National Consumer Disputes Redressal
M/S. Kamal & Co. (Dealer) vs Shri Hari Singh on 6 September, 2012
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.1239 OF 2010 IN FIRST APPEAL NO.663 OF 2003 (Against the order dated 2.8.2006 in Complaint No.90/1998 of the State Commission, Jaipur, Rajasthan ) M/s. Kamal & Co. (Dealer) M.I. Road, Jaipur Rajasthan Appellant Vs. 1. Shri Hari Singh S/o Shri Satya Dan Singhji, D-4, Meera Marg, Jaipur, Rajasthan (since deceased) Through his L.R. Anantpal Singh 2. Pal-Peugeot Ltd. (in liquidation) Shri Vinod L. Doshi (Deceased) Chairman (Company in liquidation) Liquidator attached to the High Court of Judicature at Mumbai, Premier Corporation Office, Nariman Bhawan, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400 021. Through the Liquidator attached to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay Respondents BEFORE: HONBLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA, PRESIDING MEMBER HON'BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER For the Appellant : Mr.Chandra Shekhar aongwith Ms. Meghna De, Advocate For the Respondent(s): Mr. Vineet Maheshwari, Advocate Pronounced on: 6th September, 2012 ORDER
PER MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA, PRESIDING MEMBER This order shall dispose of application dated 2.12.2010, filed by appellant/opposite party no.2 for reconsideration /modification of order dated 2.8.2006, passed by this Commission (in F.A. No.663 of 2003).
2. Before dealing with this application it shall be fruitful to give the chequered history of this case.
Respondent no.1/complainant, filed a complaint against appellant/opposite party no.2 and respondent no.2/opposite party no.1, for supplying a defective vehicle. Since, the State Commission found that there were manufacturing defects, vide its order dated 24.7.2003, it allowed the complaint and passed the following order;
Consequently, the complaint of Shri Hari Singh is allowed.
It is directed that O.P. No.1 shall refund the cost of the vehicle i.e. Rs.4,95,750/- to the complainant within a period of two months from the date of the order or from the date of return of the vehicle in question by the complainant to the Dealer OP NO.2 who would hand it over to OP No.1 with interest @ 9% per annum w.e.f. 15.1.1997 till payment. The OP No.1 shall also pay to the complainant an amount of Rs.25,000/- as compensation for mental agony, physical discomfort and financial loss, etc, as also Rs.5,000/- as cost of litigation. Primarily the aforesaid amounts shall be paid by the manufacturer OP No.1 to the complainant failing which the complainant shall be at liberty to realise the aforesaid amount from OP No.2 (Dealer).
3. Aggrieved by order dated 24.7.2003, appellant filed an appeal before this Commission which was dismissed, vide order dated 2.8.2006 observing as under;
For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any force in this appeal. The appellant shall be at liberty to recover the amount from Respondent no.1. It was also pointed out that M/s. Pal Peugeot Ltd. has gone into liquidation and as such the complainant was forced to file execution against M/s. Kamal & Co. (Dealer) and M/s. Pal Peugeot Ltd. in terms of the impugned order of the State Commission.
The appellant may claim the amount from Respondent no.2 for this purpose.
The dealer appellant may be entitled to exclude the time spent during the proceedings before the Consumer Fora under Section 14 of the Limitation Act as laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works Vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute [(1995) 3 SCC 583]).
With the above said observations, the appeal stands dismissed accordingly.
4. Thereafter, appellant filed review application dated 29.9.2006, under section 22(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short as Act) seeking review of order dated 2.8.2006 of this Commission.
Main grounds on which review was sought were as under;
i) Errors of procedural irregularity;
ii) Error of fact;
iii) Error of Jurisdiction and
iv) Error in determining compensation.
5. Review application was dismissed by this Commission vide order dated 12.10.2006 observing as under;
Heard. After going through the material on record and our order we do not find that there is any error apparent on the face of record, calling for a review. The only course is open to file an appeal.
Dismissed.
