Kerala High Court
Baby Chemparathy, President, The ... vs The Joint Registrar Of Co-Operative ... on 27 June, 2002
Equivalent citations: AIR2003KER10, AIR 2003 (NOC) 10 (KER), AIR 2006 HIMACHAL PRADESH 1018, (2002) 1 KER LJ 251, (2002) 1 KER LT 698, (2002) ILR(KER) 2 KER 569, (2002) 2 KER LJ 274, (2002) 2 KER LT 730, (2002) ILR 2 KER 569
Author: Kurian Joseph
Bench: Kurian Joseph
JUDGMENT Kurian Joseph, J.
1. People elect, but once selected the voice and choice is only of the elected. What is the effect of voicing a choice to resign from the managing committee of a co-operative society, and what is the subtle difference between supercession and action on failure to constitute a committee are the issues discussed in this case.
2. Petitioners challenge Ext.P4 order passed under Section 33 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 by the first respondent whereby the managing committee of the 5th respondent society was removed from office and an Administrator was appointed. All the six petitioners were members of the committee which has a strength of seven. The quorum of the committee is four. Petitioners challenge the order on the ground of violation of the statuary provisions and also on the ground of malafides on the part of respondents 2 and 4. The impugned order is defend on the ground that by the resignation of three members namely petitioners 2, 3 and 4 the committee lost quorum and therefore, the impasse is remedied by the appointment of an Administrator.
3. The basic issue to be decided in the original petition centres round the dispute on the resignation tendered by petitioners 2, 3 and 4. It is their case in the original petition that the whole attempt is aimed at the 6th petitioner who was the Chairman of the 8th respondent apex society on being delegated from the 5th respondent society and once the delegation from the 5th respondent society is withdrawn the 6th petitioner would be ousted from the office. According to the second petitioner he had tendered his resignation from the managing committee earlier but the same was not accepted by the committee. Apparently the reference is to resignation tendered on 21-12-2001, which according to the petitioners was discussed in the committee on 12-1-2002 wherein it was decided not to accept the resignation. In the case of the 3rd petitioner it is stated thus at paragraph 4 of the original petition:
"The 3rd petitioner was approached by the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the Secretary of the Society who is under suspension stating that there is a CBI enquiry against the society. Therefore the 3rd petitioner was told by the Assistant Registrar and the Secretary who is under suspension that resignation from the board of directors is an easy method to avoid harassment. Accordingly the 3rd petitioner gave the resignation letter to the Assistant Registrar."
Regarding the resignation of the 4th petitioner the version is:
"The 4th petitioner herein was also approached by the 2nd respondent seeking to tender the resignation. Accordingly a resignation letter was given to the 2nd respondent under threat that there is a CBI enquiry against the society. The said letter was given to the 2nd respondent on the basis of the misleading information regarding the CBI enquiry."
It is their case that the moment they came to know that the story of a CBI enquiry was presented as a ruse for pressurising the said members to tender resignation, they immediately took steps to withdraw the resignation. It is submitted that they had not tendered their resignation to the President of the Society and that the resignation letters obtained from them had not been given to the President. That the 3rd and 4th petitioners thus expressed their decision to resign from the membership of the society is not in dispute; according to them the resignation was obtained on the basis of misrepresentation. The 3rd petitioner states that he had addressed Ext.P3 letter to the President expressing his willingness to withdraw the resignation.
4. The first respondent has different story to tell. It is profitable to quote from the counter affidavit:
"6. On 16-1-2002 the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the 2nd respondent herein has received a registered letter from the 2nd petitioner wherein a copy of his resignation letter addressed to the President of the Society was enclosed. On 11-2-2002 the 3rd petitioner approached the 2nd respondent in his office and submitted a copy of his resignation letter addressed to the President. He has submitted another letter to the Assistant Registrar dated 11-2-2002 stating that he is not interested to participate in the activities of the society any more. Similarly the 4th petitioner also approached the Assistant Registrar on the same day and submitted a copy of his resignation letter addressed to the President of the Society. He has also submitted a letter addressed to the Assistant Registrar stating that he has tendered his resignation letter to the President of the society, on that day."
