Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Anam Educational Charitable Trust, vs The Assistant Commissioner, on 24 December, 2019
Author: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
Bench: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
WRIT PETITION NO.17713 OF 2017
ORDER:
This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Prohibition, prohibiting respondent No.4 - Andhra Pradesh Endowment Tribunal from adjudicating O.A.No.241 of 2017 filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2.
The petitioner is a charitable trust incorporated and established under the provisions of Trusts Act, 1882, presently operating from Chennai, State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner purchased wet land admeasuring Ac.7-08 cents out of Ac.16-94 cents in Sy.No.353/2 of Kadiyam Village and Mandal, East Godavari District, from respondent No.2 - temple, after obtaining permission from the State Government under Section 80 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short "the Act No.30 of 1987") vide registered sale deed bearing document No.8220 of 1994 dated 24.12.1994. Thus, the petitioner has become absolute owner and possessor of the said land in Sy.No.353/2 of Kadiyam Village.
Respondent Nos.1 and 2 instituted 0.A.No.241 of 2017 before respondent No.4- tribunal seeking the relief of declaration, cancellation of the said sale deed, to evict the petitioner and damages etc. The case of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 is that the subject land was sold to the petitioner for the purpose of construction of buildings to establish and run educational institutions and since the construction itself has not been done, the sale transaction is required to be invalidated and claimed the above reliefs before the Tribunal in O.A.No.241 of 2017.
MSM,J WP_17713_2017 2 The main ground raised before this Court is that when the sale deed is executed in favour of the petitioner with absolute right, the title stood conveyed in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the character of the land has changed from endowment land to private land. Respondent No.4 - Tribunal can entertain and adjudicate matters relating to endowment land only. The relief of cancellation of sale deed can be considered and granted by a civil court under Section 31 of the specific Relief Act. Thus, in any view of the matter, the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 and when the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the Court can issue a Writ of Prohibition as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in "Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu1".
It is further contended that when once the sale deed was executed in the year 1994 and assuming that the sale deed is invalid, the possession over the subject land from 1994 has matured into adverse possession and therefore the petitioner has perfected its title by prescription since the petitioner has been in physical possession and enjoyment of the land for the last 20 years and the temple or the endowment department have not taken any steps to invalidate the title and for recovery of possession of property from the petitioner. Thus, there is no basis for the claim in O.A.No.241 of 2017 and that the litigation is frivolous and speculative claim.
Section 83 and 84 of the Act dealing with eviction of encroachers would come into play only if the land belongs to the institution/temple. If the institution/temple has sold the land, there is no basis to allege that the purchaser is an encroacher or illegal 1 (2003) 8 SCC 134 MSM,J WP_17713_2017 3 occupant of the land. Thereby, the Civil Court alone is competent to entertain the suit for cancellation of sale deed under Section 31 of the Transfer of Property Act, if it is within limitation, and the Tribunal cannot entertain the proceedings as it lacks inherent jurisdiction, on this ground alone, the Writ of Prohibition can be issued.
It is further contended that as per Section 8 and 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, a purchaser is entitled to use the property in his own wisdom. The vendor has no right to put fetters on the user or enjoyment of the property which is sold out. The entire basis for the claim before the Tribunal is contrary to law. A true owner can never be construed as an encroacher of the property, which it has purchased. It is also contended that the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction to enquire/try O.A.No.241 of 2017 and prayed to prohibit respondent No.4 from adjudicating O.A.No.241 of 2017.
Respondent No.2 filed counter along with petition to vacate the interim stay while admitting sale of property by following necessary procedure under Section 80 of the Act 30 of 1987, but it is for the specific purpose of construction for running junior college.
Bonafidely believing the representation of the petitioner trust, trust board passed the resolution on 01.05.1993 recommending the Government to alienate the land as the cause is a noble cause and the government has issued GOMS.No.1186, dated: 28.11.1994 for alienating the property by private negotiation and the same was approved by the Commissioner vide proceedings in Rc.No.M2/21234/93, dated: 13.12.1994 to execute the sale deed and invest 50% of the consideration in the nationalized bank. Thereafter the executive officer registered the sale deed vide MSM,J WP_17713_2017 4 document No.8220/94, dated:24.12.1994. Hence the sale was a conditional sale. As the purpose for which land was sold is not fulfilled, respondent Nos.1 and 2 approached respondent No.4 - Tribunal for grant of relief as claimed in O.A.No.241 of 2017 i.e. for cancellation of sale deed and for eviction of the petitioner from the land in dispute.