6. Appellant challenged the order passed by this Commission in review and appeal-by virtue of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal. However, Honble Supreme Court of India dismissed the same.
7. In the meanwhile, respondent no.1 had already filed a contempt application before the State Commission which disposed of the same, vide its order dated 25.10.2010. State Commission in its order observed;
It has also been submitted by the counsel for the applicant that as per directions of the State Commission in the judgement dated 24.7.2003, a notice was given by the complainant to the dealer M/s. Kamal & Co., Jaipur as also to the company M/s. Pal Peugeot Ltd. on 22.8.03 and 20.10.03. A reply dated 31.10.03 was received from the dealer wherein it was alleged that since the matter is pending before the National Commission, they are unable to receive the possession of the vehicle. Subsequently when the matter came up before this Commission the vehicle has now been handed over to the dealer on 5.10.2010.
Today, Mr. Anant Kasliwal counsel for the contemnor respondent no.2 submitted two Demand Drafts in the name of the present applicant namely Anant Pal Singh, one Demand Draft amounting to Rs.9,37,381.56 and the other demand draft for Rs.2 lacs. Both the demand drafts are handed over to the Registrar of the State Commission today in the court who may keep the same in safe custody and also gave receipt of the same to counsel for respondent no.2 including details of the demand drafts.
Mr. Kasliwal however, sought time to seek further clarification from the National Commission in regard to order dated 2.8.2006 passed in their appeal.
In the interest of justice, respondent no.2 is granted six weeks time to get necessary clarifications.
Put up on 6.12.2010 for further orders.
8 Now, appellant has filed the present application for reconsideration/ modification of order dated 2.8.2006 of this Commission, alleging that fraud and misrepresentation has been committed by respondent no.1/complainant, which was revealed to the appellant on 5.10.2010 upon delivery of the car in question.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well counsel for respondent no.1.
10. Main plea taken by the appellant in present application is regarding the alleged fraud played by respondent no.1 in this case and as such modification of order dated 2.8.2006 has been sought. In support, learned counsel has relied upon following judgements.
i) Meghmala and others v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383;
ii) A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Govt. of A.P. and others (2007) 4 SCC 221;
iii) Tata Egineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. and another v. Gajanan Y. Mandrekar (1997) 5 SCC 507 and
iv) Indian Bank v. M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.
AIR 1996 SC 2592.
11. On the other hand, it has been argued by learned counsel for respondent no.1 that present application for modification is not maintainable at all, since Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant against orders passed on merits as well as in review, have already been dismissed. Present application has been filed just to harass the complainant. In support, learned counsel has relied upon a recent decision of Apex Court reported as Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India and others 2011(7) SCALE.
12. Consumer complaint in this case was filed as far back as in the year 1998. During pendency of this litigation, complainant who was aged more than 87 years old died and his LRs have been brought on the record. Inspite of getting adverse findings from all the Consumer Fora as well as the Apex Court, appellant went on filing one petition or the other.
13. The plea of fraud has been taken by the appellant for the first time before this Commission. It is well settled that once the matter has attained finality (as has happened in the present case) the appellant cannot be permitted to have de-novo trial, after having lost upto the highest court of the land by taking an altogether new plea i.e. of Fraud, which was never its case before the State Commission or this Commission earlier.
14. We fail to understand as what was the occasion for the State Commission to have passed order dated 25.10.2010 giving liberty to the appellant to approach this Commission for modification of order dated 2.8.2006, which has attained its finality upto the Supreme Court of India.
15. The only motive in filing of the present application seeking modification of order dated 2.8.2006 is just not to let the legal heirs of the complainant live in peace and to keep them engaged in one litigation or the other.
16. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra), Supreme Court with regard to the finality of the judgment and to put an end to the litigation has observed;
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
114. The maxim `interest Republicae ut sit finis litium' says that it is for the public good that there be an end of litigation after a long hierarchy of appeals. At some stage, it is necessary to put a quietus. It is rare that in an adversarial system, despite the judges of the highest court doing their best, one or more parties may remain unsatisfied with the most correct decision. Opening door for a further appeal could be opening a flood gate which will cause more wrongs in the society at large at the cost of rights.