According to the first respondent only in the above circumstances of three members resigning from the committee of the 5th respondent society and consequently the committee losing quorum, Ext.P4 order was passed based on the report of the Assistant Registrar.
5. It is significant to note that petitioners 2, 3 and 4 have not come forward to dispute the statement made by the first respondent in the counter affidavit. It is the 6th petitioner, the former President who vehemently contends that the resignation was obtained by fraudulent means and in any case the resignation letters having not been tendered to the President, there is no valid resignation. The situation hence necessarily calls for perusal of the records. In the case of the second petitioner Mathew it is seen that he had originally tendered resignation by letter dated 21-12-2001 which was discussed in the committee on 12-1-2002 wherein it was decided not to accept the resignation. However, the said Mathew had again tendered another resignation to the President by letter dated 15-1-2002. The same was sent by registered post. It is seen received on 22-1-2002. There is absolutely no reference to the said resignation letter in the original petition. Therefore, there cannot be any factual dispute regarding the tendering of resignation by the 2nd petitioner. In the case of the 3rd petitioner George, the files disclose that he had addressed a letter to the President on 11-2-2002 resigning from the membership of the society on the said date. There is another letter dated 11-2-2002 itself addressed to the Assistant Registrar which states that the said petitioner had not signed in the minutes book of the society or any documents for the past more than one year and that he did not intend to participate in the meetings. In the case of the 4th petitioner Poulose it may be seen that he had been working as the honorary Secretary of the society and he had tendered resignation from the said post as per Ext.R2(b) letter dated 4-2-2002. Ext.R2(c) is a communication addressed to the Assistant Registrar intimating that he has resigned from the membership of the committee and the matter had been intimated to the President also. The files show another letter from the said Poulose addressed to the President dated 11-2-2002 wherein it is stated that though he had tendered his resignation from the post of honorary Secretary to the President earlier no decision was taken by the President and hence he was resigning from the membership in the committee. Ext.R2(c) is a letter addressed to the Assistant Registrar informing him that he was resigning from the membership in the committee and that he has informed the President the same in writing. There is no dispute that these letters are in the own handwriting of the respective petitioners and they have not controverted the fact of execution or tender of those letters. It is the 6th petitioner who was the President who maintains that the same had not been tendered to him. In the absence of any contravention of the specific pleadings of respondents 1 and 2 by petitioners 2, 3 and 4, it not necessary to refer to the vehement plea of the 6th petitioner that the resignation letters had not been tendered to him. The resignation letters are addressed to the President and those letters show that the same had been tendered to the President.
6. Sri. George Poonthottam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended for the position that there is no resignation as contemplated under the Act and Rules and hence the first respondent should not have acted on the alleged resignation by petitioners 2, 3 and 4. Section 33(1) of the Act provides for appointment of an Administrator in certain contingencies and the modality for the same. It reads as follows:-
"33. Appointment of new committee or administrator on failure to constitute committee, etc. (1) -- Where the term of office of a committee has expired and a new committee has not been constituted, or where a no-confidence motion is passed by the general body against the existing committee or where the existing committees resigns enbloc or where vacancies occur in the committee either by resignation or otherwise and the number of remaining members cannot constitute the quorum for the meeting of the committee, or where the committee fails to hold its regular meeting consecutively for six months or where the Registrar is satisfied.
(a) that a new committee cannot be constituted before the expiry of the term of office of the existing committee; or
(b) that a new committee is prevented from entering upon office or a new committee fails to enter upon office, on the date on which the term of office of the existing committee expires, the Registrar may, either suo motu or on the application of any member of the society after intimating the Circle Co-operative Union, appoint:-
(i) a new committee consisting of not more than three members of the society; or
(ii) not more the an three Administrators who need not be members of the society to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding six months as may be specified in the order, which period may at the discretion of the Registrar and for reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended, from time to time, so, however, that the aggregate period shall not, in any case, exceed one year to till a new committee entries upon office, whichever is earlier.
Provided that before making such order, the Registrar shall publish a notice on the notice board of the head office of the society inviting objections to the making of the order within a period specified in the notice and consider such objections.
Provided further that it shall not be necessary to publish such notice in cases where the Registrar is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to do so.
