Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow
Diwakar Tripathi vs Central Excise And Customs on 28 April, 2026
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
LUCKNOW BENCH
Review Application No. 332/00037/2025
In Re Original Application No. 332/00091/2023
This, the 28th day of April, 2026
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR OJHA, MEMBER (J),
HON'BLE MR. PANKAJ KUMAR, MEMBER (A)
1. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue, New Delhi.
2. Chairman, Central Board of Excise and Customs, North Block,
New Delhi.
3. Chief Commissioner, Customs, Central Excise and Service e Tax,
7-A, Ashok Marg, Lucknow.
4. Commissioner, Central Excise, Allahabad.
5. Joint Commissioner (P&A), Central Excise, Allahabad.
..Review Applicants
By Advocate: Ms. Prayagmati Gupta.
VERSUS
Diwakar Tripathi, S/o Shri R.L. Tripathi, aged about 52 years,
R/o 2/251, Virat Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow.
..Respondent
By Advocate: xxxx
ORDER
PER HON'BLE JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR OJHA, MEMBER (J) Heard learned counsel for the review applicants on delay condonation application and perused the records.
2. Through MA No. 2927 of 2025, review applicants have prayed for delay condonation in filing of the review application.
3. Learned counsel for the review applicants relied upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Writ-A No. 5564 of 2023-Surendra Kumar vs. Union of India and other whereby the Hon'ble High Court has held that Tribunal can condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Page 1 of 8 Act, 1963, if it is satisfied that sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time has been supplemented.
Learned counsel for the review applicants argued that Tribunal created under the Administrative Tribunals Act-1985 is not covered by the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda dated 07th January, 2026.
Further submitted that this Tribunal sometimes holds the power of Civil Court, hence, power to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is vested in it.
Further contended that Principal Bench of this Tribunal has issued a circular dated 05.03.2026 (Annexure No. 2, page-19 of the written arguments) wherein also provision for delay condonation has been provided.
4. Before dealing with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the review applicants, we deem it appropriate to refer the relevant provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act-1985.
"Section 3- Definitions.
(a)- .......
(f)- „Central Administrative Tribunal‟ means the Administrative Tribunal established under sub-section (1) of Section 4."
"Section 22. Procedure and powers of Tribunals -
(1) A Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in private.
(2) A Tribunal shall decide every application made to it as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every application shall be decided on a perusal of documents and written representations and [after hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced].
(3) A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of [discharging its functions under this Act], the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence of affidavits;
(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(f) reviewing its decisions;
(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex- parte;
(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation for default or any order passed by it ex-parte ; and
(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government.Page 2 of 8
5. From the aforesaid provisions, it is manifest that this Tribunal has been established under Administrative Tribunals Act-1985 and this Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, however, under sub-section 3 of Section 22, this Tribunal has the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure-1908 while trying a suit. This includes the power to review its decision. Thus, it is evident that this Tribunal has power to review its decision as the Civil Court while trying a suit under Code of Civil Procedure-1908.
6. For smooth functioning of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 have also been enacted. Rule 17 provides for application of review which runs as follows:
"17. Application for review. - (1) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed.
(2) A review application shall ordinarily be heard by the same Bench which has passed the order, unless the Chairman may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct it to be heard by any other Bench.
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the Bench concerned, a review application shall be disposed of by circulation and the Bench may either dismiss the application or direct notice to the opposite party.
(4) When an application for review of any judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same manner.
(5) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is supported by a duly sworn affidavit indicating therein the source of knowledge, personal or otherwise, and also those which are sworn on the basis of the legal advice. The counter affidavit in review application will also be a duly sworn affidavit wherever any averment of fact is disputed."
7. Sub-rule 1 of Rule 17 of the aforecited rule, specifically provides that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed. It means that review application can be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed.
8. In the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (2026 (LiveLaw (SC) 19), in para- 160, the following principles have been laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court:-
"160. A conspectus of the legal and factual discussion on the power of the CLB to extend time or condone delay under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 is as follows:Page 3 of 8
i. The appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred by the respondent herein was filed during the period between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016. Therefore, although the appeal was made under the new provision of the Act, 2013, yet the body/forum before which it was made i.e., the CLB, was one constituted under the provisions of the Erstwhile Act. According to Section 10E(4C) of the Erstwhile Act, the CLB was a court only in the restricted sense. There existed no express provision which empowered the CLB to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 to the proceedings and appeals before itself.
ii. In multiple decisions of this Court, notable and significant emphasis has been placed on which institution/body is seeking to employ the provisions of the Act, 1963 or exercise the powers conferred under the Act, 1963.
iii. The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to „courts‟ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.
iv. In Officer on Special Duty (supra), Prakash H. Jain (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) respectively, this Court has unequivocally held that the power to extend time under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated. It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.
v. In Parson Tools (supra) and M.P. Steel (supra) respectively, this Court has developed a body of jurisprudence indicating that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 could be applied to the provisions relating to quasi-judicial bodies, unless there is any express indication to the contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision. However, there exists a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 respectively.
vi. The differences between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively are as follows - First, one pertains to the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the courts and the other is a mandatory provision independent of any exercise of discretion; Secondly, one refers to "sufficient cause" which term by itself is subject to a good amount of elasticity and the other has delineated well-defined conditions which must be met; and Lastly, one deals with the extension of time while the other is concerned with the exclusion of time.
vii. The principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, cannot be analogously applied to proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies because in the former, the courts exercise their discretion in extending and more specifically, adjusting the prescribed period of limitation itself to create a fresh period of limitation. No entitlement as a matter of right arises vis-à-vis extension of time. Whereas, in the latter, the prescribed period of limitation remains intact, no delay is attributed to the litigant and the time during which the abortive proceeding was being prosecuted is expunged in the eyes of the law to place the litigant back or restore his position within the prescribed period of limitation wherein he is entitled to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, as a matter of right.
viii. The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, however, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct.