115. It should be presumed that every proceeding has gone through infiltration several times before the decision of the Apex Court. In the instant case, even after final judgment of this court, the review petition was also dismissed. Thereafter, even the curative petition has also been dismissed in this case. The controversy between the parties must come to an end at some stage and the judgment of this court must be permitted to acquire finality. It would hardly be proper to permit the parties to file application after application endlessly. In a country governed by the rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment. Permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of this court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice.
116. In Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur (1976) 4 SCC 124 this court held that the doctrine of stare decisis is a very valuable principle of precedent which cannot be departed from unless there are extraordinary or special reasons to do so.
117. In Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat and Another (2002) 1 SCC 109 this court reiterated the view that finality of the order of the apex court of the country should not lightly be unsettled.
118. A three-Judge Bench of this court in M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167 held that a party is not entitled to seek a review of this court's judgment merely for the purpose of rehearing and for a fresh decision of the case. Departure from the normal principle that the court's judgment is final would be justified only when compelling our substantial circumstances make it necessary to do so. Such circumstances may be that a material statutory provision was not drawn to the court's attention at the original hearing or a manifest wrong has been done.
119. In Union of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. (1989) 2 SCC 754, this Court held that the plea for reconsideration is not to be entertained merely because the petitioner chooses to reagitate the points concluded by the earlier decision in Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability.
120. In Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India & Others (1996) 2 SCC 749, the Court considered the earlier decisions and held that the writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution assailing the correctness of a decision of the Supreme Court on merits or claiming reconsideration is not maintainable.
121. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Another v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India (1996) 3 SCC 114, the Court held the reconsideration of the final decision of the Supreme Court after review petition is dismissed by way of writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution cannot be sustained.
122. In Gurbachan Singh & Another v. Union of India & Another (1996) 3 SCC 117, the Court held that the judgment order of this court passed under Article 136 is not amenable to judicial review under Article 32 of the Constitution.
123. Similar view was taken in Babu Singh Bains and others v. Union of India and Others (1996) 6 SCC 565, a three-Judge bench of this Court held that a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against the order under Article 136 of the Constitution is not maintainable.
124. Another three-Judge bench of this Court in P. Ashokan v. Union of India & Another (1998) 3 SCC 56, relying upon the earlier cases held that the challenge to the correctness of a decision on merits after it has become final cannot be questioned by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution. In the instant case the petitioner wants to reopen the case by filing the interlocutory application.
125. In Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association & Others (2001) 5 SCC 42, the Court placed reliance on the judgment of a nine-judge Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra and another AIR 1967 SC 1 and the Court observed as under:
It is difficult to see how this decision can be pressed into service by Mr. Setalvad in support of the argument that a judicial order passed by this Court was held to be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court itself.... In view of this decision in Mirajkar case it must be taken as concluded that judicial proceedings in this Court are not subject to the writ jurisdiction thereof.
126. The Court in the said case observed that having regards to the facts and circumstances of the case, this is not a fit case to be entertained to exercise jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution.
127. In Mr. X v. Hospital Z (2000)9 SCC 439, this Court held thus:
Writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against the judgment already passed by this Court cannot be entertained. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that prayer (a) which seeks overruling or setting aside of the judgment already passed in Mr X v. Hospital Z may be deleted. This prayer shall accordingly be deleted. So also, the other prayers which indirectly concern the correctness of the judgment already passed shall stand deleted. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the petition may not be treated as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution but may be treated as an application for clarification/directions in the case already decided by this Court, viz., Mr X v. Hospital Z (CA No. 4641 of 1998).