Provided also that, where a committee, Administrator or Administrators, as the case may be, is in office at the commencement of the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1992, the Registrar may extent the term of such committee, Administrator or Administrators, as the case may be, for a further period not exceeding one year from the date of such commencement."
Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, a tender of resignation by a member of the committee shall have the effect of terminating his membership from the Committee."
Therefore, when vacancies occur in the committee by resignation of the members and the number of remaining members cannot constitute the quorum for the meeting of the committee, the said provision can be passed into service. That the quorum is four is not disputed. That there were only six members available in the committee is also not seriously indispute and at any rate the 7th member in the committee, who allegedly lost his membership in the committee earlier has not demurred on his loss of membership.
7. It is clear from the Explanation that for the purpose of Section 33(1) tendering of resignation by a member of the committee shall have the effect of terminating his membership from the committee. There is however, a procedure for resignation from the committee provided under Rule 38(3) and (4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, which reads as follows:-
"38(3). Any member of a committee, whether elected or nominated may tender his resignation to the President of the committee.
(4) The President, on receipt of a resignation, shall within seven days from the date of receipt thereof place it before the committee of the society for consideration if the member is an elected person or send it to the authority who nominated the member, if he is a nominee. The resignation shall have effect only from the date of its acceptance by the committee or the authority who nominated the member concerned as the case may be. The fact of its acceptance or otherwise shall also be communicated to the member concerned. In the case of nominees the fact of acceptance or otherwise shall be communicated to the society also."
While the Act contemplates the very act of tender of resignation as sufficient for the purpose of initiating action under Section 33, the Rules provide for the acceptance of the resignation. But action under Section 33(1) need not await the action by the President on the resignation tendered by the member. The legislative intention is clear; for an action under Section 33(1) the due expression of the decision by a member of the committee is sufficient. The word 'tender' for the purpose of Section 33 has to be taken to mean only the expression of the decision of a member to resign. It is also to be seen that under Section 33 such a resignation cannot be withdrawn since it takes effect simultaneously with the tender and there is cessation of membership.
8. This Court had occasions to consider the issue from different angles. In Varma v. Joint Registrar, 1987 (2) KLT 420 it was held as follows:-
"Explanation to Section 33 (1) of the Act clearly states that for the purpose of the sub-section tender of resignation shall have the effect of terminating his membership from the committee. That being so the member cannot go back on his resignation in so far as the resignation invites action under Section 33(1) of the Act. He could not have withdrawn the resignation so as to get over the effect of termination of his membership for the purpose of Section 33 (1) of the Act."
Bhat, J., as he then was, was of the view that even if there is violation of the procedure regarding the acceptance of the resignation it is of no consequence since the mere tender of resignation itself was sufficient for the purpose of Section 33(1). Referring to the contention regarding the procedural lapses it was held as follows:-
"7. This contention is prima facie unsustainable for more than one reason. When four members tendered the resignation the society had no President. They tendered the resignation on 22-6-1987 and 23-6-1987. The President had been removed on 11-6-1987. They could not therefore have tendered it to the President. The rule cannot be interpreted to mean that during any interval when the society has no President no member of the committee can resign. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the rule has been violated by sending the resignation letter to the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, who has supervisory jurisdiction over the affairs of the society. With the resignation only three members are left in the committee. Therefore, the resignation could not be placed before the committee for acceptance.
8. The possibility of such a situation has been visualised by the legislature by incorporating explanation to Section 33(1) of the Act, by Amending Act 33 of 1971. The explanation states that for the purpose of this sub-section tender of resignation by a member of the committee shall have the effect of terminating his membership from the committee. The rule certainly cannot over-ride the provision in the statute. Where the tender of resignation creates a situation inviting action under Section 33(1) of the Act, Sub-rule (4) of Rule 38 of the Rules cannot have any effect. The provision in the statute would have over-riding effect. That being so, when four members of the committee tendered resignation it had the effect of terminating their membership from the committee. The result was that the vacancies occurred in the committee by resignation and only three members remained and they cannot constitute quorum for the meeting. There could therefore be no doubt that a situation inviting action under Section 33(1) of the Act arose in the instant case. The finding to that effect by the first respondent cannot be found fault with."
It is significant in this context to note that it was a case where the President had already been removed from office and hence resignation letters were addressed to the Joint Registrar who has supervisory jurisdiction over the affairs of the society.