It is specifically asserted that the petitioner is an encroacher as he failed to fulfill the conditions of sale, thereby respondent Nos.1 and 2 invoked Section 83 of the Act 30 of 1987, as such O.A.No.241 of 2017 is maintainable and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court explicitly barred by Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987. Therefore, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such suit.
One of the contentions of the respondents is that the petitioner is in physical possession and endowments department has right to initiate proceedings to invalidate the title and possession, as the petitioner has not done anything for the past 20 years and the action of the petitioner is frivolous and speculative, which is made for the sake of the writ petition as the very purpose the land was sold, as per the representation of the petitioner, was not being fulfilled, hence the temple has taken steps to recover the same. Thereby the petitioner is disentitled to claim any relief and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
During hearing, Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would contend that when the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction to grant relief in O.A.No.241 of 2017, this Court can issue Writ of Prohibition in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in "Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu" (referred supra). Apart from that MSM,J WP_17713_2017 5 the sale is absolute, though it was meant for construction of building to run a junior college therein, the condition repugnant to the interest created in the property is void and further as per Section 8 and 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner is entitled to enjoy the property as per its choice and the vendor cannot impose any condition to use the property for particular purpose. In addition to the above, learned Senior Counsel further contended that the primary relief claimed in the O.A.241 of 2017 is to declare the sale deed as invalid, not enforceable and to cancel the sale deed and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction under Section 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act and the Civil Court is only competent to cancel the sale deed executed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the petitioner, on this ground alone the petition is liable to be allowed.
Learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 contended that in view of clear embargo contained in Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted, thereby the Civil Court cannot entertain the suit even for cancellation of sale deed. Apart from that the petitioner failed to fulfill the condition i.e. purchase of property for construction of building to run junior college, thereby the sale can be revoked, consequently the petitioner is liable to be evicted from the subject land, prayed to dismiss the petition.
Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is:
Whether respondent No.4 - Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain O.A.No.241 of 2017 for grant of relief of declaration that the sale deed dated 24.12.1994 is not legally enforceable and invalid, cancellation of sale MSM,J WP_17713_2017 6 deed dated 24.12.1994 vide document No.8220/94, recovery of possession after evicting the petitioner herein and for damages? If not, when the transfer is absolute, the condition for use of the premises for running junior college is invalid. If so, whether respondent No.4 be prohibited from proceeding with enquiry in O.A.No.241 of 2017?
P O I N T:
Originally, the land belongs to respondent No.1, on the request of the petitioner, a resolution was passed on 01.05.1993 for alienation of property of an extent of Ac.07.08 cents out of Ac.16.94 cents in Sy.No.353/2 of Kadiyam Village and the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.1186 dated 28.11.1994, granted permission by exercising power under Section 80 of the A.P. Act 30 of 1987 for alienation of immovable property by private negotiation and the same was approved by the Commissioner of Endowments vide Rc.No.M2/21234/93 dated 13.12.1994. Thus, alienation of property is completed by execution of sale deed dated 24.12.1994 vide document No.8220/94. At this stage, it is appropriate to advert to the copy of sale deed placed on record to find out whether the transfer is absolute or conditional one. If any condition is imposed, when the transfer is absolute, such condition is valid or not is to be examined by this Court.
Preamble of the sale deed itself shows that the sale is absolute and the specific sentence is extracted hereunder for better appreciation.
"This deed of absolute sale made and executed on this 24th day of December, 1994, by Sri Malleswaraswamy varu at Kadiyam............"