128. In Triveniben v.
State of Gujarat (1989)1 SCC 678 speaking for himself and other three learned Judges of the Constitution Bench through Oza, J., reiterated the same principle. The court observed: (SCC p. 697, para 22) It is well settled now that a judgment of court can never be challenged under Articles 14 or 21 and therefore the judgment of the court awarding the sentence of death is not open to challenge as violating Article 14 or Article 21 as has been laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra) and also in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the only jurisdiction which could be sought to be exercised by a prisoner for infringement of his rights can be to challenge the subsequent events after the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is because of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that is what has consistently been held by this Court. But it will not be open to this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final verdict reached by a competent court convicting and sentencing the condemned prisoner and even while considering the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent circumstances could be held to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion that execution of the sentence of death will not be just and proper....
129. In Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra), this Court observed thus:
24.
.... when reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to the decision made in the case, is normally brought under challenge. It is, therefore, relevant to note that so much was the value attached to the precedent of the highest court that in The London Street Tramways Co. Ltd. v. London County Council (1898 AC 375) the House of Lords laid down that its decision upon a question of law was conclusive and would bind the House in subsequent cases and that an erroneous decision could be set right only by an Act of Parliament.
... ... ...
... ... ...
26. ...This Court will not sit as a court of appeal from its own decisions, nor will it entertain applications to review on the ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself to be aggrieved by the decision. It would in our opinion be intolerable and most prejudicial to the public interest if cases once decided by the Court could be reopened and reheard:
There is a salutary maxim which ought to be observed by all courts of last resort interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. (It concerns the State that there be an end of lawsuits. It is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of lawsuits.) Its strict observance may occasionally entail hardship upon individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source must be small in comparison with the great mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions of such a tribunal as this.
32.
...When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions.
33. In Maganlal Chhaganlal (1974) 2 SCC 402 case a Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court considered, inter alia, the question: whether a judgment of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers case (1967) 3 SCR 399 was required to be overruled. Khanna, J. observed: (SCC p. 425, para 22) At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that certainty and continuity are essential ingredients of rule of law. Certainty in law would be considerably eroded and suffer a serious setback if the highest court of the land readily overrules the view expressed by it in earlier cases, even though that view has held the field for a number of years .In quite a number of cases which come up before this Court, two views are possible, and simply because the Court considers that the view not taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of the matter would not justify the overruling of the view. The law laid down by this Court is binding upon all courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous cases all over the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court. Many people arrange their affairs and large number of transactions also take place on the faith of the correctness of the view taken by this Court. It would create uncertainty, instability and confusion if the law propounded by this Court on the basis of which numerous cases have been decided and many transactions have taken place is held to be not the correct law.
42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles -- ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision-making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice -- a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of the view that though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious consideration to the question, we are persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in the public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to challenge, yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and would cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.
130. A four-judge bench of this court in Sumer v. State of U.P. (2005) 7 SCC 220 observed as under:
In Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra) while providing for the remedy of curative petition, but at the same time to prevent abuse of such remedy and filing in that garb a second review petition as a matter of course, the Constitution Bench said that except when very strong reasons exist, the court should not entertain an application seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on dismissal of review petition. In this view, strict conditions including filing of certificate by a Senior Advocate were provided in Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra). Despite it, the apprehension of the Constitution Bench that the remedy provided may not open the flood gates for filing a second review petition has come true as is evident from filing of large number of curative petitions. It was expected that the curative petitions will be filed in exceptional and in rarest of rare case but, in practice, it has just been opposite. This Court, observing that neither it is advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which curative petition may be entertained, said that nevertheless the petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner. To restrict filing of the curative petitions only in genuine cases, Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra) provided that the curative petition shall contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of all the requirements provided in the judgment. Unfortunately, in most of the cases, the certification is casual without fulfilling the requirements of the judgment.
131. In Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi & Others (2009)10 SCC 501, this Court held thus:
41.
