quantum of sentence on 12.05.2026.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27th April, 2026 (Nikita) ::: Downloaded on - 02/05/2026 09:29:47 :::CIS