MSM,J WP_17713_2017 7 The above specific sentence in the sale deed itself is sufficient to conclude that the transfer is absolute transfer. Even, further paragraphs of the sale deed clearly indicate that the property described in the schedule annexed to the sale deed absolutely belongs to and vested in the temple and the vendor transferred the same by way of "absolute sale" and physically handed over possession of the property in an extent of Ac.07.08 cents in Sy.No.353/2 of Kadiyam village. At the same time, at page No.8 of the sale deed, it is specifically mentioned as follows:
".......... the purchaser who shall hereafter peacefully and quietly possess and enjoy absolutely and forever the schedule land and every part thereof without any manner of interruption........." Thus, the language used in the document i.e. sale deed indicates that the sale is absolute transfer. Therefore, when the petitioner herein got absolute, clear and marketable title over the schedule property, any condition imposed in the sale deed for construction of building to run junior college is repugnant to the interest created in the property in terms of Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short "the T.P.Act"). Section 11 of the T.P.Act, deals with restriction repugnant to interest created. According to Section 11 of the T.P.Act, where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
Thus, the condition, even if incorporated in the sale deed, it is invalid. The condition itself is invalid, more particularly when the absolute interest is created in the property; failure to fulfil the MSM,J WP_17713_2017 8 condition will not render the sale invalid. Hence, on the ground that the petitioner failed to fulfil the condition, which is repugnant to the interest created in the property, the sale deed cannot be declared as illegal and cannot be cancelled.
One of the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel is that the petition can be filed under Section 83 of the Act 30 of 1987 only for eviction of encroacher as defined under explanation to Section 83 of the Act 30 of 1987. When the petitioner purchased the property with absolute right under registered sale deed after complying the necessary formalities under Section 80 of the Act 30 of 1987, the property stood vested on the petitioner on the date of execution itself, thereby nature of property changed from endowment property to private property and the person in occupation in pursuance of such transfer cannot be described as trespasser as his occupation is neither unauthorised nor continuing in possession after expiry of lease or license within the ambit of encroacher as per explanation to Section 83 of the Act 30 of 1987. Therefore, the question of entertaining petition by Tribunal to evict the petitioner though a consequential relief does not arise as the petitioner became absolute owner by virtue of sale deed dated 24.12.1994 vide document No.8220 of 1994.
Learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 contended that when the sale was conditional sale and the petitioner failed to fulfil the condition i.e. construction of building for running junior college, the temple is entitled to cancel the sale deed. But as seen from the material on record, the vendor of the petitioner did not reserve any right to cancel or annul the sale transaction covered by sale deed dated 24.12.1994. In the absence of reserving any right to cancel the transaction covered by sale deed, respondent Nos.1 and 2 MSM,J WP_17713_2017 9 cannot annul or cancel the sale deed by approaching the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act 30 of 1987. Even otherwise, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act 30 of 1987 is limited. Therefore, when the petitioner is not a trespasser as defined under the Act 30 of 1987, the Tribunal will not get jurisdiction. Hence, the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 is hereby rejected.
The dispute is with regard to the property originally belonging to the Hindu Charitable Endowment or Religious Institution, which was transferred in favour of the petitioner in compliance of Section 80 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 created an interdict on the powers of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or legal proceedings in respect of administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matter in dispute, for determining or deciding for which the provision is made in this Act shall be instituted. Thus, there is an implied bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but it is subject to provisions made in the Act.
Tribunal is established under Section 162 of the Act 30 of 1987 for deciding certain disputes relating to the Hindu Charitable Endowment and Religious Institution etc. When a special Tribunal is constituted, the ordinary Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted in respect of those matters specified in Section 87 of the Act 30 of 1987.
Section 87 of deals with power of Endowments Tribunal to decide certain matters and disputes, it is extracted hereunder for better appreciation.