We must also observe that the petitioner has been able to frustrate the acquisition and development of the land right from 1980 onwards by taking recourse to one litigation after the other. The record reveals that all the suits/writ petitions, etc. that had been filed had failed. Undoubtedly, every citizen has a right to utilise all legal means which are open to him in a bid to vindicate and protect his rights, but if the court comes to the conclusion that the pleas raised are frivolous and meant to frustrate and delay an acquisition which is in public interest, deterrent action is called for. This is precisely the situation in the present matter.
42. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with costs which are determined at rupees two lakhs. The respondents, shall, without further loss of time proceed against the appellant.
132. This court in a recent judgment in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka and others (2011) 3 SCC 408 observed that principle of finality is passed on high principle of public policy. The court in para 13 of the said judgment observed as under:
That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the color and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties.
133. In order to discourage a litigation which reopens the final judgment of this court, while dismissing the petition imposed costs of rupees 10 lakhs.
17. After going through the record, we find that there is no ground for modification of order dated 2.8.2006 passed by this Commission.
18. None of the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are applicable to the facts of the present case.
19. It is well settled that no leniency should be shown to such type of litigants who in order to cover up their own fault and negligence, goes on filing meritless petitions in different Fora. Time and again courts have held that if any litigant approaches the court of equity with unclean hands, suppress the material facts, make false averments in the petition and tries to mislead and hoodwink the judicial Forums, then his petition should be thrown away at the threshold. Equity demands that such unscrupulous litigants whose only aim and object is to deprive the opposite party of the fruits of the decree must be dealt with heavy hands.
20. Now question arises for consideration is as to what should be the quantum of costs which should be imposed upon the appellant for dragging respondent no.1 upto Supreme Court of India, when appellant had no case at all. It is not that every order passed by the judicial Fora is to be challenged by the litigant even if the same are based on sound reasonings.
21. Apex Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors. Vs. Nirmala Devi and Ors., Civil Appeal Nos.4912-4913 of 2011 decided on July 4, 2011 has observed ;
45. We are clearly of the view that unless we ensure that wrong doers are denied profit or undue benefit from the frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigations. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that courts otherwise scarce and valuable time is consumed or more appropriately wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases.
Apex Court further observed;
54. While imposing costs we have to take into consideration pragmatic realities and be realistic what the defendants or the respondents had to actually incur in contesting the litigation before different courts. We have to also broadly take into consideration the prevalent fee structure of the lawyers and other miscellaneous expenses which have to be incurred towards drafting and filing of the counter affidavit, miscellaneous charges towards typing, photocopying, court fee etc.
55. The other factor which should not be forgotten while imposing costs is for how long the defendants or respondents were compelled to contest and defend the litigation in various courts. The appellants in the instant case have harassed the respondents to the hilt for four decades in a totally frivolous and dishonest litigation in various courts. The appellants have also wasted judicial time of the various courts for the last 40 years.
56. On consideration of totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any infirmity in the well reasoned impugned order/ judgment. These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation.
22. Thus, looking from any angle we do not find any merit in the present application. Hence, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the appellant in delaying the matter and creating all sorts of obstructions so that legal heir of respondent no.1 cannot enjoy the fruits of the award, the present application being bogus, frivolous and mischievous one, is liable to be dismissed with punitive cost. Accordingly, we dismiss the present application with punitive cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only). Out of the cost imposed upon the appellant in this case, Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) shall be paid to the legal heir of respondent no.1 and balance amount of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) shall be deposited in the name of Consumer Legal Aid Account of this Commission.
23. Appellant is directed to deposit one demand draft in the name of legal heir of respondent no-1- Anant Pal Singh and draft for the balance amount of Rs.50,000/- in the name of Consumer Legal Aid Account of this Commission, within four weeks from today.
24. In case, appellant fails to deposit the aforesaid costs within the prescribed period, it shall also be liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a., till realization.
25. Cost awarded to legal heir of respondent no.1 shall be paid to him only after expiry of period of appeal or revision preferred, if any.
26. List for compliance on 19.10.2012.
...J (V.B. GUPTA) (PRESIDING MEMBER) ....
(VINAY KUMAR) Sg. (MEMBER)