9. In Sadasivan v. Joint Registrar, 1994 (2) KLT 238 Varma's case (supra) was distinguished on facts. It is a case where the resignation letter was addressed to the Assistant Registrar and the same was presented to him, inspite of the availability of the President of the Society. That mode was defended on the ground that pursuant to the resignation by five members the committee lost quorum there was no necessity to tender the resignation to the President since he could not convene a meeting with a valid quorum. Deprecating the practice, it was held:
"15. The Explanation to Section 33(1) states that the tendering of resignation by a member of the committee shall have the effect of terminating his membership from the committee. As to how he should tender his resignation is laid down in Rule 38(3) namely that it should be tendered to the President of the Committee. As soon as the resignation is so tendered it takes effect and the member ceases to be a member of the committee. Though Sub-rule (4) requires the President to place the resignation before the committee for consideration, the Committee has no role to play in the matter of acceptance or non-acceptance of the resignation, inasmuch as it takes effect on its being tendered to the President, and the member ceases to be a member when it is tendered to the President. When the consequence of tender of a resignation is so serious and the member ceases to be in the committee immediately on such tender, it is imperative that the mode prescribed for tender of resignation is strictly followed, before it can take effect as a resignation. The procedure prescribed is mandatory. The Act or the Rules do not prescribe any other mode of tendering resignation by a member of the committee. It is beyond controversy that when an act is required to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done in that manner and not in any other. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. This is so even if there are no negative words. The position is well established since the decision of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahamad v. Kind Emperor, AIR 1936 P.C. 253. If this be so, the only permitted mode of resignation of a member of a committee is to tender it to the President, except in the exceptional circumstance postulated in Varma's case, to which I shall refer later."
Varma's case was referred to in paragraph 17 of the judgment distinguishing the same on facts, in the matter of non-availability of the President. Thus it can be seen that in Sadasivan's case the procedure for resignation was held to be mandatory, namely tendering the same to the President of the Committee except in exceptional circumstances.
10. A Bench decision of this court in Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society v. P.K. George 1974 KLT 189 has dealt with the issue. Incidentally it is to be noted that neither before Bhat, J. nor before Viswanatha Iyer, J. in Varma's case and Sadasivan's case respectively, this Bench decision was cited. Whether the violation of the procedure under Rule 38(3) and (4) would invalidate the resignation as such was considered in detail in the said decision at paragraph 5 which reads as follows:-
"5. Counsel for the Respondent stressed the well-known principle that when the law has ordained that a certain act shall be done in a certain manner, it shall be done only in the particular manner, or, not at all. He pointed out that under the Explanation to Section 33, a tender of resignation shall have the effect of terminating the membership of the Committee, and that a tender of resignation is contemplated only by Sub-rule (3) of Rule 39 and therefore must be done as enjoined by that sub-rule; and if not, cannot be regarded as valid. Sub-rule 3 and 4 between them provide for the whole process of resignation, from tender, to acceptance. Non-compliance with every step does not invalidate the resignation. We are unable to read Sub-rule (3) as anything more than a procedural provision. The said is only directory, and non-compliance with it, does not, in our opinion, invalidate the resignation, as the same is to be accepted by the appointing authority and is to become effective only on such acceptance. The explanation to Section 33 is for the limited purpose of action under the said Section. The ordinary mode of resignation and its acceptance is contained in Rule 39, and despite the Explanation, nothing preclude the Registrar from acting under Section 33 after a resignation has taken effect to the usual way."
The decision squarely applies to the facts of the case. The act of resignation not in dispute, procedural violation or Sub-rule (3) of Rule 38 cannot invalidate the resignation. At paragraph 4 of the judgment in unmistakable terms the Bench held:
"We are not prepared to hold that non-conformity with Sub-rule (3) of Rule 38, would invalidate the resignation."