"Section 87 - Power of Endowments Tribunal to decide certain disputes and matters MSM,J WP_17713_2017 10 1[(1) The Endowments Tribunal having jurisdiction shall have the power, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the person concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question -
(a) whether an institution or endowment is a charitable institution or endowment;
(b) whether an institution or endowment is a religious institution or endowment;
(c) whether any property is an endowment, if so whether it is a charitable endowment or a religious endowment;
(d) whether any property is a specific endowment;
(e) whether any person is entitled by custom or otherwise to any honor, emoluments or perquisites in any charitable or religious institution or endowment and what the established usage of such institution or endowment is in regard to any other matter;
(f) whether any institution or endowment is wholly or partly of a secular or religious character and whether any property is given wholly or partly for secular or religious uses; or
(g) where any property or money has been given for the support of an institution or endowment which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or the performance of any service or charity connected with such institution or endowment or the performance of a charity which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or where any property or money given is appropriated partly to secular uses and partly to religious uses, as to what portion of such property or money shall be allocated to secular or religious uses;
(h) Whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or Endowment.
(2) The Endowments Tribunal may, pending its decision under sub-section (1), pass such order as it deems fit for the administration of the property or custody of the money belonging to the institution or endowment.
(3) The Endowments Tribunal may while recording its decision under sub-
section (1) and pending implementation of such decision, pass such interim order as it may deem fit for safeguarding the interests of the institution or endowment and for preventing damage to or loss or misappropriation or criminal breach of trust in respect of the properties or moneys belonging to or in the possession of the institution or endowment. (4) The presumption in respect of matters covered by clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) in sub-section (1) is that the institution or the endowment is a public MSM,J WP_17713_2017 11 one and that the burden of proof in all such cases shall lie on the person claiming the institution or the endowment to be private or the property or money to be other than that of a religious endowment or specific endowment, as the case may be.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the above sub-sections the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction shall continue to enquire into and decide the disputes referred to in sub-section (1) until the constitution of the Endowments Tribunal.]"
In view of limited jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal, it is required to be examined whether the reliefs claimed in O.A., can be granted by the Tribunal.
The reliefs claimed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 in O.A.No.241 of 2017 are as follows:
(a) Declaring the registered sale deed dated 24.12.1994, document No.8220 of 1994 is void and not legally enforceable and valid Consequentially
(b) Cancel the registered sale deed dated 24.12.1994, document No.8220 of 1994 executed by 2nd petitioner in favour of the respondent.
(c) Order eviction of the respondent from the petition schedule property and deliver vacant possession to petitioner No.2 under Section 83 and 84 (1) of the Endowments Act 30/87.
(d) Award damages for use and occupation till the respondent vacate the petition schedule property from the date of the petition.
(e) Award costs of the petition
(f) Award such other relief or reliefs as the Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit and
proper in the circumstances of the case.
The first limb of the relief is to declare the registered sale deed dated 24.12.1994 document 8220 of 1994 is void and legally not enforceable. But it is outside the scope of the jurisdiction that conferred on the Tribunal by section 87 of the Act.
Even otherwise, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to declare the sale deed as invalid or void etc., such declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act or cancellation under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act can be granted by competent Civil Court.
MSM,J WP_17713_2017 12 In "M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd., v. State of Bombay2" the Apex Court while considering the bar under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is of the view that the Court has to examine whether remedy in special statue is sufficient or adequate. Such determination is relevant but not decisive in case of express bar. In case of plea of implied bar, such determination may be decisive. Special right and liability created by special statue determinable by special tribunal, even then Court will enquire whether remedies normally available in civil court are prescribed by such statute and whether the Tribunal can grant such reliefs which can be granted by the Civil Court, to determine the jurisdiction of Civil Court.
In "Dhulabai v. State of Madhya Pradesh3", the Supreme Court laid down the following seven guidelines to infer jurisdiction of ouster of jurisdiction.
"(1) Whether the statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decision to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and scheme of particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the 2 AIR 1965 SC 1942 3 AIR 1969 Supreme Court 78 MSM,J WP_17713_2017 13 statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all the questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act is ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constitutes under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness or the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the order of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined, because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply."
The judgment of the Apex Court in Dhulabai's case is a classic judgment on the issue of jurisdiction of a civil court, still it is good law.
In "M/s.K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Madras4", the Apex Court held that if a statute imposes a liability 4 AIR 1966 SC 1089 MSM,J WP_17713_2017 14 and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of law or fact by necessary implication civil court's jurisdiction is barred.