Page 4 of 8ix. Moreover, the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively also stand on a different footing for the reason that when the legislature has intended to grant powers of extension of time, the same has been expressly indicated either through the manner in which the concerned provision is phrased (more often than not through a proviso) or by the adoption of the Act, 1963 through a separate provision to the special law as a whole (akin to Section 433 of the 2013, Act).
x. Therefore, the decision of this Court in M.P. Steel (supra) would not apply analogously to a situation when the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 are sought to be applied by quasi-judicial bodies which aren‟t empowered in that regard.
xi. Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be.
xii. In Ganesan (supra), it has been settled that the savings provision in the Act, 1963 i.e., Section 29(2), is of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The question whether a certain provision in a special or a local law expressly excludes the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively arises only in pursuance of the savings provision under Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963. As a natural corollary, if Section 29(2) is, by itself, inapplicable to a particular case then there would be no need to look into or analyse whether there is any express exclusion.
xiii. An exception to the aforesaid, i.e., a reason why one would still look at whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively are "expressly excluded" irrespective of the application of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, is when the argument that the principles underlying those provisions of the Act, 1963, must be applied, is being explored.
xiv. Presently, we are dealing with an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred before the CLB - a quasi-judicial body."
9. From the perusal of sub-para iii & iv of Para 160 of the aforecited judgment, it is evident that power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated.
10. In the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it has been categorically stated that tribunals, quasi-judicial bodies or statutory authorities have no power to extend the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act- 1963 unless expressly indicated. Although power to review the orders passed by Tribunal has been provided under Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act- 1985 but under Rule 17 of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, review application can only be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed, thus, it is manifest that it has not been provided that this Tribunal can exercise the power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act- 1963.
Page 5 of 811. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that in view of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (supra), this Tribunal has no power to extend the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act-1963 because as per Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, Review Application can be filed only within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed.
12. It is pertinent to note that keeping in view of the Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, we used to reject the delay condonation application but after passing of the judgment by Hon'ble High Court in Writ-A 5564 of 2023, we started condoning the delay in filing of the review applications.
13. Now, there is a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (supra) wherein sub-para iii & iv of Para 160, the Hon'ble Apex Court has unequivocally held that the power to extend the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless expressly indicated.
14. As Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 does not provide for delay condonation in filing of the review application, so following the Authority of the Hon'ble Apex Court, we have no option but to reject the delay condonation application.
15. Learned counsel for the review applicants submitted that this Tribunal created under the Administrative Tribunals Act-1985 is not covered by the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (supra). We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submission because we are of the Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act-1985. From the nomenclature, itself, it is manifest that this is a Tribunal. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has not made any distinction between different Tribunals functioning in the country.
In view of the above, argument advanced by learned counsel for the review applicants is rejected.
16. Learned counsel for the review applicants further argued that this Tribunal sometimes holds the power of Civil Court, hence, power to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act-1963 is Page 6 of 8 vested in it. We do not agree with the aforesaid submission because under Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act- 1985, this Tribunal has power to review its decision but under Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, Review Application has to be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed. There is no express provision either under Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act-1985 or Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 for condoning the delay in filing of the review application, ergo, this argument also stands rejected.
17. Learned counsel for the review applicants further urged that Principal Bench of this Tribunal has issued a circular dated 05.03.2026 (Annexure No. 2, page-19 of the written arguments) wherein also provision for delay condonation has been provided.
The aforesaid argument is also unsustainable in the eyes of law because in the aforesaid circular power to condone the delay by Tribunal has not been provided.
18. Learned counsel for the review applicants also relied upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble High Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court:-
(i) Writ-A No. 5564 of 2023- Surendra Kumar vs. Union of India & Others- Hon'ble Allahabad High Court.
(ii) Writ-A No. 5558 of 2024- Vinod Kumar vs. Union of India & Others- Hon'ble Allahabad High Court.
(iii) Gopabandhu Biswal vs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and others reported in 1998 (4) SCC 447.
(iv) Ajit Kumar Rath vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 1999 (9) SCC 596 We have gone through the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the review applicants.
In view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (supra), the rulings cited by learned counsel for the review applicants have no application.
19. The upshot of the above discussion is that in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of The Property Company (P) Ltd. vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda (supra), this Tribunal lacks power to condone the delay in filing of the review application.
Page 7 of 820. Accordingly, prayer for delay condonation in filing of the review application is rejected.
Logical conclusion is that review application also stands rejected.
(Pankaj Kumar) (Justice Anil Kumar Ojha)
Member (A) Member (J)
JNS
Digitally signed by
Jay Narayan Jay Narayan Singh
Singh Date: 2026.04.30
14:57:06 +05'30'
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