As already stated above, the signatories of the resignation letters namely petitioners 2, 3 and 4 have not disputed the execution of the documents namely the resignation letters. They have not controverted the specific averment in the counter affidavit of respondent 1 and 2. True on behalf of those petitioners the 6th petitioner has filed a reply affidavit, in reply to the affidavit of the 2nd respondent wherein he denies the tendering of resignation by petitioners 2 to 4 to him. But the resigners for reasons best known to them, inspite of a specific averment kept silent. Not only that in the case of the second petitioner there is suppression of a subsequent resignation dated 15-1-2002. In the case of the 3rd and 4th petitioners it is not in dispute that the resignation letters are addressed to the President. It is significant in this context to note that in Sadasinvan's case wherein Viswanatha Iyer, J. distinguished Varma's case, the resignation letters were addressed to the Assistant Registrar. It is also not in dispute that petitioners 3 and 4 handed over the resignation letters (according to respondents 1 and 2, copies) to the Assistant Registrar. It may be noted that the 3rd petitioner himself used the expression that he is willing to "withdraw the resignation" since he was misled. It may not be altogether out of context also to note that admittedly petitioners 3 and 4 were prepared to resign from the society in case there was a CBI enquiry into the affairs of the society. According to them only since they learnt that, as a matter of fact, there was no such enquiry, they understood that they were misled and the 3rd petitioner showed his preparedness to withdraw the resignation. Thus the fact and act of resignation by petitioners 2, 3 and 4 are not in dispute. For the purpose of Section 33(1) as observed above the act of resignation and its communication is sufficient. In the above circumstances I have no hesitation to hold that petitioners 2, 3 and 4 have by their conduct of resignation paved way for action under Section 33 and the first respondent was justified in pressing into service the inevitable consequence under the Section since the remaining members cannot constitute the quorum for the meeting of the committee.
11. Another vehement contention by learned counsel for the petitioners is regarding the non-compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 33, first proviso, regarding publication of notice on the notice board of the head office of the society inviting objections to the passing of the order and considering the objections. The Registrar is free to waive the notice where he is "satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to do". In the impugned order Ext.P4 the first respondent is of the view that since there is no quorum for the committee of the society pursuant to the resignation of petitioners 2 to 4, there is no relevance for a notice under Section 33. It may be noted that in the case of supercession of the Committee under Section 32 also, notice to the members can be waived if it is not reasonably practicable to do so.
12. The effect of action under Section 32 and 33 of the Act is the same, elected committee is replaced by the Administrator/Administrative Committee. But the procedure is different, the consequences are different and both sections operate in two entirely different situations. It is significant to note that the expression 'removal of the existing committee' is used only under Section 32 and under Section 33 the expression 'removal' is conspicuously absent. Section 32 contemplates "giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections" whereas under Section 33 only publication of "notice in the notice board of the head office of the society" alone is contemplated. Under Section 32 consultation with the financing bank and Circle Co-operative Union of the State Co-operative Union is mandatory whereas under Section 33 intimation to the Circle Co-operative Union alone is contemplated. A member of the Committee superseded under Section 32 entails a disqualification for contesting an election for one year whereas there is no such disqualification for a member of a committee which suffers action under Section 33. When Section 32 provides "supersession of Committee" Section 33 provides for "appointment of new committee or Administrator on failure to constitute a Committee". True, in both cases if the Registrar is of opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to do so, notice to the Committee and consultation with the financing bank or Circle Co-operative Union in the former and publication of the notice on the notice board in the latter can be dispensed with. A comparative study of these two provisions would clearly indicate that there is no rigour of the procedural safeguards as far as operation of Section 33 is concerned. The obvious reason is that Section 32 operates on the subjective satisfaction of the Registrar whereas under Section 33 there is no scope for a subjective satisfaction and the satisfaction is entirely objective, except in two situations. It is now settled law that in a situation where the satisfaction is objective "it may be advisable to disregard a breach of natural justice where the demerits of the claim are such that it would in any case be hopeless." (H.H.R. Wade on Administrative Law). In such circumstances there is no discretion on the part of the administrative authority. The enquiry need only be to see whether the ingredients of the invocation of the power and the need for invocation of the power are there and once the administrative authority is objectively satisfied on both those counts, there need not be a rigorous compliance with the principles of natural justice, in case cogent reasons are available. After all, essentially natural justice only means "the natural sense of what is right and wrong" and if an administrative authority in the natural sense sees the absence of right and feels the presence of wrong then the invocation of the statutory power is imperative, even dispensing with the procedural compliance with natural justice on reasons.