The law is clear from the principles laid down in the above judgments, when separate machinery is created, which can grant relief likewise Civil Court, to the party aggrieved, the Court can infer that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. The Tribunal is constituted under Section 162 of the Act for deciding the claims pertaining to charitable endowments and religious institutions etc., but not competent to declare a sale deed or any other document as invalid and not enforceable under law. Therefore, the machinery created by the Statute i.e. Endowments Tribunal is not competent to grant relief of declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act in view of limited jurisdiction conferred on Tribunal vide Section 87 of Act 30 of 1987. Hence, this Court cannot infer ouster of the jurisdiction of Civil Court in favour of the respondent herein.
Yet, another contention raised by Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the power under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act can be exercised only by the Civil Court i.e. second limb of the relief claimed in O.A., the Tribunal has no jurisdiction and the bar under Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 will not come in the way of granting such relief by the Civil Court. Therefore, the Tribunal is incompetent to enquire into O.A.No.241 of 2017 for grant of any relief claimed by respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Chapter V of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with cancellation of instruments. Section 31 reads thus:
"1. When cancellation may be ordered.--
(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void MSM,J WP_17713_2017 15 or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation."
At the same time, Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 created a bar to entertain a suit by the Civil Court. None of the provisions, more particularly Section 87 of Act 30 of 1987 conferred power on Tribunal for cancellation of sale deed, but it is covered by Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and such relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act can be granted only by the Civil Court in a suit filed by a party to the transaction, if a third party wanted to annul or cancel the sale deed, the remedy open to the third party is to file a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as in "Muppudathi Vs. Krishnaswami5" Full Bench of Madras High Court held as follows:
"To seek relief of annulment of a written instrument is void or voidable and such person apprehending that if it is left, it would prejudice to the rights of such party, can maintain a suit for cancellation under Section 31, but if a third party to the document wants to claim right ignoring such document, he must necessarily seek declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act."
In "Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh Vs. Randhir Singh and others6", the Apex Court while deciding the Court fee payable under Sections 6 and 7 of the Court Fee Act, 1870, held that where the executant of a deed wants to annul the deed or document, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. 5 AIR 1960 (Madras), page 1 (DB) 6 2010 SAR (Civil), page 402 MSM,J WP_17713_2017 16 Therefore, respondent Nos.1 and 2 being the parties to the document, if intended to annul or cancel sale deed, are entitled to approach the Civil Court to claim relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, and no such power is vested on respondent No.4 to cancel such sale deed or document.
Relief of cancellation of sale deed dated 24.12.1994, and eviction of respondent in O.A. (petitioner herein) and damages are only consequential to the primary relief of declaration that the sale deed dated 24.12.1994 bearing No.8220 of 1994 is void and not legally enforceable and valid. Thus, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 being the parties to the document are not entitled to seek declaration that the sale deed dated 24.12.1994 is void, at best they are entitled to claim relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in view of the law declared by the Full Bench of Madras High Court and Apex Court referred supra.
In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in the judgments (referred supra), the Civil Court is competent to grant such relief of declaration or cancellation of sale deed and consequential relief including damages etc., but not Tribunal.
The major contention of the petitioner before this Court is that when the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction, the Writ of Prohibition can be issued by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This view is fortified by the Apex Court in "Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu" (referred supra). In the said judgment, the Apex Court held as follows:
"On the basis of the authorities it is dear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior Court or MSM,J WP_17713_2017 17 Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or In excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial disciplines of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of a writ."
In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in "Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu"
(referred supra) and in the circumstances stated above, the Court can exercise such power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Prohibition.
In the present facts of the case, the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass an order/decree declaring the sale deed dated 24.12.1994 vide document No.8220 of 1994 is void and consequential relief of cancellation of sale deed.
Therefore, I find that the case on hand falls within the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments (referred supra) and it can be said that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to grant any of the reliefs since such power is vested on the Civil Court.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be allowed.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed prohibiting the respondent No.4 from proceeding with the enquiry in O.A.No.241 of 2017 pending before it. No costs.
The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.
_________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY 24.12.2019 Ksp