13. The Registrar being a statutory authority, it is imperative on him to act under Section 33 in the following situation:
(1) Even after the expiry of the term a new committee is not constituted.
(2) Where a no confidence motion is passed by the General Body of the Committee.
(3) Where the existing committee resigns enbloc.
(4) Where vacancies occur in the Committee and the number of the remaining members cannot constitute the quorum for a meeting of the Committee.
(5) The Committee fails to hold regular meetings consecutively for six months.
(6) Where the Registrar is satisfied that the new Committee cannot be constituted before the expiry of the term of the existing committee or where the Registrar is satisfied that the new Committee is prevented from entering the office or fails to enter office.
It is pertinent to note that an element of subjective satisfaction is contemplated under Section 33 only in the last two situations and in all the former five situations there is only the subjective satisfaction. In those situations of objective satisfaction there is hardly any scope for softening the heart of the administrative authority by considering the objections.
14. On the facts of the instant case it is to be noted that there is termination of membership in the case of petitioners 2, 3 and 4 and the remaining members cannot constitute the quorum. In such a situation it is also necessary to consider as to whether there is any likelihood of prejudice to the petitioners or anybody when the publication of notice on the notice board was dispensed with. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is clear that there cannot be any prejudice to anybody let alone the petitioners. It is a situation where the operation of Section 33 is imperative. It is also now a well accepted principle that the court will not issue futile writs and therefore, there need not be an elaborate investigation as to whether there is violation of the principles of natural justice to the extent of nullifying the impugned order Ext.P4. Of course, the approach of the first respondent should not have been as to whether there is any relevance for the notice but as to whether it is reasonably practicable to publish the notice. For that reason alone this court need not direct a futile exercise of such complain since that would only be an empty formality and which cannot in any way change the outcome of the impugned decision in the facts and circumstances of the case.
15. In view of the above factual and legal position, it may not be necessary at all to refer to the contentions regarding malafides. That would have been necessary only if the petitioners are otherwise entitled to succeed. Both on facts and law, I do not find any scope to interfere with the impugned Ext.P4 order and therefore, it is not necessary to consider the imputations as to what actuated the issuance of Ex.P4. Learned counsel also drew my attention to the developments pursuant to the impugned order, of withdrawing the nomination of the 6th petitioner from the 8th respondent apex society, steps for convening a new meeting of the apex society etc. Those are the subject matter of separate proceedings before this court and other authorities and hence it is not necessary to refer to the same for the resolution of the essential dispute raised in the original petition.
Ext.P4 is valid and validly issued. The original petition is therefore, dismissed.
APPENDIX PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS:
EXT.P1 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.P. NO. 33156/2000 DT. 16.12.2000.
EXT.P2 TRUE COPY OF THE POLICE COMPLAINT GIVEN AGAINST THE SECRETARY OF THE SOCIETY DT. 8.2.2002.
EXT.P3 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER GIVEN BY THE 3RD PETITIONER ADDRESSING THE 1ST PETITIONER DT. 14.2.2002.
EXT.P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. S.C.T.M. 589/2002 DT. 12.2.2002 BY THE JOINT REGISTRAR (GENERAL) OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, IDUKKI.
EXT.P5 TRUE COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR DT. 13.2.2002.
EXT.P6 TRUE COPY OF THE DECISION DT. 13.2.2002 ADDRESSED MANAGING DIRECTOR, KERALA STATE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING FEDERATION LTD BY THE ADMINISTRATOR.
EXT.P7 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. MP(1)4932/2002 DT. 19.2.2002 ISSUED BY THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES TO THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, KERALA STATE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING FEDERATION.
EXT.P8 TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES NO. MP(5)44158/01 DT. 21.3.2002.
RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:
EXT.R2(A) TRUE COPY OF THE POSTAL COVER & REGISTRATION LETTER.
EXT.R2(B) TRUE COPY OF THE RESIGNATION LETTER BY THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH PETITIONERS.
EXT.R2(C) TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SENT BY T.P. POULOSE TO THE ASST. REGISTRAR GENERAL, THODUPUZHA DT. 11.2.2002 WITH THE RESIGNATION LETTER OF T.P. POULOSE TO THE PRESIDENT.